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Everyday Conceptions of Emotion

A cura di: J.A. Russell - Jose Miguel Fernandez-Dols - Anthony Manstead - Jane C. Wellenkamp

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In *Everyday Conceptions of Emotion*, prominent anthropologists, linguists and psychologists come together for the first time to discuss how emotions are conceptualised by people of different cultures and ages, speaking different languages. Anger, fear, jealousy and emotion itself are concepts that are bound up with the English language, embedded in a way of thinking, acting and speaking. At the same time, the metaphors underlying such concepts are often similar across languages, and children of different cultures follow common developmental pathways. The book thus discusses the interplay of social and cultural factors that humans share in their development of an understanding of the affective side of their lives. For researchers interested in emotion, development of concepts and language, cultural and linguistic influences on psychological processes.

NAIVE THEORIES OF THE EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE: JEALOUSY

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ABSTRACT Italian subjects (N=854) conceptualised the reactions elicited by jealousy-eliciting events as consisting of various emotional and behavioural responses. They instead mentioned regulated, strategic responses of a 'rational' nature as adequate behaviour in such situations. Several specific concepts in subjects' naive theories varied as a function of the event's subjective seriousness rather than of subjects' age and sex; self-serving biases were observed too. Subjects had a rich emotional knowledge and conceptualized the emotional experience as a complex, dynamic reaction that unfolds in time, highly influenced by individual and situational factors.

1. Introduction

What do people know about emotions, how do they conceptualise them? Recent studies have focused on people's knowledge of emotions and its structure by analysing self-reports about events that elicited a given emotion (e.g. Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson & O'Connor 1987; Scherer, Wallbott & Summerfield 1986; Frijda, Kuipers & ter Schure 1989; Parrott & Smith, 1991); judgements of similarities and differences among emotion terms (e.g. Shaver et al. 1987; Fehr & Russell 1984) or among emotional events (e.g. Harrison 1986); ratings of the "emotionness" of a given lexical term (e.g. Fehr & Russell 1984; Shaver et al. 1987; Zammuner, 1994a), or of other

dimensions captured by the emotion lexicon such as intensity, hedonic tone, appraisal, action tendency or duration of the emotional experience (Davitz, 1969; Frijda, Ortony, Sonnemans & Clore, 1992; Zammuner, 1994a); and so forth. The results of such studies show that people's knowledge of emotions in general, and of specific emotions, is quite extensive: we, children included (e.g. Saarni & Harris, 1989), are able to recognise (basic) emotions in others by observing their facial expressions and their behaviours; we know what kind of situations typically elicit a given emotion; we know which emotions are subjectively pleasant or unpleasant, intense or mild, frequent or rare; we can predict that someone who feels a given emotion will feel or show certain behavioural and cognitive propensities or inclinations; and so forth. Emotion knowledge seems to be prototypical rather than categorical in nature; on the basis of direct and indirect emotional experiences, we construct mental representations or scripts of the various (basic) emotions, and of the emotion category itself, and use them to perceive and understand single exemplars of a given emotion. As it is the case for other knowledge domains, we might hypothesise that the various bits and pieces of emotion knowledge that people possess are integrated into more or less complex and coherent conceptual structures that, as a whole, form what might be seen as a 'naive theory' of emotions. We might expect naive theories to vary as a function of individual and socio-cultural variables -- such as age, sex, degree of 'exposure' to emotional experiences, and so forth -- and to underlie people's emotional competence (Saarni, 1990).

Our understanding of people's knowledge, and naive theories, of emotional experience is, however, still very partial, and, generally speaking, limited to the so-called 'basic' emotions -- typically, joy, sadness, fear and anger. The study here presented is, on the contrary, about a so-called 'complex' emotion, namely *jealousy*, an emotion that presumably plays a role in the lives of many if not most people¹. Using a method that helps avoiding biased data collection and analysis, the study attempted to address the following questions about people's naive theories.

Emotional Experience: Its Components and their Salience and Nature. When people think about an emotional experience, how do they *spontaneously* conceptualise it? In other words, if we assume that an 'emotion' is a multicomponential experience (e.g. Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1984), how central or subjectively important is each 'classic' emotional response component or reaction (e.g. feelings, physiological changes, behaviours) in people's conceptualisation of an emotional experience? And, in turn, what is the quality of each component? For instance, to what extent do people's theories refer to 'basic' physiological changes such as increased or decreased heart rate, or to stomach troubles, or to bodily or facial emotion expression? If people refer to feelings, what kind of specific emotions do they mention, and why? what aspects (intensity, situational adequacy, etc.) of the emotion do they consider? Finally, do people conceptualise an emotional experience as a stable and discrete state, 'an emotion', or do they conceive of it as an "emotional episode" (Frijda, Mesquita, Sonnemans & Van Goozen, 1991; Frijda, 1993), i.e. as a continuous emotion sequence resulting from the more or less continuous impact of a given event, giving rise in turn to different emotions?

Adequacy of Emotional Responses. What kind of theories do people have about the functionality and adequacy of their own or of others' emotional response to an event? In other words, do people believe that the way one reacts emotionally to an event is also the best way to cope with it? Why? What is the role given in people's naive theory to regulation processes, and to such issues as the legitimacy and social/personal adequacy of the emotional response, or of one or more of its specific components (cf. Solomon, 1993; Frijda, 1986; Epstein, 1993)?

Factors that influence naive theories. Finally, how rich and varied is people's knowledge? What accounts for it? Do naive theories change with age, or with reference to different kinds of emotional antecedents (cf. Frijda, 1986)? Is there a discrepancy between how people conceptualise emotional experiences when the reference is to the self as opposed to other people (e.g. Parrott & Smith, 1991; Shaver et al., 1987)?ⁱⁱ Do men and women differ in their

conceptualisations (see Shields, 1991; Manstead, 1992; LaFrance and Banaj, 1992; Fischer, 1993)? We might in fact expect naive theories to be rooted, as said earlier, in people's direct and indirect emotional experiences, and to be functional to such individual and/or socially based concerns as the maintenance of self-esteem, personal well-being, positive interpersonal relationships and group cohesion. Therefore, we might expect theories to covary not only with people's emotional experience, but with their concerns as well.

2. Method of the study

In order to ascertain people's theories about the emotional experience of jealousy, a large group of (North) Italian men and women (N=854 in total), both young (mainly university students) and mature adults (roughly 40 year-old, with a university instruction level), were administered a questionnaire that described, in a vignette-story, one of two highly typical jealousy-eliciting events. Subjects were then asked, with two open questionsⁱⁱⁱ, to carefully think about and to write down what would be the “*reactions*“ that someone, or they themselves, would have in association with that antecedent, and what would be an “*adequate behaviour*” in such a situation. In other words, subjects made either *prototypical attributions* (“What would be the reactions, in general, of the protagonist of a situation like this?” or “... the adequate behaviour...”) or *self-attributions* (e.g. “What would be your reactions if you found yourself in such a situation?”). In sum, this study examined the effects of 4 independent variables: age, sex, attribution type, and event type. Each subject judged only one vignette and made only one kind of attribution.

