



UNIVERSITÀ
DEGLI STUDI
DI PADOVA

Università degli Studi di Padova

Human Rights Center Antonio Papisca

International Joint Ph.D Programme in 'Human Rights, Society, and Multi-level Governance

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND CITIZENSHIP: COMPARATIVE RESEARCH OF CROATIA AND ITALY

This thesis was written with the financial contribution of Cassa di Risparmio di Padova e Rovigo.

Coordinator: Prof. Alberto Lanzavecchia

Supervisor: Prof. Giuseppe Giordan

Ph.D. student : Teuta Marušić

Abstract

This research explores the sphere of religious freedom and citizenship, particularly focusing on the patterns of attitudes in Croatia and Italy towards these two concepts. The methodology of this research forms part of a quantitative comparative approach, with specific use of a questionnaire as a research instrument. This research is based on a convenience sample of young students attending the University of Zagreb in Croatia and the University of Padova, in Italy. The questionnaire was submitted to 603 students in Croatia and 714 students in Italy, collecting 1317 questionnaires in total, which form part of our data analysis.

We focus the analysis of this research on three main aspects – linkage between religious freedom and citizenship; State-religious relations and the affect on the protection of religious freedom; and, exploration of the interrelation of religious and national identities by looking at the role of religion in the sphere of national identities. Within the framework of theoretical and empirical observations, we search for the differences between young students in Croatia and young students in Italy. Following this, we firstly explore whether and how attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights are reflected in attitudes toward Religious Freedom. Secondly, we analyse in which way certain state-religious models are linked to attitudes toward the protection of Religious Freedom. Lastly, we examine the identification of participants with national culture and dominant religion, and how the patterns of this relation reflect in the views on Religious Freedom, specifically searching for the differences between Croatian and Italian samples.

Therefore, this research emphasises the following questions:

- What is the linkage between attitudes toward 'Citizenship and citizens' rights' and attitudes toward various aspects of 'Religious freedom' in Croatia and Italy?
- How do attitudes toward 'Citizenship and citizens' rights affect attitudes toward 'Religious freedom' in Croatia and Italy?
- How are certain preferred 'State-religious models' (neutrality, support, control) are linked to the attitudes on the level of religious freedom protections in Croatia and Italy?
- What is the effect of 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' on attitudes concerning the protection of religious freedoms?
- What are the patterns of identification with national culture and dominant religion, and how the role of religion is perceived in Croatia and Italy?
- Is identification with national culture and dominant religion reflected in attitudes toward 'Religious freedom'?

Acknowledgements and some stories to remember

‘Ph.D. comes to you at a specific time of your life’ – these were the words of my dear mentor Giuseppe Giordan, which often came to my mind during the three years of my Ph.D. In the beginning, I wondered what these special and specific life events would capture my writing of the thesis. Later on, I discovered that indeed, a Ph.D. comes to you at a specific time of life. I would like to thank my mentor, prof. Giuseppe Giordan for all the support, understanding, and encouragement I received in the difficult times of my thesis writing, and for his valuable guidance throughout these three years, which empowered me to do my research.

I would also like to thank Prof. Olga Breskaya, who always found time for me and my questions, regardless of how busy she was, her advice and kind support always helped me eliminate confusion from my mind.

Conducting research during the time of the pandemic was particularly difficult. For this reason, I thank Prof. Siniša Zrinščak for his enormous help and effort in the process of collecting my data in Croatia. His assistance and support made the process of my research much easier.

Ph.D. often feels like a lonely road, but thankfully this impression is not real, since someone always provides help. I would like to express my special thanks to the Ph.D. team of the Human Rights Centre, all my colleagues and to all the people enrolled in helping students like me to take the most out of this Ph.D. program.

My further appreciation cannot be acknowledged without circling back to the words of my mentor, and why Ph.D. indeed comes to you at a specific time of life. My Ph.D. came to me at the time when the world fell on its knees to a global pandemic, the love of my life – Andreja, finally found me, and cancer decided to teach me a few lessons about life. I can say with certainty that I started this Ph.D. program as one person, and I will finish it as a different one. Indeed, these three years of my life were the happiest and most difficult times of my life. These three years taught me the values of life and real people and to appreciate all the moments that bring joy and happiness to our minds.

One of the real people, who never left my sight, is the love of my life – Andreja. I am so grateful for your encouragement, strength, love, and support for me in the last three years. You always believed in me and always reminded me to believe in myself: ‘...If you believe in what you do, your hard work will be worth it ...’ Thank you for showing me that you are my guardian angel and never back down, for better or for worse.

I would like to thank my parents, Petar and Nevenka, for bringing me to this world and supporting me throughout all the years of my education. Thank you for believing in me always letting me know how proud you are of everything I do. It all wouldn't be possible without your love and support.

When I sometimes forget what life is really about, I always remember what my dear brother Istok once said: '...Don't you understand Teuta? You have already submitted your thesis...But it was a different kind of thesis, with a different kind of commission. It was a thesis of life, and in the commission was Saint Peter, and guys like him...'

I also want to thank my brother Tomislav, who never actually knew what I did for the last three years, but in the conversations we led, he would say to me: '...Well, you are a Sociologist, you know this stuff...', which encouraged me that maybe I do know something.

Finally, the last, but not the least of my dear brothers, I thank my youngest brother, Jan, for always reminding me that even though three years passed in the blink of an eye, it was a long time, by saying: '...Oh my god, you are still writing the thesis, why is it taking you so long to do this?...'

On the 30th of September 2019, I wrote in my Ph.D. notebook that I am looking forward to the first meeting of Ph.D students, and wondering if I will make any interesting friends. As well, I wrote that I was bothered by the fact that I couldn't find an apartment in Padova and didn't want to be alone anymore. I met Alessia Leofreddi a few days later, who soon became my good friend and roommate. I want to thank my dear friend, Alessia Leofreddi, whose smile, positivity, long calls, and messages, always reminded me that not only, I am not alone in this, but I gained a friend and memories for life. Thank you for your kindness, support, and love.

I would also like to thank cancer for giving me some valuable life lessons. You showed me how it could be frightening when the light in your life gets covered by darkness, but loving people in my life were that one ray of light that made me believe that light will overcome darkness. You certainly showed me that writing a thesis is not so dramatic and among many other things, I found out that I am stronger than I ever imagined, and not many things scare me anymore. Thank you for that, and goodbye, forever.

Preface

I believe growing up in the area of Balkan, a crossroad of national, religious, and cultural identities with a turbulent history, shapes you in a specific way. Especially if you are (un)lucky enough, that this Balkan pot has a little bit of your own personal family story. Within thirty years of my living, life has put me in different perspectives many times. For a long period of my life, I was a citizen with all my rights, belonging to the religious majority. But, life has shown me, as well, how it is to be a foreigner, a foreigner with temporary residence, a foreigner belonging to a national and religious minority, a foreigner belonging to the dominant religion in a society full of religious and cultural diversity, a foreigner with employment, a foreigner without employment. I could see and feel advantages and disadvantages, openness and prejudice, opportunities and impossibilities – not only coming from others to me, but as well from me towards others. I was also a foreigner who, one beautiful morning at 6 AM, standing in the line to obtain my residence ID number, realized that having EU citizenship is something, since I was immediately allowed to go on top of the line. I always wondered: if for me, the process was difficult, how it must be hard for others belonging to the world outside of the EU. And, I could only imagine how hard it is for those who only carry hope and one backpack.

When I was a child I never fully understood why my family celebrated two Christmases, one Catholic and one Orthodox, and I never fully understood why my mother always told me: ‘If somebody asks you where your mother is from, just say from a village nearby ...’ – always giving a different location. From a very early age, I always knew that my family had a certain unpleasant feeling towards our origin, and toward people asking about it. In the meantime, when I got to adolescence, I started composing the puzzle from the pieces I picked up during the years, from certain family gatherings and conversations. For example, I knew that my grandparents died when I was a newborn, but I never remember someone explaining to me how and why they died. But I somehow knew that their death was violent. It has also fascinated me that my mother grew up in a non-religious family that valued traditional religious Orthodox values, but became a firmly deep believer when she was in her late 30’s. Inspired by faith, my mother decided to attend religious classes and be baptized in a Catholic Church. I always looked at her story as a fascinating religious phenomenon of a woman who found her faith in her adult years, realizing the context of her spiritual awakening afterwards. She became religious during the ‘90s in Croatia, and, today, I understand that this was her way to heal her soul from the harmful events she suffered, and an (unconscious) way to assimilate more easily to the new socio-political happenings in Croatia. Life has strange, almost ironic ways to challenge you and touch your deepest fears. I married a person who belongs to the biggest national minority in Croatia, and you can only imagine the mind constellations of my family after so many years of playing hide and seek with their own identity. My husband currently has a temporary residence visa, which hopefully, after many years of paperwork will one day turn into Croatian citizenship. He was born in a country that does not exist anymore. He was raised in a non-religious family, which celebrated Orthodox

holidays as part of their traditional values. Still, in difficult times of his life, he found peace in the Church – the Catholic one. I guess my interest in the phenomena of religion and national identities started at a very young age, while different perspectives of life showed me the beauty and the beast of cultural, religious, and national diversities.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION.....	9
1. Theoretical Framework: Religious Freedom and Citizens’ rights	18
1.1. Religious Freedom – the Beginning and the (miss) Understanding the Meaning of Religious Freedom	19
1.1.1. State-religious Relations and the Role of Governance Mechanisms in Repressing Religious Freedom	22
1.2. Complexities of Citizenship and Citizens’ rights.....	31
1.2.1. Citizens’ rights in Relation to Human Rights.....	34
1.3. Issues of migrations Reflected in the Complexity of Religious Identities.....	35
1.4. (Miss)Understanding of Rights: Intertwining of Group and Individual rights	38
1.4.1. Reasons and Possibilities For and Against Claiming Group Rights in Relation to Religious Freedom and Citizens’ rights	41
1.5. Merging Sociology and Human Rights in Empirical Research.....	44
1.5.1. Insights on some Empirical Studies on Religious Freedom.....	46
Chapter I – Conclusion.....	51
2. Croatian and Italian Context of Religious Freedom and Citizens’ Rights	55
2.1. Croatia	56
2.1.1. Citizenship Practices in the Period of Nation Building – Croatia	57
2.1.2. Role of Catholic Church in Transforming the Identity – Croatia.....	61
2.1.2.1. Positioning of Religious Minorities, Legal Aspects and the Consequences of Transition on Religious Freedom in Croatia	64
2.1.3. Religious Education in Croatia	69
2.2. Italy	74
2.2.1. Citizenship Policies and Issues as a Reflection	75
of Migrational Changes in Italy	75
2.2.2. Position of the Catholic Church and Religious Identity in Italy.....	80
2.2.2.1. State Law Policies and Regulation of Religion and Religious Freedom in Italy	83

2.2.3. Religious Education in Italy	89
2.3. Empirical Research on Religion, Religious Freedom and Citizenship in Croatia and Italy	93
Chapter II - Conclusion	101
3. Methodological Approach to Research – Why Quantitative Methodology with a Comparative Approach?	103
3.1. Research Design	107
3.2. The Questionnaire within the Framework of Comparison	112
3.2.1. Conducting the Research – Distribution of the Questionnaire	115
3.2.1.1. Online survey method – Croatian sample	116
3.2.1.2. Telephone Interviews – Italian sample	117
3.2.1.3. Paper-pencil Method – Italian sample	118
3.3. Limitations of the Research and the Consequences of COVID-19 Situation	118
Chapter III – Conclusion	120
4. Analysis of Results from the Study “Religious Freedom and Citizenship: Comparative research of Croatia and Italy”	123
4.1. Socio-demographic Characteristics of Participants	126
4.2. Testing the Reliability of the Computed Scales used for Analysing Attitudes toward ‘Religious Freedom’ and ‘Citizenship and Citizens’ rights’ in Croatia and Italy	127
4.3. Pearson Correlation Coefficient of the Computed Scales used for Analysing Attitudes toward ‘Religious Freedom’ and ‘Citizenship and Citizens’ rights’ in Croatia and Italy	133
4.4. Exploratory Factor Analysis of the Computed Scales used for Analysing Attitudes toward ‘Religious Freedom’ and ‘Citizenship and Citizens’ rights’ in Croatia and Italy	137
4.5. Analysis for H1 – ‘Religious Freedom and Citizenship’	141
4.5.1. The Effect of ‘Attitudes toward Citizenship and Citizens’ rights’ on ‘Attitudes toward Religious Freedom’ - Regression Analysis	146
4.5.2. Main Conclusions on the Findings for Hypothesis 1	153
4.6. Analysis for H2 – ‘State-religious Relations and Protection of Religious Freedom’	155

4.6.1. The Effect of ‘State-religious models’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ on ‘Protection of Religious Freedom’ - Regression Analysis	159
4.6.2. The Effect of ‘State-religious models’, ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ and ‘Level of religiosity’ on ‘Attitudes toward RF’ - Regression Analysis.....	161
4.6.3. Main Conclusions on the Findings for Hypothesis 2.....	164
4.7. Analysis for H3 - Identification with National Culture and Dominant Religion – Independent samples t-test.	167
4.7.1. Differences between Croatian and Italian participants in Attitudes toward Religious Freedom – Independent samples t-test	172
4.7.2. Main Conclusion on the Findings for Hypothesis 3	175
4.8. Other Analysis	176
4.8.1. Differences between ‘Croatian and Italian participants’ in Attitudes toward ‘Model of endorsed religions’ – ANOVA	176
4.8.2. Level of Cultural identification, Belief, and Religious Affiliation	178
4.8.3. The Effect of Religiosity and Cultural Identification on ‘Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants’ - Regression Analysis	179
4.8.4. Differences between Croatian and Italian Participants in Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants - ANOVA.....	181
4.9. Main Findings within the Framework of Theoretical and Empirical Observations..	183
FINAL CONCLUSION	193
List of references	199
Appendix.....	210

INTRODUCTION

Religious freedom could be seen as a cherished cornerstone of citizenship - sometimes, one gets in the way of another, while sometimes, one cannot exist without the other. This dance between religious freedom and citizenship is very much led by a variety of social, political, and cultural internal and external factors. This thesis aims to explore the relationship between religious freedom and citizenship by comparing Croatia and Italy, focusing on the three main aspects of their linkage. Firstly, we explore the linkage between attitudes toward 'Religious freedom' and attitudes toward 'Citizenship and citizens' rights'. Secondly, we explore 'State-religious relations' and their association with attitudes toward 'Religious freedom protection'. Thirdly, we focus on the sphere of national identity, religion, and culture, the patterns of the relation between them, and their association with attitudes toward 'Religious freedom'. We search for the differences between Croatian and Italian participants in all three aspects of our research.

- **Short insight into the context of Croatia and Italy**

The impact of historical and socio-political factors on the sphere of religious freedom and citizens' rights can vary across different contexts. Within our research, we compared Croatia and Italy, both established as democracies, and both predominantly Catholic, with strong religious identities and a strong sense of nationhood. In Croatia and Italy, religion and the Catholic Church play a significant role in the public and the private sphere of citizens lives. However, these two countries differ in pathways of establishing and implementing democratic norms and values, and significantly differ in the levels of religious and cultural diversification of society. Croatia's national, religious, and cultural diversification is at lower levels and mostly tied to the socio-demographic structure of the former SFRY. At the same time, socio-political changes within the country caused national and religious homogenization, putting minority groups in undesirable positions. On the other hand, due to the increased migration flows in the last two decades, Italy has been experiencing higher levels of national, religious, and cultural diversity, which ultimately changed the socio-demographic landscape of the country and affected the positioning of minority groups within the country.

Croatia's path to establishing democracy has been shaped by the fall of the communist regime and war events in the '90s. These events were reflected in the national awakening, supported by religious liberation and the positioning of Catholicism as the preferred religion of the State. The clash between the values of the former regime and the newly formed country was marked by the idea of reinforcing Croatian identity, and detaching from anything that resembled the former country. Therefore, citizenship policies and the sphere of religion reflected the idea of 'croatization', which once citizens' turned into foreigners, while being Croatian meant being Catholic (Marinović Jerolimov and Zrinščak 2006; Maldini, 2006; Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006; Zrinščak, 1998). The new order of acceptable identifying values brought tension

between dominant society and minority groups, situating national and religious minority groups in excluding positions and, on the other hand, being set on a path to enter the EU and align with the requirements of European democratic values, obligated Croatia to lower the built-up intolerance and make progress towards higher inclusivity of minorities. The complexity of interdependence between national and religious identities combined with the legacies of the fallen regime, produced discrimination of minorities within different spheres of social life, making it difficult to distinguish whether the exclusion was based on national or religious reasons (Dimitrijević, 2012; Kumpes, 2018; Knezović and Grošinić, 2017; Štiks, 2015). Even though the accession to the EU produced positive shifts within the sphere of citizenship and religious rights, it is still questionable to what extent the impact of international communities moved Croatia to a real, on-the-ground change. Moreover, if the legislative framework has changed, does this mean a change in the beliefs and attitudes of Croatian citizens toward national and religious minorities?

On the other hand, Italy, as one of the founders of the EU, has a significantly longer tradition of democratic values and inter-religious cooperation. Still, the issues surrounding the sphere of religious freedoms and citizens' rights resulted from the unpreparedness of Italian society to deal with the massive changes within the socio-demographic structure of society caused by high migration flows over the past decades. The policies concerning religious freedoms and citizens' rights reflected the idea of Italy as a country of emigration, without the awareness of the changes brought by new cultures and that Italy has become a country of mass immigration. When the diversification was held on the margins of society, under the veil of invisibility, citizens of Italy did not perceive the changes in the socio-demographic structure as a possible threat to their own identity. Issues arose within the sphere of majority-minority relations when minority cultures became aware of the importance and possibilities of demanding rights (Zincone, 2010; Zincone and Basili, 2013; Zaccaria et al., 2018). Faced with increased religious pluralism, the Catholic Church had to navigate the changing dynamics within society while maintaining its influential role as a public actor. One approach was to secure its position in the country emphasizing its importance in the lives of Italians while advocating for the needs of immigrants, thus demonstrating religious tolerance and openness to interreligious dialogue (Giordan and Zrinščak, 2018). Despite the strong socio-demographical changes within Italy's national and religious sphere, Italian citizens still identify strongly with Catholicism, reflecting the deep bond between Catholic affiliation and Italian identity (Garelli, 2010; 2012; Pace, 2014). Over time, as the Catholic Church and the strong Catholic identity of Italians adapted to societal changes, old religious traditions and values assimilated to accommodate new individual needs and demands of the multicultural society. Nevertheless, the traditional favouritism towards the Catholic Church, whether reflected in state-religious relations or citizens' perceptions of other religions, posed challenges for religious minorities in claiming their rights and status within society.

- **Research objectives and theoretical background for the hypotheses**

Our research objective is to analyse how young university students perceive religious freedom and citizens' rights, focusing specifically on the attitudes toward these two concepts and the patterns of relation and association between them. In line with this we address three main questions. Firstly, we question to what extent and how attitudes toward religious freedom are linked to attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights? Secondly, we question how State-religious relations and socio-cultural attitudes toward religion are related to attitudes toward religious freedom protection. Lastly, we question what are the differences between Croatia and Italy in perceptions of the role of religion in relation to nationality, examining the patterns of identification of nationality and dominant religion and how these patterns are reflected in attitudes toward religious freedom? Within the framework of these research questions, we have developed and tested three main hypotheses: '*More positive attitudes toward equal citizenship and citizens' rights will be associated with more positive attitudes toward religious freedom*' (H1); '*The stronger is the identification of the State with religion; the lower is the level of protection of religious freedom in the society; specifically, the more participants endorse the neutral position of State-religious relations and support neutral socio-cultural attitude toward the dominant religion, the less they perceive that religious freedoms are protected in their country*'; (H2); and, '*Participants' identification with national culture and the dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy, which is as well, reflected in more negative attitudes toward religious freedom*' (H3).

When it comes to the concept of citizenship, Brettschneider (2010) perceives that religious freedom mirrors the religious beliefs of citizens, and that free and equal citizenship is the basis for religious freedom. Within the essence of this idea is that religion should not hold a distinct or privileged position, and by all means, should not overcome or restrict any sphere of citizens' rights. Therefore, Brettschneider (2010) suggests that the state should protect and promote free and equal citizenship and persist in fulfilling the objective of transforming those religious beliefs that are opposing the fundamental values and rights of citizenship. In line with this perspective, Brettschneider (2010) emphasises that if we perceive religious freedom as a safeguard of religious practices, we must acknowledge that certain religious practices or beliefs should not supersede the principle of equality, and thus, should not enjoy the protective umbrella provided by the State. According to Brettschneider (2010) in certain cases, religious beliefs and the main principles of religious freedom can serve well to emphasise and support the basic principles of equal citizenship. On the other hand, when religious beliefs oppose free and equal citizenship, it is legitimate that the State transforms them, in order to align with the concept of equality. Empirical research (Zaccaria et al., 2018; 2018a) has shown that a positive view toward diversities and trust in religious out-group positively impacts attitudes toward religious freedom and the political rights of non-citizens. If free and equal citizenship poses a basis for religious freedom, and if openness to multiculturalism and pluralism creates a positive outcome on religious freedom views, we question whether positive perceptions of citizenship and citizens' rights should have a positive outcome on religious freedom views. At the background theory of Brettschneider (2010) and

based on empirical research of Zaccaria et al., (2018; 2018a), we hypothesise: *'Free and equal citizenship is the basis for religious freedom, in other words, more positive attitudes toward equal citizenship and citizens' rights will be associated with the more positive attitudes toward religious freedom'*.

In exploring State-religious relations, Durham (2012) analyses the nature of State-religious patterns and defines two main spectrums, within which all countries, in some way, fit, and fluctuate. One extreme refers to the level of involvement in religious affairs, or to say the level of action or inaction of the State within the religious sphere, thus, ranging from absolute absence of religious freedom to full religious freedom. The other part of the spectrum refers to the level of identification or separation of State institutions with religious institutions and beliefs, whereby the range goes from positive identification to negative identification (Durham, 2012). Within this concept Durham emphasises that 'as identification of religion and State goes up, religious liberty goes down' (Durham, 360, 2012). In this sense, high levels of negative identification of the State and religion sometimes lead religion toward total inaccessibility, not only for the minority religious groups but also for the dominant religion. On the other hand, high levels of positive identification can lead to a lack of religious freedom for minority religious groups. Furthermore, Durham (2012) notes that countries often shift from one to another extreme of the spectrum, producing strong positive or strong negative identifications - extreme favouritism or extreme exclusion of religion. Within this type of dynamics of State-religious relations, countries rarely achieve an ideal, middle point of the continuum. Consequently, the way State manages religion has an effect on religious freedom, especially in terms of the protection of religious freedom. Therefore, the tension between State and religion is reflected in the levels of religious endorsement, which consequently shapes society's perception of religion and society's levels of recognition and acceptance of religious freedoms. Referring to the perspective of Cole Durham (2012), we hypothesise: *'The stronger is the identification of the State with religion; the lower is the level of protection of religious freedom in the society; specifically, the more participants endorse the neutral position of State-religious relations and support neutral socio-cultural attitude toward the dominant religion, the less they perceive that religious freedoms are protected in their country.'*

Our third hypothesis concerns contextual differences between Croatia and Italy. As we have emphasised earlier in the text, diverse historical encounters and different paths of democracy development have significantly impacted the sphere of Citizenship rights and Religious Freedom in Croatia and Italy. Consequently, the shift within the socio-political sphere of Croatia caused the transformation of national and religious identities and changed the dynamics of majority-minority relations. On the other hand, Italy's experience of mass migration flows affected the position of the dominant society and culture, which caused unrest and insecurity, changing the way the dominant population perceives minority groups. These different historical aspects shaping the countries' social, political, and cultural spheres resulted in different levels of endorsement of multiculturalism and religious pluralism in each country. Therefore, different levels of embracement of national, religious, and cultural diversity can impact the views of religious freedom, and can be reflected in defining the role and position of religion in the society. According to Kumpes (2018), the

national component in religious identities should never be neglected, especially in researching countries that emerged from the fall of Communism. In Croatia, the sole confessional identification was not narrowed only to religiosity; moreover, it represented the sphere of national identity, culture, tradition, and nation-building, while the increased religious practice illuminated the liberation from the former regime, welcoming the long-awaited social acceptance of religion (Maldini, 2006). A strong vision of the chosen religion for the State, enforced by nationalism, conditioned religious rights and freedoms by socio-political turbulences, creating an atmosphere of intolerance toward the significant other (Zrinščak, 1998). As a result, these factors affected the active construction of the cultural and national Croatian identity, while the strong active role of the Church in the social life of Croatia served for preserving and strengthening the national spirit during the transitional period. The history of the Balkan area is filled with the battles and struggles of people for the sustainment and recognition of their national and religious identity (Jukić, 1994). It is then not strange that the centuries of struggles altered and moulded how people of Balkan cherish and defend religious remarks of their identity (Jukić, 1994). Thus, religion, even though was covered under the veil of Socialist time, was deeply rooted in the social and psychological patterns of citizens, serving as a marker of collective identity, which later transformed to be one of the cornerstones of social and political changes (Jukić, 1994). The necessity to protect the main symbols of nationhood and the creation of a strong collective identity with reformed and adjusted approving values, brought tension in majority-minority relations, where the dominant society started to feel threatened by the minority (Marinović Bobinac, 1996; Radović, 2013). In this sense, Maldini (2006) and Kumpes (2018) highlight the significance of the intertwining of religious and national, implying that confessional identification reflects the complexity of religious identities in Croatia and is connected to a strong sense of social and cultural identification, which is visible in greater social distance toward non-citizens. In the light of these theoretical observations concerning the socio-political context of Croatia, we formulate our third hypothesis: *Participants' identification with national culture and dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy, which is also reflected in more negative attitudes toward Religious Freedom.*

- **Methodological approach to analysis**

In terms of the methodology, this research implemented a quantitative method with a comparative approach using the instrument of questionnaire, by conducting research in Croatia and Italy. We analysed the results of a survey that applied a revised version of the Social Perception of Religious Freedom (SPRF) questionnaire (Breskaya and Giordan, 2019), which was submitted to a convenience sample of university students during the period from March 2021 to February 2022. For the purposes of this research we have developed and adjusted the original version of the SPRF questionnaire by adding sections on citizenship, belonging, and cultural identification. Due to COVID-19 limitations and our dependence on university classes and students, we collected questionnaires using three different methods (multi-mode method), depending on which was best suitable for the given situation in each country, at each specific period of the

time. In Croatia, we collected 603 questionnaires through online software, allowing us to distribute the questionnaire through a web link. In the case of Italy, we collected 546 questionnaires by paper–pencil method and 168 questionnaires by conducting telephone interviews, reaching a total number of 714 submitted questionnaires to university students in Italy. In total, we collected 1317 questionnaires completed by university students in Croatia and Italy. For the purposes of collecting the data, the questionnaire was translated into Croatian and Italian language.

Regarding our variables, our research has four main sets of variables, two dependent – ‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’ and ‘State-religious relations’; and two independent variables – ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’; and ‘The role of religion in relation to identity and national culture’; and one set of control variables, which includes ‘Socio-demographic characteristics of participants’. For each set of variables, we have constructed various scales which enabled us to measure different aspects of the concepts of religious freedom and citizenship and test the research’s three main hypotheses.

Our first set of variables which refer to ‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’ consists of three scales – ‘Socio-legal function of RF’; ‘Societal value of RF’ and ‘RF aspect: belief and practice’.

Our second set of variables, ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’ consists of four scales – ‘Citizenship status and political rights’; ‘Citizenship status and socio-economic rights’; ‘Membership and belonging’; ‘Elements of national identity and origin’; and two single variables ‘Assimilation-oriented model’ and ‘Diversity model-oriented’.

