From cartels to futures. The aluminium industry, the London Metal Exchange and European competition policies, 1960s-1980s

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Abstract:

In 1978, the London Metal Exchange started a futures trade for aluminium. Before then, the global aluminium trade was regulated by a producers’ list price, which was settled through cartel networks and served as price referral for the market price. Many observers agree that the start of the futures was a turning point for the aluminium industry because it reshaped global markets and the strategies of the main actors into the industry. Despite this recognition, little attention has been paid to the factors behind this change. This article shows that this outcome was helped by an antitrust action of the European Commission. Discussing the weight that the European Commission held in this change, this research brings new evidences about the nexus between competition policies and the governance of global market for commodities. One major conclusion is that the European antitrust contributed in making the producers’ list prices unworkable, assisting the emergence a new pricing system.

Keywords: commodity trade, international cartels, competition policies, futures, produce exchanges, metal traders

In the October 1978, the London Metal Exchange (hereafter LME) launched a futures contract for aluminium. This fact surprised the non-ferrous market analysts for two reasons. First, aluminium was never traded through a futures exchange because its pricing system, historically based on a producers’ list price, avoided in the previous decades harsh fluctuations of prices, making useless the adoption of futures – i.e. contracts about forward transactions for mitigating the risk linked to price fluctuations. Actually, the LME and other commodity exchanges, both in Europe and in the US, failed in starting such a trade in the previous decades, while aluminium producers openly boycotted this initiative, demonstrating a strong preference for their historical list prices. Second, the launch of futures
contracts was announced concomitantly with the start of an antitrust law suit of the European Commission. A few days before the start of LME’s futures, the antitrust division of the European Commission (the DG IV) formally accused the European producers and their trade association, the European Primary Aluminium Association, of collusive behaviours. According to the sentence, which the European Commission formulated some years later in 1984, the protracted boycott of the LME was considered a serious evidence of anti-competitive behaviours. As a consequence, the sentence suggested that the adoption of a futures trade was more aligned with a competitive market, paving the way to the success of LME’s aluminium trade.

The transition from a list price system to futures is considered a major turn in the history of aluminium. This change is often explained as the outcome of mere economic forces, such as the emergence of new strategic groups of producers or the natural effect of the full maturation of this industry. Also, the traders who have taken part to the introduction of aluminium at the LME never clarified if this transition was helped – and how – by the European anti-trust authorities. This article attempts to discuss the weight that the European anti-trust had played in the establishment of futures contracts in such an important commodity as aluminium. It argues that the European antitrust authorities and the LME not only found common goals in establishing a futures contract for aluminium, but also cooperated in changing the pricing policies in this industry. While looking at cooperation between the European antitrust authorities and the LME, this article contributes to three main areas of research: first, the dynamics of international cartelisation and subsequent decartelisation; second the connections between law and big business, and the history of international commodity trade, with particular reference to the role of the commodity exchanges in their governance. In relation to this point, it deals with the way in which global markets are reshaped by setting up explicit and tacit rules and institutions.

First established after the invention of aluminium electrolysis in 1886 (the Hall-Héroult process), this industry grew as a global business. At the end of the nineteenth century aluminium was still a young and unknown metal, but it progressively became a key industrial material during the twentieth century. From 1900 to the 1970, the demand for aluminium grew by about 10% per year, while its global output soared from about 5,000 tons in 1900 to about 15 million tons in 1979. After
the World War II, aluminium output progressively overtook that of other non-ferrous metals, such as
tin, zinc, lead and copper, becoming the first non-ferrous metal in terms of demand and output;
nowadays, it is even challenging the position of iron and steel. The applications of aluminium are very
broad, ranging from drink cans to airplanes and from low to high technology applications. There is no
single explanation behind the success of aluminium: this is the combination of intense research and
development, vertical integration and ad hoc commercial policies that, differently to other non-ferrous
metals, relied on list price instead of futures. Specific events, such as the two world wars stimulated
important applications and end-uses and, as a consequence, innovation and demand. The historical
majors firms, such for instance ALCOA, Pechiney and Alusuisse, moreover, succeeded in carrying out
upward and downward integration, which were crucial both to the creation and expansion of new
outlets, and, more importantly, to a quick transition of the aluminium firms from a war to peace
economy, a development which could be taken for granted soon after the war.

With regard to the commercial policy, producers adopted a fairly stable list price in the early
stage of the history of this metal to make aluminium compete against other non-ferrous metals. Price
stability represented one features in the history of this trade. Actually, a common and stable price list
policy, which was settled through cartels and similar co-operative arrangements, remained in place
until the start of aluminium futures in the late 1970s. The price policy of aluminium producers was
an important factor in the success of this metal and in its spectacular growth. For instance, users were
in position to establish reliable figures when adopting aluminium as substitute of other metals, while
producers took advantage from stable returns that were used to invest in new outputs. Against this
background, the reasons as to why this industry opted for another pricing system, i.e. the futures trade,
are of paramount importance. After having discussed the methodological issues linked to the transition
from a list price system to futures trade in the part 1, the article will describe the framework of
aluminium cartelisation in the post-World War II era in the part 2 in order to explain how producers
were able to continue their price policy. This implies that producers adopted a specific political and
legal strategy, analysed in the part 3, which was used to cover them from the anti-trust concerns. The
part 4 will focus on the EU Commission’s anti-trust suit, which drove both producers' cartel network
and their pricing policy to an end.
1. From cartels to futures. A state of the art about the aluminium industry.

While the history of aluminium cartels is already known by the scholarly studies, it is less clear how this industry is linked to the futures trading and, in particular, how this metal was introduced into the trading of the LME. Aluminium industry was often considered a shining example of international cartelisation. In the first studies about international cartels, the aluminium industry was described as one of the most cartelised business on the global level. The specific economic and technological features of this industry, notably its huge capital outlays, strong industrial concentration, and standardisation, were often used to explain the cartel behaviour of aluminium firms. The literature focused mostly on the period before 1945, when a series of official cartels with a virtually global reach were created. However, the aluminium cartel was re-activated after the World War II, confirming the researches of Harm Schröter and Jeffrey Fear, which suggested that cartelisation continued after 1945. Moreover, the case of the aluminium industry confirms also that cartelisation was not only a feature of the European economy, having a true global reach. Stuckey and Holloway for first explored cartelisation in aluminium industry after the World War II, and they inferred that it took other forms of collaboration, such as joint-ventures and trade associations, but they could not, for various reasons, back up their argument with archival and other primary research material. Recent studies provided detailed information about cartelisation in the aluminium industry after the Second World War, suggesting that the kernel of the industrial cooperation was the adoption of the same pricing system world-wide.

The fact that a cartel survived after the war is important for a number of reasons, not least because it provides some insight into the debate about cartel stability and cartel success initiated by Stigler in the late 1960s and continued more recently by Levenstein and Suslow. The ability to put in place governance systems aimed at the control or definition of global prices, i.e. cartel or anti-competitive arrangements, remained central in this industry after 1945, which attributes the success of cartels to their ability to adapt to given institutional conditions and exerts leverage on a certain degree of commitment. From this standpoint, the introduction of aluminium at the LME appears as a deep historical rupture. Referring to the French national case, Hachez-Leroy claimed that although ‘still
unexplored,’ the introduction of aluminium in the LME remains ‘central to understand the evolution of
the aluminium industry since 1979.’ Other studies already proposed the introduction of aluminium at
the LME as the end of this industry’s cartelisation. Company histories in addition showed that in the
1980s some aluminium producers, such as ALCOA or Alusuisse, began to use the LME on the ground
that it was part of a broader transformation which saw those firms to emphasise a more financially-
oriented. Studies about other aluminium producers, notably Pechiney and ALCAN, also confirmed
the transformation during the 1970s of the their financial strategies that were, in its turn, more in line
with the LME. However, these elements do not provide a complete explanation for the adoption of
LME’s devices. It is still unclear how the LME won the resilience of the historical producers to futures
trading.

