Topology Maintenance in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), that is, alternating duty cycles with sleep cycles while having an adequate number of nodes monitoring the environment, is a necessary requirement to allow the WSNs to move from niche applications to widespread adop- tion; topology maintenance is even mandatory when the WSNs are used in a security sensitive context. In this work, we present the first scalable Secure Topology Maintenance Protocol (Sec-TMP) for Wireless Sensor Networks that does not require pair-wise node confidentiality. The aim of Sec-TMP is to enforce event delivery to the BS while providing a standard topology maintenance ser- vice to the WSN. Sec-TMP enjoys the following features: it does not require pair-wise node confidentiality; it does not need any underlying routing—just one-hop communications are used; and, it is highly scal- able. Sec-TMP reaches its goal being also resilient to the known attacks on TMPs: snooze attack; sleep deprivation attack; and, network substi- tution attack. Furthermore, Sec-TMP confines node replication attack: once a node is captured, the protocol limits the possible usage of the corresponding node’s ID to a single neighbourhood. Finally, extensive simulations support our findings.
Sec-TMP: a Secure Topology Maintenance Protocol for Event Delivery Enforcement in WSN
CONTI, MAURO;DI PIETRO, ROBERTO;
2009
Abstract
Topology Maintenance in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), that is, alternating duty cycles with sleep cycles while having an adequate number of nodes monitoring the environment, is a necessary requirement to allow the WSNs to move from niche applications to widespread adop- tion; topology maintenance is even mandatory when the WSNs are used in a security sensitive context. In this work, we present the first scalable Secure Topology Maintenance Protocol (Sec-TMP) for Wireless Sensor Networks that does not require pair-wise node confidentiality. The aim of Sec-TMP is to enforce event delivery to the BS while providing a standard topology maintenance ser- vice to the WSN. Sec-TMP enjoys the following features: it does not require pair-wise node confidentiality; it does not need any underlying routing—just one-hop communications are used; and, it is highly scal- able. Sec-TMP reaches its goal being also resilient to the known attacks on TMPs: snooze attack; sleep deprivation attack; and, network substi- tution attack. Furthermore, Sec-TMP confines node replication attack: once a node is captured, the protocol limits the possible usage of the corresponding node’s ID to a single neighbourhood. Finally, extensive simulations support our findings.Pubblicazioni consigliate
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