These two sets of variables (‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’ and ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’) will serve us to test our first hypothesis.

Our third set of variables, ‘State-Religious relations’ consists of five scales – ‘State-religious support’; ‘State-religious neutrality’; ‘Model of control over religion’; ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’, and ‘Protection of religious freedom’. This set of variables will serve us to test our second hypothesis.

Finally, our fourth set of variables ‘The role of religion in relation to identity and national culture’ consists of two scales – ‘Role of religion in relation to nationality’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’, and two single variables ‘Assimilation-oriented model’ and ‘Level of cultural identification’. This set of variables, together with our first set of variables (‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’) will enable us to test our third hypothesis.

Within the framework of our research analysis, we highlight the associations and linkage between the concepts of religious freedom and the concept of citizenship, exploring the attitudes and impacts while searching for the differences between Croatian and Italian participants. Following this, we determined that the main statistical tools for our analysis would be the Pearson correlation coefficient, Regression Analysis and Independent samples t-test. Regarding our measurements and checking the computed scales' reliability, we used the Cronbach Alpha reliability test, the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).

To test Hypothesis 1, we conducted Bivariate Regression Analysis on three different aspects of religious freedom attitudes – ‘Socio-legal function of RF’; ‘Societal value of RF’ and ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’, testing the impact of six scales concerning citizenship and citizens’ rights.

For our second hypothesis, we conducted the Pearson Correlation Coefficient to test whether and how, different state-religious models (neutrality; support; control) and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ are correlated to attitudes toward ‘Protection of religious freedom’. As well, we conducted Bivariate Regression Analysis exploring the effect of the ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’; ‘Model of control over religion’; ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’; and ‘Level of religiosity’ on attitudes toward ‘Protection of religious freedom’.

To test the third hypothesis, we performed five Independent samples t-tests to discover the differences between Croatian and Italian samples to explore the role of religion in relation to nationality and identification of participants with national culture and dominant religion. As well, we performed three independent samples t-test to explore the differences between Croatian and Italian sample regarding the attitudes toward different aspects of religious freedom.

- **Main findings**

Within the framework of our first hypothesis, our research has shown that ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’ significantly predict ‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’. Specifically, the results of our analysis imply that more positive attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights are associated with more positive attitudes toward various aspects of religious freedom (‘Socio-legal function of RF’, ‘Societal value of RF’ ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’). Therefore, in the case of the ‘Socio-legal function of RF’ the more participants were supportive of socio-economic rights for all people regardless of their citizenship status; and, the more participants were open to public and private expression and recognition of diversity; the more they acknowledged various aspects of religious freedom (liberties of religious identity, non-discrimination, equality, democratic values, non-violence, freedom of religious expression, recognition of religious freedom as an important aspect of a democratic society). In the case of ‘Societal value of RF’, the more participants were supportive of political and socio-economic rights for all people regardless of their citizenship status; and, the more participants were open to public and private expression and recognition of diversity; the more they acknowledged ‘Societal value of RF’ (religious freedom promotes non-discrimination; religious and cultural diversity; inter-religious dialogue; equality and peaceful co-existence). Finally, in the case of ‘RF belief and practice’, results indicate that the more participants were supportive of basic political and socio-economic rights, and, the more participants were open to public and private expression and recognition of diversity; the more they supported the freedom to have no religion, freedom to worship, and freedom to have inner personal convictions. These results confirm our first hypothesis - *‘More positive attitudes toward equal citizenship and citizens’ rights will be associated with the more positive attitudes toward religious freedom’*.

Furthermore, regarding our second hypothesis, the results of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient indicated a statistically significant relationship between State-religious models (support, neutrality, control) and attitudes toward 'Religious freedom protection'. The results of our research imply that the more participants agree that the State should be neutral, avoid religious favouritism, and provide an equal condition for all religious groups, the less they agree that religious freedoms are protected in Croatia and Italy. Regarding 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' and attitudes toward 'RF protection', results, as well, indicated a statistically significant relationship, implying that the more participants support a neutral state-religious model, the less they agree that the Catholic Church and Croatian and Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured in the country due to dominant prevalence. As well, testing the impact of the variables, the results of Bivariate Regression showed that the 'Model of endorsed Catholic Church'; 'Model of state-control over religion', and 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' significantly predict attitudes toward the levels of religious freedom protection in Croatia and Italy. These results confirm our second hypothesis – *'The stronger is the identification of the state with religion; the lower is the level of protection of religious freedom in the society'; specifically, the more participants endorse the neutral position of state-religious relations and support neutral socio-cultural attitude toward the dominant religion, the less they perceive that religious freedoms are protected in their country'*.

Finally, in the case of testing our third hypothesis, research analysis has shown that Croatian participants significantly differ from Italian participants in perceiving the role of the Catholic Church, dominant religion and dominant culture; and in attitudes toward the role of the religion in relation to nationality. On average, Croatian participants support more the idea that religion should strengthen the national spirit and take responsibility for the national culture, than the Italian participants. As well, Croatian participants support more the idea of favouritism toward the Catholic Church and favouritism of the dominant religion and culture, than the Italian participants. The level of cultural identification resulted as non-significant in terms of differences, whereby both, Croatian and Italian participants identify on a medium level with their country's culture. In addition, our analysis confirmed that Croatian participants have more negative attitudes toward various aspects of Religious Freedom, than the Italian participants. These results confirm our third hypothesis – *'Participants' identification with national culture and dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy, which is as well reflected in more negative attitudes toward Religious Freedom'*.

- **Thesis outline**

Chapter 1 highlights the main characteristics and issues revolving around the concept of religious freedom and the concept of citizenship. To illuminate the problem of freedom and oppression, this Chapter emphasises different factors that affect the sphere of demanding rights within the dimension of religious freedom and citizenship. Thus, we highlight the issues surrounding State-religious relations and governance mechanisms methods, the difficulties that emerge when the right to religious freedom annuls citizen's rights and vice versa, the effect of migration on the dynamics of religion, and the problematic overlap of individual and group rights. Finally, Chapter 1 gives a short overview of merging sociology and human rights in empirical research, with an insight on some empirical studies in the field of Religious Freedom.

Chapter 2 focuses on the contextual differences between Croatia and Italy by highlighting the historical, social, political, and cultural aspects that affected the dimension of religious freedom and citizens' rights. Furthermore, Chapter 2 describes the position and role of the Catholic Church and minorities, giving an overview of the characteristics of religious identities and State-religious relations in both societies. The first part of the Chapter mainly concerns Croatia's and Italy's citizenship practices and legislation; policies and regulation of religious freedoms in Croatia and Italy; the role and position of the Catholic Church; and, the positioning and regulations of religious minorities in Croatia and Italy. The second part of the Chapter deals with religious education in Croatia and Italy and gives an overview of empirical research regarding religion, religious freedom, and citizenship in Croatia and Italy.

Chapter 3 describes the methodological approach to our research, concerning the use of a quantitative method with a comparative approach in analysing religious freedom and citizenship in Croatia and Italy. This includes the development of our research design, the structuring and adjustment of our research instrument – questionnaire, the process of conducting the research and, limitations and issues that evolve with using this type of research methodology.

Chapter 4 focuses on the analysis and results of a questionnaire distributed to a convenience sample of Croatian and Italian university students. The main framework of this Chapter refers to testing three main hypotheses, providing a detailed overview of the variables and scales being used for measuring attitudes toward 'Religious freedom' and attitudes toward 'Citizenship and citizens' rights'. The research analysis encompasses Cronbach alpha reliability testing of the scales, Factor Analysis, Pearson Correlation Coefficient results for the whole sample and for each sample individually, Bivariate Regression Analysis and, Independent samples t-test. Additionally, this Chapter provides several analysis results that fall outside the framework of hypotheses (ANOVA, Crosstabs, and Bivariate Regression Analysis). Finally, Chapter 4 provides conclusions on the main findings for each tested hypothesis and discusses the research results within the framework of theoretical and empirical observations.

1. Theoretical Framework: Religious Freedom and Citizens' rights

This chapter examines two different but equally complex concepts – religious freedom and citizenship, with a tendency to explore their particularities and the relation between them, focusing on the aspects and factors of their linkage. Religious freedom is seen as a specific and fundamental right, that forms an important part of individual and group identities, oftentimes conflicting with other human rights (Scolnicov, 2011), while citizens' rights are seen as a necessary ground for claiming any other right, even those rights we have as human beings (Arendt, 1951; Nash, 2009). James Dingley examining the role of religion within the frame of national identity, emphasises the importance of 'identifying the core values, norms, structures and ideologies attached to religion and how they influence our behaviour, and relations with others, tying us into particular groups' (Dingley, 2011, 397). we will see how a certain country's religious dimension significantly impacts State-governance methods in terms of protecting or restricting religious freedom. This is not a one-way road, but rather it goes reciprocally, producing mutual interactions and relations that depend on each other. Each change and shift within the political system changes and affects the system of the State's governance, determining whether these mechanisms will be directed towards the protection or oppression of religious freedom. While State governance mechanisms shape citizens and religious rights, State models of those rights are reflected in the sphere of identity, whereby holding or not holding those rights shapes, transforms, and borders group and individual identities on different levels. Therefore, State directly or indirectly affects the range of opportunities to express and give voice to different identities within the dominant society. The problem arises when the right to religious freedom collides with other rights, conflicting the sphere of State's obligation to protect and ensure equality of all citizens and the obligation to protect and guarantee religious freedom for those same citizens. As Dingley (2011) claims, shared culture and a bounded set of relations forms the basis for nations, while groups formed within societies have particular limitations, which may result in not being able to fully integrate and preserve 'important aspects of our individual and social identities and being' (Dingley, 2011, 397). Decision-making within this tension depends on different factors and the government's perception of what is and how religious freedom should be implemented. This produces an intense relationship between the concept of religious freedom and the concept of equal citizenship, reflected not only in the State-religious sphere but also in the relation of other citizens towards religious groups and religious groups toward other groups. The dynamics of these relations are reflected in the sphere of identity, which is reflected in how members of each group and different societies perceive religious freedom. This tension poses a question of whether the dimension of equal citizenship should be protected no matter what, or whether religion as an essential part of identity and the right to religious freedom has an exceptional position, because of its specific character in the sphere of rights.

This Chapter will give us an insight into some general ideas, thoughts, and issues concerning religious freedom and citizenship, with a tendency to explore what these two concepts encompass. Chapter 1 is divided into four parts, each with a subparagraph. Firstly, we will explore the role of religion and religious

freedom, starting with the historical aspects and events that produced thinking and development of the concept itself, moving forward to what really defines religious freedom and what are the difficulties and blurred spheres of defining and understanding Religious Freedom. Discussing religious freedom naturally leads us to explore and extract what are the factors of repressing religious diversity by State and legal systems, focusing on the conflict that arises between religious freedom rights in collision with other rights. Within this aspect, we explore the issues that arise when the right to religious freedom is confronted with the State's responsibility to protect religious freedom, but as well its obligation to protect the sovereignty of the State and equality of citizens, along with their rights to express particularities of their identities. Following that, we move to another main focus of our research – citizens' rights, whereby as well as with exploring religious freedom, we firstly trace back historical moments and aspects that influenced and produced the development of the citizenship concept in modern societies, and secondly, we explore what are the complexities of defining citizenship and the struggles that come along in making clear notions on what citizenship as a concept entails. Exploration of the concept of citizenship cannot be examined without taking into account the aspect of migration dynamics. Therefore, we explore the complexity of migratory issues in relation to religion, focusing on the role of religion in the dynamics of migration. This leads us to the second part of the Chapter, where we tend to understand what is encompassed under the idea of rights and the tension that rises between claiming group and individual rights, not only within group-member relations but also in group-group and state-group relations.

Additionally, concerning rights, we explore what are the aspects and factors for and against, when it comes to claiming group-differentiated rights in relation to religious freedom and citizenship. Finally, approaching the end of this chapter we give our attention to empirical notions and possibilities of merging sociology and human rights research and what are the methodological challenges when researching human rights from a sociological perspective, giving a brief insight into some empirical research done in the field of religious freedom and human rights. Chapter 1 gives a brief look at the sociological perspectives toward the concept of religious freedom and citizenship in order to understand its notions and aspects, providing an introduction for the chapters that will follow, which will examine closely and in detail the concept and the context of religious freedom and citizens' rights specifically in relation to Croatia and Italy.

1.1. Religious Freedom – the Beginning and the (miss) Understanding the Meaning of Religious Freedom

The first known manifestations of religious repressions can be found in the ancient history of Egypt, where the authority, known back then as the pharaoh, introduced monotheism in the society of his kingdom and started with demolishing every aspect of the former beliefs and prosecuting anyone who opposed him (Engh in: Sarkissian, 2015). In Ancient Greece, Socrates was charged before the Court of Athena as a person who jeopardised the city's good relation with the gods by inventing new religious beliefs, not worshipping the religious beliefs of Greece, and ruining young people's mindset (Sarkissian, 2015). Besides

Ancient Egypt and Ancient Greece, historical examples of religious violence and persecutions can be found in other parts of the world, like for example in the Roman Empire where the spread of Christianity resulted in repressing every religion that wasn't consistent with the Roman law, especially Christians (Sarkissian, 2015). At that time, Christians were blamed for all the catastrophes that happened, while 'those who were not Roman citizens were subjected to the harshest punishment meted out by Roman law' (Sarkissian, 2015, 2). With the coming of the Edict of Milan in 313. Christianity became accepted and obtained legal status as a religion of the Empire, which resulted in turning the violence towards Jews, other pagan religions, and as well other Christians (Sarkissian, 2015). Oppression of religious freedom has been present throughout history for a long time, but we might say, that the first thoughts on developing and implementing rights to religious freedom, and grounds for the religious freedom concept as we know it today, were brought up during the 16th and 17th centuries, with different religious civil wars, especially with the events of the separation of English Church from the authority of Roman Catholic Church and the war between Protestants and Catholics in Germany, causing tremendous victims and sufferings (Richardson, 2006). While religious violations throughout history have been extremely violent physically, religious violations in modern times have a more hidden aspect of violence, represented by nonviolent repression through different mechanisms (Sarkissian, 2015). One of the first examples of this "soft" and less visible persecution of religion was noticeable during the events of the French Revolution, in the late 18th century, where instead of violent behaviour and killings of the members of the undesired Catholic Church, 'governments began to impose laws intended to make it difficult for them to gain political power' (Sarkissian, 2015, 3). Certainly, history has shown that religion represented a reason for many wars, oppressions, sufferings, and conflict situations, which in a way gives religion and religious freedom a right to be specifically protected in order to avoid repeating history.

On the other hand, the situation nowadays shows that the privileged positioning of religion within the systems of countries seems unsuccessful in providing full protection for religious groups (Cross, 2015). These historical events brought the necessity for creating a power stronger than religious reasons for wars, which meant creating treaties that would enable States to become the protectors of religious freedom, creating what Richardson (2006) calls a 'strong State', since the State as authority itself was not a 'sufficient condition for the emergence of religious freedom' (Richardson, 2006, 274). A 'strong State' can reflect a dual character, it can reflect its power in the ability to protect and guarantee religious freedom for its citizens, encouraging religious minorities to 'flourish within the society' (Richardson, 2014, 37) or it can mean that its powers are directed to sanctioning positive developments for religious minorities, producing repression of religious groups and practising unethical behaviour towards religious freedom (Vermeulen in: Richardson, 2006; Richardson, 2014). How society manages and treats religious diversity certainly depends on the religious-historical background of society, whereby some States managed to accommodate religious diversity because of the long-term presence of various religious groups, regardless of the privileged position of the dominant religious group. On the other hand, some societies that have encountered with other

religious groups and identities in recent history, have difficulties with not only developing and implementing measures that would help the process of accepting religious diversity but as well have problems in relation to the dominant religion (Richardson, 2014).

In the world of social sciences, when it comes to defining religious freedom, even though it is a concept widely discussed, there is no specific agreement or general conclusion on what religious freedom represents and what it stands for (Breskaya and Giordan, 2019; Fox, 2015). A concept broadly debated in the academic sphere appears to be contradictory in terms, representing 'freedom as an absence of constraint and religion as a self-imposed constraint on freedom' (Scolnicov, 2011, 1). As Scolnicov claims, 'religious freedom is a unique right' (Scolnicov, 2011, 31), with a dual character, and is a 'unique source of individual and personal identity' (Witte in Cross, 2015, 5). Some researchers lean on the concepts of culture while defining religious freedom, while according to Scolnicov (2011), observing and defining religion and religious freedom only throughout the meanings of culture leads to losing the ability to define it outside of the cultural context and as such makes it dependable on the concept of culture, much more than any other right (Scolnicov, 2011). As is defining the concept of religion extremely difficult, in the same way defining religious freedom as well produces a range of complicated narratives that usually don't work well (Cross, 2015). Furthermore, blurred attempts to define religious freedom produce unclear meanings and unclear tendencies to disclose what is encompassed under the protection of religion. Hence, if we want to protect religion, we need to define it in order to protect it, but as Cross (2015) stated, definitions could be dangerous, meaning that definitions can easily exclude or include something that may cause the loss of the dimension of protection within the definition itself (Cross, 2015). Different researchers (Finke, Fox, Stark, Richardson etc.) have given their ideas and approaches in defining religious freedom, relying on a socioreligious theory of religious economy, theoretical perspective of political secularism, and social constructivist theory, while Richardson and Mayrl focus more on the role of the judicial system affecting the sphere of religious freedom and seeing it as a 'structural condition for religious freedom maintenance' (Breskaya and Giordan, 2019, 3). Religious freedom definitions, especially coming from law and legal backgrounds, encompass several different terms and concepts, which mostly indicate which actions violate religious freedom, but not why these actions produce violations. According to Fox (2014), a clear definition would give an answer to this (Fox, 2015). Studies mentioned above pave the way to religious freedom within the sociology and political sciences, broadening the use of religious freedom outside the framework of only legal or historical dimensions (Breskaya and Giordan, 2019). Reasoning on the duality of religious freedom, Scolnicov (2011) states that on one side, the expressive activity of belief, criticism, and inquiry - encompasses the concept of freedom, and on the other side, the sphere of identity - encompasses the concept of equality. Since there is a right to choose religion, unlike for example to choose your race, religion is both a matter of liberty and a matter of equality. In this sense, religious freedom represents a characteristic of an individual, who is entitled to have this right protected by the law, not only because religion represents a part of identity, but as well as because religion is 'also an activity of thought, criticism, speech, an activity that merits protection in its robust and

open manifestations' (Scolnicov, 2011, 31). The first concept (freedom), embodies individual perception of religion, and the second concept (equality), is related to 'equality between religions' (Scolnicov, 2011, 31), and identifies religion through the view of collectivism, highlighting the identity aspect of religion. Rising the question of the dual character of religious freedom, understanding it under the concepts of "freedom" and "equality", Scolnicov (2011) points out that 'the right to equality, or non-discrimination, on the grounds of religion is complementary to the right to freedom of religion' (Scolnicov, 2011, 33), and is becoming the main focus in the field of international law (Scolnicov, 2011). On the other hand, coming from different theoretical views, Fox (2015) focuses on various concepts of religious freedom, indicating the existence of 'multiple conceptions of religious freedom' (Fox, 2015, 4), which could be divided in two different categories. The first one is the freedom of exercising religion and the second one is that all religions must be equal (Fox, 2015).

1.1.1. State-religious Relations and the Role of Governance Mechanisms in Repressing Religious Freedom

According to Scolnicov (2011), religion represents a system that provides values and norms for all aspects of life. As such, it can play an important role in building the identity of the State, it can be in line with the change of regime/system or against it, and can go along with the process of democratization or stand behind totalitarian regimes. In this sense, religion takes shape of the State system where it is present, and even though it is a system of values apart, it is strongly intertwined within different levels of the State (Scolnicov, 2011). The relation between the State and religion is not a static one, it is subjected to changes that come within the political system of the State and can be used as a powerful tool for those same changes, while the 'the right to religious freedom creates a tension between liberty and equality, a tension manifested in the legal protection accorded to this right' (Scolnicov, 2011, 24). Even though the spectrum of religious freedom reflects and is intertwined with the State system, international law serves well in restricting the State's ability to evade radical ideologies. On the other hand, when we think about international law and the acceptance of human rights by the States, it is strange that those States that represent themselves as democratic, frequently restrict religious freedoms, exactly because of the complex and entangled ways of interpreting and implementing this specific right (Scolnicov, 2011). In some societies, the legal and judicial systems are in an inferior position to the political rulings of countries, with a severe lack of autonomy which degrades the position and status of religious minority groups. In countries with this type of political ruling, the justice and legal system 'becomes a weapon for use by those who dominate the society' (Richardson, 2014, 35), which contradicts the idea of treating all citizens equally (Richardson, 2014). The factor of the State respecting religious freedoms and not interfering in religious matters does not necessarily reflect the social situation on the ground, especially since other factors included in this situation on the ground are not necessarily in line with these ideals, from which 'many of them go in the opposite direction' (Zrinščak et al.,

2014, 2). According to authors (Zrinščak et al., 2014), these are the reasons why for example the newly emerged religions found themselves in a problematic situation, why there is a “selective” character towards religious groups when it comes to church-state relations or why the inclusion of Islam within the public spheres actually reveals how the concepts and ideologies of Christianity and Western understandings are rooted in church-state relations of those countries (Zrinščak et al., 2014). Different societies have different characteristics of legal mechanisms of governing individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions, whereby some States have very invasive and thorough management of religious groups, while other States do not put so much energy and focus on controlling the religious sphere (Richardson, 2006). Along with the level of how invasive legal systems of certain countries are, the aspect of the degree of centralization as well matters (Richardson, 2014). Highly centralized countries and highly centralized legal systems usually assume significant control and restraints over the citizens from the side of authorities, in different aspects of life, which certainly affects the functioning of religious minorities within the society (Richardson, 2014). Examining church-state relations, authors Zrinščak, Marinović Jerolimov, Marinović Bobinac, and Ančić refer to author Ferrari (Ferrari in: Zrinščak et al., 2014) who emphasised a specific European pattern when it comes to the church-state dimension regardless of national differences. In this sense, authors (Zrinščak et al., 2014) claim that ‘the European dimension is to be found in: (1) the protection of individual rights of religious freedom (2) the lack of incompetence of the State on religious matters and the independence of religious faiths, and (3) the “selective” collaboration between States and religious faiths’ (Ferrari in: Zrinščak et al., 2014).

One of the aspects of understanding the concept of religious freedom is to understand which State/government mechanisms are used in regulating this freedom and how legal mechanisms control and monitor religious groups (Breskaya and Giordan, 2019). One example of this kind of mechanism is the registration policy. As Sarkissian (2015) states, governments can repress groups by restricting the formation of religious communities through discriminatory registration policies, and by all means registration requirements are one of the most commonly used restrictions against religious groups (Sarkissian, 2015). Registration policies and specific requirements for obtaining it are usual for most of the States, serving them not only as a controlling tool but also as ‘an opportunity for involvement in religious practice’ (Cross, 2015, 50). Finke, Mataic, and Fox (Fox et al. 2018) claim that these types of mechanisms represent a fruitful space for controlling religious groups or to say putting restrictions on their activity and freedoms. Therefore, if we want to have a closer look at how States can use legal mechanisms, it is important to ‘examine political regimes, types of political secularism and nationalism, as well as a type of religious competition within the country or regionally’ (Breskaya and Giordan, 2019, 3). Fox (2014) divided restrictions on religious freedom in three categories – ‘restrictions on religious institutions, restrictions on group rights and restrictions on individual rights’ (Fox, 2014 in Fox, 2015, 5), and it is likely that these three categories tend to overlap. Richardson (2006), examining the impact of pluralism on religious freedom and the developments in Western Europe extracted four different types of religious-state relations concerning

European societies, creating a hierarchy of religious groups. The first group is ‘officially sanctioned, allowed full access and all privileges’ (Richardson, 2006, 277). These type of religious groups have access to, for example, religious education, to military institutions and can enjoy a certain level of privileged status in society or within the legislation system, which allows them special tax status or State funding. For the second type of religious groups, Richardson refers to as ‘other acceptable churches, allowed limited privilege’ (Richardson, 2006, 277). This type of religious groups understands religious communities that maybe enjoy special status in other States that are of importance in terms of diplomatic relations, or maybe they have a historical value within this society. The third type of religious groups relates to ‘all other religious groups, with few or no privileges’ (Richardson, 2006, 277), which do not have the right to ownership, to exercise religious practices in the public space, or to proselytize. This type of religious groups are only allowed to function within the private sphere and not much more. Finally, the fourth type refers to ‘illegal groups, punished for being present and active’ (Richardson, 2006, 277), which mostly perform their activities undercover, and usually are confronted with discrimination and harassment not only by society but as well by authorities of the State. In most cases, this type of groups are usually in a “stand by” status, trying to uphold their existence or increase the number of members within their religious groups, which is usually the condition for authorities to approve their religious practices or to obtain higher privileges (Richardson, 2006). As Richardson (2006) states, ‘observing the frequency and patterns of social control efforts applied to new religions and other minority faiths can reveal much about the values and organization of a society, as well as about the state of religious freedom in that society’ (Richardson, 2006, 288).

Richardson (2006), examining the concept of religious freedom through the lenses of the Sociology of Law, Sociology of Religion, and studies of new and minority religions, explores different historical, structural, cultural, and sociological factors, which affected and indicated the growth of religious freedom ideals in modern societies. In this sense, Richardson (2006) examines the relationship between religious freedom and pluralism and the role of the State, focusing on different socio-political and legal aspects that affect religious freedom on an internal and external level. According to this, Richardson dissociates from the idea of Enlightenment, with a tendency to understand ‘sociological conditions under which certain ideas arise at a given time and place’ (Richardson, 2006, 272). Richardson (2006) notes that we could predict a positive relationship between pluralism and a high level of religious freedom within the framework of the State policies and implementation strategies, but religious freedom is not a concept that is not only needed in religiously diverse societies but as well in societies that have lower levels of religious pluralism. On the other hand, we could say that regardless of high levels of religious plurality, repression of religious groups is present due to a strong authority and power of an internal factor within the State, such as the military or political party (Richardson, 2006). All modern societies are ‘religiously pluralistic to some degree’ (Richardson, 2006, 274), and it is quite impossible to deny diversity within this kind of societies, but it does depend on the level and type of pluralism that is present in the given society and the impact it has on religious minorities (Richardson, 2006; Richardson; 2014). When it comes to aspects of controlling religious

minorities, Richardson (2014) determines that besides pluralism, a significant difference makes how society defines itself – secular, religious, or somewhere in between that. If society defines itself as secular, then the State is in a position to successfully control almost all religious groups. On the other hand, societies defined as religious might use some extreme measures to eliminate undesirable religions. For the group that falls in between this spectrum of religious control, which is the position of most modern societies, they usually succeed in developing management mechanism and arranging certain agreements with religious groups, while there is an existence, at least to some extent, of the separation between the church and the State (Richardson, 2014).