The vignette described how a person X, the story protagonist, sees his or her partner either *flirt* with someone, or *kiss* someone (see examples below^{iv}; subjects were given a story version whose protagonist X was of their same sex). The flirt event represents an instance of a *light* threat to X's sentimental relationship, presumably eliciting what has been called “suspicious jealousy”, while the kiss represents a *serious* threat to it, presumably eliciting what has been called “*fait accompli* jealousy” (for a discussion of these events as relevant and typical antecedents of jealousy, see Parrott, 1991; Bryson, 1991; Zammuner & Frijda, 1994; Zammuner & Fischer, 1994). The relationship between the two partners portrayed in the vignette was depicted either as that of boy/girl-friend, or of husband/wife. The following exemplify the two event stories, written for female subjects.

Flirt. “Paul, my husband, and I were invited for a dinner party with friends. The hostess had split up all the couples and this is how Paul was seated next to a very beautiful looking woman, who was unknown to us. Dinner took place in a very pleasant atmosphere and we formed several small groups. Because I had paid all my attention to the conversation in my own group, it was not until the end of the evening that I noticed that Paul's attention had completely been devoted to this charming woman.”

Kiss. “I had spent a day in the countryside with Paul, my boyfriend, staying at the house of friends who had invited several other people as well. The day had gone by fast and had been very enjoyable. At some point towards the evening, it was already dark, I wanted to say something to Paul, but I noticed that he was not around in the house. I left the others with an excuse, and went out into the garden. There I saw Paul, not far away, passionately kissing a girl.”

2.1. DATA ANALYSIS

Coding method. Answers given by subjects to the two open questions were analysed using a mainly data-driven coding method. Four *macro-categories* were defined a priori and comprised all concepts subjects mentioned in their answers to the two open questions: *Emotions*;

Physiological Reactions, Behaviours, Cognitive Reactions (see table 1). As subjects' answers to each open question were often rich and detailed, each subject's answer to each question was subdivided in several *meaningful segments* or concepts, each of which was coded (see examples below). Subjects' actual statements and labels were initially used to form several micro-categories; they were later kept to indicate a micro-category if that label had been produced very frequently; otherwise, a more general label was used to designate it (most initially-formed micro-categories were later grouped together on the basis of their conceptual similarity; e.g. for *Emotions*, the emotions *surprise, wonder, shock, amazement, stunned, shaken, and frozen* were grouped in one micro-category, named *Surprise-Shock* (the single most frequent labels used by subjects)^v.

Below are reported three examples of subjects' answers to the *reactions* question, and of how they were coded. Each meaningful segment that was coded is italicised and its code reported in brackets; e.g. E2=*Emotions*; Micro-category: 2=*Anger*; B1=*Behaviours*, Micro-category: 1=*Control*. The final four-digit code specifies the subject's sex (Male/Female), the judged event (KISS/FLIRT), which attribution was made (SELF/PROT.), and the subject's 'conventional' age (20/40). As a reading of the examples will show, subjects' answers contained elements that were not explicitly coded (e.g. temporal aspect of the emotion; causes or consequences of an emotion or action; etc.). However, such elements were taken into account both in interpreting a given answer segment and assigning it to a given micro-category, and in the purely 'qualitative' comments and interpretations that will be offered in this paper.

Example 1 "... After the *anger* [RE2] and the *jealousy* [RE6] perhaps *one feels indifference* [RE9], which is surely just a way to overcome the crisis" [F-KISS-PROT-20]

Example 2 "After I saw it [the partner's flirt], I would *feel cold* towards him [E9] and I would *take on an attitude of behavioural rigidity* [B1] until I would be able to *get an explanation of the fact from him* [B9]; *with the girl I would be detached* [E9:2] *but I would not avoid her* [RB1], moreover *I would not hide from others my annoyance* [E9] [B10] and my *embarrassment* " [E7] [F-FLIRT-SELF-20]

Example 3 "Initially the [story] protagonist would feel a diffuse sensation of interior *pain* [E4], then she would *try and understand if she has misinterpreted the situation* [C1]. If she cannot explain to herself her husband's behaviour she would feel *insecure* [E7] and feel a *sense of inferiority* [E7]. Afterwards, she would try to react [to the situation] by *attempting*, by means of verbal but mainly of nonviable behaviours, *to make her husband feel the same sensation by her getting close to another man*" [B8] [F- FLIRT-PROT-20]

Statistical analyses. Raw and percentage frequencies of occurrence, in subjects' answers, of each micro- and macro-category for both Reactions and Adequate Behaviours were computed separately for each level of the independent variables, i.e. for the two Event types, Attribution types, Age groups, and the sexes. To see the richness of subjects' theories, each individual micro-category score within each macro-category was then transformed into a binary score (1, 0; 1 indicated that a subject had supplied one concept within a given macro-category; for instance, for Example 1, above, the *Emotion* binary score would be 3, i.e. the total number of emotions mentioned by the subject). These scores were submitted to several statistical analyses. Finally, to test the influence of the independent factors on subjects' naive theories, raw micro-category frequencies obtained for the two levels of each factor (e.g. for Kiss and Flirt) were analysed by a factorial analysis method, known as 'Correspondence analysis' (Lebart, Morineau & Fenelon, 1982).

3. People's theories of jealousy

3.1. OVERVIEW

3.1.1. *Richness of naive theories*

Although the 'richness' of subjects' theories is, to some extent, the theoretically least important question, before discussing the actual *concepts* of subjects' naive theories (see table 1) it might be useful to briefly illustrate what results were obtained in relation to this issue. Notice that the two questions put to subjects were on purpose very general. In other words, the various kinds of reactions, behaviours etcetera that subjects mentioned were *spontaneously* supplied by them; the likelihood that subjects tried to think about, and came up with, certain reactions, behaviours or other responses simply because the questionnaire asked them to do so, was therefore minimised. Secondly, the data-driven coding method does not run the risk of superimposing on the data a possibly extraneous structure: although subjects might 'forget' to mention aspects of the emotional experience about which they nonetheless are knowledgeable, it was expected they would mention those aspects they consider important, relevant or most frequent, i.e. truly prototypical.

On the average, subjects had more to say in answering the *Reactions* than the *Adequate Behaviour* question (2.8 vs. 1.9 concepts). This result, however, as we shall see later, was mainly due to the fact that emotions and physiological changes were mentioned almost exclusively as Reactions. Each of the independent variables considered in the study, namely Event type, Attribution type, and subjects' Sex and Age, affected the richness of subjects' theories. People in fact gave richer, more articulated answers when judging the most serious event, i.e. the Kiss, than when thinking about the Flirt (3.1 vs. 2.5 Reactions concepts, and 2.0 vs. 1.8 Adequate Behaviour concepts); notice, however, that the difference between the two events was most pronounced when subjects made prototypical rather than self-attributions. Subjects gave somewhat richer answers when thinking about how they would react to the event, be it the Kiss or the Flirt (rather than about how someone in general would react: 2.9 vs. 2.7 Reactions; self- and prototypical-attributions of Adequate Reactions did not differ in richness: they comprised 1.9 concepts in both cases). Women gave richer answers than men (3.3 vs. 2.6 Reactions; 2.2 vs. 1.6 Adequate Behaviour). Finally, young adults usually gave more articulated answers than mature adults, both to the Reactions (3.3 vs. 2.3 concepts) and to the Adequate Behaviour question (2.1 vs. 1.7).