These points seem legitimate research questions because, in spite of the role of the LME as
price settler for aluminium market, it appeared that price manipulations continued in more recent
times, for instance during 1994, as reported by Stiglitz, and also in 2013, as reported by the trader
press. According to Slade, a scholar who inspected in detail both pricing approaches for non-ferrous
metals, prices ‘determined on exchanges are not synonymous with competitive prices’ and aluminium
at LME does not make exception. From the standpoint of the economic theory, the two pricing
options analysed for the history of aluminium industry, i.e. producers’ list price and commodity
exchanges’ pricing, are idiosyncratic: the one excludes the other. According to the pioneer studies
about futures trading of Goss, some conditions are required to set a successful futures trade, such as a
relevant variation of prices, the presence in the market of economic agents with commitments (traders
for instance), high standardisation, the possibility to store the commodities traded, and, finally,
demand for risk hedging facilities. Other researchers also tried to establish a comprehensive
framework to analyse futures markets feasibility, arguing that they provide facilitations to
stockholding, to hedging, to collect and disseminate information, and to perform a forward pricing
function.

Nevertheless, it is hard to define which is the best option for an industry, even though we can
assume that exchange prices are more volatile than producers’ list prices. Exchanges’ pricing has both
positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, fluctuations in prices can create concerns to producers,
especially to the ones operating in heavy industries that make plans about production and investments. Consumers can share similar concerns, especially when they need to make costs foresights. On the other hand, exchanges could provide hedging facilities to cover both producers and consumers from the risk of price fluctuation. They could also provide facilities for handling inventory excess; their services could be particularly valuable in the case of an industry affected either by chronical overproduction or by technical rigidities. Moreover, while producers’ list prices could be considered not fully transparent for consumers, exchanges provide in many cases more. When a commodity is traded though exchanges, this also reduces the need to make foresights, because the price can serve as a barometer to illustrate the supply/demand situation – thus providing elements to a producer to decide about production and investments. In an industry with high concentration, firms are more often driven to opt for a list price, varying in alternative output, inventories or both and keeping prices stable. Generally, in this case the industry leader’s list price also works as barometer, which other producers follows in their quotations.28

Until the late 1980s, the concentration of the aluminium industry made it fits with producers’ list price, while its rigidities and periodical oversupplies made it reasonable to opt for futures trading. Economists have also studied whether the aluminium trade at LME has been efficient or not since the late 1980s, analysing either the consistency between LME prices and real market prices or their effectiveness in forecasting.29 However, these studies have analysed neither the efficiency of LME prices at the launch of futures contracts, nor the working of former pricing system. Thus, we do not know if LME was more efficient of the producers’ list price when futures trade was started. According to the general theory of industrial pricing, some factors can change pricing from list price to futures trade, such as an increase in number of suppliers, a fall in vertical integration of producers, a geographical increase of outlets and an increase of product standardisation. In particular, the arrival of new suppliers can be detrimental for the effectiveness of producers’ list price because this entry is cause of asymmetries of information between producers and consumers. The entry of new players in the game of pricing, such as brokers and speculators, is the main difference between a list price situation and the context of an institutional market (such as an exchange): their role in providing
information alternative to the producers is often considered central to determine a price that the market can adopt as basis for the transactions.\textsuperscript{30}

Official reports made in the late 1970s and during the 1980s, i.e. when aluminium was modifying its pricing policy, however, seem not confirm that these factors were clearly changing. While global output was still concentrated in the hands of the six aluminium majors (ALCOA, ALCAN, Reynolds, Kaiser, Pechiney and Alusuisse), the level of the vertical integration of the industry was about the 80-85\% (thus only the 15-20\% of the metal produced was sold as an ingot in the market). Moreover, no relevant new entrant was yet come to the fore.\textsuperscript{31} In the mid-1990, the picture was completely changed, as a result of the decline of the ‘big six' market power and the emergence of new strategic groups with lower vertical integration that enlarged the market for ingot.\textsuperscript{32}

Discussing the historical change of aluminium trade at the LME, Chalmin rightly pointed out that this metal would unlikely be back to list prices in the future, describing the start of futures as a great path dependency for the governance of this industry.\textsuperscript{33} Nappi explained that the change in the pricing system was the outcome of the emergence of new strategic groups of firms, which were more aligned with a governance ‘by the prices,’ meaning that the fluctuation of prices influences the global output (when price rises, producers increases outputs and \textit{viceversa}).\textsuperscript{34} However, this turn was not taken for granted when the LME contracts were launched. In this article, it is argued that the efficiency of list prices in the aluminium market dropped after the launch of the LME contracts and not before. The economic approaches to futures can only partially explain this transition of pricing. Both the classic functions of a futures trade and its feasibility became evident after 1978 and not before.

This study also offers opportunities to discuss the links between business and antitrust. In particular, we wonder if antitrust helped the launch of futures trading. Surprisingly, even if aluminium is often considered a good case study to understand certain aspects of the global antitrust regulation, such as the meaning of oligopolistic competition or the extra-territorial reach of such policies, scholars have paid only little attention to the European competition policies. The evolution of this industry was very often linked only to the US antitrust policies, because of the weight that it had on ALCOA, the American giant firm. Actually, law and business historians very often studied the action against this firm that the US antitrust authorities started in 1937 and ended in 1945, considering it as a turning
point for the history of antitrust approaches.\textsuperscript{32} This case marked the end of one of long lasting monopoly of ALCOA in the US aluminium industry after the World War II and imposed a series of remedies that brought new producers to the North American market, such as Reynolds Metals Co. and Kaiser Aluminum, and that made ALCAN an autonomous company from ALCOA.\textsuperscript{36} This case represented a main change in the US antitrust attitude toward big business, opening a season in which monopoly \textit{per se} was considered as contrary to antitrust law. In this respect, the ability of the US authorities in shaping the industrial structure of the main producing country during the 1950s is often used to confirm the idea of the US regulation as a global actor from the standpoint of antitrust policies.\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, this US antitrust case had also a direct impact over the international cartelisation because, while the decision on ALCOA was still pending, the US authorities were able to induce ALCAN to ask for the termination of the cartel, thus providing partial solution to the complaints against the American company.\textsuperscript{38}

Even if the US antitrust case caused a global change, it did not unravel the anticompetitive behaviours of such as oligopolistic industry. Since the 1950s, the aluminium firms have continued to collude, and scholars have already debated about their pricing behaviour, trying to understand how firms were able to impose a global price to this industry, in this case the price that the Canadian firm Alcan practiced in its international sales (‘Alcan export price’). Actually, this price served as list price by the aluminium industry as a whole and it was considered the general barometer in aluminium market, being the reference for all quotations till the eve of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{39} In such as an oligopolistic markets as the aluminium one, it is not uncommon that list prices are used as barometer for both long-term contracts and spot trades.\textsuperscript{40} But, in the specific case of aluminium, this attitude toward price was not perceived as a fraud against the public interest, because it was encouraged by governmental policies, such as the US administration, which surveyed the prices in the national market both to control ALCOA’s attitude toward new entrants of this industry and to monitor the military expenditures linked to the Cold War.\textsuperscript{41} It is also to be said that, while many intergovernmental commodity agreements were formed after 1945 in order to stabilise the prices of several commodities, the network of aluminium producers accomplished this task, without any need to form a public authority for the international governance of this metal.\textsuperscript{42} Other researches about single national
markets during the post-war period also showed that governmental controls and tariffs played a crucial role in providing order in the international aluminium trade and in defending national producers from an international competition that would be too harsh.\textsuperscript{43} From this standpoint, it is also important to consider that the global market for commodities – especially the industrial ones – was not fully developed before the trade liberalisations that followed the European integration and GATT’s rounds during the 1960s and the 1970s.\textsuperscript{44} For its military and strategic importance, aluminium was often protected from excessive trade liberalisation during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{45} This is an important factor for this research: a terminal market like the LME could work only with a certain degree of market openness. The governments’ approaches to the LME appear important to understand its success; how the political level reacted to the proposal of a futures trade for aluminium could reveal causes for its success or demise.