When it comes to religious diversity in relation to the State, it inevitably poses the question of ‘how societies respond to increasing variety of religious faiths within the borders’ (Richardson, 2014, 31), and in which way they are functioning in the public space and what their legal status involves and allows (Richardson, 2014). In answering those questions of great value is the research done by Ani Sarkissian, “The varieties of Religious Repression”, which concerns State restrictions posed by the States. Sarkissian deals with ‘why some countries choose to repress religion while others not’ (Sarkissian, 2015, 4). By looking into the problems and developing different criteria to address this issue, using quantitative and qualitative methods, Sarkissian recognizes different categories of repression across non-democratic countries and distinguishes variations in the level, types, and targets of religious repression. Sarkissian (2015) classified 101 countries, finding that there is an intersection between high levels of country restrictions and a level of political competition and religious divisions in the country. Along with that, Sarkissian observes that, where the visibility and activity of the religious groups in the political sphere of society are higher, the more the country restricts and oppresses them. Sarkissian divided countries into categories such as - the countries that ‘repress all religions’, countries that ‘repress most by favouring one’, the countries that ‘repress some religious groups’, and the countries that ‘repress no religious groups’ (Sarkissian, 2015). Countries that ‘repress all religions’ are marked by the aspect of State total control over religious activities and institutions, whereby governments use religious justifications to punish anyone who is opposed, giving themselves a “religious right” to violate and restrict religious minorities. Accordingly, in these types of countries ‘no aspect of religious expression falls outside of State control’ (Sarkissian, 2015, 52). Sarkissian’s category of ‘repressing most by favoring one’ is a category of countries that usually select one religious group that enjoys privileges and State favouritism, focusing repression and restrictions mainly on religious minorities. In the case of countries ‘repressing most by favoring one’, majority religions function independently, enjoying autonomy in handling their own affairs, of course in exchange for political support of the regime or ruling government. In the fifth chapter of the book, “*The Need to Choose*”, Sarkissian copes with an analysis of the countries that selectively repress some religious groups. In this sense, Sarkissian (2015) specifically analyses States from different parts of the world, that despite the difference in the targeted groups of repression, they ‘all share a relative religious freedom for those groups that avoid the political sphere of activity’ (Sarkissian, 2015, 159). When it comes to this group of countries, governments repress only

religious groups that are politically active and opposed to the State, while the overlapping and background context of the relations between ethnic and religious belonging is significant in explaining the character of religious repression (Sarkissian, 2015). As well, the aspect of change in the government and the politicization of religion for the purposes of building national identity represents an important factor of religious repression (Sarkissian, 2015). ‘In countries with a history of conflict and regionally concentrated religious and ethnic groups, religious repression tends to be enforced by local actors who apply policies or enforce rules targeted at the minorities in the region’ (Sarkissian, 2015, 130). Even though, country cases examined by Sarkissian in the chapter “*The Need to Choose*”, differ in the level of political competition, each one of these cases includes religious elements and in some specific cases ethnic issues, with a history of conflict, followed by the change of government (Sarkissian, 2015). Countries, where no religion is repressed, are characterized by a higher level of political competition than the countries in any other group. Interestingly, this type of non-repression of religious freedom is a characteristic of some non-democratic States, where ‘the lack of perceived political threat from religious groups explain why leaders refrain from attempting to repress them’ (Sarkissian, 2015, 160), but on the other hand, these countries share an element of lower religious divisions within society. Sarkissian (2015) notes that even though all States regulate religion to some extent, different regulations can support or oppose religions. Countries that desire to oppose religious groups, design their policies with the intention to restrict their activity and their visibility to a minimum level. These types of policy restrictions are associated with State registrations of the groups in order to legally practice religion, restrictions on property ownership, restrictions against political participation, education, and in the domain of government support and funding for religious activities, etc. More specifically, Sarkissian develops the concept of restrictions within the following categories - ‘repression of religious expression and association’, ‘repression of the political expression of religion’, and ‘targeted repression’ (Sarkissian, 2015, 27). From the research of Ani Sarkissian, we can notice that ‘religious’ is a concept that combines a range of social and political aspects, while the State plays an important role in targeting civil society, where regulation of religion can take different forms, to exclude some groups or favor the other.

How legal systems are formed and what are the mechanisms of their functioning have a great impact on the treatment of religious minorities in societies (Finke in: Richardson, 2014). In examining the relationship between the State and religion, Richardson (2014) explores how formal legal structures and their flexibility impact the functioning and legality of religious minorities and what are the levels of their openness in terms of accepting religious minorities. With a tendency to answer those questions, Richardson (2014) develops a scheme of how legal social control is distributed over minority religions (see p.32), which includes ‘significant differences in the legal status of minority religious groups and the ways different societies manage minority religious groups’ (Richardson, 2014, 32). Richardson framed legal social control of religious minorities in three levels, which vary from a very limited legal pluralism to a functioning legal pluralism, which depends on the society where religious groups are accommodated. According to

Richardson (2014), legal pluralism occurs when there are two or more legal structures within the same geographical space, and differs from State to State, depending on which are the aspects of given normative authorities within these legal structures. On the left end of this, what Richardson (2014) and Durham (2012) call a 'continuum', are groups that are vigilantly operating outside formal legal structure, typically ignored by the authorities. In the middle are placed groups that operate within the legal structure with varying privileges according to placement in the hierarchy of accepted religions (Richardson, 2014). On the right end of this continuum are groups operating outside legal structure with the approval of authorities, within the frame of certain limitations. The first category of religious groups implicates groups without the legal recognition of the State, groups that operate outside of the legal system of the State and usually have their norms and values but do not have a high number of members. Usually, these types of religious groups do not attract a lot of attention from the authority side and in this sense have a limited legal plurality, of course depending on the State and type of societies to which they belong. Second category refers to the groups that are in some way legally recognized and usually registered, which allows them to enjoy certain rights and privileges, but the level of enjoyment differs from society to society and also from group to group. Either way, these types of religious groups have a clear distinction in terms of what or how they can perform their religious activities. The third category, which follows the right end of the continuum, according to Richardson (2014) is an example of functioning legal pluralism and refers to religious groups that enjoy a certain level of legal autonomy, which allows them to implement their values, norms, and customs within their own institutional structures, but exercising social control over them is more difficult since these types of group are usually high in numbers of participants and in some cases geographically isolated. Such presence of strong and large religious groups, through their requests for greater autonomy and more rights, can 'encourage the development of legal pluralism within these societies' (Richardson, 2014, 32). According to Richardson (2014), questioning how people respond to increasing religious diversity, what is the public role and place of religious groups, the level of their legal rights and privileges, the level of discrimination and harassment, and the level of access to education system can 'reveal much about the degree of tolerance and religious freedom in a society, and also will indicate to what degree minority religious groups are allowed to exist and function within society' (Richardson, 2014, 32). Explaining state-religion relations, Richardson (2014) emphasises that the development of legal pluralism in certain societies, largely depends on the openness and responsiveness of a given society towards religious diversity (Richardson, 2014), meaning that their perception of religious freedom and perception towards religious minorities shapes the possibility of a certain State to develop and successfully implement and protect religious freedom through government mechanisms. According to Richardson (2014), the development of the level of legal pluralism depends on the openness, flexibility, and perception of the society towards religious diversity. The more society is opposed to accepting religious diversity within society the lower are the levels of legal pluralism in the society.

As often mentioned, state-religious relations are a reflection of different factors, such as different historical events, culture, religious ideology, social and political changes, and many more, which all define the ultimate behaviour of the State toward religion and religious freedom. Durham (2012) explored the nature of state-religious relations and defined two main possible ‘continuums’ (Durham, 2012, 360), from which one of the continuum represents a range from no religious freedom to full religious freedom, while the other represents the level of (positive or negative) identification of the State with religion. Different cases of state-religious relations throughout the world showed that ‘as identification of religion and State goes up, religious liberty goes down’ (Durham, 360, 2012), but in some cases, low identification with religion results in low levels of religious freedom, or the opposite, high identification with religion produces high levels of religious liberty as well, which ultimately results in lack of understanding of the place of religion. According to Durham (2012) high levels of negative identification of the State and religion sometimes results in leading the dominant and other religions towards undesirable position within society. Following this, Durham (2012) defines types of religious State structures by defining their key structure features – theocratic states, established religions, religious status systems, endorsed religions, preferred set of religions, cooperationist regimes, accommodationist regimes, separation, laïcité, secular control regime and finally, abolitionists states. This typology Durham (2012) represents as an ‘outer band’ of the identification continuum, which is followed by the ‘inner band’ that represents the attitudes of the State toward religion, more precisely the attitude attributed to each State structure, which could be in the alignment with the structural type or can indicate a possible movement toward some different structural type. One of the attitudinal types, to which Durham (2012) refers to the ‘religious status system’ and ‘endorsed religions’ State structures is - toleration. Toleration leads to respect which could be appointed to different religions altogether or to a preferred set of religions. Toleration and respect are followed by secularity, which can vary from general support and cooperation with religion in terms of providing financial aid, ability of religious education, and other supports; to the extent of achieving equality in terms of not providing aid for any religious groups. Following this, secularity could potentially lead to rigid secularism which captures the religion within the private sphere only. And finally, at the end of the continuum, Durham (2012) identifies insensitivity and hostility not only directed to other religious groups but as well to religion in general, which is a characteristic of ‘secular control regime’ and ‘abolitionist regime’ State structures.¹ Regardless of the position of the State on the continuum, religious groups will always seek more protection, privileges and will take actions necessary for their endurance within the society, which could produce moving of the State back or forward on the continuum, depending on ‘what one wants freedom from’ (Durham, 2012, 371), producing protection of religious freedom or hostility toward religions. As well, Durham (2012) emphasises that radical shifts within the continuum, from negative to positive identification and vice versa, even though are usually seen as groundbreaking revolutions, it tends to produce instability within the structures and deepen the divisions within the society.

¹ For a detailed explanation and the conceptual scheme of the state models and attitude patterns see Durham, C (2012) Patterns of religion state

Since the continuum is not a one-direction way, thus its particularities are liable to flexibility, and Durham (2012) sees this flexibility in two aspects. Firstly, different structural and attitudinal types could be suitable for different societies, whether it regards general freedoms or religious freedoms of particular groups. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, different attitudinal types could fit in different categories of structural types, and aspects of various structural types could overlap, and each type is liable to different interpretations. Nevertheless, even flexibility has certain limitations, and even though there is no existence of an automatic correlation between the specific structure and levels of religious freedom, Durham (2012) indicates that ‘the closer a particular regime type is toward either end of the identification continuum, the more closed it is to other belief systems and the more likely it is to interfere with the freedom of religion and to discriminate against those other systems’ (Durham, 2012, 372). Finally, Durham (2012) identifies four models of State neutrality characteristic for the cooperationist regimes, which usually have a neutral positive concept of religious freedom at least in terms of religious funding, education, and humanitarian service. According to Durham (2012), those religion-State regimes which are sensitive to the aspect of human rights, usually place themselves somewhere within this neutrality of the continuum, with a flexible moving from cooperationist structure to a separationist structure of state-religion relations, correlating with one of the four following models of neutrality. The first model Durham (2012) identifies as ‘State inaction’. The second model requires that the State encompasses neutrality and takes a position of full impartiality when it comes to religious matters. Within the third model, the State plays a minimal role in determining limitations, but still has the ability to make certain provisions regarding time, space, and activity depending on the necessity. The first three models are different versions of separationism. The fourth model is represented as ‘substantive equal treatment’ (Durham, 2012, 374) and it is typical for accommodationist regimes, meaning that the State treats all individuals equally, but at the same time takes into account the necessity to assimilate its treatments depending on the differences and conscientious beliefs. The fifth model could be represented as the upgraded version of the fourth model, which views the necessity of having an accommodationist point of view regarding the adaptability of equal treatment, and at the same time takes a cooperationist point of view, seeing this adaptability of treatment as a positive obligation of the State. As mentioned before, each extreme identification with any end of the continuum, positive or negative can lead to discrimination and dangerous restrictions when it comes to religious freedom, while those State systems that place themselves within flexible position floating between accommodationist to separationist structures and models ‘are more likely to optimize freedom of religion or belief’ (Durham, 2012, 374).

According to Brettschneider (2010), religious freedom often reflects the religious beliefs of citizens and does not solely have a character of protecting religious practices from the intrusion of the state. Religious freedom as a concept becomes problematic when the religious beliefs of citizens are not in line with that same concept, or when religious beliefs oppose the concept of equal citizenship, consequently producing a ‘potential tension between beliefs and the desire to protect religious freedom’ (Brettschneider, 2010, 189).

In regards to that, Brettschneider (2010) tends to argue against a static conception of religious freedom, whereby rules the idea that simply because beliefs have a religious character they deserve to be protected from the State's intention to change those beliefs, opposing this model to what she calls a 'transformative model of religious freedom' (Brettschneider, 2010, 188). The static model of religious freedom is based on the theories of McConnell and Nussbaum, which held to the idea that religious beliefs have a special position in the public sphere and are connected to the sole value of religion, whereby any kind of oppression by the State to transform certain religious beliefs, intentionally or unintentionally can dangerously jeopardize religious freedoms (McConnell; Nussbaum; in: Brettschneider, 2010). With respect to that, the viewpoint within the static conception of religious freedom is that the State should not, at any cost, interfere with the religious beliefs of citizens regardless of the consequences on the equality of citizens. Brettschneider (2010) sees free and equal citizenship as the basis for religious freedom, advocating for a transformative approach to religious freedom, on the basis of three main arguments – (1) religion freedom as a commitment that requires a transformation of religious viewpoints even if it is in conflict; (2) the transformative model does not necessarily mean to choose exclusion of religious beliefs in order to obtain liberty and (3) highlights the compatibility aspect of a transformative model with basic rights on an example of freedom of association (Brettschneider, 2010). On these grounds, Brettschneider (2010) suggests that the State should base and actively promote free and equal citizenship regardless of religious beliefs, and with it, the State should tend to transform religious beliefs that are opposing those basic values and rights but not through violent and forceful measures. All of this reveals a certain paradox within the concept of religious freedom, which Brettschneider (2010) emphasises on a stand that, if we understand religious freedom as a protector of religious practices (which are based on certain religious beliefs), we should acknowledge that certain religious practices or beliefs should not override the concept of equality, and by that should not be protected by the State (Brettschneider, 2010). These attempts to transform religious beliefs should certainly be limited, meaning that the States should avoid those religious beliefs that are fundamentally in conflict with the shared values of the State. Brettschneider (2010) suggests that if States should apply a transformative approach to religious freedom, two limitations are necessary for the States that are trying to transform religious beliefs that are in conflict with the ideal of religious freedom and the basic rights of citizens. The first limitation is called "means-based limit" and it regards the way these transformations are suggested by the State and as mentioned earlier, it should not be through coercive measures and should promote the concept of equal citizenship, 'reasoning on behalf of the principles of the legitimate State' (Brettschneider, 2010, 195). The second limitation Brettschneider calls "substance-based limit", and it refers to the limitation of the content of beliefs that are targeted by the State. This type of limitation refers to the specific types of religious beliefs that States want to transform and what are the justifications for suggesting this type of transformation. Taking all this into account, and as Breetschneider (2010) claims, it is visible why the concept of religious freedom itself invokes the necessity for certain religious practices and beliefs to be transformed in order to be in line with the equal concept of citizenship and basic human rights. In

relation to human rights, Scolnicov (2011) claims that religious freedom differs from other “typical” human rights, because of its contradictory element of freedom and self-imposed constraints that makes ‘interpretation and protection of religious freedom as human right’ (Scolnicov, 2011, 1), far more complicated than other rights. As Scolnicov claims, ‘the right to religious freedom creates a tension between liberty and equality, a tension manifested in the legal protection accorded to this right’ (Scolnicov, 2011, 24).

1.2. Complexities of Citizenship and Citizens’ rights

The aspects and characteristics of “citizenship” and “citizens” goes back to the rise and creation of cities in medieval Europe, distinguishing a ‘citizen’ from others, as a person with certain privileges and duties, forming a part of the city on different levels – cultural, social and economic. Taking a step back for instance to Greek polis and Aristotle's understanding of how citizen was perceived back then, we could find that ‘human was a creature formed by nature to live a political life’ (Pocock in: Levy, 2014, 27), while thinking of Roman society, the idea of citizen evolved around ‘the possession of things and the practice of jurisprudence’ (Pocock in: Levy, 2014, 27). Citizenship back then put weight on the individual’s position towards the State, with a tendency to balance between the rights of individuals and responsibilities towards the State (Schubert, 2006). Even in those early stages, the development of the idea of citizens and citizenship, the idea of rights and obligations towards the State, a sense of community and belonging, the inclusion in the political arena of the polis, and other various aspects, brought up discussions on ‘how broadly this sense of obligation should apply’ (Schubert, 2006, 35). Even though, discussion on citizens’ rights can be traced back to ancient Greeks and Romans, concrete thinking and development of the concept and theories concerning citizenship started with changes within the social and political sphere during the 17th and 18th centuries, marked by different wars for independence and different revolutions that launched the concept of citizens’ rights - as important, in the orbit of modern politics. Turner (2009) adverts specifically to the notions of political changes during the English Civil War, the American War of Independence, and the French Revolution. Within these big political changes on the global level, each political change interpreted and assimilated citizenship differently, however, having some common aspects regarding mere transformations of citizenship (Turner, 2009, 185). Taking into account how three big historical events shaped citizenship practices, Turner (2009) gives a brief look at what distinguished one from another. In the case of France, the idea was to eliminate the difference throughout the system by excluding religion from the sphere of public, moving the focus to sharing a common loyalty to the republic. In the US, the concept of citizenship was envisioned through participation within the voluntary institutions of civil society, especially chapels or other religious institutions. Among people, these activities were based on the idea of social equality and that all people should be treated equally, which produced a strong reluctance and distrust towards the government and its central institutions. When it comes to Britain, the concept of citizenship was grounded in the framework of common law, and it represented an obstacle in

struggling against the power of the State which protected the privileged position of the property owners. In the end, these political changes resulted in the changes within the system of rights, which instead of putting the focus on enjoying certain privileges, therefore constructing positive rights, made essential rights as negative freedoms from interference (Marshall in Turner, 2009). Examining historical reflections on citizenship, we cannot move forward to today's new conceptions of citizenship without making a stop to Thomas H. Marshall, one of the initiators of citizenship theories that put grounds and basis for further development of this concept. Marshall saw citizenship as a status that is assigned to those who are full members of society and are equal with respect to rights and duties that come with the enjoyment of this status (Marshall in Turner, 2009). He distinguished civil, political, and social rights, and even though throughout history these three dimensions of rights were intertwined, Marshall examined the history of citizenship tracing down the time frames in which these three elements of citizenship separated. In this sense, he traced the defining moment of civil rights in the 18th century and relates them to the rights concerning individual freedom (Marshall in Turner, 2009). For example, such as freedom of speech, freedom of thought, property ownership, the right to work in terms of freedom of choice, and so on. Civil citizenship, in a way, set the ground for the development of political citizenship in the 19th century, making it possible for citizens (especially the economic class) to actively participate in the political community as a member throughout the body of the political system. Finally, the concept of social citizenship entered during the 20th century, which entails equality, welfare, and security of rights, mostly connected to educational and social service institutions (Marshall in Turner, 2009). Since the world witnessed a wide range of changes and developments within the economic and social sphere, thus the concept of citizenship went in parallel with these changes (Turner, 2009). First studies on citizenship followed extensively the Marshallian concept of citizenship, gradually expanding and upgrading the scope of research from individual rights towards legal, institutional, and social meanings of citizenship, and along with that creating new fields of citizenship research (Levy, 2014). Taking the shape of a more complex and diverse concept 'Marshallian citizenship has been subject to extensive criticism over the last two decades' (Turner, 2009, 185), and with the process of modernizing Europe, and changes through different levels of society, the concept of citizenship went beyond the ideas of medieval cities and started intertwining with the rise of capitalism and nation-states, rewriting the understandings of citizenship (Levy, 2014). With the changes in societies and struggles for rights in different spheres, the scope of citizens' rights and claims for it changed, becoming more extensive and important within the framework of rights (Levy, 2014). New developments and problems emerged especially in the 80's which had an immediate effect on the issue of citizenship, and it was clear that the framework through which the concept of citizenship is observed needs to be restructured (Steenbergen, 1994). While early citizenship conclusions were mostly focused on the relation between the State and the rights and obligations of the citizens, recent social notions of citizenship concept set the focus on social structures that produced malformations, violations, and denials of citizens' rights, typically coming from the side of the race, gender, and class (Turner, 2009).

Isin and Nyers (2014) examining the concept of citizenship notice that in each given definition or tendency to define citizenship, frequently these attempts lack the definition that encompasses every aspect of it and usually results in ‘assumes so much and leaves so much’ (Isin and Nyers, 2014, 1). Even though most of the literature refers to citizenship as a concept connected to the membership to a nation-state, Isin and Nyers point out a multidimensional aspect of citizenship, which will be elaborated later on, whereby people do not only belong to the institution of the State, but to a variety of institutions. While in some cases, these varieties of institutions are connected and overlapping, on the other hand, these institutions are sometimes opposed to each other on different levels, ranging from the level of the city to regional level, from the level of State to international level, producing a variety of complex relationships. Due to this lacking aspect, Isin and Nyers (2014) offered their own definition of citizenship in which they use quite different semantics from the usually given definitions. They define citizenship as: ‘an institution mediating rights between the subjects of politics and the polity to which these subject belong’ (Isin and Nyers, 2014, 1) For example, in this definition, Isin and Nyers (2014) give special meaning to concepts such as “institution”, “polity”, “political subjects” and “belonging”. Hence, the meaning of “institution” refers to a much greater scope than the sole organization, encompassing the meaning of processes ‘through which something is enacted, created and rendered’ (Isin and Nyers, 2014, 1). Following that, Isin and Nyers use the term “polity” to go outside the framework of the State since the State is not the only sole factor of authority and legislation process determining citizenship policies, but there are other different actors such as different agreements, declarations, international laws and policies that as well play a role in defining what citizenship encompasses. Furthermore, they use “political subjects” in exchange for “citizens”, based on a view that ‘not all political subjects have the designation of citizens’ (Isin and Nyers, 2014,1), while the plurality of the term “subjects” signifies the relation between not only individuals and the “polity”, but as well, signifying the relation between “polity” and groups. “Political subjects” according to Isin and Nyers as well has a double meaning, in the sense that on one hand, it includes ‘those people who have constituted themselves as subjects of politics’(Isin and Nyers, 2014, 1), and on the other hand, it includes ‘where and how the mediation of rights occur’ (Isin and Nyers, 2014, 2). In reference to belonging, Isin and Nyers consider different variations of belonging, in terms of formal or informal, or legally formed belongings and extra-legal belongings. While approaching the problematic of citizenship nowadays, Isin and Nyers (2014) differ two important dimensions, considering these dimensions as fundamental in understanding the concept of citizenship. The first one is the combination of rights and duties that define citizenship, which has always been an outcome of social struggles. The second one is the aspect of performance, which highlights the aspect of passive and active rights, mostly known as active and passive citizenship. Furthermore, the second dimension, referred to as the aspect of performance, invokes two different issues. Firstly, the rights and duties that are not performed by citizens are seen as passive and can be brought into existence only by citizens. Secondly, non-citizens can also perform citizens’ rights and duties, especially in the process of obtaining citizenship (Isin and Nyers, 2014). Along with that, Isin and Nyers reject or at least try to reason

on neglecting the prior ideas of narrowing down the concept of citizenship to ‘Europe and The West’, whereby “The East” (Isin and Nyers, 2014, 7), due to cultural segments was falling behind. The difference in citizenship development and implementation between the West and the East was a common ground for most social scientists and could be found not only in the historical reflections on the issue but as well throughout the studies and analysis of social sciences today, while Isin and Nyers (2014) rather see citizenship as an ‘institution that belongs to World history’ (Isin and Nyers, 2014, 6).

1.2.1. Citizens’ rights in Relation to Human Rights

For nearly two centuries the “rights of man” were interpreted as the rights of citizens acquired by their nationality and in that way assured the protection by the authorities of their nation-State. Not until the mid-20th century, in the face of the disempowerment of citizens – by religion, ideology, and States – did human rights stop being seen as the rights of citizens, but as the rights of human beings (O’Halloran, 2019). The phenomenon of stateless persons, globalization, and mass migration has accelerated the erosion of the relationship between citizenship and human rights. The concept of citizenship transformed and is no longer tied to the nation or State, and precisely because of the effect of human rights, these transformations produced a new category - citizens of the world (O’Halloran, 2019). Human rights as are known today, raised due to changes in different national, geopolitical, and social relations especially after the events of WWII., with a specific focus on changing and reinforcing the understanding of acceptable social practices within societies (Woodwiss, 2009). Turner (2009) examines the complexity of the relation between human rights coming from the aspect of people and the ‘rights of citizens as members of a nation or the State’ (Turner, 2009, 186). Exercising any right in the context of a relationship either with other human beings or with the State can be interpreted as an incident of citizenship, which is derived from nationality (O’Halloran, 2019). While the concept of human rights perceives rights as inalienable and equal to all, the concept of citizens’ rights is created differently by the States, which creates a contrasting relation difficult to justify in terms of rights, or as Turner said ‘human rights and citizenship, and State sovereignty and rights are often contradictory couplets’ (Turner, 2009, 187).

Hannah Arendt (1951) puts focus on the tension between human rights and citizens’ rights from a critical perspective, emphasizing that having human rights as an unaccompanied concept is not worth much without the presence of citizens’ rights. Once those rights are not available to individuals, the existence of human rights becomes a very abstract possession, visible in the declarations but not so much on the ground. According to Arendt, the idea of the ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt in: Turner, 2009, 187) functions only if the individuals are members of a political community and human rights are inalienable and enjoyable only ‘by citizens of the most prosperous and civilised countries’ (Arendt in: Nash, 2009). Rawls distinguishes human rights from other constitutional rights, defining human rights as ‘a special class of urgent rights’ (Rawls in: Turner, 2009, 187), which are used as special protection from different rights violations, especially in the case where the State is not capable to protect their citizens or even worse, when the State

takes part in the infringement of basic human rights, taking advantage of their vulnerability as human beings (Turner, 2009). On the other hand, Burke poses an argument that the rights and freedoms of individuals are far more protected by their States, than by the force of international law, due to the fact that the States are the main political mechanisms through which international law and legalities are accepted and applied in one country (Burke in: Turner, 2009). With citizenship adapting and taking different shapes, and taking a shift towards post-national citizenship which relies on more flexibility, it began to be difficult to distinguish the difference between citizen and non-citizen. Nash refers to Jacobson (1996) and Soysal (1994) research, pointing out that this difference, between the citizen and non-citizen, is often blurred - on one side, by the possibility of being a long-term resident (without citizenship) and obtaining certain rights in terms of education, healthcare, and employment, and on the other side by the effect of international human rights agreements, especially when it comes to refugees and asylum seekers (Jacobs; Soysal in: Nash, 2009). Nash comes back to Arendt's criticism, that without membership within a political community you cannot fully enjoy other rights, pointing out that regardless of the achievements in some level of rights, post-national citizenship is unsecured terrain where individuals remain vulnerable and are left without political rights and a possibility to actively enroll within the political community (Nash, 2009). However, Nash claims that membership in a political community itself is not enough when it comes to respecting fundamental rights since even those who enjoy full political rights still come to be a vulnerable group in times of crisis. Therefore, Nash emphasises what she calls 'solidarity' (Nash, 2009, 99), pointing out to the important role of the members of the political community who have an influence on the institutions that serve to protect rights. With respect to that, Nash calls out for a cultural transformation within the political community whereby the fundamentals of human rights would be placed within the politics, transforming the 'public orientation towards what it means to be a member of the political community' (Nash, 2009, 101), encompassing the solidarity that would overcome the national boundaries and treat all human beings as equal (Nash, 2009).

1.3. Issues of Migrations Reflected in the Complexity of Religious Identities

Nowadays, most sovereign societies are characterised as pluralistic or culturally diverse, while the perspectives on diversity views changed in the last decades (Mesić and Bagić, 2011). As Mesić and Bagić (2011) claim, until mid of the last century Western European countries were characterised as being more and more homogenous, which corresponded with traditional notions of the national States. On the other hand, societies of North America and Australia were labelled as countries of plurality and cultural diversity (Mesić and Bagić, 2011). Evidently, notions of these dynamics changed, shifting European societies to being marked as culturally diverse. Therefore, the dynamics of migration in Europe became one of the main issues in the past few decades. The main reason why migration has been mostly perceived as a problem refers to the capability of social reception of migrants within societies, whereby migrants and refugees are mostly perceived negatively due to the cultural and identity differences they bring along.