The results obtained for the Event and Attribution variables, and for Sex, seem as a whole to support the hypothesis that people's representations of emotions, i.e. their emotional knowledge, is, generally, somewhat richer, more complex when the eliciting event is very salient to them, i.e. when it has important implications for their life, when it touches one or more concerns that are of basic importance to them^{vi}. First, the subjectively (and, one might say, the objectively) most salient event in this study is the Kiss (see also Zammuner & Frijda, 1994; Zammuner & Fischer, 1994): it signifies the partner's betrayal of shared concerns for faithfulness, mutual trust, etcetera; it means a strong blow to one's own concern for a stable and exclusive sentimental relationship, and to one's own self-image (both the private self-image and, in prospective, the public one). The Kiss is, as said, an instance of "fait accompli jealousy": the threat to the relationship is real, rather than just potential or imagined as in the Flirt. That people should have a richer knowledge about events that are not unlikely to happen in the real world and that might have personally devastating consequences, seems to have a functional value, both from an individual and a social viewpoint. A complex knowledge of less relevant events would, on the contrary, be much less necessary. Second, when people think about how they themselves (as opposed to a generic 'someone') would experience a given event, the event might be imagined, thought about, in more detail because the task becomes emotionally laden; or, given the privacy that surrounds the specific event types here considered, people might rely on a subtler and/or more extensive knowledge base; or, people might be aware of potential individual differences and therefore feel more confident when thinking about their own likely reactions and

behaviours. Whatever the specific process(es), the end result would be that, in self-attributions, the event becomes more salient, and its implications for a person's concerns are examined with greater attention, in greater depth. Finally, if women, because of sex-role internalised values, are allowed to, or thought to, pay greater attention to, or be more involved with, their (and others') emotional experiences, and/or value more than men do their interpersonal relationships in general, and especially sentimental ones, and/or are more concerned than men are about "exclusive possession" of their partners, then the salience hypothesis applies to the finding of women's greater representation richness as well (as we shall see later, however, sex differences in *types of emotion concepts* were very rare, a result that seems to indicate that sex differences in emotion knowledge are more a matter of 'detail', perhaps of salience of a given 'discourse topic', rather than a matter of very different 'substance').

The differences in representation richness obtained for the two age groups might be similarly explained by the salience hypothesis (e.g. younger people are less 'emotionally-wise' and therefore pay more attention to emotional phenomena and are more concerned about them), or might be explained by purely motivational or skill factors: younger subjects (university students!) might simply have been more willing to make the 'effort' of writing down their thoughts on the subject matter, or more accustomed to do so.

3.1.2. *Factors influencing the contents of subjects' naive theories*

The observed 'quantitative' differences due to the independent variables were largely mirrored by the results obtained by the factorial analysis of the *contents* of subjects' answers. Four factors were found to explain almost all the variability in the concepts supplied by subjects (95.5% of the variance). The first factor (explaining 64.2% of the total variance) coincided with the *Event type* variable; the second and third most important factors (explaining 16.2% and 8.8% respectively of the total variance) coincided both with the *Age* and the *Attribution type* variables; and the fourth factor coincided with *Sex* (explaining 6.2% of the total variance). These results show that people's naive theories mainly differ according to what type of event they consider, as we shall see in greater detail in the next section. On the other hand, thinking in terms of others' or one's own response to the event, being a young or a mature adult, or being a male or a female does make some difference in the theories people entertain. But let us now turn to a discussion of what kind of representation people have of the emotional experience associated with jealousy-eliciting events.

3.2 'REACTIONS' TO JEALOUSY-ELICITING EVENTS: PEOPLE'S THEORIES

The analysis of people's answers to the first question they were posed, "What would be (your/the protagonist's) reactions to a situation such as this?", showed that, in naive conceptualisations, the various components of the emotional experience are not present to the same extent, and are not given the same degree of centrality or salience, i.e. are not similarly 'cognized'. As we shall see below, people in fact focused on emotions and behaviours much more than on physiological reactions and on cognitions. It should also be noted that several subjects, although they did specify most of the times which reactions the protagonist would feel, stressed that it is difficult to know how someone, or they themselves, would feel in the judged situation due to the importance of individual factors such as personality, age, cultural background, relationship history, or capacity for coping. Subjects furthermore stressed that 'imagined' reactions are likely to differ from what one would actually experience in a specific situation, characterised by specific features.

Emotional reactions. Jealousy-events, as depicted by subjects, elicited one or more specific emotions (see table 1, and Examples 1 and 3); many subjects in fact listed up to 3 emotions, and a few listed as many as 5 or 6. Perhaps not so surprisingly, subjects supplied a wide range of different emotion labels (about a hundred emotion terms were produced) that, during the coding

phase, were grouped into six main kinds of emotional reactions. Their frequency of occurrence was usually related to the event type judged by subjects, and often, but to a lesser degree, to age as well.

The most frequently mentioned emotion type (especially for the Kiss, and in prototypical attributions, as shown by the factor analysis) was *anger* or *irritation* -- and related emotions such as being *annoyed* or *outraged*. Thus, naive theories agree with scientific theories in hypothesising that an intentional action, done by someone else, that obstructs one's own goals elicits anger, the more so the greater the goal relevance for the person who is the 'victim' of the act. Another important group of emotions comprised *disappointment* (the protagonist's expectations about the partner's behaviour, love, etc. are not met) and *sadness* and *pain* (due to the potential loss of the sentimental relationship, and of what it entails); these emotions were more frequent for self attributions, and, not surprisingly, for the Kiss event. People seemed to believe that such events are usually not expected to occur, as shown by their frequent mention of a third group of emotions, namely *surprise*, *shock*, and *amazement*. The more serious the event, and the more likely the protagonist is assumed to be taken by surprise, or, indeed, be shocked -- these emotions were mentioned more frequently by the oldest subjects.

According to subjects' naive theories (especially to young people when making self-attributions), feeling *jealous* and/or *betrayed* is also a frequent reaction, although not the most frequent or the only one. Jealousy is, in naive theories, an emotion that characterises *both* potential threats to the relationship and actual ones, somewhat in opposition to scientific theories and other empirical data according to which it characterises mainly a potential or suspected threat (e.g. Parrot, 1991; Bryson, 1991; Hupka, 1991). Cultural differences might account for such discrepant results. 'Jealousy' is *the* term that Italian subjects judge, among more than a hundred, most quickly as referring to 'an emotion' (Zammuner, 1994a). A quick judgement is usually interpreted as implying that the term (e.g. "chair") is well represented in memory because it refers to a prototypical or central exemplar within a conceptual category (e.g. 'furniture'). "Jealousy" seems therefore to be a very well-known emotion (or, more simply, a much used emotion label) to Italians. Furthermore, when Italian subjects are asked to recall and describe a jealousy-eliciting event that they experienced, they report in about equal proportions both potential and actual threats to their sentimental relationship (Zammuner & Pellinghelli, 1994), thus showing that the term covers in Italian both types of threats. As the previously reported examples showed, subjects often reported explicit causes for the emotions they mentioned. For jealousy, the mentioned causes usually invoked the belief in, or the need for, exclusive possession of the partner ("my wife belongs to me") or of his/her love or attention (often on the account that the partner is "part of oneself").