In fact, the vision of national and international authorities toward a speculative global market has still to be explained. Aluminium is not the only commodity that was affected by a transition from list prices to futures. In particular, coffee, tin and nickel have known similar paths. However, in none of these cases antitrust authorities played any role. The main reason of change in these other commodities was the incapacity of the list price to serve as referral for market quotations.\textsuperscript{46} The case of aluminium is different: the ‘Alugate,’ as the producers nicknamed the antitrust procedure that interested the European aluminium industry for about a decade, is a clear sample of a change induced by the institutional action of an international authority, the European Commission. The ‘Alugate’ lasted about as long as the ALCOA case of the 1930s-40s: the first inspections of the DG IV started in 1975 and the legal initiative ended in December 1984 with the publication of the accusations of all the European producers, which also included US firms that had invested in Europe since the 1960s. According to the existent literature about EU antitrust, this global impact of a European action seems rather unique and it anticipated more famous cases, such as the one against Microsoft and Coca-Cola.\textsuperscript{47} In particular, according to Warlouzet, the Commission of the period analysed by this study was particularly weak to act effectiveness anti-cartel policies, while Ramirez-Perez described the tolerance of Commission toward other agreements contemporary to the aluminium case, such as in the automotive industry.\textsuperscript{48} In spite of its seminal and global feature, this case has not yet enticed the
curiosity of historians of the DG IV.\textsuperscript{49} It seems on the contrary that it has to be analysed in detail, wondering which were the goals of the European authorities behind this change.

Futures trade and produce markets have drawn only little attention among business and economic historians, in spite of their central importance for the history of global trade.\textsuperscript{50} In many cases, studies only deal with the problem of their regulation and – or manipulation, with reference to the US context of agro-industrial commodities, such as cotton or wheat.\textsuperscript{51} Since the second half of the nineteenth century, when the principal produce exchanges were established, there has not been a common idea about their utility and desirability as tools for market governance.\textsuperscript{52} About the specific case of the LME, only poor information is available in the principal scholarly publications about UK commodity markets, merchants and traders; often our knowledge is focused only on the beginnings and initial development of this exchange.\textsuperscript{53} The only exception to this state of the art is the seminal publication of Rees, which dedicated about 40 pages to the LME from its creation to the 1970s, but without taking aluminium in consideration.\textsuperscript{54} The analysis of historical works about London financial centre, such as the ones by Cassis and Michie, is no more useful to understand the interconnection between the LME and City’s haute finance, even though London metal traders are a great expression of the financial capitalism with many ramifications to the British haute finance.\textsuperscript{55}

The LME was created in 1877 to cope with the risks and prices fluctuations of tin, copper and lead markets, when the ongoing globalisation of the market for these metals increased the imports in the UK replacing local production as a result of the country depletion of mineral resources. For many decades, these three metals represented the core business of the LME. In these metals, a producer exchange is essential to hedge from the risk of harsh price fluctuations, which characterised their history on the long run, and which were quintessential to the mining nature of these industries and to the distance between production sites and terminal markets. In this context, the LME was able to provide futures and forward prices, which became the basis for the spot trading. Even though cartelisation is not excluded in the presence of a produce market such as the LME and is very common to non-ferrous metals, cartels in these industries either failed to impose a ‘list price’ or had to cope with the LME price, manipulating it.\textsuperscript{56} When aluminium was ‘invented’ at the end of the nineteenth century, the history of this metal and of LME took two parallel ways: aluminium producers, through
cartels and other cooperative strategies were able to impose a list price, which firms chose to keep as stable as possible on the long run, while LME for long time disregarded this metal considering it not interesting for a futures trade.\textsuperscript{57} Neither the implication in aluminium trade of German metal traders with ramifications into the pre-1914 London terminal markets, nor the direct involvement of a former LME’s president – Sir Cecil Budd – in an Anglo-Norwegian company formed in 1906, were sufficient to challenge the producers vision at the very birth of this industry.\textsuperscript{58} Yet, things started to change during the 1960s and the 1970s. As we will see, many factors of uncertainty attempted the ability of producers in controlling their industry through a list price.\textsuperscript{59}

In dealing with these three main topics, cartelisation and decartelisation, nexus between law and business, and futures markets, this research relies on material found in a certain number of archives. These are, first, the producers’ archives, in particular the ones of Pechiney, ALCOA, Alusuisse, British Aluminium Company (hereafter BACO) and Reynolds, which are crucial to understand the nature of the producers’ networks (cartel agreements, trade associations and other forms of market governance) and their approach to the LME. In the case of Pechiney, also the complete records of the ‘Alugate,’ which included also the correspondence with EEC commissioners and the other producers, was disclosed to this research. Documents of the traders that were involved in the settlement of aluminium future markets were found in the historical collection of the Institute for the History of Aluminium, in Paris. In addition, this work has analysed the documents of the European Primary Aluminium Association (hereafter EPAA) – the European association of aluminium producers, which were important especially in relation to the ‘Alugate.’ These documents were seen in association with those of the European Commission and of the Bank of England, which helped LME to shape the aluminium futures contract during the 1970s. This research also makes use of material kept at the National Archives, as far as the British authorities entered in the nexus of links between aluminium producers and the LME over the decades analysed by this research. Those archives have finally been complemented by the OECD documents, where a study group on aluminium worked during the 1970s as last resort attempt to avoid alternative pricing system to the producers’ one.

\textbf{2. The economics and politics of aluminium market governance during the 1960s.}
After the World War II, the leading European actors (Alusuisse, BACO, Pechiney, Montecatini and Vereinigte Aluminium Werke (hereafter VAW)) were the founders of a new informal way of industrial cooperation, the Club, which was created in 1953. Afterward, it was extended to other companies from Austria, Norway, Spain, and Sweden during late 1950s and beginnings of 1960s. This larger ring of companies was consolidated during the 1960s and in 1969 its members created the European trade association of this industry, EPAA. Until the beginnings of the 1960s, the US producers were not very active outside the US, because the relative little openness of the international markets and, above all, the growing domestic military demand that made the American producers focusing on the US market. Only occasional meetings were organised to share information during the 1950s between Europe and US. A notable exception to this sketch is Reynolds’ takeover of BACO in 1958.\(^6\) Differently to the US firms, the Canadian ALCAN was a global firm already in the 1950s, with active sales both in the US and in the European markets, in particular the British one.\(^6\) ALCAN had very frequent meetings with the European firms since the early 1950s; it became a stable member of the Club in 1966, attending every meeting with its European subsidiaries. In 1972, the international economic crisis led aluminium producers to create a global forum to link US and European firms: The International Primary Aluminium Institute (hereafter IPA).\(^6\)

During this period of frequent meetings, the chairmen of European firms have chosen ALCAN’s export list price as the reference for market quotations, because the Canadian firm was the most important actor in the global market of this metal during the 1950s and the 1960s. This list price was also adopted by the specialist trade press, such as the Metal Bulletin or the American Metal Market, as the referral for market quotations. The effectiveness of the producers’ list price was the outcome of the sharing of information within their network on a very refined basis: each month, they gathered data on production, capacities, dispatches and stocks. Data on stocks were judged essential to follow the evolution of the market situation, which made the producers aware of the global situation with very frequent updates. This mechanism was essential for the governance of the international situation and it became the kernel of EPAA and of IPA.\(^6\) Information about the supply/demand situation was central to the pricing policy of the producers: the oligopolistic structure of the industry, together with the ability in gathering reliable information that covered virtually the 100% of the
aluminium, helped the pricing policy in being efficient during the 1950s and the 1960s, when market prices were strongly correlated to the list price. Actually, producers were able to adapt constantly the output to the increasing demand, making their price effective as a barometer for the global market.64