As Žagi (2021) claims, migrants in relation to the dominant society are always “othered” by the majority, while the level of this “otherness” depends on the specificities of migrants groups in terms of language and racial differences, religious affiliation, and cultural and social divergences from the dominant society. Considering group identities and the interaction produced between them, Modood and Thompson (2021) examine what is encompassed by the process of “othering”. This usual process of constructing and deconstructing social identities through the interaction of two or various groups, regardless of it’s habitually, can sometimes evoke “otherness” of the groups subordinate to the dominant one (Modood and Thompson, 2021). As Modood (2019) claims, “otherness” represents a perception of minority groups by the dominant group, as being something ‘inferior and threatening’ (Modood, 2019, 78), producing negative connotations and exclusion of the specific “other”, as a result of fear and necessity to keep the leading position within society (Modood, 2019; Modood and Thompson, 2021). The notions of “otherness” can be perceived within the process of assimilation of the migrant population, whereby the practice of integration of immigrants often represents the downsizing of differences between immigrants and the dominant population (Bloemraad et al., 2008), thus questioning the extent to what the process of assimilation removes the visibility of “otherness”. In this sense, the symbolic boundaries, like language, religion, culture are one of the main characteristics of separation, not only between the dominant and migrant population, but as well in relations of one migrant group to another (Žagi, 2021). Thus, symbolic boundaries folded within cultural values can sometimes be much more difficult to cross than the real one.

Religious groups within societies are mostly competing with each other for the same goods, especially in terms of expanding the circle of their public support, whether it is between dominant-minority groups, or on a minority-minority group level, it is precisely why religious people perceive others, who are trying to take what is theirs, as a potential threat and danger to sustainability of their own religious identity (Scheepers et al., 2002; Ysseldyk et al., 2010 in: Bohman and Hjerm, 2012). Thus, these negative attitudes toward the specific “other” may vary, depending on which is the dominant religion of the country, what are the levels of religious homogenization, and how state–religious relations are regulated (Bohman and Hjerm, 2012), along with the influencing factors such as the geo-political position of the country, its demographical structure and historical background of religious and national relations.

As Bohman and Hjerm explain, religion has always been a great factor in the ‘creation and sustainment of social cohesion’ (Durkheim, 2001 in: Bohman and Hjerm, 2012), especially in countries with Catholic dominance, causing religious context to be partly a factor that affects attitudes toward foreigners. In this sense, cultural values and religious homogeneity of certain society becomes challenged by foreigners, which finally produces a fear among the dominant society that important aspects of their identity, values, and belief system could be potentially damaged (Bohman and Hjerm, 2012). While religiosity in different ways can present an obstacle for the integration of migrants, on the other hand, religious institutions can offer a sense of belonging and acceptance (Foner and Alba, 2008). Provided help, coming from religious institutions, and connections to religious entities, can serve to ease the

process of assimilation within the new community, at the same time offering a place where migrants can stay linked to their own cultural values and traditions while accepting the transformation of their own identities (Foner and Alba, 2008). As Zanfrini (2020) claims, religious affiliation becomes an element of vulnerability, whereby religion is used as a factor for filtering in terms of inclusion or exclusion, thus giving the chance to those foreigners to more easily cross cultural and social frontiers of a specific society.

In this sense, religion has two contradictory faces, on one hand, it can represent a strong voice in defending and advocating for the rights of those in need, on the other hand, it can be a burden in the process of assimilation of migrant population (Zaccaria et al. 2018; Zanfrini, 2020). With this in mind, States position and governing mechanisms represent a weight that directs the balance within this tension, guiding the way of approaching immigrant issues and migrant reception within societies. Most EU country migration policies are guided by the practice of integrating migrants into society, implying a two-way process of integration and adjustment - assimilation and pluralism, whereby both of the practices, have a goal to establish the balance between recipient society and migrant population for both sides (Knezović and Grošinić, 2017). The practice of assimilation is related to the process of foreigners' adaptation to the values and norms of the recipient society based on a peaceful coexistence within a diversified society (Knezović and Grošinić, 2017). The pluralist practice of migration policies fundamentally revolves around the acceptance of cultural differences, their freedom, and equality within society, supporting openness, dialogue, and tolerance toward cultural diversification (Knezović and Grošinić, 2017).

The research on the dynamics of migrations and effect of religion has long been one of the main interests in the field of sociology, especially in the 20th and 21st centuries during the increase of migratory trends (Foner and Alba; Kvisto in Kumpes 2018). There are three main aspects of researching the role of religion in the sphere of migrations – the differentiation of immigrants based on their origin and country of coming; the characteristics of religiosity of the dominant society; and the establishment of an institutional legal framework which usually reflects certain historical relations between majority and minority groups (Foner and Alba; Kvisto in Kumpes, 2018). As well, Kumpes (2018) highlights the importance of contextual differences when studying migration topics, while Bohman and Hjerem (2012) emphasise the significant lack of comparative studies in terms of empirical research on the interrelation of migration and religion. Most of the research studies imply that immigrants are perceived as mainly a cultural threat (Mc Laren, 2003; Sides and Citrin 2007; 2008; in Kumpes, 2018), while according to the study of Pew Research Centre, European refugees are seen as danger factor for possible terrorism, a threat to certain social and economic privileges and a cause of increased criminal (Kumpes, 2018). As well, Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello (2002), determined that certain religious aspects such as belonging to Christian denominations, church attendance and levels of religious differentiation is connected to ethnic prejudice (at least in the case of European countries), while low levels of socio-economic inclusion is to a

great extent connected to higher levels of religious practice (Zanfrini, 2020). Indeed, for most of the researchers, religion represents the main problematic in the process of integration of migrants, especially in the case of migrants with Muslim religious background (Foner and Alba, 2008; Kumpes, 2018).

The entanglement of Europe with the issues of migratory crisis is becoming each day, more and more evident, and above all necessary. Starting with the huge migrant crisis in 2015 and with the recent violent conflict in Ukraine, which has already disturbed social and economic spheres on the global level, indeed is, unquestionably testing the Europe's preparedness (legal and on the ground) for the changes that already came. Regardless of the support of various organizations and institutions, it seems that below the surface, Europe is practising the "not in my yard" rhetoric. As Zanfrini (2020) claims, the view of the European public on migrants usually comes down to something that Europe needs to defend itself from, while these alarms that are invoking the defence systems, usually do not regard only economic issues and labour market, but above all the fear from cultural fading. Considering all mentioned above, the arrival of migrants with various national, religious, and cultural backgrounds, can indeed verify the true embodiment of democracy, democratic values, and the spectrum of religious freedoms in a specific society (Zanfrini, 2020).

Considering immigrant issues in relation to religiosity, a range of studies have shown that higher levels of religiosity are linked with negative attitudes toward immigrants (Bohman and Hjerm, 2014; Kumpes, 2018; Kumpes et al., 2012; Sheepers et al., 2002). Indeed, this kind of relationship depends on various contextual factors within socio-political dimensions and is influenced by various characteristics of the country's religious landscape (Bohman and Hjerm, 2012). Bohman and Hjerm (2012) examined the influence of different religious contexts on negative out-group attitudes, thus, finding that strongly religious people, on average, oppose more immigration than non-religious people and as well that countries with prevailing Catholicism tend to be more averse to immigration, while Hall, Matz and Wood emphasise that where the attachment to certain religious identity is stronger, the stronger is the resistance toward other groups (Hall, Matz and Wood in Bohman and Hjerm, 2012). Along with this, leaning on group-threat theory and devolving into the problematic of contextual differences, Bohman and Hjerm (2012) emphasise that specific contextual factors can become one of the main triggers for negative out-group attitudes. For example, social cohesion based on ethnicity or religion, religious homogeneity, policies of state-religious relations in terms of favouring or restrictions, or type of the religion prevailing in a country, can be a strong mediator in how attitudes will be articulated toward other groups.²

1.4. (Miss)Understanding of Rights: Intertwining of Group and Individual Rights

After WWII, the international religious freedom regime emphasised the ideas of individual religious rights along with the rights of religious groups. Within the framework of the sociology of rights, authors

Somers and Roberts (2008; p. 412), pose a question of what really defines ‘the Right’, stating that theories and studies on defining the concept of rights are often argued as flawed and inadequate. Coming from the second half of the 20th century, we start to see the struggles for recognition and ‘the rise of a politics of rights’ (Levy, 2014, 30). The battle for rights started with marginalized groups of women and people of color seeking for the wrongs from the past to be corrected and moving further to the rehabilitation of the damages produced by modernization, and different injustices that came along with political and social changes of the world (Levy, 2014), while the idea of individual rights or rights as individual entitlements accelerates with the capitalism and the changes it brought on social and economic level (Woodwiss, 2009). In some cases, religion enjoys a superior position, which puts religion in a clash with some other rights and some other freedoms. It is ‘an important area of individual autonomy’ (Cross, 2015, 3), and the sole right to choose religion, is a right constitutionally protected, unlike some other rights that fall into the category of individual autonomy (Cross, 2015). In this sense authors like Leiter, Dworkin, Eisgruber, and Sager, argue that religion should not take a special position or enjoy special benefits within the framework of constitutional rights and freedoms with no specific justification for doing so (Leiter; Dworkin; Eisgruber; Sager in: Cross, 2015). On the other hand, some authors, such as Witte, Boyle and Sheen, Greenawalt and Laycock claim differently, stating that religion is a quite unique, different, and specific right, and in a way more important from other rights which gives it right to be singled out from other rights (Witte, Boyle and Sheen, Greenawalt, Laycock in: Cross, 2015). Woodwiss (2009) looks at the dual character of the rights, where on one hand; capitalism brought certain freedoms in terms of property ownership, and on the other hand, the ability of the ones without property ownership, to control labor power, their security, and economic situation. In this view, Woodviss emphasises, what was seen as a process of development that led to another process of development, should be seen as an ‘ideological hindsight’ (Woodwiss, 2009, 107) that covered the negative side of the rights.

Looking over different rights and what they encompass, Somers and Roberts go in line with the idea of Iris Young (1990), which declines to define the rights as something, we possess or have. Instead, they see it as ‘complex configuration of relationship and institutional agreements’ (Young in: Somers and Roberts, 2008, 413). Regardless of the kind or level of the rights we consider, Somers and Roberts see it as a ‘label we use to characterize certain kinds of social arrangements’, with a tendency to move the focus away from what is individually possessed to individual position within social relations (Somers and Roberts, 2008, 413). As Young (1990) claims, rights are tied to relations, determining what people can do in relation to others, pointing out more what we can do, instead of what we have, enabling and constraining actions within society (Young in: Somers and Roberts, 2008, 413). Somers and Roberts (2008) overviewing the rights separates them in two categories – the rights to membership and inclusion; and civil-judicial rights. The first category is defined as fundamental rights, which set the basis for civil-judicial rights, making the existence of the second category of rights dependent on the right to membership and inclusion. In this sense,

² This subchapter forms part of published article - Stipišić, T. (2022) Attitudes toward Immigrants Intertwined with Religion: Comparison of Croatia

Sommers, relying on the theories of Polanyi and Marshall, indicates that membership to a political community ‘depends equally on the de facto right to social equality and full social inclusion in civil society’ (Somers and Roberts, 2008, 413). The second category of rights referred to as civil-judicial rights encompasses civil, political, and social rights, including as well category of cultural, economic, indigenous, same-sex rights, and human rights, which all require recognition in order to be fulfilled, and it can only be assured through membership and social inclusion. In this sense, Somers and Roberts (2008) claim that the right to recognition is a condition and necessary for claiming any other right, and within that human rights and citizens’ rights are deeply dependent on the ‘recognition that comes only from attachments and inclusion’ (Somers and Roberts, 2008, 414).

Turner (2009) within the context of the relation between rights and duties, as well, observes the difference between group rights and individual rights, referring to them as extremely different but with a tendency to overlap. Hence, Turner (2009) identifies individual rights as human rights and group rights as social/collective rights. In this sense, individual rights (human rights) are enjoyed by humans, characterized as universal, and there are no specific duties that go linearly with the enjoyment of these rights. On the other hand, group rights, or as Turner calls social rights, are the ‘rights of citizen in return for the duties they perform in society’ (Turner, 2009, 183). Core issue that Scolnicov (2011) explores and develops in her approach to religious freedom, is the ‘clash between individual claims and group claims’ (Scolnicov, 2011, 2) and the conflict that comes out in interpreting individual or group rights. According to this, Scolnicov (2011) gives a thorough examination of what is understood by group and by individual rights and the justifications for those rights, which reveals the problematic nature of religious freedom as a right. The main key point on which Scolnicov (2011) grounds his viewpoint, is the argument that group rights do not really exist without the claims of individual rights and are basically the outgrowth of individual rights, and as such could never be superior to individual rights (Scolnicov, 2011). Within the aspect of exploring and defining rights, Vincent evaluates the nature of the rights, and their contemporary role in international politics, pointing out that existential rights are in superior position to human rights, while Forsythe recognizes human rights as a powerful tool for limiting political power (Vincent; Forsythe; in: Morgan, 2009), especially since throughout history rights were defined as rights of the citizens against the state, created exactly for the reason of protecting individuals from the collective force of the State (Scolnicov, 2011, 27). In this sense, Woodiwiss (2009) examining the sociology of human rights, indicates that ‘taking human rights seriously’ (Woodiwiss, 2009, 104) means giving priority to individual values and rights over the collective rights, especially when the State is representing the collective. Turner (2009) brings attention to the relation between rights and duties, describing that if people have rights then automatically they have duties. While the analysis and study of rights have been mostly led by political and law science, the study of duties, if we consider them in terms of moral duties that come through our culture and normative institutions in the shape of religion, values and morality; should be considered ‘as a traditional task of sociology’ (Turner, 2009,

182). In this sense, examining the tension between rights and duties, Turner (2009) points out the useful model developed by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld in 1919, who divided the relationship between rights and duties into four main relations – right/duty; privilege/no-right; immunity/disability; power/liability (Fredenn in: Turner, 2009), served as a basis for most of the legal typologies of rights and duties (Turner, 2009). In this relation between the rights and the duties, according to Turner (2009) the main notion of this typology is that ‘only some rights (for example claims) typically exercise constraint on others’ and can be interpreted as a ‘sociological typology of social interaction’ (Turner, 2009, 182).

1.4.1. Reasons and Possibilities For and Against Claiming Group Rights in Relation to Religious Freedom and Citizens’ rights

Before analyzing further the difference between group and individual rights, Scolnicov (2011) intends to define and identify what as a matter of fact is a group right. Scolnicov (2011) begins with an argument that even though some rights are given as individual rights, as well are most commonly practiced through a group, such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, or freedom of belief. ‘The speaker needs an audience, as the worshiper needs his co-religionists’ (Scolnicov, 2011, 25), but this does not imply that those rights should be considered as group rights. In this sense, Waldron points out that recognizing group rights could be contradictory to the idea of freedom, by ‘conflicting and possibly overriding individual choices’ (Waldron in: Scolnicov, 2011, 25), giving the group a force to impose their views and ideologies. Furthermore, when it comes to recognition of the group, there is an issue of defining membership and the legitimate decision-making process for exercising this right, which leads to three possible options: self-identification, identification by the group, and objective identification. The issue with self-identification as an option might be suitable for race or ethnic groups, but cannot work on religious groups since ‘religious doctrines create the group in the first place’ and ‘often claim as part of their doctrine the defining criteria of membership’(Scolnicov, 2011, 26). Therefore, making self-identification a criterion for defining membership in a religious group would bring to pass the right of religious freedom as an individual right superior to group rights. The second possible criterion would be identification by the group, which induces a range of dangerous consequences when it comes to human rights. Giving a certain group the right to define its own membership can affect and jeopardize a range of individual rights of the members of the group. Finally, the third possible principle – objective identification is a questionable one, since ‘religion by its nature is always defined from within’ (Scolnicov, 2011, 27), and objective identification represents an external factor that should decide whether an individual belongs to a group or not, making the implementation and protection of rights insecure (Scolnicov, 2011). Therefore, individual rights within a group should not be more or less important, but individuals should not sacrifice their right to have rights for the purpose of group rights. Waldron (Waldron in: Scolnicov, 2011), proposes an idea of granting group rights, but in an external way, which would allow to bypass internal conflict and practice those rights only when it comes to conflicts between the group and an outside person. According to Scolnicov, this approach

might work well for other groups, such as ethnic or racial, but in terms of religious freedom it is not sufficiently adequate since religious groups mostly expose their demands, within the group (internally), directly to their members (Scolnicov, 2011) Waldron's solution could serve well, but with certain limitations, and hardly for religious groups, considering the intense conflict between group and individual rights when it comes religious freedom. As Scolnicov claims, the concept of group rights is difficult not only to explain but to justify when opposing individual rights, especially since 'the concept of group right is antithetical to the idea of rights as a limit to collective power' (Scolnicov, 2011, 31). Regardless of the presence and recognition of group rights within international law and human rights, certainly, its interpretation and implementation invokes challenges with an unknown and oftentimes endangering outcome when it comes to protecting the human rights of individuals (Scolnicov, 2011).

Kymlicka (1995) as well, analyses the connection between individual and group rights from a liberal perspective, which mostly sees group rights as an opponent to individual rights, whereby individuals are seen as 'the mere carriers of group identities and objectives' (Kymlicka, 1995, 34). According to this, Kymlicka considers the term collective rights as too broad and inadequate for the various types of group differentiated rights. Therefore, Kymlicka points out two different meanings of collective rights – internal restrictions and external protection, which must be distinguished. Hence, collective rights can in one way 'refer to the right of a group to limit the liberty of its own individual members in the name of group solidarity or cultural purity (internal restrictions)' (Kymlicka, 1995, 7); and in another way, collective rights could serve to restrict or limit the power exercised by a larger group or society which could endanger the minority group, and this refers to external protection. In this sense, Kymlicka argues that the external protection that serves to protect the vulnerability of the group from the majority is not necessarily in conflict with individual rights and freedoms (Kymlicka, 1995). These two types of collective rights, internal restrictions and external protection can both be claims for the protection of the stability of a certain group, but coming from 'different sources of instability' (Kymlicka, 1995, 35). Internal restrictions refer to the relations within the group and decisions made by individual members that oppose the norms of the group, and in this sense, the group might use State power in order to limit the action of their members. These types of rights are questionable when it comes to radical religious practices or maintenance of cultural traditions, whereby often vulnerable groups like women or children are endangered, especially when collective rights take over individual rights. Kymlicka emphasises that internal restrictions and this will for protection exist not only in culturally homogeneous countries but almost in every culture (Kymlicka, 1995). External protections mostly serve to limit the impact of a larger society, and it is done on the level between major and minor groups, which also can produce some discriminatory practices, bypassing the level of individual liberties, but directly affecting the dimension of equality in between groups. Unlike internal restrictions, external protections can only emerge within multinational or polyethnic countries. The main argument of Kymlicka (1995) is that these two types of collective rights do not necessarily go together, and it makes a

big difference if a minority group demands internal restrictions that jeopardize individual freedoms or it seeks to gain external protection (Kymlicka, 1995).

According to Kymlicka, a number of States have come to accept the idea that some forms of cultural differences should be integrated through acceptance of special rights and constitutional measures, and should be placed above and out of usual citizens' rights. It means that new forms of citizenship should be developed, for example, multicultural citizenship that would fit into modern multicultural societies. Regarding that, it is worth mentioning the concept of differentiated citizenship, first developed by Iris Marion Young (1995), under the presumption that specific variations of group differences can exist only if group members have group differential rights (Young in: Bogdanić, 2004). Kymlicka established the concept of group-differential citizenship based on observing the 'politics of identity' and how certain forms of national, regional, ethnic and religious identities are perceived (Kymlicka in: Bogdanić, 2004). In regards to that, Kymlicka differs three types of group differentiated rights – 'self government rights, polyethnic rights and special representation rights' (Kymlicka, 1995, 26), emphasizing that certain cultural varieties can be satisfied only through 'special legal or constitutional measures, above and beyond the common rights of citizenship' (Kymlicka, 1995, 26). Self-government rights mostly fit within multinational States practising a federal system, whereby powers are divided between the central government and regional political unit. In this sense, if the national minority is concentrated within a specific region and forms a majority within this region, federalism can provide significant self-governance mechanisms to this specific national minority. This results in empowering the legal position and decision-making of national minorities, without being suppressed by the larger society of which they form part. The non-existence of self-government mechanisms for national minorities produces far more risk for the power of their rights and enlarges the dimension of vulnerability (Kymlicka, 1995). The second type of group differentiated rights is 'Polyethnic rights', and mostly refer to ethnic groups and religious minorities, since the idea of minorities abounding their cultural norms and customs in order to assimilate fully to the larger society has been left out. The demands for the rights of minority groups are starting to be more and more extended, not only in freely expressing their customs and culture, but as well as in the sphere of education and public funding of their cultural practices in order to maintain and preserve their cultural heritage, and to most controversial one referring to the exemptions to the laws and regulations that limit their religious practices. In this sense, Kymlicka (1995) claims that 'Polyethnic rights' serve to protect and help minority groups express their cultural particularities without the fear of not fulfilling their goals within the institutions of a larger society. Finally, Kymlicka argues on 'Special representation rights', which serves for bigger inclusion of minority and vulnerable groups within the political parties, as candidates or leaders, which would help to reflect the real diversity of the population, and effectively represent the views and interests of a specific minority. It is visible that one of these three types of group-differentiated rights is usually practised by modern democratic countries, and minorities tend to seek more than one group of rights, like for example, self-governance and special

representation, or for example, some groups could have right to seek polyethnic rights but not have legit reasons to seek claims on another group of rights (Kymlicka, 1995).

1.5. Merging Sociology and Human Rights in Empirical Research

The assimilative nature of human rights gives a possibility to explore human rights within different interests, regardless of the position of these interests within the political sphere (Morgan, 2009). Furthermore, the language of human rights is adaptable for use even when it comes to opposing actors, conflicted in their stands, but claiming their rights (Morgan, 2009). When it comes to sociology and human rights within the sphere of empirical research, Turner (2009) notes that since political sciences were occupied with the question of justice and legality of the regime, sociology failed to develop an analysis of justice and rights. Therefore, the closest sociology came to exploring rights was in terms of inequality issues, which led to missing the opportunity for sociology to engage with the growth of universal human rights (Turner, 2009). As Turner claims, ‘because sociology has withdrawn from the issues covered by international relations as a subject area, it does not have much to say about contemporary political issues’ (Turner, 2009, 184). Researchers in the field of human rights are often criticized for the methods they use or don’t use, especially since a broad range of human rights scholars are oriented towards exploring human rights issues from a legal stand, international relations, and political science analysis (Commans et al., 2010; Breskaya, Giordan, Richardson, 2018) relying mostly on secondary, rather than primary sources (Commans et al., 2010). In this sense, researching human rights often tends to be narrowed to adoptions of resolutions, signing conventions, and results of States accepting different human rights, forgetting that the situation on-the-ground can be contradictory to what each State legally accepted (Commans et al., 2010). As Morgan (2009) claims, there is a great gap between the human rights drafted and incorporated within the numerous declarations of international law, and the real, violating situation on the ground, exposed daily by the media and by the reports of various NGOs. This failure of upholding international law within the reality of the States certainly comes from limiting the nature of the legal system and its mechanisms, as a consequence of the huge influence of social, political, economic, and cultural factors on the abuse of rights (Morgan, 2009). Regardless of that, the legal approach to human rights is more advanced than the sociological one, due to the only recent inclusion of sociology with the human rights agenda and the normativity of human rights where the issues of moral justification of rights were left to philosophers, while sociologist turned their focus on citizenship (Breskaya, Giordan, Richardson, 2018). In the past decades, the literature on the topic of human rights has expanded by different scopes of science (Morgan, 2009), and over the years, there has been an increase in the attempts to approach human rights issues through the lens of sociology, encompassing the theories and ideas of ‘sociology of citizenship, social movement research, gender sociology, political sociology, sociology of law and sociology of religion’ (Breskaya, Giordan, Richardson, 2018, 420). Sociologists have neglected the sphere of human rights by focusing on citizens’ rights (Morgan, 2009), mostly because they felt comfortable in researching citizenship issues, but not going furthermore in the

global scope of human rights, staying inside the frame of inequality studies (Morgan, 2009, 5), allowing them to focus more on a societal dimension of human rights, without necessarily exploring the global sphere of it.

Following legal framework and exploring the narratives of the relationship between religion and human rights, Banchoff and Wuthnow (Banchoff and Wuthnow, 2011), proposed a theoretical framework for understanding the place of religious freedom within human rights discourse. A sociological perspective on human rights and religion introduces new approaches to studying religious freedom and religious minorities. The analysis of religious minorities within the human rights perspective highlights the issue of sociological sensitivity to law and political context (Breskaya, Giordan, Richardson, 2018). According to Morgan (2009), researchers of human rights within social sciences firstly and mostly need to explore and explain what are the 'social, political, economic and cultural conditions' (Morgan, 2009, 8) that allow the violations of human rights. When it comes to exploring the factors that influence and condition the violations of human rights, studies coming from political science offer a range of quantitative data, which can help identify those particularities. In this sense, the political system, level of economic development and interest, cultural diversity, population size, pressure, the experience of war, and armed conflict are some of the factors that influence the regularity and appliance of human rights (Morgan, 2009). A great amount of attention is given to the aspect of changes in regime and to the process of democratization, as one of the factors that are negatively correlated with the violation of the rights (Howard and Donnelly in: Morgan, 2009). Observing democracy within the aspect of repression, Davenport and Armstrong (2004) claim that there is no clear linkage between democracy and repression, on the other hand, Fein (1995) suggests that until democracy isn't fully institutionalized, there is more conflict within and repression of human rights during the process of democratization. In terms of democratization having a positive influence on the acceptance of human rights, Zanger (2000) through his analysis pointed out that through the first year of a country's change of regime towards democracy, human rights abuses decrease (Davenport and Amrstrong; Fein; Zanger in: Morgan, 2009). Findings by Mitchell and Mc Cormick (1998) showed that the level of income and countries' economic development represents one of the main factors influencing the positioning of human rights within the country. According to Mitchell and Mc Cromick, countries affected by low income and the lack of economic wealth are more likely to abuse and violate rights by implementing repressive measures against their citizens (Mitchell and Mc Cormick in: Morgan, 2009). In terms of economic wealth, Meyer (1996) discovers that the presence of multinational corporations affects positively on the preservation and implementation of civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights (Meyers in: Morgan, 2009). There is a widespread opinion within the political theory that 'cultural pluralism presents difficulties for functioning democracy and guarantees of freedom' (Morgan, 2009, 9), even though Walker and Poe (2002) and Lee et al. (2004), claim that there is no clear linkage between cultural diversity and violations of human rights (Walker and Poe; Lee et al. in: Morgan, 2009). Morgan (2009) claims that even though these studies represent a great value for building up human rights research within social sciences,

these studies as well do not represent everything there is within the scope of research since there are still some incomplete aspects and a broad range of topics that are unexplored. Regarding the gaps within the research on human rights, Morgan (2009) notes that there is a great need not only for introducing a wider range of variables but also a need of a more precise focus on the impact of certain variables. There is a certain scientific gap in terms of paying attention to social and economic rights, as the basic rights for enjoying any other right, as well as the methodological lack of mixing quantitative and qualitative methods in order to get the most accurate and valid answers while approaching human rights issues (Morgan, 2009). Empirical research in terms of implementation and monitoring of international religious freedom policies has not been present for a long time when it comes to collecting and revealing specific statistical data, which is of significant importance for developing social science methods of their analysis (Commans et al., 2010). The method used in the research is defined through our approach to the research and ‘it should flow logically from the research project question’ (Commans et al., 2010, 184), essentially leading the way we will show and interpret our results. According to Morgan, using the methodology in the studies done before is one of the main limitations when it comes to researching human rights by analyzing quantitative data. He notes that the core issue of methodology is not in the use of statistical analysis but in the lack of using and implementing mixed methodologies that would provide a more realistic picture of human rights. This need for compacting quantitative and qualitative data would complement this picture, and maybe give an answer not only to what is in relation or in linkage, but as well as, how this relationship is produced (Morgan, 2009).