The potential loss of the exclusive 'possession' (Flirt) was assumed to give rise (more frequently than the actual loss) to *insecurity*, *uneasiness*, *agitation* and *anxiety*. In other words, as subjects emphasised in their comments, in the situation depicted by the Flirt event the protagonist is not quite sure about how to appraise the situation, i.e. whether the partner indeed is guilty of something, whether one should try and change the ongoing situation, and so forth. These emotions were mentioned more frequently by the younger adults, a result that might point to their lesser experience with such events, and therefore to their greater uncertainty about the event's implications, and about how to cope with the events.

Finally, emotions that were mentioned very infrequently (and more idiosyncratically) by subjects included *pride* (in the partner's qualities, e.g. his/her charms), *envy* (directed at the rival and never at the partner: the event protagonist envies the rival's qualities --looks, humour, etc.-- that are attractive to his/her partner), *frustration* (due to seeing one's own goals blocked, or to being unable to cope successfully with the event, or to the uncertainty about how to cope), *disgust* (for the partner's behaviour), *indifference* or *coldness* (usually as the result of coping attempts), and *feeling excluded*, *inferior*, and with a *diminished self-esteem*.

The obtained results show that emotions, with or without further qualifications, constitute a very central part of people's representations of the experience elicited by jealousy events. The

results clearly indicated that people mostly have complex and temporally articulated emotional scenarios in mind (as examples 1-3 showed). In other words, people conceive the emotional response as an 'emotional episode' rather than as 'an emotion' and do not make a one-to-one match between events and emotions. The protagonist usually feels several emotions; some emotions are felt first, constitute the most immediate reaction to the event, others are felt later; some emotions vanish in a brief time, others continue to be felt for the amount of time the event lasts, or for the amount of time the event has an emotional impact on the person; different emotions may coexist because each emotion focuses on a different aspect of the situation, as the following example shows:

Example 4 "... jealousy, sense of inferiority towards the young attractive man, embarrassment (due to the fact) that others might observe that my wife's attention was entirely devoted to this young man ..."[F-FLIRT-PROT-20]

However, naive theories vary about which emotions are hypothesised to arise first or later, which specific aspect of the event and of its background individuals are hypothesised to focus upon when feeling a given emotion, and which appraisals individuals are hypothesised to make -- although, as we would expect given the appraisal-emotion relationship, there is constancy too. For instance, insecurity might be elicited by a comparison with the rival, or by worrying thoughts about the partner's possibly wavering commitment to the relationship; anger might be directed at the partner for his/her behaviour, or at the self for one's own thrust in the partner, or at the partner because the 'unfaithful' behaviour is publicly displayed; and so forth. In other words, the results point out that if subjects mention a given emotion in relation to an event, part of the 'meaning' of the emotion, e.g. its subjectively perceived cause, may still be unknown to us. Several factors might account for such 'indeterminacy': the meaning of the emotional labels themselves is to a great extent 'fuzzy'; actual use of the emotion lexicon might be highly idiosyncratic; different individuals appraise the same event (or aspects of it) in different ways, in terms of both what is perceived as salient, and what implications a given aspect has for different individuals (cf.. Frijda's (1986) notion of concerns).

The obtained results imply that when we ask people to label an event as an instance of the emotion X, or when we give them an emotion label and ask them to supply a relevant antecedent event, we are presumably getting only the 'first association' or 'match' that people make, or the 'first label' that comes handy rather than the 'whole picture' they have in mind. If this hypothesis is correct, it would question the validity of claims about the existence of one-to-one matches between emotions and events, physiological reactions, etcetera, when such claims are based on such data collection methods.

Behavioural reactions. As said, naive theories frequently focused also on actual behaviours hypothesised to be carried out by the event protagonist -- 61% of the subjects listed at least one behaviour, quite a few listed a second or third one. The behaviours mentioned by subjects were of three main kinds, all quite strategically oriented: behaviours that implied *postponing immediate action*, due to a 'let's see what is really happening' (or 'has happened') attitude or to a self-control attitude, *intervention* behaviours, aimed at immediately modifying the situation, and, less frequently, behaviours that implied '*abandoning the field*' (see table 1).

The 'postponing immediate action' behaviours took various forms. *Observing the situation*, how it is and how it develops, was more frequent in prototypical attributions, while *pretending indifference* was more frequent in self-related ones, and, not surprisingly, for the flirt situation (both were more typical of young subjects). *Refraining from immediate reaction*, or, more generally, exercising *self-control*, and *refraining from making a scene* were most frequent in self-attributions (refraining from reaction was also mentioned more by younger subjects). Finally, a frequent behaviour was also *talking with the partner*, a behaviour that usually implied a suspension of judgement and action till later, carried out in order to get an explanation from the

partner, or be reassured, or sometimes simply let the partner know how badly he/she acted (more frequent in self-attributions and in men's). These results, in other words, show that in subject's naive theories the self is seen as more capable of exerting control than the average individual is, or of having 'greater wisdom' ("*clarifications are better than quarrels*", "*dramatic decisions should be postponed till possible*", etcetera), a self-serving bias not unknown to psychologists.

Among the so-called 'intervention behaviours' were *non-aggressive* actions that aimed at modifying the situation by trying to *get back the partner's attention* (e.g. by flirting too, or by going up to the partner and interrupting his/her conversation with the rival; this reaction was more frequent for the flirt, and in prototypical and women's attributions), or by *doing something* (such as creating a 'forced' focus of attention for everyone involved by starting to do something unusual; this reaction was more frequent for flirt, and in younger subjects' attributions). 'Intervention behaviours' were however also openly *aggressive*, directed at the partner (the most frequent case), the rival, or both -- again not surprisingly perhaps, they were more frequent for the kiss situation. Within aggressive behaviours, *verbal aggression* (quarrelling, making a scene) characterised women more than men, while *physical aggression* characterised prototypical attributions, men's, and the younger subjects'. To put it differently, the self was *not* attributed such socially and personally inappropriate behaviours. Finally, a relatively infrequent intervention behaviour (mentioned as relevant mainly for the flirt, by older subjects, and in self-attributions), was *to show openly one's own disappointment*, and/or other negative emotions to the partner, usually with the aim of making him/her understand how badly he/she hurt the protagonist, or of making him/her feel guilty, etcetera.