However, the global aluminium market was not free from concerns. During the 1960s, in spite of the control of the Club over the supplies was virtually full, two unexpected sources of metal risked to upset the global market for this metal. According to the economic literature resumed above about pricing, new sources of supply are a main possible cause of abandon of list. The interesting point is that, while during the 1960s there was no significant new producer that challenged the producers’ list price, new sources of metal were linked to the economic struggle between the two blocs of the Cold War.65 The aluminium trade was menaced by supplies, first, from the Soviet Block and, second, from the US strategic stockpile. The strategy of the cartel was to put under control both sources of supply, with the goal to avoid alternative pricing models for them. About the USSR risk, an increasing trade from the Eastern Europe threatened to destabilise the global aluminium market, because of some low quotations in the metal market in London. The Soviet exports, which were caused by the need for the Communist block to gather western currencies with which to import other goods, became a threat to the western markets at the end of the 1950s and turned out to be dramatic at the beginning of the 1960s.66 The impact of low quotation on the main terminal market of London also provoked a first reaction in the traders milieux, which started to publish a so-called ‘free market price’, sometimes referred to as ‘other quotations’ as alternative to the ALCAN’s list price. This was the first time in which the referral price for aluminium was challenged by a price whose formation was not controlled by the producers but, instead, by the traders. The discrepancy during the initial flow of the Soviet metal into the UK market provoked a first proposal to open a futures trade at the LME, which was justified as functional to provide hedging facilities to cover buyers from the risk linked to the new fluctuations in the aluminium price.67

In the other champ of the Cold War, the US government announced several times its intention to put the US strategic stockpile to an end and to buffer its inventories on the market. The strategic stockpile was a policy that the US government had been accumulating since the Korean War in order to improve its military-industrial force in case of war.68 At the beginnings of the 1960s, these stocks
represented about 3 years of the global production for this metal and their clearing on the market would have threat the industry at the global level, causing a serious unbalance between demand and supply, as the key US producers reported. This happened at the same time when the western markets were hit by the Russian metal. In order to handle the stockpile surplus, the American producers proposed though their trade association to establish a global cartel scheme to the US Congress, but this proposal was rejected in 1962 for antitrust reasons. Since this rejection, the US government and the American firms opposed different visions about how to manage the stockpile depletion, and the Commodity Exchange of New York (COMEX), which were the US equivalent of the LME, tried to exploit the situation announcing its intention to start a futures trade with the aluminium coming from the governmental stockpile. However, this proposal was rejected both by the producers and the US government, which were both aligned to the idea of preserving the price stability of the aluminium market. Nevertheless, that was a serious attempt to change the pricing policy for this metal during the 1960s in the US market.

Two years after the starting of the stockpile incident, a special committee was formed in order to define the way in which this metal would be cleared on the market. The US firms prospected to buy back the metal from the administration and to gradually buffer it on both the national and the international markets. While this proposal was being discussed, the US government reckoned that the list price was better than any other pricing policy because, while discussing the stockpile depletion, the US government was able to hamper an augmentation from 24¢/lb to 26 in the list price that North American firms proposed. After having obtained the endorsement of their proposal about the re-purchase of the stockpile from the US administration, the US producers negotiated a further agreement with the European producers to find an outlet into the Old continent’s market. However, the US strategic metal was not the most dangerous supply for the producers. The trade with the Soviets was the cause of more anxieties for political reasons. This trade was embarrassing for some national political powers in Europe, in particular West Germany, France, Italy and United Kingdom, which were trying to build cordial economic relationships with Eastern Europe. National political actions would have meant imposing either anti-dumping procedures or limitations to trade by licencing; however, these actions were not achievable because, before the settlement of the European general
tariffs, some countries were big importers of aluminium and were not disposed to help the enactment of high tariffs. In particular, the Belgian authorities were against high protections for the European market. At the time the UK, which was the main target of the Russian metal, was not part of the European Community and in this case no action by the European authorities was practicable because, once introduced in the British market, the Soviet metal could have been re-exported with ease in the European Common Market.  

According to internal archive documents of the Club, political powers aimed to avoid a political action to stop this trade, also because they were not willing to change the West-East diplomatic situation in a period in which the political tensions was balanced by a relative commercial peace between the two blocs. However, the availability on the market of metal from the USSR, which was not under the control of the Western producers, stimulated a growing interest of the LME toward aluminium. The producers used their political channels to avoid this outcome, in particular begging the authorities that could intervene with the most ease to stop LME action. Both BACO and ALCAN were able to find in the UK government, and in particular in the Board of Trade, an ally to prevent LME’s action. Endorsing the producers’ request, the Board of Trade blessed a gentlemen’s agreement to take control over the metal from the USSR, claiming the desirability of a ‘commercial action’ – as UK officials called the agreement – to tame the concerns coming from an uncontrolled pricing of the Soviet metal in the UK market. The other producers also involved their own government in a general endorsement, which was considered the best solution to avoid both diplomatic issues between the East and the West and the disruption of the basic features of the international aluminium market. The European firms and Raznoimports agreed on the quantity of metal and its price, which was referred to the ALCAN’s export price, i.e. the official industry’s list price. After four years, this agreement was renewed, and then it was renegotiated on yearly basis several times until 1976, modifying the quantity of metal but without contesting the producers’ pricing policy. As regards this aspect, specific clauses were set to prevent any sale through the LME. During the 1970s, a ‘spirit of agreement’ clause was also added, which foresaw the broking of the agreement in the case of any trade of aluminium would have started at the LME. While the meetings with the Soviet traders were managed by Alusuisse in its headquarter in Zurich, the aluminium producers used as their middleman for the final settlement of the
agreements a London based metal trader, Brandeis Goldschmidt Ltd, which was also member of the ring of the LME. For that reason, the Eastern metal agreements were often quoted in the trading press as ‘Brandeis agreements.’ Brandeis was part of the Warburg Group, the leading financial supporter of the British Aluminium Company and a main agent during its takeover by Reynolds in 1958. Its direct involvement was also aimed to tame any further action by the LME. Without entering into details, these agreements took the form of a bilateral agreement between Brandeis and Raznoimports. Each producer signed a different agreement with Brandeis in order to share the metal purchased from Raznoimports.

(here tab. 1)

As shown in the table 1, which lists the participants into the Brandeis’ agreements, also the North-American firms were part of it, in spite of the clearly uncomfortable political position behind this kind of agreement. They entered in the first agreement from 1963 and 1967, then they asked to be formally cancelled from the agreements in 1967 for political reasons but they continued to purchase the Soviet metal from the European companies, trading it with the engagement of the Europeans to buy the US metal from the stockpile disposal. Thus, both the US stockpile metal and the USSR metal were managed by the club as a reservoir of surplus to buffer on the market. At the end of the 1960s, the US companies officially entered again into the agreement through their European subsidiaries, such as Reynolds Deutschland, Preussag and Anglesey Aluminium (both controlled by Kaiser), and Mosal and Elkem (both linked to ALCOA). Also new entrants in the industry, such as Rio Tinto Zinc, became a partner to the agreement over the. Raznoimport, in turn, was the middleman for other metal traders from Eastern Europe, such as Metalimpex (of Romania), Impexmetals (of Poland) and others. Several agreements were signed between Brandeis and Raznoimport from 1963 to 1976. The outcome of the general governance of the aluminium market represented a balanced situation between demand and supply, which helped price stability during the whole 1960s (at a price of 24 ¢/lb), in which stocks from the US stockpile and the Soviet countries were used to avoid swings, filling temporary lacks of supply such as in specific situations, like in 1965, in 1968, in 1973 (see figure 1).
3. Legal issues for aluminium agreements. Brandeis and the other agreements of the 1970s