1.5.1. Insights on some Empirical Studies on Religious Freedom

According to Grim and Finke (2006), there is a severe lack of quantitative studies when it comes to religion and access to cross-national data. Religion itself receives little attention, and the existing data for the most part is incomplete, relying on an inadequate, small range of cases, posing a limitation to the use of research (Grim and Finke, 2006). Not before the year 2000 has the broad and far-reaching collection of quantitative data concerning religion started. A great contribution to the empirical sphere of data on religious freedom, especially concerning government-religion relations, certainly was provided by the research of Freedom House, Pew Research Centre, ARDA, and the RAS project (Fox et al., 2018). One of the first empirical data representing different country analyses is the one of “Freedom House,, and its “Freedom in the World,, annual global report on civil and political liberties. Freedom House review report started in the 50’s, and till nowadays a number of updates and adjustments have been made to the methodology of their research so the research strategies could be in accordance with the ideas about political and civil liberties at the moment of collecting data. The reports are produced each year by a team of analysts and experts from the academic and human rights communities, and the researchers use a variety of resources, such as academic articles and analysis, different reports from NGOs, individual professional contacts, and on-the-ground research. One of the great advantages of this type of analysis is that it provides

data on hundreds of different countries, which gives the possibility not only to see the general image of the world's political and civil rights, but to go into the specifics of each country or to compare them. In terms of methodology, 'Freedom House' reports offer a number of numerical ratings and descriptive texts for each country, and one of the most significant aspects of measuring the scores and status of the countries is their methodology of measuring the status of the countries on the scale from "free" (1.0 to 2.5) to "free partly" (3.0 to 5.0) and to "not free status" (5.5 to 7.0), scoring the political rights and civil liberties ratings. The section on "Freedom of expression and belief" within the "Civil liberties" contains questions on religious freedom. They measure the types of State governance of religious life and monitoring of the possible State interference in collective religious life. In this section they focus on the individual's freedom to practice and express their religious faith or non-belief in the public and private sphere, taking into account the registration requirements of religious institutions, the level of discrimination or harassment of majority and minority religious groups, State monitoring, governance interference in appointing religious leaders, control and restrictions on production and distribution of religious writings, construction of religious buildings, religious education and other general restrictions on practising religious beliefs. The introduced score system of the Freedom House Report can serve as important contextual evidence that can serve for other types of religious freedom research, as well as for the comparison among various types of freedoms across different countries. Regarding citizens' rights, most specifically they are questioned under the section of civil liberties, regarding various segments of the population (including ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT, and other relevant groups) and their access to political rights and electoral opportunities. The question they pose is, are there 'unusually excessive or discriminatory barriers to acquiring citizenship that effectively deny political rights to a majority or large portion of the native-born or legal permanent population, or is citizenship revoked to produce a similar result?'. Furthermore, they explore citizenship issues under the aspect of enjoying personal social freedoms, in terms of family integrity and obtaining citizenship status for foreign spouses, and the transmission of citizenship to children. The 2020 edition covers developments in 195 countries and 15 territories from January 1, 2019, through December 31, 2019.³

Another useful research in the methodology area of social sciences, particularly for researching religious freedom, is the study of Grim and Finke (2006) and their development of models and indexes for government regulation (GRI), government favouritism (GFI) and social regulation of religion (SRI). According to Sarkissian (2015), developing a quantitative method to measure the complex nature of religious divisions is difficult to construct, and the most adequate and precise method is the one developed by Grim and Finke, especially concerning the Social Hostilities Index (Sarkissian, 2015). Empirical studies on religious freedom are of great contribution for developing a sociological approach to researching human rights (Breskaya, Giordan, Richardson, 2018, 424), while Finke (2013) claims that the field of researching religious freedom is relatively new, especially when it comes to existing cross-national data. Religious

³ Freedom House, Freedom in the World Research Methodology, available at <https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology>, accessed 18 January, 2021

freedom examined through concepts of the dominant religion, social order, social isolation and exclusion, religious minority/majority nexus, social conflicts, and movements (Finke, 2013) signifies the importance of continuous translation of law into sociological language and in the same time redefining the meaning of a right to free exercise of religion (Finke and Martin, 2014). The issues of minority groups in society, and an independent judiciary (Richardson, 2015; Richardson and Lee, 2014) challenge sociological perspectives with political and legal discourses through macro-level empirical research. The indexes are developed and based on the data from the 2003 International Religious Freedom Report for 196 different countries. According to Grim and Finke, these three indexes allow researchers to measure the government's preferences and support, regulations, and limitations, as well as the restrictions placed on religion by social and cultural factors. The first one, Government Regulation Index, measures the concept of the State's regulation of religion, focusing on the official rights and policies promoted by the State, restrictions placed on the practice, profession, or selection of religion by the official laws, policies, or administrative actions of the State. GRI is combined of six items and covers a broad range of religious freedoms that are frequently denied by the State: (1) missionary work is prohibited; (2) proselytizing, preaching, or conversion is limited or restricted; (3) government interferes with individual right to worship; (4) freedom of religion is not protected; (5) government does not generally respect freedom of religion; and, (6) low government respect for freedom of religion. Government Favouritism generally views state-church relations, but it is more focused on the privileges given to specifically selected religions. GFI refers to the actions of the State that provide one religion or a small group of religions special privileges, support, or favorable sanctions. The questions that are used to measure the State's favouritism of religion are composed of five items: (1) imbalanced government funding of religion; (2) degree to which religion is favored; (3) inequitable level of government favors; (4) inequitable government funding of things related to religion; and, (5) government funding index (funding schools, media, clergy, etc.). Both government regulation and favouritism are attempts by the State to control religion. Finally, the social regulation index measures restrictions placed on the practice, profession, or selection of religion by other religious groups, associations, or the culture at large. As Grim and Finke (2006) claim, 'this form of regulation might be tolerated or even encouraged by the State but is not formally endorsed or implemented by government action' and can be extremely subtle, rising from the norms and culture of the larger society. The social regulation index goes beyond State formalities and indicates how religion itself can regulate other religions. SRI does not depend on the State's action and it focuses on 'general social attitudes toward religion and the actions of social movements and religious institutions toward other religious groups, especially new, foreign, or minority religions' (Grim and Finke, 2006). It is composed of five items: (1) negative social attitudes towards other religions; (2) negative social attitudes towards conversion to other religions; (3) negative attitudes towards proselytizing; (4) existing religions try to shut out newcomers; and, (5) social movements against certain religious brands.⁴

⁴ Grim and Finke. 2006. International religious indexes: Governmental Regulation, Government Favouritism, and Social Regulation of Religion. *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* 2(1), available at: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4254791> [accessed 18 January 2021]

The Religion and State (RAS) project, a research conducted by Johnatan Fox, provides variables measuring government involvement in religion, containing a detailed analysis of religious freedom in different countries (Fox, 2009). The project is constructed to provide detailed descriptions of government policies throughout the world, providing an understanding of how and which factors influence governments' religious policies. Till today, this project was conducted in three rounds, in which the first round of the project, collected data for 175 countries from 1990-2002, the second round collected data for 176 countries, extracting the variables from 1990 to 2008 (Fox, 2009), while the third round of the project (RAS3) measures the extent of government religion policy for 183 States on a yearly basis between 1990 and 2014.⁵ However, only RAS3 project offers a 'Societal Module that measures the actions of non-state actors against religions and an expanded Minorities Module that provides these measures for specific religious minorities' (Fox et al. 2018, 3), which help to fulfill the biases of previous research which missed a detailed measure of societal discrimination against religious minorities. Societal Module offers measures of societal actions and attitudes. It focuses on the actions taken by non-state actors, as well as on the actions between religious groups (Fox et al, 2018). Since the RAS project explicitly focuses on governmental policies, providing the codings at a country level, it makes the RAS data compatible with the other existing datasets (Fox, 2009). Fox (2009) illustrating the approach and methods of the RAS project stated that 'variables included in the dataset must meet two criteria. First, they must measure a distinct and clearly defined aspect of government policy, laws, or structure that relates to religion. Second, there must be sufficient information available to code this variable for all States included in the dataset' (Fox, 2009, 448). RAS categorizes the approach of States towards religious minorities, breaking down the restrictive policies into several categories - restriction on minority religious practices', 'religious regulation' and 'religious legislation', providing for each category the measurements of its own influencing factors and scores (Cross, 2015). According to Cross (2015), even though RAS methods and measurements have certain biases, it surely is a valuable asset in the sphere of empirical data, measuring state-religious relations and the impact on religious freedom across the world (Cross, 2015).

Another research base, which handles large amounts of quantitative data, is the Pew Research Center database. Pew Research Center (PRC) has been tracking data on religious restrictions in nearly 200 countries and territories since 2007, producing a series of reports analysing religion-related social hostilities and government restrictions on religion. In 2015, PRC released five key findings of global restrictions on religion. Firstly, 'a little more than a quarter of the world's countries (27%) experienced high or very high levels of religion-related hostilities by individuals or social groups in 2013, down from 33% in 2012'. Secondly, researchers from Pew Center found that certain religious groups are a particular target of restrictions and hostilities, with a seven-year high increase for the Jewish community. Data shows that Jews were harassed or by their governments or by social groups across 77 countries in 2013. Thirdly, the Middle East still stands out as one of the areas with the highest restrictions on religion in the world, both by high

⁵ Religion and State project (RAS3), <https://www.thearda.com/ras/>, [accessed 16 June 2021]

levels of government repression or restrictions and social hostilities. Furthermore, according to the research, many countries had restrictions and hostilities, related either to the government or social groups, targeting minorities in 2013. The final key finding is that obstacles for religious minorities usually do not stand alone, but more often are a part of a broader set of restrictions on religion, indicating that restrictions on religion create a circle of various restrictions.⁶ From 2009, the extended measures elaborated by Grim and Finke (2006) were used by Pew Research Center and in the same year the report on “Global Restrictions on Religion” was released. In their studies, Pew Research Center looks at two types of activities in each country – government policies or initiatives that restrict religious belief or practice; and actions by private individuals and groups in society (social hostility index - SHI). They identified 20 types of government restrictions on religion, within a range from State favouritism of specific groups to legal restrictions on individual ability to convert to another religion, and, official violence or abuse against religious groups. In addition, researchers identified 13 types of social hostilities involving violence and discriminatory practices related to religion⁷. SHI measures acts of religious hostility by private individuals, organizations, or groups in society. This includes religion-related armed conflict or terrorism, mob or sectarian violence, harassment over clothing for religious reasons, or other religion-related intimidation or abuse. The report was released in July 2019, covering the period from 2007 until 2017. During these ten years, there has been a visible increase in four categories of GRI: favouritism of religious groups, general laws, and policies restricting religious freedom, harassment of religious groups, and limits on religious activity. Laws and policies restricting religious freedom and government favouritism of religious groups have consistently been the most prevalent types of restrictions globally⁸. Harassment against religious groups, both by governments and individuals or social groups was reported in 185 out of the 198 countries in 2018. while Christians and Muslims experienced harassment in the highest number of countries⁹.

6 Pew Research Center, Henne, P. Five key findings about global restrictions on religion, published on February 26, 2015. available at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/02/26/5-key-findings-about-global-restrictions-on-religion/>, [accessed 19 January 2021]

7 Pew Research Center, Masci, D. How Pew Research measures global restrictions on religion <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/02/26/qa-how-pew-research-measures-global-restrictions-on-religion/>, [accessed 19 January 2021]

8 Pew Research Center, Lipka, M., Majumdar, S. How religious restrictions around the world have changed over a decade, available at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/16/how-religious-restrictions-around-the-world-have-changed-over-a-decade/>, [accessed 19 January 2021]

9 Pew Research Center, Majumdar S., Government restrictions on religion around the world reached new record in 2018, available at <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/10/government-restrictions-on-religion-around-the-world-reached-new-record-in-2018/> Government restrictions on religion around the world reached new record in 2018, [accessed 19 January 2021]

Chapter I – Conclusion

Through this chapter, we intended to illustrate the characteristics and aspects of religious freedom and citizenship. Exploring the elements and what is the essence of those two concepts, we can notice how these two concepts differ, but in those differences, there are some intersections and overlaps within the sphere of demanding those rights. Both religious freedom and citizenship seek equality and freedom, and they both form part of identity and play a significant role in fulfilling the dimension of identity, on a group and individual level. Furthermore, exploring the historical aspects of the development of religious freedom and citizenship, we can notice how these two concepts trace back to ancient history, where religious freedom was oppressed by the prosecutions of everyone who opposed the belief system of the given time and place, while different philosophers of Greek and Roman societies put effort to understand what it means to be a citizen. In both cases, the rise and development of the first concrete thinking devoted to religious freedom and citizenship are connected to huge political changes, revolutions, and shifts within the different spheres of societies around the world. Another common aspect of the concept of religious freedom and citizenship are the issues that arise with establishing a clear definition that would encompass all the aspects that form part of these two concepts. Especially nowadays, in modern societies, it has become difficult to distinguish the spheres and limitations in demanding the rights encompassed in the spheres of religious freedom and citizenship. Exploring the sphere of freedoms of any concept will always lead us to look on the opposite side of the polar - restraint. In terms of Religious Freedom, restraint comes in the shape of government policies, State ideologies, and other mechanisms directed at restricting and oppressing religious freedom. Relation between the State and religion functions like a mirror, where the ideologies of the State are reflected in the sphere of rights and freedoms of religious groups, and those rights and freedoms are reflected in society's ability and capacity to accept and embrace religious diversity, at the same time being able to express and maintain essential parts of their identity. Furthermore, adding the dimension of citizenship to the already intense relation between the State and religion reflects in the tangled dynamics produced by the process of demanding rights and the State's obligation to protect those rights, whereby the demands of rights to religious freedom endanger the demands for equal treatment of all citizens and their basic human rights. This conflict between the demands of different rights is as well reflected on the individual and group levels, whereby the sphere of claiming group or individual rights is blurred and complicated because it misses a clear idea and established limitations in determining whether in some cases group rights should overcome individual rights or giving a clear answer if and when this should even be an acceptable option.

In our exploration of Croatia and Italy, which will be analysed in further chapters, we will emphasise the dynamics of religious freedom and citizenship practices in Croatia and Italy, by focusing on the patterns of State-religious relations, the role of the Catholic Church, complexities of citizenship issues, and how they function in managing religious diversity and liberties of citizens' by identifying the socio-political trajectories that shaped and determined the sphere of religious freedom and citizenship in Croatia and Italy. These theoretical observations will be followed by a comparative quantitative analysis of these two

countries with a tendency to give answers to what are the patterns of religious freedom and citizenship perceptions among young students of Croatia and Italy. In order to explore the linkage between religious freedom and citizenship and citizens' rights in our empirical part, we will put our focus on three main aspects. Firstly, we will put emphasis on the perception of religious freedom and its relation to citizenship and citizens' rights, by exploring the impact of the idea of equal citizenship on religious freedom. Secondly, we explore State-religious relations and socio-cultural attitudes toward religion in relation to perceptions of religious freedom protection. Thirdly, we will put focus on identity as a sphere that encounters both religion and citizenship, strictly focusing on the relation between religion and its role within national identity and culture, exploring it in relation to the perceptions of religious freedom.

When it comes to the concept of citizenship, Brettschneider (2010) perceives that religious freedom mirrors the religious beliefs of citizens and that free and equal citizenship is the basis for religious freedom, emphasising the idea that religious beliefs and religion itself should not hold a specific or privileged position within any society, especially when opposed to citizens' rights. In terms of Citizens' rights in relation to Religious Freedom, empirical research (Zaccaria et al., 2018; 2018a) has shown that a positive view toward diversities and trust in religious out-group has a positive impact on attitudes toward religious freedom and the political rights of non-citizens.

Durham (2012) examines the nature of state-religious relations and defines two main possible 'continuums' (Durham, 2012, 360) within which all countries, in some way, fit and fluctuate. One continuum, refers to the level of interference, or to say the level of action or inaction of the State within the religious sphere, whereby the range goes from no religious freedom to full religious freedom; while the other refers to the level of identification or separation of State institutions with religious institutions and beliefs, whereby the range goes from positive identification to negative identification (Durham, 2012). Different cases of state-religious relations throughout the world showed that 'as identification of religion and State goes up, religious liberty goes down' (Durham, 360, 2012).

In the case of Croatia, Church-State conditions reflect general European dilemmas, in which the connection of ethnic and religious identity is raised from an unfavourable social-historical context. The social moment of Croatian society in the late 90's was under the effect of various factors – war, transition, privatisation, strong social differentiation and high level of insecurities, poverty, jeopardized and excluded population (Zrinščak, 1998; Marinović Jerolimov and Zrinščak 2006). With the end of socialism and with the creation of the new State, the institution of the Church saw the moment of national liberation as an opportunity for religious liberation (Maldini, 2006), while the effect of war happenings and suffering additionally created a social and psychological need for belonging to a collective identity and identification with a nation and religion (Maldini, 2006), which gave religion the capability to define collective identity (Zrinščak 1998, 343). Adjustment to new social circumstances, and the consummation of rights and freedom of religious communities were conditioned by all the aspects of social events in the 90's, which led to political conditioning of rights and religious freedoms (Zrinščak 1998, 343). Strong ideas of the chosen

religion for the State (Catholicism) and the condition of exclusion from the society created a gap between religious majority-minority, which additionally emphasised the atmosphere of intolerance and lack of trust (Marinović Bobinac, 1996; Radović, 2013). In this sense, confessional affiliation was not strictly connected to religiosity but more over to identification with nationality, culture, tradition and nation-building, while increased religious practice showed the disappearance of former social obstacles, freedom of public expression, and social acceptance of religion (Maldini, 2006), reflecting the interrelation of religious and national identity in Croatia (Kumpes, 2018). As a result, these factors affected the active construction of the cultural and national Croatian identity and furthermore strong active role of the Church in the social life of Croatia by preserving and strengthening the national spirit during the transitional period.

Leaning on these theoretical and empirical approaches within the sphere of religion, religious freedom, and citizens' rights (Brettschneider, 2010; Zaccaria et al., 2018, 2018b; Durham, 2012; Kumpes, 2018; Maldini, 2006; Marinović Bobinac, 1995; Radović, 2013; Zrinščak, 1998;), and placing it within the context of Croatia and Italy, this research verifies the following three hypotheses. The first one, regards the relationship between religious freedom and citizenship, relying on theoretical arguments concerning these two concepts:

- At the background of the theory of Brettschneider (2010) and based on the empirical findings of Zaccaria et al., (2018; 2018a), we hypothesise that free and equal citizenship is the basis for religious freedom, in other words, more positive attitudes toward equal citizenship and citizens' rights will be associated with the more positive attitudes toward religious freedom.

With two other hypotheses, we tend to explore how different contextual variables influence the perception of religious freedom. The first concerns the correlation between the models (patterns) of state-religion relations and perceptions of religious freedom. The second concerns the relationship between the national, religious and cultural identity of citizens and perceptions of religious freedom. Thus, we hypothesise:

- Referring to the perspective of Cole Durham (2012), we hypothesise that the stronger is the identification of the State with religion; the lower is the level of protection of religious freedom in society. Specifically, the more participants endorse the neutral position of state-religious relations and support a neutral socio-cultural attitude toward the dominant religion, the less they perceive that religious freedoms are protected in their country'.

- Referring to theoretical observations and empirical findings of Kumpes (2018); Zrinščak (1998); Maldini (2006); Radović (2013); and, Marinović Bobinac (1996), we hypothesise that participants' identification with national culture and the dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy, which is also reflected in more negative attitudes toward Religious Freedom. Based on the socio-political and historical analysis of the two societies, we are interested in testing if the role of religion in the post-conflict conditions in Croatia produced stronger associations between national identity and perceptions of religious freedom.

These hypotheses will serve us to explore different aspects of religious freedom and citizenship attitudes, and will be developed and analysed in detail within the empirical part of the research. First hypothesis concerns citizens' rights and the aspect of equal citizenship and religious freedom, with a tendency to explore if and how the perception of citizenship and citizens' rights is in relation to religious freedom perceptions. Second hypothesis focuses on the aspect of State-religious relations and socio-cultural attitude toward religion in relation to perceptions of religious freedom protection, focusing on the perception of students regarding religion, the role of the State within the religious sphere, and the role of the Catholic Church within society and its positioning within public and private spheres¹⁰. The last hypothesis deals with the sphere of identity and the linkage between religion, culture, and nationality, with an aim to explore if the role of religion is affiliated with the idea of preserving and strengthening the national spirit, and if the identification of national and religious identity is reflected in perceptions and views on Religious Freedom, by searching the differences between Croatian and Italian participants. For the purposes of this research we will search for differences between Croatian and Italian participants in all three aspects of our research – religious freedom and citizenship linkage; State-religious relations and socio-cultural attitude toward religion in relation to religious freedom protections; and, the role of religion in relation to nationality and religious freedom perceptions. The reasons on which we ground our hypothesis regard contextual similarities and differences between Croatia and Italy. In both countries, Croatia and Italy, there is a strong presence of the dominant religion – Catholicism, and even though both countries' national identities are strongly connected to the dominant religion, there are significant differences in how this religious sphere is manifested within different social and political dimensions of each society. Different socio-political and historical contextual factors of these two countries pose a question of how religious freedom and citizenship are perceived within each society, what are differences in the perception of place and role of religion in Croatia and Italy, and what are the patterns of Religious Freedom and citizenship linkage. On one hand, we have Italy, a European historical ancestor of Catholicism, and one of the country founders of the European Union, that despite the secular approach or as some authors call it specific Italian *laïcité*, has a very strong and active religious dynamic within social and political part of society, and which socio-demographic image has deeply changed over the past twenty years due to migration flows resulting in the rise of religious diversity. On the other hand, we have Croatia, an ex-communist country with historical and traditional traits attached to Catholicism, whereby the aspect of building national identity in the 90's was strongly connected to religion, identifying Croatian nationality with Catholicism, producing national and religious homogenization of Croatia. In the following Chapter 2, we will explain in detail these contextual differences and similarities of Croatia and Italy, focusing on the role of religion and religious freedom, state-religious relations, nation-building, and the context of citizens' rights in both countries.

¹⁰ As well, for the construction of this hypothesis we lean on the findings of research conducted by Breskaya, Giordan, Zrinščak (2021), which operationalized three state models defined by Durham (2012) in relation to religious freedom and secularism and supported empirically the hypothesis that models of an endorsed Catholic Church and state control over religion would have negative effects on the perception of religious freedom. The research was conducted on a sample of 1035 young Italian students.

2. Croatian and Italian Context of Religious Freedom and Citizens' Rights

The focus of this chapter is set on religious freedom and citizenship practices of two similar, yet so different countries – Croatia and Italy. While in the case of Croatia established citizenship policies and the sphere of religious freedoms have been directed by the fall of the former communist system SFRY and the State's transition to democracy; Italy's experience was firmly affected by migrational changes in the last three decades, resulting in the changes of socio-demographic structure of society bringing up the levels of religious diversity and pluralism. While Croatia was confronting the consequences of war and the clash between the values and norms of the former system with the newly established values and norms, the main goal was set on reinforcing Croatian identity on its path to democracy. One of the main tools used in the so-called 'croatisation' of society was among others, religion, or better to say, establishing Catholicism as the preferred religion of the State. This idea created a melting pot of national and religious identities, which evoked awakening of the hidden historical and traditional values attributed to Croatian society – being Croatian is being Catholic. Italy, on the other hand, which is as well predominately Catholic as Croatia, confronted changes caused by migration flows which resulted in turning Italy from a country of emigration to a country of mass immigration. In the case of Italy, the Laws defining citizenship practices and religious freedoms were reflecting Italy's unpreparedness for the changes brought by new cultures and new religious movements across the country and the consequences of a changed religious image marked by the diversification of society. When immigrants and their national and religious diversity were held on the margins of society, under the veil of invisibility, Italians did not recognize or perceive immigrants as a threat to the values, culture, and tradition of Italy. It is not the case that Italy never confronted diversity before, it was the case of diversity that became extremely palpable and tangible within different spheres of society once the numbers of immigrant population started rising. These changes experienced by both societies, had a strong impact on citizenship practices and the development of religious freedoms in each country. This chapter is a tendency to present and explain how two countries with different historical backgrounds, both with strong national and religious identities, but with different levels of national and religious diversity developed and established their citizenship practices and religious freedoms in the face of those changes.

Chapter 2 examines the Croatian and Italian context of religious freedom and citizens' rights in Croatia and Italy, with a specific focus on citizenship practices, role of the Church, state-religious relations, positioning and legal frameworks of religious minorities, and trajectories of religious education. First part of the Chapter is devoted to Croatia, exploring the sphere of citizenship practices, role of the Catholic Church, positioning of religious minorities, and religious education in Croatia. Therefore, we first grasp into Croatia's citizenship practices established in the period of nation-building. This part of the chapter explores the main historical points which affected the reality of citizens' rights and the impact of socio-political changes on the legal framework of citizenship of the newly formed State – Croatia. Following that, we move to the sphere of religion and religious freedom, examining the role of the Catholic Church and its influence

on the revitalization and reinforcement of Croatia's identity along with the positioning of the Catholic Church as the preferred religion of the State. This subchapter as well includes a subparagraph that concerns the positioning of religious minorities and the effect of transitioning to democracy on the status and freedoms of religious communities. These two parts of Chapter 2 are devoted to the exploration of church-state relations and minority-state relations in Croatia. The second part of Chapter 2 is devoted to the establishment and development of citizenship policies and issues through the lenses of migration changes in Italy. As well, in this subchapter, we grasp into certain historical events which influenced the State decision-making process in establishing citizens' rights in Italy. In the following Subchapters we analyse the position of the Catholic Church in Italy and the impact of Catholicism's favouritism on the religious identity of the Italian people. This Subchapter also encompasses a part that regards legal aspects and regulations of religion and religious freedoms in Italy, as well as the status and positioning of religious groups within the Italian legal system of attributed rights. Furthermore, since within the framework of education of certain society, it is possible to trace down the patterns of available freedoms, whether it concerns national or religious minorities, we examine the role of religion within the sphere of education, more precisely, issues concerning religious education in Italy and Croatia. Finally, as last part of the Chapter, we decided to present several empirical researches which are concerning religion, religious freedom, and citizenship practices in Croatia and Italy which allow us a better understanding of the perception of the religious and citizenship sphere of rights, as well an insight on the patterns of Croatian and Italian identity.

2.1. Croatia

Croatia is a country situated at the crossroads of Central and Southeast Europe, known for its rich and valuable heritage, as well as by its turbulent and intense history, which shaped today's patterns of socio-political conditions within Croatian society. Being a country that throughout history adopted several versions of political systems, and formed part of several governing formations, it is possible to imply that the most significant effect on what Croatia is today, was certainly shaped by governing politics of the former SFRY, and its disintegration. The fall of SFRY, and the newly formed State, brought changes within all spheres of society, transforming the laws and policies regarding citizenship practices, and disrupting the position and status of minority groups. Specifically, new governmental policies and ideas of strong nationhood transformed once citizens into foreigners, while certain specific identity values which were historically and traditionally attached to the country again gained empowerment, thus emphasizing more than ever the equalization religious and national identity.