As said, subjects also mentioned behaviours that represent a strategy of 'abandoning the field': *going away* from the situation (from the party, or the house), which was very frequent, and *leaving the partner* (infrequent). Both were supplied almost exclusively for the actual threat to the relationship (Kiss), and were more frequently mentioned by younger subjects. *Going away* was a behaviour that subjects thought would be performed in order to think more clearly about the event and its implications, to regain emotional control, etc.; the implication was that the protagonist had not yet taken a final decision (it was more frequently mentioned in prototypical attributions). *Leaving the partner* usually had instead a final meaning (it was more frequent in self- and men's attributions).

As had already been the case for subjects' theories about emotional reactions, here too subjects very often listed several hypothetical behavioural reactions as *alternative* solutions in the given situation, or thought that several actions would be taken in turn --the result of a previous action being taken into account in order to select the most appropriate next action. On the whole, subjects' answers indicated that people know a wide repertoire of potential behaviours; furthermore, as they had already stressed in relation to emotional reactions, people believe that the probability of enacting a specific behaviour depends upon which 'aspects' characterise a given situation and its protagonists ('seriousness' of the threat, personality factors, degree of involvement in the relationship, how an individual appraises the situation, etc.).

Cognitive reactions. In their answers, subjects mentioned only to some extent 'purely' cognitive reactions (on the average, 28% mentioned at least one such reaction; younger subjects mentioned them significantly more frequently than older ones). This result might be interpreted in various ways. It could simply indicate that people implicitly assume that emotions and behaviours are self-evident, so to speak, that there is no need to be very detailed about the underlying or associated thoughts, appraisals, or action tendencies. It could imply that subjects believe that emotions and behaviours are more informative about a given emotional experience than cognitions are. Or it could be interpreted as an indication that indeed in naive theories cognitions do not represent a very salient component of the immediate reaction to an emotion-inducing event. The first hypothesis seems to better fit, on the whole, the results here reported, but further research is necessary to test it. The most frequent cognitive reaction mentioned by subjects was *ponder on the situation, on how to react*, i.e. to take time to think. *Rationalising the situation* and

controlling one's own reactions, and the opposite tendency of *finding it difficult to control one's own cognitive processes* were also frequently mentioned. The 'pondering' reaction was most frequent in self-attributions and in young subjects'; the 'cognitive self-control' reaction was somewhat more frequent in prototypical attributions; the difficulty of cognitive control, not surprisingly, was mainly present for the kiss situation, and mentioned more frequently in prototypical attributions and by younger people. A few subjects (especially men) mentioned also an attempt at *minimising the event's gravity*. In sum, according to subjects' theories, the most likely cognitive reaction is a mental attempt not to be 'overrun' by the event, not to give in to how it is 'naturally' perceived, an attempt which however might not be successful nor easily achieved.

Physiological, expressive, and motor reactions. Such reactions are definitely not very central features, in naive theories, of the emotional experience, of how one reacts to an salient event. On the average, barely 9% of the subjects mentioned (usually) one such reaction, mainly referring to increases in *heart beat rate, perspiration, and blushing*, and, less frequently, to *crying*; other changes included feeling *paralysed*, or *fainting*. A very few, quite 'exceptional' subjects, however, thought of Reactions exclusively in terms of physiological changes, as Example 5 below partially shows. Physiological, expressive, and motor reactions were mentioned significantly more frequently for the Kiss than the Flirt event, for prototypical attributions, and by women.

Example 5 “... *paleness, trembling, heart that goes faster, sweating...*” [F- KISS-PROT-40]

3.3. PEOPLE'S THEORIES OF ADEQUATE REACTIONS

When they were asked about what behaviour would be *adequate* in the described situation, quite a few subjects rejected the very notion of 'adequate' behaviour (or reactions), claiming that adequacy cannot be judged in absolute terms but depends on the person's coping potential, personality, involvement in the relationship, etc., and on the specific relationship and its past history. Furthermore, a main point in the answer of some subjects was that someone might *know* how to react in the best way to the situation, but *be unable to do so* because he or she is not sufficiently calm, detached from the situation, etcetera. Most subjects that questioned the 'adequacy' concept did nonetheless subsequently list what they judged to be an adequate behaviour. At times, the adequate reactions were exactly the same as those listed as immediate reactions, implying that subjects considered them totally adequate; however, what most subjects mentioned as *adequate behaviours* differed dramatically from what they had mentioned as *immediate reactions* (tables 1-2), as the two examples below show.

Example 6 REACTIONS: “... *paleness, trembling, heart that goes faster, sweating...*”
ADEQUATE REACTIONS: “*Very silently she has used, if she had them available, a tape-recorder and a camera in order to document the “fact” and whatever else might have followed it. If she didn't have these instruments, she has called other people, always without interfering in the least with her husband's behaviour, so that she might later have a complete testimony*” [F-KISS-PROT-40]

Example 7 REACTIONS: “*When the protagonist sees this scene she is completely shaken and keeps watching them [the partner and the rival]for at least thirty seconds, to see if the situation is really what it seems; then she runs away from there and later on she behaves as if she has not seen anything, because she is afraid*”. ADEQUATE REACTIONS: “*The right thing for the girl to do, but it is difficult that she can manage it, would be to make Paul feel jealous by getting herself together with another boy and behaving with him as Paul did, of course after explaining to the boy what she wants to do and why*” [F- KISS-PROT-20]

A careful (although not quantitatively based) inspection of subjects' answers showed that, with respect to the immediate reactions, the listed adequate behaviours could be characterised, in general, by one of the following three types of relation. (i) The adequate behaviours were *totally similar* to the reactions. The similarity, however, was due to various reasons: the listed reactions were already of a strategic, coping kind; the reactions already reflected self-control; 'impulsive' reactions were judged to be adequate; several different reactions had already been considered, and one or more was chosen as adequate. (ii) Adequate behaviours were *quite similar* to the reactions, but as adequate responses they became intentional, or their implementation was elaborated in detail, or they were intensified or de-intensified. (iii) Adequate behaviours were *quite different* from the reactions: the former implied greater rationality, control, and determination, or, vice versa, greater rashness; in most cases, the person's goal was to avoid being a passive victim of the situation, and of his/her own emotions.

As we shall see, the greater control that characterised most behaviours listed as adequate was almost always aimed at giving the protagonist the possibility to form a behavioural plan that would be adequate to cope in the best possible way with the situation -- a plan that subjects thought the protagonist would not be able to conceive were he or she under the influence of his/her emotions.

Emotional and physiological reactions. Perhaps not surprisingly given the long standing theory in our cultures that *emotions* are dysfunctional, adequate behaviours listed by subjects included very rarely emotional reactions (table 2). On the average, about 11% mentioned one or more emotions (women did so more frequently than men); the listed emotions mainly referred to faked indifference, and to anger. In other words, underlying subjects' answer is, to a great extent, the belief that emotional reactions are understandable, natural in such situations (as many of them explicitly said), but do not represent the best way to cope with the event (many subjects actually voiced this belief quite explicitly). In fact, as will be clear from the discussion below, trying to keep calm, avoiding to act on first impulse, not showing one's emotions, and so forth, represent, according to the interviewed subjects, some of the proper ways to deal with the situation. *Physiological reactions* were practically absent as adequate responses to the event.