The political endorsement of national authorities was an important aspect of the agreements. In particular, the help offered by the British powers on the Brandeis agreement should not be surprising, even though the trade from Soviet countries to Western markets attracted less from the scholarly community than the export from the West to the East and their containment. In a pioneering research about the oil trade between the East and he West, Jensen-Eriksen showed similar approaches adopted during the 1960s, when rising trade from the Soviet Union threatened to disrupt the Western market. In the specific context of the Cold War, private firms could play a unique role in business diplomacy that, in return, was politically covered by the national powers. Generally speaking, aluminium could epitomise the West-East trade during Cold War, in which a certain dose of pragmatism was adopted by both political and business world. The peculiar case of aluminium confirms the specific risk of the Soviet flow of commodity as a possible ‘upsetting’ factor in the global trade, to which Western political powers aimed to find a remedy, as Vernon claimed in a work almost contemporary to the facts described. In this sketch, the German authorities also played a key. The German firm – VAW – was a state-owned enterprise. As it was reported during the producers’ meetings, the German government was well informed about VAW participation into aluminium agreements. VAW has been one of the leading members of the Club since its creation and it contributed to craft the model of international governance of this industry after the WWII, prompting the creation of the EPAA during the 1960s. For instance, the EPAA and many meetings about the Brandeis negotiations were held in its general headquarters in Dusseldorf.

As regard to the links between aluminium industry and EEC, these agreements were not notified to the DG IV during the 1960s, even though the regulation 17/62 was already working when the first Brandeis agreement was defined. As far as the political powers were informed about the agreements and, sometimes, acted as grey eminences during their negotiations, it was clear that the commercial approach of aluminium firms was considered aligned with the general welfare and not
contrary to it, which implied that the legal protection coming from registration was not necessary. However, the main reason why these agreements were not registered to the DG IV was the impossibility to define the Brandeis’ agreement as a European affair, at least at the beginnings. This agreement was based in the UK, where BACO and ALCAN received the help of the Board of Trade, and it was operational in Switzerland, where Alusuisse carried out the negotiations with the Russians, sometimes with the help of ALCAN. Instead of being fully European and in spite of being clearly against the already enforced EEC legislation, at this agreement could be seen an Anglo-Swiss affaire during the 1960s. Nevertheless, the German firm notified the agreement to its national antitrust authority – the Kartellamt, obtaining approval to proceed, and this fact was judged in the club as sufficient in case of criticism from the legal authorities. However, from the legal standpoint there was no consensus whether the international antitrust authorities had priority over national ones in the European framework. The legal literature claims that the evolution of the aluminium antitrust case opened the door to a new interpretation of the while European law, which started to be considered as hierarchically superior to the national ones.

In spite of these legal consideration, the UK antitrust authorities expressed some concerns during the 1960s, requesting the registration of the Brandeis agreements. The registers of cartel agreements have interested recent studies, which agree about the ambiguity of this regulation that swung between survey and buoyancy of authorities in regards of collusion. This fact resulted into a confrontation between UK trade and antitrust authorities. While the Board of Trade blessed it, in 1966, the British antitrust authorities started to investigate the Brandeis’ agreement. The Board of Trade played the role of middleman between the British antitrust authorities and the British firms implicated in these agreements (BACO, ALCAN-UK and Brandeis), agreeing with their ideas. The producers aimed not to register the agreement because they wanted to keep secret their agreement, since the political concerns that such as a trade could have provoked if disclosed to the public opinion. A further concern came from LME, that could have exploited the information to start a new attempt to launch a futures trade on aluminium. The Board of Trade supported the idea to keep the confidentiality of the whole dossier. Actually, BACO and ALCAN asked the Board of Trade to conceal the dossier, in the case in which the antitrust authority requested registration. The Board of Trade shared the producers’
fears about the negative consequences that public disclosure of the Brandeis agreement, recognising that this case ‘could lead to a clash between the executive and the judiciary,’ and it also proposed to producers to ‘redraw the agreement in such way that it would not be registrable.’ After some discussions between the Board of Trade and BACO, the agreement was finally registered in 1968, but asking to keep it confidential. Before registering it, the Board of Trade suggested to modify the agreements in the future, in order to avoid further concerns with the UK antitrust. In particular, the use of a non-UK firm for the operation was suggested: the producers then moved the management of the agreements to the Swiss subsidiary of Brandeis, which was established in the Warburg’s office in Zurich.

These discussions between the UK producers and the Board of Trade had some effects on the legal choices of the European producers. Actually, this first case reshaped the global legal strategy of the European aluminium producers, also in regard to the European authorities. In particular, VAW expressed some perplexities about the fact that these agreements had never been notified to the DG IV. According to VAW, the current European legislation in matter of antitrust could have helped the structuration of more stable agreements with the Soviets, and thus preventing any further action from LME, instead of working against them. To achieve this goal, VAW proposed to rewrite the Brandeis’ agreements in order to align them with current European antitrust legislation and to register it in Brussels. A VAW’s legal expert was charged to re-write the agreement, Alexander Rudell. He also followed the idea to move the crux of the agreement from London to the Basle or Zurich, in order to stop any possible future action from the UK authorities. In a certain way, the European antitrust authority was considered safer than the UK one: consequently, Rudell transformed this agreement, which at first was essentially British, into a European one. The European producers welcomed the possibility to have agreements designed to protect them from infringing to articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. During 1968, Rudell approached the DG IV directors to found a pragmatic solution with them to make the agreement safe from a legal standpoint. Rudell claimed very good relationships with the higher officials of the DG IV, such as with Schumacher and Jaume, and also with the general director of the DG IV, Albrecht.
The Rudell’s legal strategy was to ask for a negative clearance, which could have protected the firms during the wait for DG IV’s decision, or, even better, for an exemption at the end of the examination. In any case, there was a good chance that it would take many years to make a decision, because of the congestion of the registrations on which the DG IV was working, and during this period the Brandeis agreement would be legally safe. In particular, one of the key concerns expressed by Rudell to the Commission was his formal request for keeping this agreement confidential, following the same considerations that were expressed in negotiating the agreement registration in the UK. Rudell debated with the DG IV officials these matters while he was preparing the legal dossier submitted to the Commission. In response to these concerns, the DG IV replied that ‘it is possible that no publication will in fact be effected if the Commission does not intend to prepare for a decision,’ suggesting that the DG IV operated a ‘deliberate non-action’ – as Rudell called it – with the goal to help the producers in keeping the agreements secrets without any negative outcome from registering. Once adopted for the Brandeis’ agreements, this strategy was also adopted for other agreements that the producers enacted at the beginnings of the 1970s.

The new legal approach of the European producers was concomitant with the emergence of the international economic crisis at the beginning of the 1970s: the registration of the Brandeis agreement was linked to other agreements and to the creation of a study-group of the OECD, which was considered as a further guarantee of immunity from a legal standpoint. At the beginning of the 1970s, the European producers were able to forecast a dramatic reduction of the global demand, which put on hold the 10% average growth per year that had characterised this industry since the early 1950s. Before this slump of the market, the main issue for the producers was to increment the global supply for a growing market; at the beginnings of the 1970s, a serious fear of output excess overcame. Inventory accumulation was a first outcome of this excess and the producers considered as urgent to prevent any possible operation from the merchants who may try to take over it for speculative goals. The producers explored the possibility of carrying out some joint actions to cope with the economic turmoil and tame the passing negative market trend. In particular, since a new upward trend in demand was forecasted for the period that followed 1973, the French and Swiss producers proposed at meeting of the EPAA in January 1971 to organise a collective stockpile to ‘freeze’ excessive inventories as an
alternative to severe reductions and to create a specific firm to handle this excess of metal, Alufinance. The hint to stockpile inventories was crucial to the control market prices. Collective stockpiles had proliferated since the 1930s in order to keep prices stable in the commodities markets, and also political powers suggested their adoption as a key tool to fight inflation and unemployment.