Within the process of country formation and identity reinforcement, Catholic Church played a significant role, serving as a catalyst of new ideas of Croatian identity, thus empowering the symbiosis of religious and national values. Therefore, confessional identification in Croatia became a mirror of complex narratives surrounding the socio-political situation within the country, encompassing more than just the

sphere of religiosity, broadening to cultural, traditional, and national values of society. The complexity and intertwining of national and religious spheres in Croatia created shifts and instabilities in majority-minority relations, as well, disturbances within the relation between the State and minority groups. Due to complex socio-political events, the group representing the preferred majority of Croatia acceleratively started to be intolerant toward the significant other, while minority groups started to feel jeopardized and unprotected from the State.

Issues became more evident when the true embodiment of democracy was not aligned with the values and meanings attributed to the new Croatian identity and contradictory to the character of the newly formed State. The shift in the governmental rulings, and aspiration to EU, brought changes within the sphere of citizens' rights and religious freedoms for minority groups. Accession to the EU and pressure of international communities forced Croatia to lower intolerance within its governmental practices and commence concrete work on lowering the level of discriminatory practices within different spheres of socio-political structures. However, it is questionable to what extent EU accession has made a real change on the ground, and whether the legacies of discriminatory practices shaped by historical events have truly waned, questioning to what degree intolerance toward minority groups decreased in the mindset of Croatian citizens. Moreover, the records of discriminative behaviour documented in Croatia mostly refers to the national and religious minority groups and is connected to the narrative of the 90's, whereby at the same time, it is difficult to distinguish whether it regards national or religious intolerance. This fusion of religious and national intolerance within discriminatory behaviours demonstrates the interdependence of national and religious identities in Croatia. All of these issues are discussed within the following chapters, dedicated specifically to issues of citizenship practices, the role of religion and the Catholic Church, the position of religious minorities, and problematics encompassed in the religious education of Croatia.

2.1.1. Citizenship Practices in the Period of Nation Building – Croatia

As history has shown through various events, each nation-state, whether it is old or newly created, can be at the same time inclusive or exclusive, depending on the factors that each state takes as crucial to its membership. Due to that, when a state and nation transform into the national state, its specific elements such as language, culture, or the history of the dominant ethnic community become an official language, culture, and history of that state (Zlatković, 2015). All of these features create a necessity for ethnic, cultural, and religious homogenization of the given nation-state and the already existent ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and even religious pluralism in the newly formed states becomes more of a problem, than normality (Zlatković, 2015). Ethnic identity gains priority and creates a category of excluded, thus moving from the goal of fixing old mistakes to producing new mistakes, strictly directed to individuals that lived in the country but have different ethnic origin (Zlatković, 2015). The case of Croatia, a country that formed part of Yugoslavia, as a new democracy at the time, reveals the political and social consequences of historical changes that affected the lives of minority groups (Bogdanić, 2004). Before going further into the concept and complex narrative

of Croatian citizenship, which is produced out of legacies of the failed system and nation-building in the 90's, it is important to emphasise that individuals as social and political beings are shaped by citizenship, by the status, privileges, and restrictions that are drawn inside of this right. In fact, being born in one place and not the other, in a particular period of time is highly significant when it comes to enjoying citizenship rights (Štiks 2015). 'Socialist era constitutions had placed all citizens on formally equal footing, guaranteeing the rights and proportional representation of national minorities' (Verdery 1998, 4), as was the case of the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which collapse ended those constitutional protections and changed the dynamics of citizenship rights. In Yugoslavia, federative citizenship had priority over republican citizenship for obtaining citizenship rights (Štiks, 2015). As Štiks (2015) claims, changes that came as a consequence of transforming from one system to another and the process of democratization were deeply affecting citizenship practices. Thus, it appeared that in former SFRY republican citizenship was one of the main aspects in determining citizenship status and the only strong criterion for political inclusion or exclusion in the newly formed State (Štiks, 2015). The citizenship system in Yugoslavia was supposed to create and give priority to one single Yugoslav identity and promote the integration of all nations in one State (Štiks, 2015). According to that, citizenship was a tool for ensuring equality for all Yugoslavian people regardless of their place of residence or nationality, but it soon became clear that it was easier to create Yugoslavia than Yugoslavs (Štiks, 2015). Citizenship back then was a tool of cooperation among nations but it failed to produce a strong sense of Yugoslav political identity and culture, and it became obvious that ethno-national fragmentation was stronger than the idea of common Yugoslav identity (Štiks 2015). This complex identity of people in Yugoslavia, and as Joppke (2007) calls it - 'complex citizenship constellation' made out of federative and republic citizenship, in a legal sense was not an issue or provoked problems during the time of Yugoslavia, but later on, with the breakup of the federation many citizens found themselves realizing they were foreigners in their own state (Koska and Matan, 2017). The awakening of radical nationalist ideas in the public sphere and the call for independence all over the region provoked the war for independence in Croatia that lasted from 1991- 1995, mostly led against the military of the Yugoslavian National Army, which was occupying territories of Croatia. Author Štiks (2015) detects citizenship as a trigger for conflict, in the sense that citizens were searching for a political community in which they would secure their rights and belonging to a State that would guarantee their protection. This resulted in massive internal displacements, which in 1991 were estimated between 250,000 and 500,000, while larger military actions in 1995 mainly targeted the Serbian population, resulting in a massive exodus of more than 200,000 Serbs (Stubbs and Zrinščak 2015, 401). Almost everywhere in Post-Communist Europe, likewise in Croatia, citizenship legislation and administrative practices resulted in three different categories of individuals: the included, the excluded, and the invited (Štiks, 2015). These constitutional redefinitions of the state and enactments of new citizenship laws created situations in which yesterday's citizens were turned into today's aliens or second-class citizens (Štiks, 2015). Rogers Brubaker (1992) distinguishes between three models of citizenship policies adopted by the newly formed post-communist

states. The first one is the 'new state model' – the new State simply includes all residents residing on its territory. The second one is the 'restored state model' - citizenship is granted only to the lawful citizens of the inter-war independent republics and their descendants, the others are excluded. And the last one is a combination of the mentioned previous two - restored citizenship and inclusiveness (Brubaker in: Štiks, 2015). However, according to Štiks (2015) none of the previously mentioned models can be applied to the citizenship policies of the former Yugoslavian states since each one had their own laws and registers. According to that, constitutions and citizenship laws were used as an effective tool for nation-building and ethnic engineering in order to influence the ethnic composition of the population residing on the territory of Croatia. Štiks (2010) notes that it is important to have in mind that citizenship laws and policies often had a hidden purpose since they were organized to satisfy the minimal international standards, while discrimination took place in real life, serving as a tool of ethnic cleansing (Štiks 2010). Former Yugoslav republics used their republican citizenship laws to establish their initial citizenries, and this change of citizenship status was particularly difficult for those living in zones of conflict, those of mixed origins and different ethnic backgrounds (Štiks, 2015). During the period of transforming Croatia into one ethnic country, a significant part of Croatia's population had no connection to Croatian central authorities and no access to Croatian citizenship, meaning that the formation of laws, institutions working on it, and complicated administrative requirements significantly lingered the process of obtaining citizenship, emphasising the importance of the core ethnic group (Koska in: Stubbs and Zrinščak, 2015). An applicant for citizenship in Croatia had to satisfy the following criteria: continuous residency in Croatia for at least five years, proof of termination of any foreign citizenship, proficiency in the Croatian language (including competencies in the Latin script), attachments to the legal system and customs of the Republic of Croatia and the overall acceptance of Croatian values and culture (Štiks 2010). According to Štiks (2010), fulfilling all of these requirements became close to impossible, while on the other hand, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was in no way obligated to justify the refusal of applicants' acquirement of citizenship (this was the practice until 1993). As to the role of the Catholic Church in the process of nation-building, which we will discuss later on, it is interesting that Roman Catholic Church certificates were also accepted as ground proof of ethnicity and obtaining citizenship rights (Štiks 2010).

The practices of the Croatian state of the 90's and its citizenship regimes, marked by the exclusion of the Serb minority and promotion of the Croat ethnic community, were often defined as a model of 'constitutional nationalism', which Robert Hayden (1992) describes as the constitutional redefinition of new states as national states of their ethnic core groups. The same term could be used for other post-communist countries, and it is clear that these constitutional redefinitions had a direct impact on citizenship policies (Hayden, 1992; Štiks, 2015). The Constitution of Croatia from the 90's declared the Republic of Croatia as the national state of the Croatian people and the state members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens; in comparison to the SFRY Constitution from 1974; whereby Croatia was defined as a national state of the Croatian people, a state of Serbian people in Croatia and a state of nationalities living on its

territory (Štiks, 2015). By comparing this, it is visible why people of Serbian nationality felt jeopardized by the new Constitution and why the Croatian Constitution created a category of people that were previously included into excluded. As Verdery (1998, 294) states, ‘the process of writing new constitutions enabled ambitious politicians to manipulate the very definition of citizenship’. All these citizenship puzzles and moreover turning republican citizenship into a leading one, caused severe difficulties among the population in securing their citizenship status, realizing that they might acquire the unwanted status – minority. The common citizenship (federative) that all across Yugoslavia once granted freedom of movement and equal rights to all, in the newly formed state(s), as in Croatia, transformed the old majority into a new minority. ‘New foreigners’ - mostly people of Serbian nationality, and others who were not ethnic Croats, found themselves in a sphere of limited rights, with a threat to their place of living and in a status of temporary or full illegal immigrants, without a clear sign of possible solution (Štiks 2015; Zlatković 2015).

By the end of the 90's it was visible that not only due to war but also because of the autocratic political regime, Croatia's transition to democracy was falling behind in comparison to other post-Communist countries. It was evident that the balance between national interest and the principles of democracy was not an easy thing (Spajić-Vrkaš, 2003). The system in many ways maintained double standards, leaving thousands of people with their citizenship status unresolved¹¹. European Union seems to be one of the most significant economic and political factors in shaping post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes and influencing the lives of citizens. It is important to note that the EU does not operate by itself, indeed it has a broad spectrum of organizations and bodies that regulate the regimes in those countries, by supervising different adopted conventions and regulations and actively incorporating them within the political, social, and economic framework (Štiks 2015). As author Štiks (2010) explains, when it comes to citizenship policies in post-independence Croatia, there is a significant difference between the political and administrative practices of the 90's and after 2000 (the era of preparing for the EU). One of those changes between the 90's and 2000 was visible on the political scene, by the discourses presidential candidates used for their campaigns. Pauperization and the lack of clear guidance for the future were probably the main reasons why Croatian citizens lost their trust in the nation-state-centered former government and in the elections of 2000, citizens shifted their vote to more Europe-centred opposition parties (Spajić-Vrkaš 2003, 35). Croatia's aspirations for membership in the EU were exposed to pressures from the international community to reduce the ethnic component of the state in its constitution. Croatia started working on involving its minorities in the affairs of the State through electoral laws and different political coalitions, witnessing greater inclusiveness, less discrimination, and increased political sensitivity. This was mostly connected to the Serbian minority, although a great deal of this minority was reduced during the 90's, Croatia still needed to arrange, this already weakened relations with this minority group. In this sense, the strongest and most explicit ideas of constitutional nationalism were abandoned under the pressure of external factors of the international

11 United States Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999 - Croatia*, 9 September 1999, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a88527.html> [accessed 9 June 2020]

community and as a result of the practical reduction of minorities to a manageable size. Because of this, the majority found a more convenient way to deal with minorities within the legal framework (Dimitrijević 2012, 20-24). International pressures mentioned before brought new regulations, additional procedures, and more transparency, but also directed to the creation of new forms of interest relations with specific minority groups. One example of this is the main political party representing the Serbian community, which was a part of a coalition government from 2003 until 2011, succeeded in changing some discriminatory policies in the legal framework of Croatia, but had little impact on real discrimination of this minority in everyday life (Štiks 2015; Stubbs and Zrinščak 2015). Furthermore, additional money was distributed for various projects concerning minority groups (especially for the Roma community), partially, to secure the votes of minority members of the Parliament (Štiks 2015; Stubbs and Zrinščak 2015). Even though, generally speaking, citizenship policies are more inclusive than in the 90's, Croatian society still faces divisions on behalf of historical events of war and its consequences on how former equal citizens, today minority, are perceived nowadays. Another point that author Štiks (2015) emphasises is the EU's limited influence when it comes to citizenship policies. In order to explain more accurately the case of these limitations in Croatia, we will briefly focus on the pre-accession and post-accession aspects. The EU, as explained in the previous paragraphs, certainly influenced the changes in Croatian (citizenship) policies, but this has not resulted in profound reforms by all means. There was more willingness to change policies and legislation in less sensitive areas than in the area of citizenship policies. Even though, some articles in citizenship Law have been changed and supplemented regarding the articles which concern obtaining Croatian citizenship¹², one of the things that support this statement is that Croatia still hasn't adopted the European Convention on Nationality¹³. Regardless of the changes in citizenship policies, it is questionable to what extent the Croatian accession to the EU and international pressures succeed in minimizing the ethnocentric character of the State. Indeed, as author Štiks (2015) claims, Croatia succeeded in satisfying the general criteria for entering the EU, without engaging in profound reforms. Even though citizenship related to the State has primacy, we should not forget that accession to the EU brought a new level of citizenship rights in terms of European citizenship.

2.1.2. Role of Catholic Church in Transforming the Identity – Croatia

As noted in the previous chapters, Croatia's transformation from communism to democracy was influenced by the events of the war in the 90's which had a great impact on how religious identities will position themselves within the society, creating a social and psychological need for belonging and claiming a certain identity, whether it concerns the religious or the national one (Maldini, 2006). Throughout history, national identity and religious affiliation were closely connected within the countries of the former SFRY, and religious identity, being deeply rooted in the patterns of tradition, served as a main marker of collective

12 <https://www.zakon.hr/z/446/Zakon-o-hrvatskom-dr%C5%BEavljanstvu> [accessed 16 September 2020]

13 <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/166/signatures> [accessed 16 September 2020]

identity even in the times of religious invisibility (Jukić, 1994). Among many similarities which were considered as factors of collective unity, such as language, culture, intertwined historical traits; religious affiliation of the countries was considered as a main factor of their differentiation. Croatia equalized and identified with Catholicism, Serbia with the Serbian Orthodox Church, and Bosnia with Islam, and these equalizations resulted in setting religion as the main tool in building and reinforcing national identities in the attempt to transform the newly formed countries (Radović, 2013). But before grasping more into the details of the intertwining of ethnic and religious belonging in the period of Croatia's transition to democracy it is important to understand the relation of SFRY toward religious identities and why the fall of the regime produced such a loud awakening of religion. As Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov (2006) claim, although not surprisingly, the communist system excluded not only the Catholic Church but as well all other religious communities, perceiving it as something negative that should be limited to the private sphere only (Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006). The silent treatment of the former SFRY in reality oppressed the religious sphere ignoring the importance of the religious identity of people, producing the isolation of all religious communities (Zrinščak 2006). Religious communities found themselves being shrouded within the consequences of the fallen system and war acts, thus burdening religious identities and the sphere of religious freedom with fear and insecurity, putting religious minorities in a tougher situation than before (Zrinščak, 1998). The intertwining of ethnic and religious identities with a strong emphasis on nationality as a defining factor in the 90's resulted in the degradation of relations between communities and their inter-religious dialogue, which all reflected the unbalanced and disturbed political relations (Marianski, 2006). After the war, at the rise of independence, Catholic Church played a significant role in supporting Croatia's political goals to achieve full independence, and democracy, thus giving its blessing to the formation and preservation of the newly transformed Croatian identity (Marinović Jerolimov and Zrinščak 2006). This historical moment of Croatia's transition, the Catholic Church perceived as an opportunity to firmly re-establish its pre-socialistic status and strengthen its position by claiming its role as the dominant and preferred religion of the State, and as well was strongly supported by the leading right-wing party which gave its approval that Croatian society is now open and receptive to Catholic Church (Marinović Jerolimov and Zrinščak, 2006; Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006).

One of the main goals of 'Croatisation' among others such as language changes, national symbols, and demographic renewal, became the return to traditional cultural values and customs of Catholicism, family, and authority (Spajić-Vrkaš, 2003). In this sense, the 'rise of religion' (Zrinščak 2006, 71) has been manifested in a way that people were attempting to save their national identity contrary to the times when that identity was threatened by the enemy, finding themselves in an identity crisis and "rebirth" of religion (Marianski 2006). On the other hand, according to some other authors (Vrcan, 1999; Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006) Croatia's religious situation was not in the phase of rebirth or rise, but in the phase of returning to the point in which religion was left bringing it backward to the time of re-traditionalisation, re-totalisation and re-collectivisation. Religion had a crucial role in the conceptualization

of the identities of post-Yugoslav political communities and influenced widely on understandings of political membership, status, and rights. Membership in a specific political community was defined by ethnicity, based on citizenship status inside of the majority, and has been often expressed through religious symbols that became embedded in state symbols (Radović 2013, 2). The end of socialism and the creation of the new State, institution of the Church saw as national and religious liberation (Maldini, 2006, 1115), which gave religion the capability to define collective identity (Zrinščak 1998, 343). Although declaratively, religion existed as a system apart from the State, briefly after the war, the relations between religious communities became an effigy of political relations, indicating reality that reflects a tighter gap than thought. As a result, these factors affected the active construction of the cultural and national Croatian identity and strong active role of the Church in the social life of Croatia by preserving and strengthening the national spirit during the transitional period. In the case of Croatia, Church-State conditions reflect general European dilemmas and some specific transitional circumstances (Marinović Jerolimov and Zrinščak, 2006), in which connection of ethnic and religious identity is raised from unfavourable social-historical context, likewise extremely negative relation of the former regime towards religion (Jakulj, 2016). All those transitional social and political processes conditioned changes in relation to religion. Opposite to the pre-transitional period, the way people expressed their religiosity became more open and visible, and as a consequence intensity of confessional affiliation and religious practices became higher (Maldini, 2006). In this sense, as Maldini (2006) claims, confessional affiliation was not strictly connected to religiosity but more over to identification with nationality, culture, tradition, and nation-building, while increased religious practice showed the disappearance of former social obstacles, freedom of public expression, and social acceptance of religion.

Since religious affiliation was not registered in the official census data until 1991; general data and literature on religion of former Yugoslav countries show that Serbs (Orthodoxy) were less religious than Croats. Some data from the 80's showed that 12,3% of atheists were Croatian nationality and around 42% were Serbian nationality (Marinović Jerolimov and Zrinščak, 2006). Research on young people in the whole territory of former Yugoslavia in the mid 80's showed significant differences between the religiosity of each nation, so Croats, Slovenians and Albanians were predominantly religious, while Serbs and Montenegrins (Orthodoxy) did not give that much importance to their religious identities (Marinović Jerolimov and Zrinščak, 2006). This difference could be traced back to doctrinal differences between the Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church, and to the fact that the people of Serbia were more identified with the former system (Župarić-Iljić 2013, 60; Marinović Jerolimov and Zrinščak 2006, 285). Empirical data from 1991 and 1996 (in Zrinščak, 2006; Marinović Jerolimov and Zrinščak, 2006) indicates the increase of one prevailing religion (Catholicism) and the revitalization of religion. These changes are visible if we compare the data from 1991; where 76,5% of the population was Catholic, 11,1% Orthodox, 1,2% Muslim, and 3,9% non-religious; and from year 1996. where Croatian society was 90% Catholic, 2% Orthodox, 2% Muslim, and 5% non-religious (Zrinščak, 2006). According to the latest census, carried out in 2011, 86,3% of Croatia

is Catholic, 4,4% is Orthodox, 1,6% is Muslim and there is 4.6% of non-religious people. In the period of Croatia's nation-building, from 1991 until 2000; Orthodox Serbian Church suffered significant decrease in the numbers of population's affiliation, which corresponds to the statistics of general decrease of the Serbian population in Croatia (Zrinščak, 1998; Kompes, 2018; Župarić-Iljić, 2013). In the first decade of post-socialism, political elites of that era used identification of national and religious for their own benefits, which the Catholic Church also accepted with a thrill as a way to gain and keep their new freedom and rights. Different social and political actors, certain ideas, and values gained religious character, becoming sacralised. In this sense, a political act becomes a certain religious act. Public political manifestation attached liturgical meaning, not only by use of religious discourse but also by the attendance of Church officials. As mentioned earlier, the intertwining of religious and national identification, tradition, and national culture strongly affected the increase of religiosity and public expression of religion (Maldini, 2006). Topić (2013) as well indicates the identification and intertwining of ethnicity and religious identities, whereby 'minority religious groups are not seen separately, but all together as faiths other than the Catholic one, through national minority corpus' (Topić, 2013). In this sense, Catholic Church is perceived as the founder and identity symbol of Croatia. This state of mind in Croatian society, gives a significant advantage to Catholic Church, putting religious minorities, non-religious people and atheists in a non-visible position (Topić, 2013).

2.1.2.1. Positioning of Religious Minorities, Legal Aspects and the Consequences of Transition on Religious Freedom in Croatia

In former Yugoslavia, religious minority communities experienced double discrimination, one by the society in terms of perceiving them and the other by the State in legal terms. Society generally viewed religion with negative connotations, especially religious minorities, and in some specific cases they broke different laws by following deeply and strictly their religious moral values. This contributed to perceiving religious minorities as a political problem, which resulted in more strict legislation and strengthened the prohibition of their activities (Marinović Bobinac, 1996). In the 70's and 80's there were no significant religious movements or communities in former Yugoslavia, but some small religious groups existed that usually held their position and status on the margins of the society. Back then, the revitalization of religion was seen as an attempt of slowing down the process of secularization, and separation of people from religion (Mihaljević 2005). Adjustment to new social circumstances and real consummation of rights and freedoms of religious communities were conditioned by all the aspects of social events in the 90's, which led to political conditioning of rights and religious freedoms (Zrinščak 1998). Strong ideas of the chosen religion for the State (Catholicism) and the condition of exclusion from the society created a gap between religious majority-minority, which additionally emphasised the atmosphere of intolerance and lack of trust. In the area of Balkan, new religions were brought by foreigners, and their communities were complemented by a

domestic population that abandoned the religion of their parents, which resulted in feeling jeopardized by them and produced hostile behaviour towards them (Marinović Bobinac 1996).

After the forming of the Republic Croatia, the position of the Catholic Church has been defined by Constitution in 1990 and all religious communities were recognized as equal before the law, free to publicly act, perform religious rituals, and establish educational and social institutions according to the law of the Republic of Croatia¹⁴. The main idea grounding the 1990 Law, was the model of the separation of Church and State, as well as the idea of cooperation in a way of protection and assistance. An important step in building the legal framework concerns the signing of an agreement between Croatia and Holy See, which was not so different from agreements signed between the Holy See and many other European countries, with similar constitutional principles. These contracts regulated the relations between the State and the Church, creating an institutional basis for the relationship between these two institutions. Transition in Croatia directed the change of positioning and status of the Catholic Church, while the transformation of Croatian society to a more democratic one, emphasised a changed religious situation that gives importance to religiosity and the higher resemblance between national (State) and religious (Church) (Mihaljević, 2005; Črpić and Tanjić, 2015). The establishment of the relations between the State and the Church conditioned various aspects concerning the status of religion; especially the signing of agreements with the Holy See additionally put in question the position and legal status of all the other religious communities. In this sense, it is useful to know that except Catholic Church, a signed agreement with the State has only 19 religious communities, out of registered 55. With regards to financing regulations, the Catholic Church is funded by the State, based on the agreement signed with the Holy See, while other religious communities are founded by the State only if they signed special agreements which determine their mutual interest (Bratić, 2020). According to Bratić (2020), the amount of money dedicated to a specific religious community is determined by the percentage of its followers and on the basis of the welfare that the community brings within society. In terms of models of financing of religious communities, Croatia adopted a combination of financing religious communities through charity donations, their own resources and finally through legal funding of the State if possible (Bratić, 2020). After the breakup of socialism, religious communities in Croatia recognized these new social circumstances as a possibility of giving religion a role that was not possible to have before. In this new wave of possibilities and circumstances, Catholic Church was systematically encouraged to find its place and ensure it, which made the process of integration and development of other religious communities significantly narrowed down (Zrinščak, 1998). The regulation of Church-State relations in most post-Communist countries was established in a more or less acceptable way; on the other hand, the position of religious minority groups, whether they are new or traditional, not so much (Zrinščak 2005). Since registering other religious communities was not possible before 2002, and along with that, the demands for their rights were denied, we can acknowledge that the position of new religious movements and

¹⁴ In the law of Republic of Croatia, Church or religious community (named differently) is a community of persons that realizes their religious freedom as equal public performance of religious rituals, ceremonies and other manifestations of their religion, and is registered in the Evidence of Religious Communities of Republic Croatia (Republic Croatia Law, NN 83/02, 73/13) [accessed 6 June 2020]

other religious communities was marked by non-acceptance and misunderstanding in the transitioning period of Croatia, not only by legal forms but also from the society where they aspired to belong.

According to official data, 55 religious communities have been officially registered, and at least 40 of them are still waiting to be legally recognized by the state¹⁵. Croatian Parliament, in its attempt to create a legal framework for all the religious communities, carried a law on the legal position of all religious communities in the Republic of Croatia. The Law from 2002 implied that in order to be registered in the legal system of Croatia, the religious community first has to exist at least five years, as an association with legal personality, needs to have at least 500 members, valid documentation that proves visibility of their religious content, practices, area, and means of their religious activity (Staničić and Ofak, 2011). This Law was amended in 2013, and current regulation implies that in order to be registered, the religious community operating as a legal entity, only needs to submit its official name, location, and information on the authorized person of the religious community¹⁶. The most widespread model accepted in Europe is that religious societies have the possibility, but not the duty, to register as legal entities (as association with legal personality), which indicates that the law on registering religious communities is not in line with European standards (Staničić and Ofak, 2011). Non-registered religious communities may operate freely, but cannot enjoy certain privileges, such as tax exclusion, access to state funds for religious activities, religious education, and property costs¹⁷. Legal Act from 2004 (Conclusion 23 December 2004), elaborates that for signing a legal agreement between the State of Croatia and religious communities, they have to fulfill at least one of two main conditions. Firstly, they have to prove that they were actively enrolled on the territory of Croatia since the 6th of April, 1941, and continuously act in legal and social ways till today. We might say that the alternative criterion for this is belonging to the European cultural circle of communities such as Orthodox, Evangelical, Jewish, Islam, and Protestant religious groups. Secondly, the number of members of this community must overcome six thousand people¹⁸. Indeed, the problem in Croatian practice certainly exists when religious communities request an agreement with the Republic of Croatia, to gain certain benefits - marriage in religious form or religious education in educational institutions. As Staničić and Ofak (2011) claim, this problem culminated in a lawsuit against the Republic of Croatia before the European Court of Human Rights filed by the Alliance of Churches “Word of Life”, the “Church of the Whole Gospel” and the “Protestant Reformed Christian Church” in the Republic of Croatia. The Commission for Relations with Religious Communities refused to conclude agreements with the plaintiffs because they did not meet the historical or numerical criteria from the previously mentioned Legal Act 2004. The Government of the Republic of Croatia nevertheless concluded such an agreement with the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Croatian Old Catholic Church, and the Macedonian Orthodox Church, even though they do not meet the criterion of 6000 members. The Government of the Republic of Croatia explained that this was because these churches met an alternative criterion, thus representing the historical religious

15 <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/1374971.html> [accessed 16 September 2020]

16 <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religious-freedom/croatia/> [accessed 31 January 2022]

17 <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religious-freedom/croatia/> [accessed 31 January 2022]

communities of the European cultural circle. The Court therefore concluded that the Legal Act from 2004 did not apply on an equal basis to all religious communities which led to different treatment between the plaintiffs and those religious communities that entered into an agreement with the Government of the Republic of Croatia, without any objective or reasonable justification¹⁹.