Behavioural reactions. The obvious counterpart to the absence of emotional reactions is the very consistent weight given to actual behaviours: on the average, 85% of subjects mentioned at least one behaviour. The behaviour most frequently mentioned (and more so for the kiss, by older subjects, and for prototypical attributions) was *talking with the partner*, an action that can mean, as we saw also earlier, getting the partner to explain his/her behaviour, and/or letting him/her know what he/she is accused of. Its aim, as detailed by subjects, is often that of trying to save the relationship, hoping that the partner will be able to justify his/her behaviour, or minimise its gravity (he/she is expected to say that the relationship with the rival is new, temporary, did not exist before; that the unfaithful behaviour was due to a moment's weakness, to a purely physical or superficial attraction for the rival, to previous problems in the relationship; etc.). As 'adequate behaviour', it is about twice as frequent as it was as a 'reaction'.

Other very frequent behaviours included *refraining from reacting to the event*, and *controlling one's own behaviour* or *avoiding making a scene*, again more frequently mentioned as 'adequate' behaviours than they were as 'reactions'. Somewhat similar behaviours included *pretending nothing has happened* and *observing the scene*. It is clear from these results that subjects think that 'thought should precede action' and that one ought not to let him/herself be influenced by what might be hasty judgements on the situation, as these might lead to actions of which one might be sorry later on. Subjects, especially the oldest ones, think that the flirt is more likely than the kiss to be a situation that one simply observes, and for which one might pretend nothing happened; vice versa, the control is assumed to be more necessary for the kiss than the flirt, and more so by the younger people. In other words, the 'controlled self' is an image more

easily entertained by the young.

Subjects mentioned quite frequently, however, also more 'active' or 'intervention behaviours', the most important of which (mainly for the flirt, young people, and typical representations) was to *try and get back the partner attention*, often by faking a flirt with someone, or by other means (staring at him/her, intervene in the conversation between the partner and the rival, etc.). Other 'active' behaviours included *showing* to the partner *one's own negative emotions* and judgements, or voicing them openly (more frequent in the older subjects' representation). For the kiss, the active behaviours were instead more aggressive: the protagonist would *make a scene* and/or *quarrel with the partner*, or, especially in the prototypical representation of the younger subjects, *heavily insult, or beat, the partner* (and, at times, the rival too). Notice that both types of aggressive behaviours, coherently with the overall picture of adequate behaviour that has emerged so far, are half as frequent than they were as 'immediate' reactions. Finally, *leaving the scene*, or *the partner*, either temporarily (in order to think about the situation) or for good (a much less mentioned option), were solutions almost exclusively mentioned for the most serious event. *Leaving the scene* as an adequate behaviour was less frequent than it had been as a reaction -- especially for the younger subjects (minus 14%), while *leaving the partner*, a more dramatic behaviour, was actually more frequent as an adequate reaction than it had been as a reaction, especially in self- attributions, possibly indicating that the acceptance of one's own partner's betrayal is perceived as self-diminishing, although one would find it a reasonable option for other individuals).

Cognitive reactions. As adequate behaviours, cognitive reactions were even less frequent than they had been as reactions (22% of the subjects mentioned at least one; younger subjects did so more than older ones). The most frequent one, characterising the kiss more than the flirt, and the younger subjects' representation, was *thinking about the situation, about the best course of action*; attempting to *control one's reactions*, and/or trying to *explain away the event* was the second most important reaction, more frequent in the prototypical representation. As a sign of the 'co-operative' attitude attributed to the protagonist, very few subjects attributed to the protagonist a *blaming attitude* towards the partner, while they mentioned attempting to *minimise the event gravity* more frequently .

Synthesis. In sum, subjects considered adequate quite a range of behavioural alternatives, but, on the whole, the behaviours (and cognitions) they mentioned were the result of *regulation processes*, activated by the event protagonist's need to have more information before acting, and oriented by the wish to save, whenever possible, the partner's and one's own 'face' (especially for the flirt situation), and the partner's affection and/or the future of the relationship. The action tendencies thought by subjects to be felt as immediate reactions, such as abandoning the scene, quarrelling, being aggressive, or 'reciprocating' the unfaithfulness, are hypothesised to be checked by the event protagonist most of the times, and to be substituted by more 'rational' behaviours; the latter in turn are hypothesised to be possible only if the event protagonist does not let emotions 'take precedence' (cf. Frijda, 1986).

4. Discussion

The results obtained in this study show that people's knowledge of emotions is quite rich and articulated, and that it is possible to get a detailed account of their knowledge even when (or perhaps more so) we ask them quite general questions^{vii}. In people's conceptualisation of what kinds of reaction are elicited by jealousy antecedents, various emotional and behavioural reactions constitute the core of the experience. On the contrary, purely cognitive reactions, and physiological and expressive reactions are much less central aspects of that knowledge as it is spontaneously told by subjects. These results might indicate that subjects attach to emotion

labels and behaviours the greatest informative value; underlying cognitions and other responses can be inferred from them.

The subjective importance of the event is the key factor that influences the 'richness' of concepts supplied by subjects, their frequency of mention, and their relative importance or centrality in accounting for, and predicting, the emotional experience. Subjects' age, sex, and whether the experience is attributed to oneself or to others, appear to be only to some extent relevant factors in defining the precise nature of subjects' concepts, or their centrality in the representations subjects have. People might be more reluctant to attribute to the self behaviours or other responses that might be judged not so adequate in terms of some social or personal standard (a self-serving bias), and younger people might indeed be somewhat more 'naive' than older people; but, provided that a given antecedent is familiar and/or frequent in a person's cultural milieu, most concepts that define 'mature' naive theories are already possessed by young people, and men's and women's concepts are not very different. In sum, the emotional knowledge derived from direct and indirect experience seems to merge in a 'coherent' whole (as seems to be generally the case for chunks of knowledge pertaining to any one domain), a theory indeed prototypical in nature that blurs most distinctions (e.g. the distinction me-others). The knowledge derived from personal experience, although possibly more salient, might be in fact not only quantitatively lesser (e.g. Shaver et al., 1987) but also qualitatively less structured than that socially acquired; as a consequence 'self' and 'others' representations feed and complement each other.

In naive theories emotions constitute the core of the immediate, unchecked reaction to an emotion-eliciting event, but not of the 'regulated' reaction. Action tendencies, or actual behaviours, that one would feel or carry out as the immediate response to the event do not coincide, in general, with the tendencies and behaviours that people consider legitimate, proper, and adequate. According to subjects' theories, there are in fact very noticeable attempts to control the external expression of emotion, and/or the very feelings, and of the felt action tendencies. Regulation of emotions and behaviours is induced by the person's evaluation of her emotional reaction against internal and/or external standards (e.g. the felt emotion is judged to be inappropriate, or too strong, or too weak; the 'beloved' one, or other relevant people might not understand it, or approve of it; etc.). However, the extent to which regulation processes are hypothesised by subjects to take control over the immediate reactions depends on various situational and individual factors --such as how much one cares for the (maybe) unfaithful partner; how much the person is able to 'suppress' or modify his or her immediate reaction, how intense that reaction is, and what is its nature (anger? insecurity? jealousy? wanting to beat the partner? etc.), what is the person's emotional, cognitive and behavioural 'repertoire'; and, of course, what are the past, and expected future prospects of the relationship.