Alufinance was a major action for two main reasons. The first relates to the technological level: the smelting technology of aluminium is very rigid and output restrictions have dramatic effects on producing costs. Heavy investments are required to reactivate the pots that were cut off from electricity supply in order to reduce output. The idea to use inventory management to avoid – or at least reduce – the impact of output restrictions aims to have a good impact over the productive efficiency more than in other commodities that have less rigid technologies. Secondly, Europeans were concerned about the risk that a huge quantity of inventories out of their control would have revitalised the eventuality of launch the aluminium futures at the LME. As a consequence, Alufinance was essential to hamper any action by the LME. The Warburg bank was called again to play the role of the drafter in this scheme, after the first intervention of its trader (Brandeis) in reducing the Soviet exports. Warburg was, at that time, a leading actor in the Eurodollar capital market and an innovative institution in the creation of ‘flat rate’ financial facilities. BACO served as middleman to involve this bank in the settlement of the scheme that, accordingly with the original ideas expressed by European producers, should have solved all the troubles outlined above.

Since the British antitrust laws were considered stricter than the EEC’s ones (especially after the struggle for registering agreements at the mid-1960s), the aluminium producers decided not to register Alufinance in London and to opt for another location. The choice was addressed to Jersey, which was in the Sterling area, still provided good access to the euro-dollar markets, and was cheap in terms of fees of registrations and taxes. The working of Alufinance was based on a purchasing of metal from the producers at a price equal to the ALCAN price minus 10% and a reselling of it at 100%. By this way, the goal of Alufinance was to stabilise the price at a level around the ALCAN’s one. Nevertheless, ALCAN’s price started to change with more frequency than in the past, losing its former stability. During the 1960s, the producers were able to keep it at the level of 24¢/lb, in a
context of monetary stability and of growth of demand. During the 1970s, the list price became itself more volatile because of the changing producing costs, linked to the first oil shock, and of the global inflation. As a consequence, during the 1970s, ALCAN’s price was revisited about 20 times and each adjustment asked an alignment in the national markets, in a context of monetary instability that made this alignment more difficult. In spite of its instability, the producers’ list price was still considered efficient until the mid-1970s, because the real market transactions recoded in the specialised press, such as the Metal Bulletin (spot prices and producers’ delivery contract), kept a strong correlation with ALCAN’s official price, as seen in figure 2. Things started to change after 1976, also as a consequence of the legal situation of the European producers.

From the legal standpoint, the producers followed the same considerations made for the Brandeis agreements. Alufinance was notified to the EEC competition authorities, asking for a negative clearance according to regulation 17/62. This was essential to protect the producers from accusations and fines from the Commission. As in the case of Brandeis, the choice to proceeding with the notification corresponded to the producers’ need to launch the facilities as soon as possible, because of the dramatic situation of stocks, without risking legal concerns. However, the members of Alufinance also tried to show their scheme to the Commission as a tool to maintain production and, as a consequence, to save employment. The idea to tie self-regulation of producers with the social welfare of European countries represented an important aspect of the narration that the producers exposed to the Commission. In order to improve Alufinance’s efficiency and to its ability in keeping price stability, their members carried out other two initiatives. In 1972, they formed an Open Price System called International Fair Trade Practice Rules Administration for Primary Aluminium (IFTRA). IFTRA was based in Vaduz, Lichtenstein, and notified to the Commission following the same considerations of Alufinance. Its shareholders were, more than the members of Alufinance themselves, also ALCAN, Kaiser Preussag Aluminium GmbH, Metallgesellschaft, Alnord Aluminium Norway A/S, Ardal og Sundal A/S, Elkem Huset A/S, Empresa Nacional del Aluminio, RTZ, and Alluminio Sardo (Alsar). IFTRA was conceived to share information about producing costs and set private anti-dumping rules to cope with low prices provoked by the international slowdown of sales. The key idea behind the IFTRA was to obtain information about production, production costs, and
prices from those producers that were not member of Alufinance. As declared by Rudell to the Commission, which asked him in 1974 ‘which is the exact difference between a normal price declaration and a price list’, by entering in a device such as IFTRA ‘a producer declares he [sic] would not deviate from his price list.’\textsuperscript{106} In other terms, these rules were essential to avoid the risk of inefficiency of the list price because, in a period of strong changes in the factors that generated their level, these rules enforced producers to avoid competitive sales, which were defined as ‘dumping,’ since the price list was declared linked to producing costs by the rules.\textsuperscript{107}

The idea of ‘normal price,’ as it proposed by the IFTRA rules, was source of concern for the producers. While the dumping was not still well defined from a legal standpoint at that time, aluminium producers aimed to spread their idea about what a dumping price was in order to provide justifications to both Alufinance and IFTRA. As a consequence, a further action was undertaken by the European producers in order to find political support. Thanks to a VAW’s official \textit{demarche} after the German government, they succeed in summoning a special study group on aluminium at the OECD in 1972, whose goals were to analyse the problems of the global aluminium industry: raising producing costs, dumping prices from new marginal producers (that in the meanwhile appeared), and the global crisis of demand for this metal. The study group aimed to coordinate the action of reducing output outside Europe, to define a common policy of growth for the future and to form an international body for the governance of this industry at the global level. The special study group on aluminium, controlled by the members of EPAA, was able to coordinate the action of the output restriction, exchanging information with North American and Japanese producers, which could enter in this official forum without fearing any antitrust concerns.\textsuperscript{108} The OECD study group also commended and recommended the adoption of Alufinance as a model to cope with the crisis and save both labour and price stability. It also published indications about the normal market price, relating it to an ‘average producing cost’ of about 25 ¢/lb for old smelters, which confirmed the vision expressed by IFTRA\textsuperscript{109} and by the board of EPAA, according to which ‘toute offre inferieure à 23 ¢/lb est dumping’.\textsuperscript{10}

4. The ‘Alugate’: how DG IV responded to producers’ legal strategies
These agreements were notified to the DG IV of the EEC, in order to request a negative clearance: DG IV/26870 (Brandeis agreements, registered in December 1970); DG IV/26919 (Alufinance, registered in April 1971) and DG IV/27000 (IFTRA Rules, registered in March 1972). However, the legal strategy of the producers turned out to be not as safe as Rudell thought, because – while the Brandeis agreements have found the endorsement of the commissioners, at least at the beginning – the other two notifications arose some suspicion. The Commission put on hold the judgement about Alufinance and it decided to focalise it attention on IFTRA. In October 1973, DG IV sent its critical observations on the text of IFTRA and a first trial had begun in a general context of distrust toward the aluminium producers and their network. According to DG IV lawyers, the agreement was considered as a pretext for the producers to meet to discuss other matters, such as prices, quotas and so on.\footnote{111} The Commission was already investigating another ‘IFTRA,’ which Rudell had set out for the glass industry, another industry which was historically cartelised,\footnote{112} in the early 1960s and which served as a model for the open price system for aluminium. This distrust became open in December 1973, when the new Commissary of the DG IV, Albert Borschette, who had taken the place of Albrecht, openly criticised the aluminium agreements and its author during an interview about the general policy of the European antitrust. He publically spoke about the ambiguity of the legal creations of a German lawyer – who probably was Rudell himself – reporting IFTRA as an example of extremely dangerous organisations.\footnote{113}

The distrust in the IFTRA paved the way for a broader enquiry of the Commission toward the whole market structure of the aluminium industry.\footnote{114} The Commission was not yet aware of the way in which the aluminium producers organised their market during the previous decades and every aspect of the connections among the aluminium firms came under focus. In order to recover the trust of DG IV, Rudell also invited the commissioners to take part in the meetings of producers. However, when the IFTRA rules of the glass industry were rejected by the Commission in 1974, it seemed impossible to reverse the situation for the same rules that Rudel set out for the aluminium industry.\footnote{115} In spite of Rudell’s effort to obtain an exemption, this request was eventually rejected in 1975 and producers were judged guilty of infringement of the European competition law.\footnote{116} As a last tentative, Rudell tried to defend the producers arguing that the German antitrust authority (the Kartellmat) had already
accepted IFTRA, on the believe that a national legislation had greater value than the European one.\textsuperscript{117}