Following the previously mentioned historical, social, and political events in Croatia and the changes toward a more liberal path followed by EU pressures, we will explain more about the status of religious communities in the recent period. The Report of Minority Rights Group International states that Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church, Josip Bozanić, who played an active role in publicly promoting reconciliation and the return of refugees²⁰, in 1999, expressed his disagreement with the former government (right wing), and Croat Catholic Bishops Conference showed its support for changes in the election for the new government in 2000. Minority Rights Group Report, on minorities in Croatia, stated that representatives of religious communities claimed that the shift in the government of Croatia was a positive step towards a more tolerant society and respect for religious rights. In order to question the position and rights of religious minorities in Croatia, it is necessary to grasp, even briefly, into the inequalities inside of the various institutions. One of the examples of such inequalities is the case of the Ministry of Defence, which employed several Roman Catholic priests, but none of the Orthodox or Muslim officials. In 2002, the agreement was reached and it was allowed to add one Muslim and five Orthodox priests as chaplains²¹. It is questionable if nowadays these issues are situated correctly since numerous reports show that there are no adequate persons for the religious practices of other communities inside of the military institutions. The International Religion Freedom Report from 2018 informed that different nongovernmental and international organizations reported instances of border police subjecting migrants to treatment inconsistent with their religious beliefs and offensive commenting of their religious affiliation. Atheist, Jewish, and Serbian Orthodox organizations complained that non-Catholic children were discriminated against in public schools, indicating that most public schools do not offer viable alternatives to Catholic catechism. The media also reported about few specific cases of child harassment on behalf of religious affiliation. Catholic symbols remained prevalent in government buildings, such as schools, hospitals and public institutions, which clearly show the nonexistence of the separation between the State and the Church, which is declared by the Constitution. Furthermore, the report states that some medical institutions refused to treat members of Jehovah's Witnesses, since they refuse transfusion of the blood because it is not in accordance with their religious beliefs. Ombudswoman for human rights claims that Jehovah's Witnesses are constantly encountered with discrimination when it comes to hospital facilities and treatments. The Report states that in 2017, there were 24 cases where hospitals in Croatia refused to treat the patient because of their religious

18 Zaključak Vlade Republike Hrvatske, klasa 070-01/03-03/03, ur. br. 5030104-04-3 od 23. prosinca 2004 [accessed 16 September 2020]

19 SUDSKA I UPRAVNA PRAKSA / Europski sud za ljudska prava HRVATSKA JAVNA UPRAVA, god. 9. (2009.), br. 1., str. 207–230 (eds Frane Staničić, Lana Ofak), available at hrcak.srce.hr [accessed 16 September 2020]

20 United States Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999 - Croatia*, 9 September 1999, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a88527.html> [accessed 9 June 2020]

21 Minority Rights Group International (MRG). *Minorities in Croatia Report*, available at <https://minorityrights.org/publications/minorities-in-croatia/> [accessed 9 June 2020]

beliefs. 15 out of those 24, in the end received their medical care in private hospitals abroad, which was financed by the Jehovah's community. Leaders of Jewish communities claimed that the Government had not implemented concrete measures in order to return properties taken during the Holocaust. Some of the religious minority groups state that Catholic Church in Croatia still enjoys special status in comparison to other religious communities, partly because of the signed agreement with the Government, and partly because of its cultural and political influence being a dominant religion in the society. The Council of Europe and Croatian ombudswoman for human rights expressed their concern for rising religious intolerance towards Jewish communities, especially on the Internet and various social networks. On the other hand, members of Islam and Serbian Orthodox communities acknowledged their good relations with the Government, and constant progress towards better inclusion of diversity in Croatian society, even though this community is experiencing stagnation in the numbers of religious believers, while the Islam community has increased since the year 2011. In the list of issues submitted in November 2019 within the framework of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), European Council expressed its concern for the harassment of members of the Serbian Orthodox Community, attacks on Jewish Communities, and vandalism of the Churches²². These attacks occurred especially in Eastern Slavonia, in places close to the border with Serbia²³, which points out that this dimension of intolerance and discrimination is double directed, not only toward ethnic but also religious minorities. Since religion and ethnicity are so closely intertwined, it is difficult to distinguish between ethnic discrimination and religious discrimination, in which case discriminatory discourses and the abolition of rights can be based on both reasons.

According to the Freedom House Report from 2019, Croatia is marked as a free country, in reference to the total score and status of political and civil liberties. In the report for the year 2019, concerning the section on religious freedoms, 'Freedom House' acknowledges that the Croatian constitution guarantees freedom of religion and that these freedoms are visible in the practices on the ground, but there is an existence of discriminatory practices with certain religious minority groups. For example, report issues that the Serbian Orthodox Church is still facing harassment and vandalism of their religious institutions. Jewish communities along with other groups expressed concern about Holocaust denial and the visibility of symbols and slogans associated with the fascist 'Ustaša' regime, unfortunately, promoted by different right-wing groups/nationalists and certain newspapers. In terms of human rights and the work of NGO's, 'Freedom House' reports that they are particularly active and prosperous in their domain of work and have the support of the country for their work and activities, but on the other hand, they acknowledged the existence of political pressures on certain journalists and civil society activists. When it comes to human rights policies, NGOs 'criticized the government for lacking a comprehensive human rights policy, and

22 ICCPR (2019) Human Rights Committee. List of issues prior to submission of the fourth periodic report of Croatia, available at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Countries.aspx?CountryCode=CRO and Lang=EN, [accessed 9 June 2020]

23 Minority Rights Group International (MRG). Minorities in Croatia Report, available at <https://minorityrights.org/publications/minorities-in-croatia/> [accessed 9 June 2020]

warned about the continuing deterioration of protection of human rights in the country, especially for marginalized groups and women²⁴.

2.1.3. Religious Education in Croatia

After socialism, most of the countries, some sooner some later, in the area of Balkan experienced the idea of introducing confessional education in accordance with the belief system of their countries, experimenting with various models (Kuburić and Moe, 2006). Croatia was the first one to introduce, followed by Bosnia, and Serbia in early 2000, while on the other hand, Slovenia strictly separates the sphere of the educational system from religion offering a non-confessional subject covering religious diversity (Kuburić and Moe, 2006). According to Kuburić and Moe (2006), the concept of introducing religious education raised a lot of debate and a range of questions concerning the role of religious education, more precisely questioning whether school is really a place for religious doctrines and if it is, should it be presented in a neutral way of understanding religious diversity or not? Along with that, came the question of treating diversity within the classroom, should pupils from different religious backgrounds be taught together or separately, how should textbooks be structured and written, and which are the experts that should write them? The issues were not only raised among major religions but as well by religious minorities, new religious movements and their right to enter and construct their role within the sphere of education. All of these questions and their possible answers define how religion is perceived in today's society, which is its place and how it is understood (Kuburić and Moe, 2006, 1).

Within the debates of religious education, the most important differences emerged in discussing the approaches and perspectives to religious education and the way it should be done, using the confessional or non-confessional approach. As Kuburić and Moe (2006) claim, the confessional approach is more related to the formation of the religious identity of the believers and the teaching content of one specific religious tradition, while the non-confessional approach is more focused on sharing knowledge by viewing the diversity of religions, and teaching about religions. The latter one is usually organized by the state authorities and it educates about non-religious ethics as well, while confessional education is organized by religious communities and avoids the teachings on atheism (Kuburić and Moe, 2006). Another issue, as mentioned earlier is the problem of integration or separation when it comes to religious teachings. Should pupils from different backgrounds be taught separately or jointly? As Kuburić and Moe (2006) claim, there is advantage and disadvantage to both of the approaches, while the integration approach can be fruitful for understanding diversity and developing tolerance for religious differences, on the other hand, it can include an attempt of under covered proselytising if it includes elements of worship. Either way, it is not an easy task for the ones that are tending to find the right principles for educating religion. If we think outside and

²⁴ Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2019 – Croatia, available at <https://freedomhouse.org/country/croatia/freedom-world/2020>, [accessed 18 January 2021]

beyond the issues of approach, or whether we should have religious education or not, Kuburić and Moe (2006) reminds us about the dimension of human rights that affects these concepts. A child has the right to non-discrimination and freedom of religion or belief, including the right not to believe, on the other hand, parents have the right to up bring their children in consistency with their religious beliefs, and upon that, states are obliged to respect those rights, but to promote tolerance and understanding for other cultures through their educational system (Kuburić and Moe, 2006). Either way, there is clearly a complexity of issues intertwined and affecting each other, so it is understandable that it is easier for the idea of different approaches to work in theory than in practice (Kuburić and Moe, 2006).

When it comes to religion within the educational system of Croatia, during the 90's, according to Zrinščak et al. (2014), the most visible change, in comparison to the Communist period, is the role of the Church in education. Debating on the type of religious education (confessional or non-confessional), ruling political structures in the early 90's strongly supported the idea of Catholic confessional education in the schools, while the non-confessional approach seemed to be out of the question. According to Zrinščak et al (2014), declarations and documents issued by the authorities set the process to a speed that put the constructive dialogue aside, while the idea of non-confessional religious culture with the time got forgotten and confessional religious education gained primacy causing that the viable alternative for non-confessional religious education has not been evolved till nowadays (Zrinščak et al, 2017; Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006). Eventually, this debate fractured into two sections: on one side, the more "conservative" majority, which backed up the idea of confessional education, mostly composed of theologians, and on the other side, the "liberal minority", which, besides some Catholic theologians, was composed out of few minority religious communities and secular experts (Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006, 52). According to Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov (2006), there were several reasons which formed the basis against introducing confessional religious education. Firstly, the Ministry of Education introduced it without consulting the public opinion of experts, professors, and teachers. Secondly, the perception of the school as a public institution which should cherish the multi-confessional culture of religious education rather than confessional non-understanding and religious culture like a doctrine. Finally, the contradiction to the aspect of Croatia as a secular country. The role of the Catholic Church and its influence was most visible through primary, secondary, and preschool education and its effort to introduce religious education in the school system (Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006). In the year 1991 Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Croatia introduced Catholic religious education in all primary and secondary schools as an optional subject (Zrinščak et al., 2014), and with that Catholic Church gained the possibility to define the content and the way of teaching classes. The legal dimension of religious education and the role of Catholic Church in the sphere of education and cultural upbringing were managed in 1996 when the state of Croatia signed the Agreement between the Holy See and the Ministry of Culture and Education (five years after introducing Catholic religious education into schools) (Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006). This agreement took

into account that the majority of Croatian citizens are Catholic and that the Catholic Church had a significant meaning within the tradition and culture of its society (Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006). According to Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov (2006) other documents that were important for the sphere of education were: 'Contract between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Conference of Bishops about Catholic Catechism in Public Schools and Public Preschool Institutions (1999), the Law on the Legal Status of Religious Communities (2002), contracts between another eight religious communities and the Government of the Republic of Croatia about questions of mutual interest (2002 and 2003). The Agreement defined the points of religious education within the terms of content, structure, number of students, invested time, as well as the possibility of the Catholic Church opening preschool and school institutions, and that the ceremonies of worship can also be performed in schools (Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006). The agreement was signed taking into account 'the irreplaceable historical and present role of the Catholic Church in Croatia in the cultural and moral upbringing of the people, and also its role in the field of the culture and education' (Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006). As Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov (2006) imply, in the case of other religious communities, the signed agreement with the State differed from the one signed between Holy See and Croatia, and this difference was especially defined by the Articles 11 and 12. Firstly, the Agreement states that Catholic religious traditions are deeply rooted in Croatian cultural heritage, and it will be taken into account in the public Croatian schools system and that Catholic religious celebration can take place in schools. Secondly, parish priests, because of the nature of their service have the right to performs Catholic religious education (Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006). When the Law on religious communities came into force, Croatia as well signed the Contract concerning questions of mutual interest, firstly signed with the Serbian Orthodox Church and Islamic religious community in the year 2002 and later on, during the year 2003; it was signed with several other communities (Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006), in total, with 19 religious communities until today These contracts were signed particularly for the purpose of State regulation of activities of the religious groups on the institutional level, in terms of children's upbringing, education, and culture with a tendency to create and maintain better conditions for conducting and monitoring religious activities of religious groups (Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006). This Contract is based on international conventions and standards, with a goal of mutual cooperation for the benefit of all citizens, regardless of their religious convictions (Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006). Following the changes within the law in the year 2002, besides Catholic Church, the Ministry of Education approved a curriculum for five other religious communities: Orthodox, Islam, Jewish, Adventists and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Zrinščak et al., 2014). Concerning the educational system, those religious communities that did not sign the agreement with the State, do not have the right to teach inside of school institutions, but only within their religious institutions, and by that are not obliged to have legally approved textbooks (Zrinščak et al., 2014).

In the beginning, religious education was introduced gradually, facing issues of inadequate structure and organization of its syllabus, textbooks, and the lack of trained personality, not only in the domain of religious knowledge, but as well as on the level of methodological and pedagogical knowledge that is required within the educational system (Zrinščak et al., 2014). In the case of primary schools, the program for Catholic religious education was approved much later (1999), than the one in secondary schools, approved in 1991. The foundations of Catholic religious education in primary schools are based on the idea of raising people within the religious dimension of life, general human and religious values, understanding religious facts and giving importance to God and religious dialogue among people (Zrinščak et al., 2014). On the other hand, for those who do not attend Catholic religious education, there is no suitable replacement, nor are schools obligated to organize an adequate activity for the pupils that don't attend Catholic religious education. This approach within the educational system speaks much about the it's relation toward the sphere of religious and non-religious issues. In addition, this inability of pupils to have another useful educational activity affects parents process of decision making whether to enrol their child into Catholic religious education or not, especially if they want to avoid their childs' idling through a day in school. Regarding secondary schools, alternative teaching to religious education is the subject – ethics, which combines different philosophies and worldviews, 'ensuring a respect to multiculturalism and a philosophical openness for dialogue', explored through the idea of human rights, universalism, and morality, which combines a religious approach as well (Zrinščak et al., 2014, 14). With regards to right to religious education of religious minorities, even though it is legally granted for those communities that signed the agreement with the State, this right is rarely used in practice.

Concerning textbooks and religious education, Zrinščak et al (2014) give a short analysis of textbooks for Catholic and Islam religious education, while the textbook used for Orthodox education was not available since schools in Croatia order and buy their textbooks on the territory of Serbia. Catholic textbooks were based on Catholic values, truths and understandings of morality which were meant to help in the formation of Catholic identity (Zrinščak et al., 2014). In terms of tolerance towards other religions, it was present in all the textbooks of Catholic education, validating other religions from a confessional stand of point (Zrinščak et al., 2014). On the other hand, regarding new religious movements, Zrinščak et al. (2014) claim that atheism and the concept of secularity are perceived negatively in the textbooks. Regarding Islamic textbooks and other religious traditions, there is no specific unit divided to them, but tolerance and open-minded dialogue are mentioned within the idea of human Islamic principles. Secularism and religious 'nones' are perceived negatively through the prism of Islamic communities (Zrinščak et al., 2014).

In terms of religion and education research (Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, 2006; Zrinščak et al., 2014) examined several different studies done in the period from 1989 until 2004, focusing among other things, on the 'attitudes of Croatian citizens towards religious education in school and social expectations of religion social role'. "Social structure and quality of life" conducted by the Institute for Social Research – Zagreb in 1989, conducted on a representative sample of the adult population, showed

that 68% of citizens agree that 'religious organizations should be allowed to have a greater role in education'. In the research from 1996. "Social structure and quality of life in the transitional period", 'participants were asked about their opinion concerning the introduction of religious education in public schools', where 65% of the participants thought that it should be optional, as it was at the time. Furthermore, in the research "Children and the media", conducted in primary schools, 52% of pupils were against confessional teaching of religious education, and 34% of teachers agree that religious instruction should not be held at school. Another research "Social and Religious Changes in Croatian Society" - conducted by the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb (2004), showed that 'less than half of respondents think that religious education should be thought within the confessional approach'. In the case of school grade and high school teachers, research "Evaluation of the curriculum and development of the models of curriculum for primary education in Croatia", showed that 34% of school grade and junior high teachers 'consider that religious instruction should not be conducted in public schools'. This research showed as well that participants support the introduction of subjects correlated to sex education, human rights, languages, etc (Zrinščak et al., 2014).

When it comes to the idea of secularization and education, Topić (2013) refers to the comments of several authors like Basu, stating that '..The idea of secular demands that the State, morals, education, etc. be independent of religion...' (Basu in: Topić, 2013), or Matheson who defines secularization as 'separation of education, social welfare, and health from the matrix of church control...' (Matheson in: Topić, 2013). As well, Topić (2013) calls upon Casanova, who in one of his dimensions of understanding secularisation differs 'secular spheres such as State, economy, and science from religious institutions and norms' (Casanova in: Topić, 2013). Topić (2013) analysing different definitions and ideas about secularization, concludes that they all have in common separating education from religion. Following that, Topić (2013) emphasises that there is a gap between the Constitutional principles defined by the law in terms of secularization and the reality of practices in Croatian society, especially when it comes to Catholicism. Topić (2013) claims that all these constitutional principles such as the banning of discrimination on intolerance on an ethnic, racial or religious basis, and equality of all religious communities define Croatia within strictly secular meanings, while on the other hand, State's practices on the ground show that 'Croatia's relationship with religion has never been of the secular nature' (Topić, 2013). What Topić (2013) sees as particularly problematic is that different positions within the state authorities, such as Ministry of science, education, sports are filled with church officials and those same church officials form part of the committees approving history textbooks and do often participate in public debates on different issues, de facto influencing directly on the type and structure of education which Croatian youth receives. Religious education in schools is part of the curriculum and the alternative given to students is subject Ethics, and that alternative is only available in secondary schools, while the adequate alternative for the primary schools does not exist. Of course, Catholic Church does not face any problems in performing its religious teachings while other religious groups face issues, that go beyond the legal system in terms of registration and

agreements that allow them to enrol within the educational system, which are connected to the schools themselves and their authorities, regardless of their status within the legal requirements (Topić, 2013).

2.2. Italy

Italy, a country with strong national and religious identifications, experienced certain transformations in the last few decades which consequently changed the dynamics between majority-minority groups. Italy's sphere of citizenship practices and religious freedom is highly influenced by the changes in the dynamics of migration in the last two decades. These changes within the socio-demographic structure of Italian society certainly transformed Italy from being a country of emigration into a country of mass immigration. Assuredly, this transformation highly affected the relations between the dominant society and minority groups, their status and position, and ultimately influenced how minority groups are perceived in Italy. The problematic of citizenship practices in Italy is connected to the laws and policies of citizenship created to protect Italy's emigrating population, thus encompassing the principle of *Ius sanguinis*. Consequently, these laws and policies were not aligned with the changes in the population structure followed by mass immigration, which caused Italy's unpreparedness for the national, religious and cultural diversities which has already been experiencing. Once diversification of the society gained higher visibility, the agitations within majority-minority relations became more and more evident. The dominant population of Italian society started to be threatened by the changes brought by new cultures, feeling discomfort with the ways Italian national and religious identity might be invaded. On the other hand, greater visibility of minority groups in Italy led to demands for their rights, initiating the process of establishing their status and position within Italian society.

The role of the Catholic Church in Italy was twofold. On one hand, the Church felt obligated to affirm and sustain its strong position within Italian society. On the other hand, Catholic Church considered important to show its openness and tolerance toward the new changes, thus showing that the Catholic Church, even though still deeply enshrined within the traditional values of Italian religious identity, can successfully adapt to the demands of modern society. In this sense, Catholic Church took a supportive role toward minority groups and foreigners, using its organizations and structures to provide help to the ones in need. In terms of the religious identity of Italian society, while the data show a decrease in the frequency of church attendance, the population of Italy still very much prefer to express their confessional identity, regardless of the inconsistency with the religious practice within the sphere of Church. Considering these issues, we devoted the following subchapters to the exploration of patterns and problematics of Citizenship, citizens' rights, and religious freedom in Italy. Specifically, we grasp into the issues of citizenship practices as a consequence of migration dynamics, the sphere of religious identity, the role of Catholic Church, the positioning of religious minorities and their freedoms, together with the problematics concerning Religious education in Italy.

2.2.1. Citizenship Policies and Issues as a Reflection of Migrational Changes in Italy

According to Zincone (2010), Italian legislation policies and decision-making process on citizenship and immigrant issues are highly influenced by past and historical events that transformed this country into what it is today. As Zinocone (2010) states, it is influenced by several different factors – the unification was promoted by the Kingdom of Piedmont, which at the time was already a liberal state. The legal framework passed to the new State, was basically the same with some adjustments, and was mostly influenced by the legal patterns of the French system. The main factors influencing citizenship legal practices were that Italy was long-standing in the search of a State, while regardless of official unification in 1861, which came quite late, certain territories were still under occupation until 1924. Along with that, while the Italian legal system was dealing with the issues of unfinished unification, Italy started experiencing mass emigration which escalated with high numbers of Italian citizens living abroad, during the first decade of the twentieth century (Zincone and Basili, 2013). As Zincone (2010) claims ‘Italy’s past is one of late unification, of ‘a nation in search of a State’, the past of a mass emigration country, of a recovery from an authoritarian regime; and of a democratic and republican constitution which established the principle of non-discrimination and gender equality’ (Zincone, 2010, 18). The Albertine Statute (Codice Civile Albertino) brought in year 1838 dealt with citizenship only as the aspect of civil and political emancipation and its legal framework was inherited by the newly unified State, positioning the Albertine Statute as its constitution (Grosso in: Zincone and Basili, 2013). Within the legal aspect of the the Albertine Statute, the *ius sanguinis* criteria was considered as the main and acceptable factor of belonging to a certain nation (Grosso in: Zincone and Basili, 2013), even though it would be expected that Italy as a newly formed nation would insist on forming a stronger and powerful relation between the nationality and citizenship (Zincone and Basili, 2013). Shortly after the unification of Italy in 1861, the idea of State membership was closely dependning on the nation membership (Zincone, 2010). Within the newly formed Citizenship Law, the influence of the French legal framework was specifically visible, which avoided the relationship between citizenship and nationality but rather preferred regulating citizenship through civil and political emancipation, looking at citizenship only through the lenses of permanent residency, place of birth and descent (Zincone and Basili, 2013).

The Fascist regime that came to power in 1922 certainly initiated a range of discriminatory practices, not only on the racial and religious level but as well within the sphere of social and political rights, repressing citizens and non-citizens, electoral competition, exiling political opponents or anyone who produced even a thought in mind against the regime (Zincone and Basili, 2013). Of course, the most vulnerable group was the Jewish community. Discriminative and barbarous politics of the Fascist regime were visible within the citizenship restrictions as well (Zincone and Basili, 2013). As Zincone and Basili (2013) claim, new regulations aimed at protecting the pure Italians, prohibiting property ownership, certain employment positions and public education for those who did not fit in the image of an Italian citizen.

Except for the anti-Semitism discourse, the legal framework of Italy under the Fascist Regime started to be coloured by racism and discrimination in general, narrowing the citizens' rights to those of pure Italian descent and exiling and denying citizenship to anyone who opposed the authoritarian regime (Zincone and Basili, 2013). After the Fascist regime, liberal principles, democracy, and equality came into force, along with the Italian Constitution in 1948, as a way to cure the damage produced by the former authorities. Europe was experiencing cultural, social, and political changes within different levels of society, the relationship within family structures changed and gender equality started evolving on a higher level. All this was visible within the Constitution from 1948 leaving an impact on citizenship regulations as well. Among other things, this Constitution prohibited the loss of citizenship for political reasons (Zincone and Basili, 2013).

Citizenship policies and the Law on Nationality were mostly based on the idea of protecting the citizens who left Italy with a tendency to preserve their link with the Italian State and its heritage, in that way, focusing more on the emigrational flows of this country and favouring the *ius sanguinis* concept of obtaining citizenship (Zincone, 2010). According to Zincone (2010), at the time, Italy was still considered as a country with a small percentage of immigrant flow, and was not concerned by the questions of how to position and regulate immigration. Italian citizenship policies nowadays mostly evolve around migration issues and demands influenced by the high rate of immigration flows in the last decades (Zincone, 2010). With the rise of rates in number of immigrants entering Italy in the last decades, the questions of regulation and management of those demographic changes became one of the most important issues in restructuring citizenship policies, while the response to the raised issues was met with a negative connotation (Zincone, 2010). According to Zincone (2010) the advocates for migrant rights, usually coming from the background of Catholic organizations, were more focused on establishing a protocol which would enable immigrant workers to legally function within the society, rather than changing the law on citizenship itself. The centre-left parties fostered the agenda of restructuring the Law on citizenship, on the other hand, the right-centered parties, while less sensitive to problems of immigrants, changed the direction of their political agenda under the leadership of Gianfranco Fini, who proposed a bipartisan bill, which would reduce the residence requirement from ten to five years (Zincone, 2010).

The 1992 Citizenship Law was based and formed on the principle of *Ius sanguinis* and the co-ethnic preference of people of Italian origin, which was indeed quite fruitful for the Italian people residing abroad, giving them the possibility of dual citizenship. The 1992 Citizenship Law involved two significant elements concerning the obtaining of citizenship rights by birth. The first one, concerns the right to citizenship if the father or mother is a citizen, and second one, refers to immigrant parents, meaning that regardless of the citizenship status of the parents, the child born on the territory of Italy, has the right to obtain citizenship at the age of eighteen with a proof of continuous period of residency within the country (Zincone, 2010; Zincone and Basili, 2013). As well, the Art 91 of the 1992 Law included changes concerning the length of residence required in order to obtain citizenship, reducing it from five to three years for people of Italian

descent and to four years for people coming from the EU, taking their ethnic similarity into account, while keeping the requirement of ten years for the non-EU citizens. The Act from 2006 introduced the possibility of reacquiring citizenship for individuals who were Italian citizens residing in territories ceded from Italy to Yugoslavia, which along with that, for the first time, introduced the language and cultural knowledge requirements for acquiring citizenship (Zincone, 2010). In a way, the legislation of 1992 Law basically was constructed to foster relationships with the emigrant population as members of the political community, putting aside immigrants and their need for legalizing their status. According to the data, in the period from 1998 until 2011, almost a million passports were issued to Italians living abroad (Zincone and Basili, 2013). Regardless of these changes, which in some specific cases have softened the politics of obtaining citizenship in Italy, marriage became the easiest way to gain citizenship, since only six months of marriage was set as a requirement to obtain citizenship (Zincone, 2010; Zaccaria et al., 2018). This trend is visible in the data, which shows that only 7% of acquired citizenship status was through the length of residency, while 93% was based on marriage (Zincone, 2010; Zinocone and Basili, 2013). Recently Italian government set a decree Law regarding marriage and acquirement of citizenship setting a proposition on the maximum time for acquiring citizenship through marriage is three years, which in 2018 was set to only two years²⁵. According to Zincone and Basili (2013), the 1992 Law on Citizenship was already outdated from the first day it came into force. Firstly, it was brought with the idea that Italy is an emigrant country only starting to experience the immigration and the anti-immigrant discourse, which was a totally misguided starting point, and secondly, Italy held and fostered the historical idea that there are many Italian citizens living abroad and some even against their will (Zincone and Basili, 2013).