Subjects' answers clearly showed that the emotional experience is not conceived as one that lasts few seconds only, or even minutes, and that arises and ends at a very well defined point in time, with sharp boundaries. Instead, its 'beginning' might be either a diffuse sensation, or an intense emotion; emotions first felt might later vanish because of regulation processes, or of shifts in appraisal focus. Typically, several emotions co-occur or succeed one another in brief time intervals: each emotion is the result of appraising a different aspect of the situation or of its implication, or of appraising the same aspect from different viewpoints -- e.g. the 'public' aspect of the flirt situation is appraised in terms of its implications for the relationship-as-a-social-entity, for the relationship as a private issue, etcetera. In sum, in naive theories a salient event gives rise to an 'emotion episode' rather than to 'an emotion'.

Although the great variety of concepts that subjects supplied is a 'collective' rather than an 'individual entity', we might hypothesise that, had subjects had the time and the motivation to do so, the collective entity would coincide to a large extent with the individual entity. In other words, in answering the two questions that were put to them each subject focused on a few emotions, behaviours, etc., but it is likely that he or she would subscribe to most of the concepts supplied by other subjects as well. Indeed, a study by Zammuner and Pellinghelli (1994) in

which 300 subjects rated an *actual* experience of jealousy they had along several 'scales' formed by the most salient micro-categories that emerged from the research here reported, supports this hypothesis.

The results obtained from analysing subjects' answers to other open questions that were put to them in the same questionnaire further support the notion that naive theories are quite complex in nature (Zammuner, 1994b, in preparation). The results showed that subjects think that the event protagonist would usually not be willing to share sincerely all of his or her emotions with his or her partner, or even with a close friend, again for strategic reasons (e.g. not to lose face, not to let the partner know how badly one was hurt). Furthermore, people think that the event protagonist is not always aware of what emotions he/she feels because their intensity might not be sufficiently strong to allow discrimination between them; or, the felt emotions might be of similar nature, making it difficult for the person to tell what she feels. People might experience conflict too over their emotional reactions, because of a mis-match with internalised norms about what one ought to feel, or because they feel emotions of a contrasting nature; or, more generally, the conflict might be related to how to interpret and react to the event. Conflict is instead not present when felt emotions match the person's norms and judgements over the situation (similar concepts characterise the naive theories of the emotional experience of sadness and pride; Zammuner, 1991, in preparation). Finally, people think that it is "natural" that a jealousy-event should elicit an emotional reaction because it touches a salient aspect of their life (their relationship and their affective involvement in it), it breaks salient expectations and norms expected to be shared with the partner, and it brings about fears and uncertainties about the future of the relationship. In fact, it would be 'pathological' if the event did not elicit emotions.

In conclusion, this study clearly shows that people have a rich and highly structured knowledge base about an emotion, jealousy, that is usually not considered to be 'basic' or primary; the structure and richness of this knowledge, furthermore, is not different, on the whole, from that which people have about a 'basic' emotion such as sadness, or about another 'complex' emotion such as pride. The results obtained in this study will hopefully provide new insights about everyday concepts of emotional experience.

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TABLE 1. REACTIONS TO JEALOUSY EVENTS (% Frequencies).

	Attribution Conventional Age N	PROT. 20 301	PROT. 40 240	SELF 20 143	SELF 40 170
Physiological, Expressive, Motor Reactions					
1. Blushing-Heart beat- Perspiration		4	3	1	4
2. Paralysis		1	3	2	3
3. Crying		6	1	4	2
4. Fainting		2	--	1	--
N % who gives at least 1 concept		10.6	6.3	7.0	7.6
Emotional Reactions					
1 Surprise - Shock- Amazement		20	19	20	24
2 Anger-Irritation		42	36	45	29
3-4 Disappointment/Sadness - Pain		24	13	33	24
5-6 Feeling betrayed/Jealousy		21	10	27	15
7 Insecurity - Uneasiness		18	13	17	13
8 Agitation-Anxiety		9	10	17	4
9 Other emotions		6	5	9	5
N % who gives at least 1 concept		64.1	56.7	68.0	55.3
Behavioural Reactions					
1. Control-Avoid making a scene		7	2	10	8
2. Not reacting		11	7	18	13
3. Pretend nothing has happened		10	7	13	6
4. Observe the situation - Curiosity		7	12	13	8
5. Go away		17	13	11	13
6. Aggressive Behaviour-Beat Partner/Rival		10	7	8	6
7. Making a scene - Quarrelling		9	12	8	8
8. Try to get Partner('s attention) away from Rival		15	14	8	10
9. Talk with Partner		15	16	22	19
10. Do something (other behaviours)		11	5	8	6
11. Show disappointment toward Partner/Rival		2	3	3	10
12. Leave Partner		4	--	6	1
N % who gives at least 1 concept		61.5	54.6	68.0	61.2
Cognitive Reactions					
1. Reflect upon situation - Upon how to act		17	7	24	11
2. Rationalisation - Self-control		7	8	8	6
3. Question validity of relationship/ Partner		5	--	3	2
4. Difficulty of cognitive control		16	6	6	3
5. Other reactions (e.g. minimise)		2	--	2	--
N % who gives at least 1 concept		37.5	20.0	32.0	24.1

Legend: PROT. Attribution= Prototypical.

The % frequency for each micro-category is derived from the total answers given by that sample for that micro-category divided by the sample's N. For instance, the 20-yr.-olds who made prototypical attributions (N=301) mentioned a total of 37 physiological reactions, distributed in the various categories. Disregarding the fact that some subjects mentioned more than one category, we could say that, on the average, 6% mentioned *crying*, 2% mentioned *fainting*, etc. The sum of % data in column 1 would be 13%. The N% row, showing the % of subjects who actually reported at least one such reaction -- in this example, 10.6%, enables the reader to 'adjust' the previous percentage data (% frequencies were meant to facilitate the reader in making an immediate comparisons across samples and content categories).