In this respect, DG IV published its decision also emphasising the superiority of the EU law over national legislation. A partial explanation of Rudell’s \textit{debacle} could be find into the fact that the directors and officers with whom he negotiated the registration of the aluminium agreements were substituted when Borschette became director of the DG IV. This change was a watershed for the legal strategy of the producers that, once this first case ended against them, were in a situation more and more precarious in respect of their credibility facing the Commission. Actually, after this first decision, the Commission started to investigate the other agreements, disregarding the informal agreements that Rudell claimed to have with the ancient officials. After having inspected the dossiers in 1975, DG IV concluded that Alufinance only represented a secondary agreement (actually, the notification of this agreement has never received a reply from the Commission) and concentrated on the Brandeis. The inspection had a bad outcome for the continuation of this agreements: the producers decided not to renew the agreements about the East metal after the summer of 1976, in order to show to the Commission their \textit{bonne foi}.\textsuperscript{118}

However, it became obvious that the DG IV did not aim to stop its legal action but to continue till a final judgement on this case. Even though the aluminium producers have already ended the Brandeis agreement and that, even if they were judged guilty according to the antitrust law, no fines would be applicable because they were prescribed for the excessive delay, the DG IV wanted to publish a final decision in any case.\textsuperscript{119} According to the chronology of the Alugate, the aluminium producers were warned about the unfriendly attitude of DG IV since the late 1975, when the decision about IFTRA was published. That not only led them to end the Brandeis agreements in 1976, it also put the producers under pressure. Actually, DG IV made other actions: in November 1975, DG IV asked for information, to which producers replied collectively at the end of February 1976. Instead to be satisfied of producers reply, in April 1976, DG IV asked for further information, while during the Summer 1976, it contacted each European producer with specific questions. When the producers replied also to further requests of information in October 1976, DG IV obtained a mandate of inspection into the producers’ documents, showing that its attitude was not conciliating. In January 1977, DG IV wrote also to the EPAA, asking about its implication into the Brandeis, thus presaging
that also the producers’ association was under inspection.\textsuperscript{120} After three years of inspections into the companies’ archives and of strict monitoring, DG IV sent about 200 pages of accusation to all the European companies. These accusations arrived in August 1978, about a month before the official launch of the LME contracts and a couple of weeks after the official news about intention of LME to start a futures trade with aluminium. DG IV’s core argument was that the aluminium producers used the Brandeis agreements to collude on prices, to take control over important supplies, and, above all, to have voluntarily boycotted LME, colluding on a collective action against it.\textsuperscript{121}

In other words, the DG IV tried to show the mechanism of LME as synonym with free market, warming the producers about the disapproval of other forms of pricing devices. The defensive strategy of the producers was to show the benefit of having stables prices to consumers, since it made the hedging operations of a futures markets in covering from the risk of price fluctuations unnecessary. To these efforts of defence, the DG IV replied with other 160 pages of objections, which were sent to producers at the end of May 1979, and with two weeks of interrogatories which were held in Brussels in November 1979.\textsuperscript{122} If we compare these legal actions of DG IV with the figure 1 about the spread between the ALCAN list price and the real market price, we can notice that to each action of DG IV corresponded a lack of efficiency in producers pricing policy. We have not access to information to assess if DG IV deliberately provoked this outcome, but we can formulate the hypothesis that the inspection worked against the power of the producers in adapting their price to the very changing market conditions that characterised the second half of the 1970s, thus eroding the efficiency of the producers’ list price. The greater inconsistencies between the ALCAN price and UK market quotations emerged in the key date of the process: when the producers received the letter of inspection from DG IV, when they received communication of the continuation of the process in the summer 1977, when they received the objections in the autumn 1978 and in the spring 1979. Afterward, ALCAN list price was never changed, making it completely inefficient to govern the global market of this metal. In particular, the phases in which emerged a certain discrepancy between the list price and the actual market quotations are strongly correlated with the evolution of the legal action, as the following figures shows:
In 10 events linked to the case, the DG IV action troubled the coordination of the producers’ cooperation. This inefficiency became total in the autumn of 1979, when producers stopped to meet for fearing an aggravation of their legal situation. Archive documents show that DG IV and LME had links before the formulation of the accusations and while inspections were causing concerns to producers. Actually, between 1976 and 1978, the DG IV participated in a study group, organised by the Bank of England and LME, which drafted the terms of a possible contract on aluminium. DG IV was invited by the Bank of England to participate into the discussion about LME reform and new contract for obvious reasons (DG IV was the regulation authority for all EU markets and since 1973 also for the UK). Thus, DG IV had already chosen to help LME to start a contract, thus we can formulate the hypothesis that it deliberately acted to provide an advantage to the futures trade over the producers’ list price. The London terminal market for the non-ferrous metals was considered a good way to curb the pricing system of the aluminium market that have characterised the aluminium business till then. During these meetings DG IV became familiar with scopes and working of LME and it helped this terminal market to opt for new features in contract that guaranteed more transparency in the price settlement.123

The support of DG IV and of the Bank of England led us to wonder what was the position of the Board of Trade. While during the 1960s, it helped the UK producers in both crafting the Brandeis agreements and in coping with antitrust concerns, in the second half of the 1970s, this support decreased. The Brandeis agreements and the policy of containing the risk of the imports from Soviet countries became less important than other political goals. When the situation with DG IV appeared particularly serious, BACO – like the other firms – asked for the help of its political powers. However, the Board of Trade showed to be particularly non-acting. Perchard’s researches about the history of BACO showed an ambivalent nexus of relationships between BACO and the UK authorities, that swung between periods of defence and other of intolerance.124 In the specific case of LME, BACO tried to find the protection of the Ministry of Industry, which replied that the Bank of England was alone responsible of this decision.125 Analysing the document of the Bank of England and the UK
Parliament papers, it results that the Board of Trade was adopting in these years a specific policy that aimed to make London the centre of the commodity markets again: as a consequence, unlike the past, it became an open ally of the institutional markets, such as LME, in providing global governance over trade. The idea to establish the aluminium contract at LME was concomitant with the idea to open gold, silver and nickel trades as well, which would have supported the creation of a World Commodity Centre in the City.\textsuperscript{126} The preparation of this project led the Zinc and Lead Study Group, the intergovernmental commission that regulated the trade of these two metals, to move from New York to London. As a consequence, LME proposal for aluminium trade was probably a way to ‘steal’ the aluminium trade from the US dollar influence to place it within the British sphere.\textsuperscript{127}

We need to add two elements to this sketch, which are important to understand the success of the LME in starting a trade with aluminium. The trader firm of the LME that proposed the launch of the contract, Rayner-Harwill, was aware that, still in 1977, the aluminium trade was fully in the hands of the old-established producers and that there were only few chances of success for the LME, due to the strong opposition that the dominant firm of this industry made to the launch of futures for this metal. However, compiling a report to the Board of LME, the trader was convinced about the decline in the next future of the majors in controlling the majority of the global output. Not only it was foreseen that the Soviet supply would pass through LME channels, but also that the global aluminium industry was next to a global change in its structures. The years of the crisis accumulated a huge delay in investments by the majors of the industry, which resulted in the emergence of new players.\textsuperscript{128} This position was largely shared in the traders’ \textit{milieux}, and the uprisng prices of aluminium LME during its first contracts at the end of 1978 (see figure 2) were explained by the global lack of metal, due to inability of the historical producers to ‘follow the trend and invest to meet the demand.’\textsuperscript{129} According to Rayner-Harwill, new producers, which were owned by governments of countries from Middle East and Latin America, would fulfill this lack. These new comers had not the same vertical integration of the old aluminium firms and they have different approaches to the pricing. They would come to the fore as powerful suppliers in the next years, asking for terminal markets for their metal. Rayner-Harwill calculated that, while in 1977 the big-six controlled the 72% of the global supply, after 1980 this portion would have decreased to about 56%. The portion of the state-owned firms would have
increased from about the 28% to 44%. Taking into consideration also the Soviet exporters, the traders forecasted that their part into the global supply would have jumped to the 30%, while in 1977 was still the 15%.\footnote{130} Facing these prospects, the LME aimed to be the pioneer in aluminium futures trading, providing hedging facilities before the market needed it. LME was not yet a firmly settled market in 1978 – and producers considered it as a meteor, like COMEX during the mid-1960s, but it was helped by the action of DG IV, which broke the ability of the producers in coordinate their actions especially in terms of pricing.

