In this paper, we propose a game theoretical model for joint scheduling and radio resource allocation in the downlink of a Long Term Evolution system, where Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access is used as the multiple access scheme. The context is that of spectrum sharing, with multiple users competing for the simultaneous access to the radio channel. We first give a layered system representation and then model it through a game theoretic formulation using Nash Bargaining theory, where players cooperate to achieve a better common payoff. A trade-off between fairness and throughput is identified and addressed. In addition, we also propose an efficient algorithm that drives the system toward a balanced Pareto efficient operating point represented by the Nash Bargaining solution. Numerical results are also provided to show the validity of the proposed approach.

A framework for scheduling and resource allocation in LTEdownlink using Nash bargaining theory

BADIA, LEONARDO;ZORZI, MICHELE
2011

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a game theoretical model for joint scheduling and radio resource allocation in the downlink of a Long Term Evolution system, where Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access is used as the multiple access scheme. The context is that of spectrum sharing, with multiple users competing for the simultaneous access to the radio channel. We first give a layered system representation and then model it through a game theoretic formulation using Nash Bargaining theory, where players cooperate to achieve a better common payoff. A trade-off between fairness and throughput is identified and addressed. In addition, we also propose an efficient algorithm that drives the system toward a balanced Pareto efficient operating point represented by the Nash Bargaining solution. Numerical results are also provided to show the validity of the proposed approach.
2011
IEEE ICC
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11577/2488960
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