The notion of a property which only one object can posses has been at the center of many philosophical disputes: such properties have been called individual essences. Among the various kinds of individual essences a prominent role has been occupied by haecceitates. Haecceitates, originally introduced in the philosophical debate by Duns Scotus, has been variously characterized as some sort of non-qualitative and intrinsic properties whose theoretical role was that of offering a metaphysical ground for the individuality of particulars. In recent years, a philosophical position called haeccetism has been introduced by D. Kaplan and R.M. Adams; according to such a view the individuality of a particular is metaphysically primitive. After a section in which we will try to give a characterization of the metaphysical status of haecceitates, we will argue that: 1. Haecceitism does not necessarily imply the postulation of haecceitates. 2. If one assumes the existence of haecceitates and believes that they ground the identity of particulars, then the postulation of haecceitates is incompatible with haecceitism. 3. If one assumes the existence of haecceitates but does not believe that they ground the identity of particulars, then the postulation of haecceitates is indeed compatible with haecceitism, but then they do not seem to play any significant role at all and therefore they should be dispensed with. 4. Haecceitates may have their expected role only in those theories where the identity of individuals is not primitive, for example bundles theory of individuals. In this case, what is required is an object-independent conception of haecceitates; such conception, however (at least in the version given to it by A. Plantinga), seems to be problematic.

Do we need haecceitates to be haecceitists?

CARRARA, MASSIMILIANO;MORATO, VITTORIO
2007

Abstract

The notion of a property which only one object can posses has been at the center of many philosophical disputes: such properties have been called individual essences. Among the various kinds of individual essences a prominent role has been occupied by haecceitates. Haecceitates, originally introduced in the philosophical debate by Duns Scotus, has been variously characterized as some sort of non-qualitative and intrinsic properties whose theoretical role was that of offering a metaphysical ground for the individuality of particulars. In recent years, a philosophical position called haeccetism has been introduced by D. Kaplan and R.M. Adams; according to such a view the individuality of a particular is metaphysically primitive. After a section in which we will try to give a characterization of the metaphysical status of haecceitates, we will argue that: 1. Haecceitism does not necessarily imply the postulation of haecceitates. 2. If one assumes the existence of haecceitates and believes that they ground the identity of particulars, then the postulation of haecceitates is incompatible with haecceitism. 3. If one assumes the existence of haecceitates but does not believe that they ground the identity of particulars, then the postulation of haecceitates is indeed compatible with haecceitism, but then they do not seem to play any significant role at all and therefore they should be dispensed with. 4. Haecceitates may have their expected role only in those theories where the identity of individuals is not primitive, for example bundles theory of individuals. In this case, what is required is an object-independent conception of haecceitates; such conception, however (at least in the version given to it by A. Plantinga), seems to be problematic.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11577/2533692
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