We develop a theory of non-interference for multilevel security based on causality, with Petri nets as a reference model. We first focus on transitive non-interference, where the relation representing the admitted flow is transitive. Then we extend the approach to intransitive non-interference, where the transitivity assumption is dismissed, leading to a framework which is suited to model a controlled disclosure of information. Efficient verification algorithms based on the unfolding semantics of Petri nets stem out of the theory. We also argue about the possibility of performing a compositional verification.

Multilevel transitive and intransitive non-interference, causally

Baldan, Paolo
;
Beggiato, Alessandro
2018

Abstract

We develop a theory of non-interference for multilevel security based on causality, with Petri nets as a reference model. We first focus on transitive non-interference, where the relation representing the admitted flow is transitive. Then we extend the approach to intransitive non-interference, where the transitivity assumption is dismissed, leading to a framework which is suited to model a controlled disclosure of information. Efficient verification algorithms based on the unfolding semantics of Petri nets stem out of the theory. We also argue about the possibility of performing a compositional verification.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11577/3258645
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