TABLE 2. ADEQUATE REACTIONS TO JEALOUSY EVENTS (% Frequencies)

Attribution		PROT.	PROT.	SELF	SELF
Conventional Age		20	40	20	40
N		301	240	143	170
Adequate Physiological, Expressive, Motor Reactions					
1.	All reactions	1	--	--	2
Adequate Emotional Reactions					
1	All emotions	7	10	15	12
Adequate Behavioral Reactions					
1.	Control-Avoid making a scene	19	5	8	--
2.	Refrain from reacting	14	13	12	33
3.	Pretend nothing has happened	20	18	27	12
4.	Observe the situation - Curiosity	4	5	5	10
5.	Go away	3	12	8	9
6.	Aggressive behavior-Beat Partner/Rival	3	2	2	5
7.	Make a scene - Quarrel	6	3	4	12
8.	Get Partner ('s attention) away from Rival- Behave as Partner- Distract oneself	22	17	20	26
9.	Talk with Partner	38	36	38	34
10/11	Show disappointment/other emotions	8	4	10	12
12.	Leave Partner	5	2	8	5
N % who gives at least 1 concept		89.7	81.8	76.9	90.6
Adequate Cognitive Reactions					
1.	Reflect upon situation - Upon how to act	23	6	16	11
2.	Rationalization - Self-control	11	10	8	6
3.	Attribute guilt to Partner	--	1	3	2
4.	Attenuate the event's gravity/implications	3	3	8	3
N % who gives at least 1 concept		29.6	16.7	25.2	18.2

Legend: PROT. Attribution= Prototypical;

N FACTORS VARIANCE	FLIRT	KISS	SELF	PROT	20YR	40YR	WOMEN	MEN
	409 F1 64.2%	445	313 F3 (F2) 8.9%	541	444 F2 (F3) 16.2%	410	446 F4 4.3%	408
R PHYS TOT	<u>16</u>	064	<u>25</u>	55	47	33	<u>55</u>	26
R SURPRISE	59	115	67	107	91	83	92	85
R ANGER	130	199	114	215	192	137	190	139
R SADNESS	59	137	<u>87</u>	<u>109</u>	117	79	121	75
R JEALOUSY	77	69	<u>60</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>126</u>	<u>77</u>
R INSECURITY	77	49	42	84	78	48	52	52
R ANXIETY	53	22	28	47	49	26	37	27
R OTHER EMOT	30	13	20	23	23	20	22	11
A EMOT TOT	49	39	44	44	44	44	<u>60</u>	<u>25</u>
R CONTROL	28	27	27	28	36	19	34	20
A CONTROL	37	51	21	67	<u>68</u>	<u>20</u>	54	25
R NOT REACT	35	62	<u>49</u>	<u>48</u>	58	39	56	41
A DO NOT REACT	53	57	37	73	58	52	61	48
R SHOW EMOT	<u>28</u>	<u>06</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>11</u>	23	18	17
A SHOW EMOT	34	39	35	38	41	32	47	26
R PRETEND	54	32	40	46	79	28	40	35
R OBSERVE	46	64	32	78	69	41	42	40
A PRET/OBSERV	<u>191</u>	<u>62</u>	126	127	<u>118</u>	<u>135</u>	132	123
R GET P ATTENT	68	38	<u>29</u>	77	56	50	<u>71</u>	<u>36</u>
A GET P ATTENT	<u>143</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>119</u>	<u>107</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>68</u>
R TALK W PART	67	80	64	83	76	71	71	76
A TALK W PART	102	211	111	202	169	144	184	128
R AGGRESSION	12	55	22	45	41	26	<u>32</u>	35
A AGGRESSION	<u>3</u>	<u>74</u>	8	69	<u>60</u>	<u>17</u>	41	28
R QUARREL	14	59	23	50	39	34	58	<u>23</u>
A QUARREL	8	34	16	26	22	20	22	19
R GO AWAY	<u>12</u>	108	39	81	66	54	76	44
A GO AWAY	<u>2</u>	<u>60</u>	26	36	<u>19</u>	<u>43</u>	37	26
R LEAVE PART	3	18	<u>10</u>	11	19	2	12	20
A LEAVE PART	<u>3</u>	<u>39</u>	21	21	<u>27</u>	<u>15</u>	26	16
R DO SMTHG	49	19	24	44	45	23	41	28
A OTHER BEHAV	12	9	4	17	17	4	<u>25</u>	<u>18</u>

LEGEND BOLD NUMBERS: SIGNIFICANT HIGHER FREQUENCY
 VARIABLE THAT CONTRIBUTES HIGHEST ABSOLUTE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THAT FACTOR.

N	FLIRT 409	KISS 445	SELF 313	PROT 541	20YR 444	40YR 410	FEMA 446	MALE 408
RC REFLECT <i>AC REFLECT</i>	57 <u>32</u>	69 94	57 43	69 83	86 91	40 35	66 74	60 51
RC SELFCONTROL <i>AC SELFCONTROL</i>	36 39	32 40	27 <u>23</u>	41 56	33 45	35 34	40 50	29 29
RC DOUBT PRT <i>AC PRT NO GUILT</i>	6 16	16 24	8 22	14 18	18 27	4 13	20 24	16 21
RC CONTROL DIFF	13	62	<u>14</u>	61	55	<u>20</u>	<u>34</u>	32
RC MINIMIZE GRAV	11	7	12	6	10	8	<u>6</u>	7

LEGEND BOLD NUMBERS: SIGNIFICANT HIGHER FREQUENCY
 VARIABLE THAT CONTRIBUTES HIGHEST ABSOLUTE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THAT FACTOR.

NOTE

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ⁱ Other studies have addressed similar questions in relation to sadness, pride, envy, joy and aesthetic emotions (Zammuner, 1991, 1993a, b, c, and in preparation; Zammuner & Seminati, 1994).

ⁱⁱ As a careful inspection of the results of Shaver et al. (1987) show, there might in fact be quite a few differences between what one expects from, or predicts for others, and what one thinks would be his or her own reaction, and why. Indeed, 52% of Shaver et al.'s 127 prototypical features (defining altogether 5 emotions) differed significantly in the 'self' and the 'general' experience descriptions, and most of them were produced as 'general' rather than as 'self' descriptions. Parrott & Smith (1991) too found several important differences in people's conceptualisations of 'self' and 'typical' accounts of embarrassment.

ⁱⁱⁱ When subjects answer a set of detailed questions (e.g. in Shaver's et al. study, 1987, the questions were very specific, such as "What happens to cause one to feel sad?" "What does one feel and think?" "What does one say?"), their accounts might be biased. Furthermore, if the coding method is theory-driven (e. g.. Shaver et al. analysed and coded subjects' 'typical' and 'self' descriptions in terms of *prototypical* features associated with each emotion, such as a set of antecedents, experiential, expressive and other kinds of responses, and self-control procedures), an extraneous structure might be superimposed on the data.

^{iv} For the vignette portraying a husband/wife relationship, another version of the kiss story stated that the couple was spending time at a sea house with friends and that one afternoon the protagonist, getting up from a nap, saw, through the open door of a room in the house, his/her partner kissing someone.

^v This method of data coding has been used in previous studies of people's theories of sadness, pride, envy and joy (Zammuner, 1991, 1993a, b, in preparation; Zammuner & Seminati, 1994). In this study, each set of protocols (e.g. all prototypical attributions made by 20-year-olds) were analysed and coded by one judge, who had been previously trained by the author; any unclear or problematic coding issue that judges had was resolved with the author. The average inter-judge agreement index, between the codes independently assigned by the author to a random sample of 80 protocols in total (20 for each judge), and the original codes assigned by each judge, was .82.

^{vi} People's knowledge of other emotions (sadness, pride) was found to be similarly richer for more salient, personally relevant antecedents, and, to some extent, in women (Zammuner, 1991, and in preparation; the attribution and the age variables were not considered in these studies).

^{vii} For instance, Shaver et al. (1987) used very detailed questions because they were afraid that otherwise subjects might not provide sufficiently precise answers.