Conclusions

The key argument of this article is that the inspection of DG IV helped to turn the producers pricing policy into an inefficient and obsolete method of governance for this industry. Producers continued to publish a list price during the 1980s, aiming to discontinue the futures trade in the London Metal Exchange, but the close scrutiny made this list price less consistent with this market quotation than it was in the past.\footnote{131} We conclude that legal actions, before disrupting the cartel, reduced the efficiency of the list price of the producers to work as a referral price for the global market. The LME became an alternative market regulator for aluminium as a consequence of this legal distress to producers’ governance. This fact shows proves that the European Commission and the LME had mutual goals and their actions were supportive the one of the other. During its first years, LME used the aluminium coming from the Arabian region (Bahrain, Iran and Oman) and also from Eastern Europe to its daily trading operation because none of the historical producers supplied the produce exchange with any metal. During the early 1980s, as a consequence of the second oil shock and also of the falling market prices at LME, some of the historical producers passed through a severe turmoil, which led some of them to the nationalisation (such as Pechiney or the Italian producer), other to the failure (such as BACO or VAW). Differently to other branches, such as the steel, the European Commission did not help the settlement of a crisis-cartel, nor showed it a tolerant attitude toward big business collusion.\footnote{132} Instead, its antitrust division continued its inspection until it reached a decision, which was came in 1984. After the publication of the DG IV decision, ALCAN ceased to publish its list price, which had served as a barometer for this industry since the 1950s, and ALCOA opted for LME.\footnote{133} Therefore, in
this critical phase for the launch of LME’s futures trade for aluminium, the fact that the DG IV decision was still pending helped guide the change of pricing system. The final decision of DG IV, even though it did not issue fines because the terms of prescription were applicable, was the finishing blow to the resilience of the producers to the LME: it condemned the whole experience of the producers’ list price, hampering its resurgence. Thus, the whole market governance of aluminium industry was destroyed by a joint-action between DG IV and LME.

For its given features, LME was not merely a neutral commercial tool for trading commodities. Its success in starting the aluminium contracts went along with a financial transformation of international trade and with the sunset of the Bretton Woods order. The will to adopt LME for a historically stable priced commodity, like aluminium, reflected a huge transformation in the governance system of commodity trade. Both the reinforcements of European antitrust policies and the financial reshaping of commodity trade during the 1970s and the 1980s affected the transformation of aluminium trade. The current literature on commodity regulation often shows another scenario: during the 1970s, many international institutions, such as UNCTAD, tried to establish new forms of international trade regulation to help price stability, thanks to the introduction of buffer stocks schemes and of a common fund to take control over them. In that context, the aluminium industry followed a different path. Actually, the inception of LME trade in aluminium created a radical modification of the features of this industry. Since the start of the DG IV inspection and the launch of LME’s contracts, aluminium has lost its exceptional price stability and started to be affected by the fluctuations that reflected the daily changes established into LME’s ring by the traders. Recent news about aluminium market manipulation at LME shows that even these devices are not immune to anti-competitive actions; as a consequence, this story could be thought as a path ‘from cartels to futures’ instead of ‘from monopoly to competition’ as the history of ALCOA was labelled by George Smith.

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2 According to the firms’ correspondence, the dossier of accusation was received during August 1978.
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5 About contemporary actors, For instance, Ian Forster, the chairman of LME committee, claimed at the annual round-table of the American Metal Market Forum of October 1978 that these two facts were ‘pure coincidence.’ University of Glasgow Documents (UGD), British Aluminium Company (BACO) Archives, 347/10/7/13, American Metal Market Forum, notes by J.S. Bridgeman (BACO), 30.10.1978. LME’s in-house historical studies: Tarring, Corner! 43-54. Gibson-Jarvie, The London Metal Exchange, 199-204. Wolff, The Wolff’s guide, 156-163. Trevor Tarring was chief editor of the Metal Bulletin, a key publication of the City’s metal traders, when aluminium entered into LME trading. Robert Gibson-Jarvie was executive secretary of LME from 1970 to 1978. Rudolf Wolff & Co. was a trading firm that contributed to the creation of LME in 1877 and still in 1978 was amongst the main traders of this produce exchange.


12 Barjot, ‘Introduction’.


15 See for instance Cerretano, ‘European Cartels.’ Schröter, ‘Cartelisation and decartelisation.’


19 About commitment, its central role in cartels has been underlined by Spar, *The Cooperative Edge*. Recently, Storli “Cartel theory and cartel practice” adopted this conceptual framework, but surprisingly without referring to pricing policy.

20 Hachez-Leroy, *L’Aluminium français*, 299

21 Bertilorenzi, *The International Aluminium Cartel*.


26 Goss, ‘The forward pricing function’.

27 Stein, The Economics of Futures Markets. Streit, Futures Markets.


30 Slade, ‘Two pricing systems.’ Burns, ‘Futures markets and market efficiency.’


33 Chalmin, ‘Aluminium and the London Metal Exchange.’

34 Nappi, L’Aluminium.


36 Peck, Competition in the Aluminum Industry. Smith, From Monopoly to Competition.


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Compare with case studies contained in Patel and Schweitzer (eds.), *The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law*.

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Figure 1. Global supply-demand balance of aluminium industry, 1950s-1970s.

Notes. Stocks figure for 1971-1978 includes Alufinance’s holdings.
Table 1, The evolution of the Brandeis Agreements, 1963-1976

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<th>Alcan</th>
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<th>Pechiney</th>
<th>Alusuisse</th>
<th>AM</th>
<th>BACO</th>
<th>Elkem</th>
<th>ENASA</th>
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<th>Montecatini-Alumetal</th>
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<th>Svenska</th>
<th>VAW</th>
<th>Norsk Hydro</th>
<th>Holland</th>
<th>Alumínium</th>
<th>Giuliani</th>
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Notes: ^ after 1967, included in BACO's quota. For Reynolds, after 1974 using Reynolds Europe. For Kaiser, after 1971 using Kaiser-Preussag; ° after 1967, included in Elkem's quota; # 6 months;
Figure 2. Aluminium price list v. UK market price (1970-1981): the rise of the list-price inefficiency compared to the legal events of DG IV

Note: * since 1979, the UK’s monthly average prices is the LME’s one.

Chronology of legal events:
1. DG IV accusation against IFTRA (July 1974)
2. DG IV objections about IFTRA to producers (Sept. 1974)
3. DG IV decision about IFTRA (July 1975)
4. DG IV first letter to producers about Brandeis (March 1976)
   In between, end of Brandeis’ agreement
5. DG IV second letter to producers about Brandeis (August 1976)
6. DG IV Verifications and inspection into producers’ archives (Nov. 1976)
7. DG IV third letter to producers about Brandeis (Jan. 1977)
   In between, negotiations between Rudell and DG IV
8. DG IV accusation against Brandeis (August 1978)
9. DG IV additional accusation against Brandeis (May 1979)
10. Hearings between DG IV and producers in Brussels (Nov. 1979)