The paper argues for the need to think differently about the attribution of functions and purposes in artifacts and in living organisms. A unified notion of function for artefacts and organisms presupposes the assumption of an artefact model of nature. In order to defende a difference between natural teleology and the teleology of artifacts it is necessary to re-think the Kantian notion of internal purposiveness and the Heideggerian distinction between organ and instrument.
Being-for. Purposes and Functions in Artefacts and Living beings
ILLETTERATI, LUCA
2008
Abstract
The paper argues for the need to think differently about the attribution of functions and purposes in artifacts and in living organisms. A unified notion of function for artefacts and organisms presupposes the assumption of an artefact model of nature. In order to defende a difference between natural teleology and the teleology of artifacts it is necessary to re-think the Kantian notion of internal purposiveness and the Heideggerian distinction between organ and instrument.File in questo prodotto:
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