ONTOLOGICAL DISAGREEMENT: A CASE STUDY

Massimilano Carrara and Vittorio Morato examine the thesis of semantic compatibilism: when there is an apparent contrast between our ordinary beliefs (e.g., beliefs about composite artefacts) and the ontological consequences of a theory, it is necessary to try to reconcile the conflict by reformulating the theory in a way that is compatible with ordinary beliefs. In order to evaluate the plausibility of this thesis, Carrara and Morato consider a specific case study of ontological disagreement: that between van Inwagen and Lewis about the existence of composite objects. According to them, this case study shows that semantic compatibilism is highly problematic since it obliges one to make the ontological commitments of a theory compatible with relevant ordinary beliefs, either by reformulating the theory itself or by explaining away all recalcitrant intuitions with the adoption of non literal interpretations. The problem, however, is that, in case of disagreement, one cannot adopt a non literal interpretation while denying the adversary the possibility to do the same.