Within the period from 1992 until 2009, there were several attempts made by centre-left governments to restructure the Law on citizenship by presenting various reform bills, but unfortunately, the nationality reform project was finally refused by the government in 2008 (Zincone and Basili, 2013). In 2009, the newly elected centre-right Government parties (People of Freedom and Northern League) headed by Silvio Berlusconi, followed by their anti-immigrant rhetoric brought new measures within the Security Act ('Pacchetto Sicurezza') (Zincone and Basili, 2013). These new measures have put Italy in a leading place as one of the most restrictive country among 15 EU countries (Zaccaria et al., 2018). According to Zincone and Basili (2013) the Security Act included several restrictive measures for the crime of undocumented entrance and residence in the country, as well as additional restrictions on obtaining citizenship status through marriage, which had a goal to prevent convenience marriages. Therefore, the government policies extended the marriage duration length requirement from six months to two years, excluding the case of married couples with children. This Act included as well, an integration agreement which needs to be signed by the immigrant, which legally obligates the immigrant to acquire basic language knowledge within two years of receiving the permit (Zincone and Basili, 2013). Furthermore, the Government denounced the possibility of dual citizenship enacted by the Law in 1992 (Zincone, 2010). The Government led by Berlusconi from 2008

25 <https://www.italiandualcitizenship.net/new-law-change-applying-to-italian-citizenship-by-marriage/> accessed at 25 of January 2022

until 2011, was certainly not interested in reforming citizenship Law and advocating for immigrant rights, but the President of the Chamber, Gianfranco Fini, together with the opposition (forming a majority in the Parliament), developed and voted for the project that was initiated by the previous Government, with a goal of reforming Citizenship Laws and regulations (Zincone and Basili, 2013). This action succeeded in reducing the years of required residency, and softening the requirements for children born and educated in Italy but at the same time included other different requirement criteria such a language and culture values knowledge (Zincone and Basili, 2013).

According to Zincone (2010), the Government's response to immigrant issues, whether coming from left or right wings parties, usually came down to two possible solutions – to postpone or to deny citizenship rights for immigrants. While the left-wing parties saw citizenship as a tool for integration, the right-wing policies perceived granting citizenship rights as a reward for accomplished integration, which in both ways, as Zincone (2010) claims, was a false ideology. In some sense, the huge wave of migrants entering Italy in the last decades gave an impression of Italy as a sort of hospitable country for immigrants, whereby according to Zincone (2010), Italy over time adopted quite restrictive measures with the goal not only to control and oversee the migration flows, but as well to deny this possibility for the unwanted migrants. At the time when immigrants seemed like something happening on the margins of society and far away for the eyes of Italians, like in the 90's, the public view on immigrants was indeed positive and welcoming the foreigners to come and start a life in Italy, but pretty soon this positivity flipped into negativity, realising that maybe this welcoming approach of Italy was a little bit too much welcoming (Zincone, 2010). This as well could be seen through the data on employment, whereby almost all Italian families wanted to hire immigrant workers, probably because of the low salary requirements of immigrants, but on the other hand, those same Italian families did not want Italy to become a country that welcomes immigrants no matter what (Zincone, 2010). Furthermore, when it comes to expressing opinions on immigration and crime, and expressions of fear toward immigrants, in 2008 Italy reached second place, with 54% of people responding that there are too many non-EU immigrants within the country, and according to 2008 and 2010 data from EURISPES, around 64% of respondents believe that immigration increases crime activity, even though the numbers comparing migration and criminality showed that, with the increase of immigrants the numbers on crime activity remained stable (Zincone, 2010).

Laws and legislative policies on citizenship and immigration, passed until 2010 were mostly cherishing the relationship between Italy and its diaspora, while policies concerning immigrants entering and legalizing their stay within the Italian system became more and more restrictive during the time passed. Many propositions that aimed at liberalizing and reducing the tension that was raised around the migrant population were not reduced and almost all initiatives resulted in oppressive restrictive measures. Generally, citizenship policies and decision-making processes are constituted according to social and political issues that are surrounding not only Italy but Europe as well, affected by the issues of fear of losing or obstructing European values by too much immigrant population, the fear of rising criminality and terrorism, the fear of

losing employment opportunities by low paid migrant population, which all in all is a general fear of immigrant population changing and transforming social and political spheres of the country (Zincone, 2010). According to Zincone and Basili (2013), the Italian system of citizenship within the legal system could be defined as a ‘familistic model’ determined by *Ius sanguinis* (Zincone in: Zincone and Basili, 2013), which according to Waltzer defines nationality and citizens’ rights through the system of members belonging to a national community by descent (Waltzer in: Zincone and Basili, 2013). Therefore, this system provides easy access to citizenship for those with the Italian descent but makes it quite complicated for immigrants or their children to obtain their rights (Zincone and Basili, 2013). There are two main historical reasons why Italy has formed its citizenship legislation through the familistic model – first one, refers to the late unification of the country, while the second one, concerns mass emigrations during the last decades of the nineteenth century, which basically directed the path of the legal system and citizenship practices.

When it comes to the problematic of immigrants and refugees the focal questions surrounding it concern the understanding to what extent political rights should be granted to immigrants, since political rights are a crucial point in forming part of the inner political community of the country (Zaccaria et al., 2018). This question especially concerns those who work and reside in a country but do not hold citizenship. Italy, as a country that until 70’s has been a typical emigrational country, in only a few decades encountered social circumstances turned around, confronting an unprepared Italy without a clear idea of how to accurately deal with immigration issues (Zaccaria et al., 2018). Moreover, some scholars find Italian migration policies as exclusivist, ethnocentric and specifically denying the rights to immigrants (Grillo and Pratt, 2002; Mantovan, 2013; Perocco, 2003 in: Zaccaria et al., 2018). On this issue speaks as well the fact that 60% out of 92 recommendations directed to the government of Italy from the part of United Nations Human Rights Council, concerned issues on immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers (Zaccaria et al., 2018). The 2003 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families states that documented migrant workers can enjoy political rights depending if the State grants them this right. Italy, like many countries dealing with a large number of immigrants and refugees, has still not ratified this Convention. In Italy, only immigrants coming from the EU have a right to passive and active vote, and regardless of expressed reservation, Italy has ratified the 1992 Strasbourg Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level that enables the right to vote to every foreign resident after a period of 5 years of residence within the country (Zaccaria et al., 2018). Another aspect that shows how Italy is rejecting to grant rights that would facilitate more inclusiveness within the socio-political sphere, to immigrants and their families is the Italian citizenship law. Accordingly, immigrants can apply for, and obtain citizenship after 10 years of uninterrupted legal residence, and the process is extremely large and mostly comes with negative outcomes (Zaccaria et al., 2018).

In 2011, Italy officially reached the number of five million of immigrant population (Pace, 2014), and according to UN Agency for refugees 181,436 immigrants arrived on the Italian coast in 2016, and 119,300 in 2017, launching Italy in fifth place in the list of main destinations for refugees. The number of foreigners

who reside in Italy occupies 8,5% of the total population (Zaccaria et al., 2018). According to ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica) report for the year 2019²⁶ the number of immigration flows has decreased by 8.6%, while the number of people living in Italy was continuously increasing. The trend of decrease in the number of residents started in 2015, but on the other hand, the population of foreign citizens residing in Italy increased, although with a relatively small number in comparison to the period before, thus making 8.8% of total residing population. As well, when it comes to the number of foreigners who managed to obtain citizenship status, the number went from a position of decreasing in 2017 and 2018, toward a substantial increase of 13% more than in 2018. In overall numbers, for the period from 2015 until 2019, about 766 000 foreigners became Italian citizens. Furthermore, the analysed data from ISTAT shows that Italy is a multi-ethnic country, counting more than two hundred different nationalities. The balance within the socio-demographic structures of national minorities groups remained stable in the sense that Romanians are still the first largest minority, counting over one million of the population; in second place are Albanians, followed by the population coming from Morocco, Chinese on the fourth place and Ukrainians on the fifth place. Although, given the new situation with the Ukraine, this order might change. The annual immigration inflow of non-EU citizens in 2020 was estimated to be 106 503 and the number of foreigners that acquired Italian citizenship in the same year was 131 803, higher than in 2019. The process of acquiring citizenship for 66 211 people went through a residency requirement, 14 044 people acquired it through marital status and around 51 thousand through other requiring conditions²⁷. Furthermore, according to the ISTAT Annual report from the year 2021²⁸, the number of the foreign population residing in Italy was estimated 5 171 894, while emerged and continuing crisis of COVID-19 had severe impact on the demographical balance of Italy, not only producing the high rates of mortality, but as well impacting the number of immigration and emigration flows in the past two years. The restraint on the mobility and movement of people produced a decrease of 30.6% of immigration while a number of people emigrating from Italy decreased by 10,8% in comparison to the 2015 - 2019 average.

2.2.2. Position of the Catholic Church and Religious Identity in Italy

Italy has once been a country monopolized by Catholicism, but due to migration flows that appeared in the last twenty years, its socio-demographic structure changed and has been challenged by increased religious diversification (Pace, 2014; Giordan and Zrinščak, 2018; Zaccaria et al., 2018), which surely produced tension in relation not only between the dominant religion towards other religious groups but as well the relational tension within state-religious sphere (Pace, 2014). The increase of religious diversification, mass migrant flows, and changes within the socio-demographic structure of Italy was not possible to spot instantly and notice the visible change which finally produced a different socio-religious

26 ISTAT National Demographic Balance Report 2019 <http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?QueryId=19721&lang=en>, accessed 20 January 2022

27 <http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?QueryId=19721&lang=en> accessed 20 January 2022

28 ISTAT Annual Report 2021 https://www.istat.it/it/files//2021/09/Annual-Report-2021_Summary_EN.pdf accessed at 20 January 2022

image of the country (Pace, 2014). Even though Italy encountered an unexpected religious pluralism, its very well structured and organized Catholic Church, for various historical and cultural reasons remained vividly present, retaining its important role in the public sphere and carefully accepting that it is no longer the sole factor within Italian society, which required a new approach to the given situation (Pace, 2014). In fact, Catholicism in Italy is characterized by strong resistance toward religious changes and transformations that religious diversity brings upon (Garelli 2010; Garelli, 2012). The rising religious pluralism and diversification did not only question the functionality of these changes within a society monopolised by one religion, but as well highlight the diversity within diversity when the internal system of belief is exposed to external factors (Pace, 2014). With that, those who are diverse by their nationality, culture and language, even though they would come to accept Catholicism as their religion, the differences they bring will bring changes within the Catholic system, and ‘add their own point of view to what being Catholic means, which will not necessarily be consistent with Italian mainstream traditions’ (Pace, 2014, 111). Catholic Church kept its strong central position, but in order to assimilate to the newest developments it started working on a strategy, abandoning the historical disinterest in religious diversity and opening itself to interreligious dialogue with other communities, emphasising the importance of religious tolerance but still reminding Italian society and other religious groups that it is the Catholic Church that still holds all the strings in this society (Pace, 2014). But still, as changes came, Catholic Church needed to adjust and change as well. In order to establish interreligious dialogue and to become more close to other religious groups, Italian Catholic Church used its religious welfare organizations to provide a support system to migrants, and as well as openly criticised government methods toward immigrants and emphasized social injustices within society (Pace, 2014). On the other hand, in order to maintain its power and to protect its dominant position within the society, Catholic Church leaned on two important factors – religious teaching in public schools and different aspirations when it comes to ways of communicating with religious groups (Pace, 2014). In the light of different social and political changes that were slowly but effectively transforming Italian society, Catholic Church decided that directing its power towards care for those in need, as has been the long teaching of the Catholic Church, could serve not only to humanity but as well to maintain the good relations with the rest of the world, so Catholic Church has become an important vocal in advocating for the rights of refugees and immigrants (Zaccaria et al., 2018). In this sense, Catholic Church has not only become a voice struggling for those in need, but as well used its power to oppose the voices of politicians who express xenophobic and populist ideas (Zaccaria et al., 2018), becoming a vocal of promoting the idea of inclusivity, acceptance, and cooperation when it comes to migrants and refugees. Indeed, as Zaccaria et al. (2018) claim, a voice of a strong religious authority can indeed serve as a ‘public advocate in the debate over immigrants and refugees rights’ (Zaccaria et al., 2018, 54). It would be wrong to say that it is a new approach of the Catholic Church to help those in need, in fact looking historically at the teachings of Christian communities and even within the Biblical readings, this community has always emphasised the need to care and show solidarity for those that suffered injustice, although there were times Catholic Church bypassed these

principles. Zaccaria et al. (2018) point out 4 basic principles of social teachings of the Catholic Church which transmit within the messages of the Church regarding migrant issues. First principle concerns the ‘fundamental right not to migrate’ (Zaccaria et al., 2018, 53) which is visible in the advocating voice of the Church to highlight the injustices and wrongdoings within a specific society. Second principle refers to the right to migrate in times of conflict, violence, hunger or any other dangers with the purpose of finding a safe place and relying on the moral and common good for all humankind. Third principle regards the necessity of social integration of immigrants and the possibilities to fully include in the life of the social and political community of the hosting country. Finally, the fourth principle that models the Church’s advocacy for migrant issues is the aspect of ‘solidarity and subsidiarity’ (Zaccaria et al., 2018, 54), representing the commitment to the common good and responsibility for all, and the cooperation and dialogue in order to achieve a common good for all humankind (Zaccaria et al., 2018).

Regardless of socio-demographic changes and the noticeable process of secularization, especially in the case of traditional religions, the religious sphere of Italy has not been completely disturbed by it (Garelli, 2012). As Pace (2014) sees it, the population of Italian society still holds on to the old-fashioned Italian Catholic identity with a twist – faithful Italian Catholics when it comes to making an identity statement, but not with so much practical involvement as before (Pace, 2014). Looking at the aspects of secularization and the reasons for abandoning traditional religious convictions we could find several pathways that lead to different ways of transformation of religious sphere and identities. As Garelli (2012) claims, in some cases people abandon old religious identities and transform them with the purpose of alignment with their needs, while others ‘choose spiritual pathways far removed from institutionalized religiosity’ (Garelli, 2012, 2). On the other hand, there is a case of those who rather remain in what is religiously familiar to them, rather than ‘search’ for the right spiritual path and get lost in it (Garelli, 2012). It is possible to interpret different forms and ways of being attached to Catholic identity in Italian society. As Garelli (2012) states, for Italian people religion represents a reference point for life, without putting too much effort into religious practice itself. Furthermore, the Italians love the show encompassed within Catholicism, as Garelli (2012) calls it ‘the spectacle of faith’ (Garelli, 2012, 7) like for example, the celebration of different Saints, Papal visits, pilgrimages, processions and so on. This indicates a certain paradox when it comes to Catholicism in Italy, which is visible in the still remaining power of the Catholic Church to actively occupy and animate the public sphere, but when it comes to churches and church attendance in everyday life, there is an evident void (Garelli, 2012). The relationship of Italian society towards the Catholic Church, as Garelli (2012) describes it, is at the same time close and distant, and according to the studies, the Church does not enjoy a high level of appreciation, but at the same time, its low level of favouritism surpasses other State bodies like parliament, political parties, judicial system and so on. Following these aspects, Garelli (2012) indicates two possible reasons for this both close and distant relation. First reason could be found in the Church’s general inclusion within different aspects of public life and its visibility within society which gives Catholicism importance and meaning to the Italians. The second reason for favouritism with respect to Catholic Church

Garelli (2012) finds in the ability of the Church's openness toward any kind of believer, whether it involves a convinced, only occasional, traditional or the "spectacle" believer. As Garelli (2012) describes it 'the Catholic Church is perceived by a large proportion of the population as being close at hand' (Garelli, 2012, 10), and the strong bond between Italian identity and confessional identity is not questioned or denied by the majority of Italian society. The two polars of the Church-society relationship – closeness and distance, is visible in the aspect that even though the religious work is appreciated, there is certain resentment toward the exemption status that the Catholic Church enjoys when it comes to payment of taxes. It is visible as well, from the attitudes toward catechetical education, that even though it is not rejected, the Italians are not big fans of Catholic schools and they do resent certain amount of interference of religion within the question of politics. As well, seeing Church as an advocate voice for certain injustices is more than welcomed, but not in the case of speaking on the topics such as family, sexuality, beginning, and ending a life and other topics of morality and life. As Garelli (2012) points out: 'the ideal church would be one not overstepping the bounds of its religious and spiritual mission and offering faith and hope' (Garelli, 2012, 12). In this sense, Garelli (2012) describes the relationship of Italy toward Catholicism as complex, embraced by favouring and dislike at the same time, producing an inability to detach from affiliating as Catholic but at the same time, an ability to critically approach it. Regardless of this favouring-dislike approach of Italian society, it does not consequently result in breaking the relationship but rather it develops and transforms the religious sphere toward a more individual approach (Garelli, 2012). When it comes to spirituality and sensing the sacred, Garelli (2012) claims that the demands for spirituality still exists in Italian society and it is reflected in the fact that the patterns of Catholic Church are still followed and respected but in a more individual autonomous shape, supporting the idea that believers do not reject the possibility of nurturing spirituality within the spheres of traditional religiosity (Garelli, 2012).

2.2.2.1. State Law Policies and Regulation of Religion and Religious Freedom in Italy

When it comes to Italy, historically looking, state development of civil rights which among other freedoms, encompass religious freedom as well, was marked by different views within different time frames, especially in the case of Catholic Church, changing its views from a strict one to a more tolerant and open minded. Catholic Church ideology was incompatible with the State ideology of the 19th century, diverging from the originated values of the modern state. But this incompatibility shifted into nowadays advocating voice of the Catholic Church for those that are on the margins of the society (Zaccaria et al., 2018). Roman Catholic religion was known as the religion of the State and held this status for a long time, rooting its position and understanding deeply within the Italian society, at least until the period of unification of Italy in 1861. Taking a step back to the main historical points of Italian state, according to Ferrari and Ferrari (2010) the intertwining of Catholic traditions and legal institutions has been visible ever since, but the unification

of Italy during the 1860's certainly startled the calm sea of settled relations between the Catholic Church and the State. In Italy, the mid of 19th century was marked by hostile atmosphere to any religion, while the State authorities fostered the idea of anticlericalism (Introvigne and Stark, 2005), and the government directed its path toward secularization taking small steps such as the introduction of civil marriage, restrictions on religious education and revising laws on religious freedom (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). These secularist regulations lasted for several decades until the coming of Mussolini in 1922, who gave back religious empowerment to the Catholic Church by signing the Concordat (Introvigne and Stark, 2005), which directed the path of state reconciliation with the Catholic Church and re-traditionalization of religious life (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). Essentially, when it comes to religious freedoms of other religious communities, the Italian Constitution did not recognize religious freedoms until year 1947; and only with exceptions to Roman Catholicism, in general, religious freedoms were undermined, and minorities were seen as a threat and as undesired social groups (Introvigne and Stark, 2005). The fall of the Fascist regime and end of WWII, gave empowerment and possibility for other denominations to be recognized within the Italian society, but the Christian Democratic Government, which was the leading government for the period from 1944 until 1994 held quite discriminatory views toward minorities, resulting in Italy's experience of slow but gradual changes within the state policies toward religious freedoms and religious minorities (Introvigne and Stark, 2005). The Constitution of 1948 regarding religion, reflects the agreements signed within the Lateran Treaty and additionally laid the foundations 'for a system of religious freedom more compatible with the principles of freedom and equality' (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010), especially articulated in the Article 7, 8, 19, 20 and 21. Practically, the Constitution of 1948 served as a redemption to the Fascist regime, forbidding discrimination and denial of rights on the basis of racial, religious, gender, political or social reasons (Zincone, 2010).

For Italian society, 70's were the years marked by the process of secularization and the idea of a clear distinction between the State and the Church, and their sphere of interference, bringing up to light two important legal frameworks – Law 898 from 1970, and the Law 194 from 1978 (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). The secularization as a process followed the process of modernization, but instead of total division of the religious and State sphere, modernization took some forms of secularization and adopted a form which can assimilate religion, producing the process of the so called, revitalization of the religion (Introvigne and Stark, 2005). Even though, many researchers predicted the process of strict secularization and fall of religious power, not only for Italy but as well for many other European countries, recent history has shown that it is been the opposite (Zaccaria et al., 2018). The secularist approach in Italy was shaped by the French 'contractual separation' (Broglia in: Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010, 432), which allows the possibility of practicing separation and at the same time adopting bilateral agreements between the State and religious groups (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). The emphasis on the idea of secularist approach in Italy is not the State neutrality toward religion, but rather the State's obligation to protect religious freedoms and preserve tolerance for religious and cultural diversity (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). In words of Ferrari and Ferrari

(2010), the Italian approach to laicità, reflects democratic values of the State and ‘supposes the existence of a plurality of value systems – the same dignity of all personal choices in the field of religion and conscience – it entails equal protection for religious and non-religious beliefs, and it requires State neutrality regarding both of them’ (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010, 433). In any case, the preceding slow and gradual changes were followed by extreme changes during the 80’s, when Bettino Craxi changed several aspects of the signed agreement with the Catholic Church from 1929, thus establishing agreement with the oldest Protestant body in Italy, the Waldensian Church, which was followed by other similar agreements with other religious communities in Italy (Introvigne and Stark, 2005). Regardless of the aspirations of Italian legal system and its approach to religion, the well-known traditional preference of the Catholic Church, often tends to produce not only difficulties in equality and freedom for all religious groups, but as well tends to favour having religious identity over non-religious one. The issue of favouritism, that views Catholicism as a part of national heritage, reflects the character of the State and its interpretations of the Constitution through the lenses of national, religious, and cultural Catholic tradition, putting aside secularism that is represented as one of the foundations for the legal system of this country (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). Concordat from 1929 had a significant importance in terms of marriage, which allowed registration of Church marriages within the registers of births, marriages, and deaths, obtaining full validity in the State law as the civil marriage. As well, Church courts were given the possibility of dissolution of marriages which has the same validity as dissolutions coming from the courts of the State. In case of other minority denominations, while though possibility concluding marriage was granted to minority religious groups, the dissolution of it is possible under the state authorities. Regardless, since the introduction of divorce in 1970, the number of applications to give validity to decisions of annulment of the Church courts has dropped to a few hundred per year (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010, 445). Church marriages do not have civil validations if certain conditions of the civil law are not respected, such as age limit, blood relations, previous marriage and so on, which prevents religious marriages to obtain civil law validation in case there is a visible abolition of rights and equalities of citizens regardless of denomination belonging.

Religious groups in Italy or any associations with religious purposes are not obliged to register or legally authorize, which results in differences in their obtained legal status. There are several possible legal statuses for religious groups such as non-recognized associations, recognized associations, legal capacity obtained through provisions of law in general, and legal capacity obtained on the basis of a law conceived, which represent a ‘Four-Tier System’ (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010, 440). Denominations that are formed as non-recognized associations are free of State control, have independence within property matters, and can receive donations, while recognized associations can obtain legal status if they have enough financial funds and have a common good aim within the society. Legal status obtained through provisions on law in general enjoy a similar status as recognized denominations, while legal status on the basis of a law conceived represent one of the most important legal possibilities for religious minority groups (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). This provision establishes equal possibilities as those given to educational or welfare organizations,

including a high tax privilege, but are controlled and subdued to state authority within decision making process. As well the last of four legal statuses for denominations represents a basic precondition for signing the agreement between specific denomination and the State (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010).

Regarding financial support for religions, according to Ferrari and Ferrari (2010), there are two possible ways through which religious denominations could be funded – one concerning 0,8% of tax income and other concerning off-setting from taxable income donations from various institutions for clergy support. The first option is basically financing through the annual tax which is paid by all Italians, whereby each individual can choose between giving the financial aid to the State (for natural disasters, aid to refugees, preservation of cultural monuments or help against famine in the world); to the Catholic Church (support of Clergy, religious needs, benefits for national communities or third world countries); and finally, to one of the denominations that have agreement with the State. In case the individual does not choose one of these options the quota is distributed among the different recipients, depending on the distribution chosen by the rest of the taxpayers. As well, according to the data from 2004 ‘about 40% of the taxpayers made a choice, and 87 % of these (which roughly equals 35% of all taxpayers) opted in favour of the Catholic Church, whereas 10% preferred the Italian State and the remaining 3% are divided among other religious denominations which signed the Agreement with the State and opted for the tax privilege’ (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010, 443). When it comes to annual tax payment for religious communities, interestingly as Introvigne and Stark (2005) claim, religious communities are becoming like huge corporations on the economy market, trying to increase their tax income, using various marketing tricks to remind their followers and even those who do not form their part, just why they deserve to be chosen for the ‘otto per mille’ option. In this sense, the competition between various religious communities, the competition for their status and the pluralism itself becomes significantly visible within the society (Introvigne and Stark, 2005).

The Constitution from 1948 (Stauto Albertino) and its Article 7 refers to the relationships between the State and Catholic Church, emphasizing specifically the sovereignty, independence and non-interference regarding Catholic Church, while Article 8 emphasises those same rulings and freedoms to non-Catholic denominations, as long as they are in accordance with the legislation of Italy. Art 7 and Art 8 have specific indications regarding the regulation of the relations between each entity and the State, and it is regulated through specific agreements that need to be signed and ratified by specific authorities if the state met the condition of understanding with the denomination (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). In case that the agreements with specific denomination and the State are reached, as Ferrari and Ferrari (2010) imply, the specific denominations have the guarantee that their legal status cannot be amended by the State. The only possible way to change the status of a certain religious entity is to set up a new agreement, between the State and religious denomination. This law, generates an important difference in comparison to other constitutional laws defining religious freedom in other countries, where the states can amended or abrogate the agreement at any given time, while in Italy this law engages a certain superiority over other laws (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). Furthermore, according to the Constitution, Art 19 clearly defines religious freedom for all,

regardless of citizenship, and the only limitation refers to religious acts that jeopardize the fundamental values of Art 9 of ECHR, health, morals, order or protection of the rights and freedoms of others ('All have the right to profess freely their own religious faith in whatever form, individually or in association, to propagate it and to exercise it in private or public worship, provided that the rites are not contrary to good morals') (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). The Italian Parliament until now has approved agreements with 'Valdenses (1984), the Christian Churches of the Seventh-day Adventists (1986), the Assemblée di Dio (Assemblies of God (1986), the Union of Jewish Communities (1987), the Christian Evangelical-Baptist Union (1993) and the Lutheran Church (1993)' (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010, 438). In 2007, there were agreements signed with several other denominations, but as Ervas (2017) claims, they were known as the 'ghost agreements' due to the delay in the Parliament approval in the period of more than five years. The 'ghost agreement' is as well the case with Jehovah's Witnesses denomination that is still waiting for the approval of the agreement. As Ervas (2017) states, a Buddhist religious denomination (Istituto Buddhista Italiano Sokka Gakkai) as well signed an agreement with the Italian State in year 2017 (Ervas, 2017). Constitutional laws in Italy are marked by difficulties in its implementation, whereby the bilateral principles are used as a political tool for selective public recognition and all the agreements are by their form and structure similar one to another, which means that some parts of these agreements could form part of general laws on religious freedom, since indeed some necessities are common to all denominations (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). Thus, instead of giving identity and visibility to each denomination by concluding specific agreements, these agreements serve as instrument of political legitimation, whereby the government has the ability to stop or slow down any negotiations for signing the agreement between the State and denomination at any time, which often is used as a tool of political games and power (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). There is a tension between the idea of liberty and equality within the Italian constitutional law, or better to say a tension to establish a balance between requiring liberty for each denomination to have possibility to obtain their rights and requiring equality as a reflection common rights and duties for all (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). Introvigne (2001), exploring the situation of religious minorities 20 years ago, suggested several examples why Italy should be considered as a quite welcoming and favourable country for religious minorities and immigrants. With this in mind, Introvigne (2001) notes that even different reports on religious freedom coming from various international backgrounds suggest that in comparison to other countries, Italy had 'one of the best environments for religious minorities' (Introvigne, 2001, 275) within the period examined. Certainly Italian religious minorities suffered some instances of discriminatory behaviour, especially when it comes to Protestant community, which has a history of problems with discrimination in Italy dating from the Fascist regime, when they were classified as cults or sects. One of the reasons why Italy could be classified as one of the best environments for religious minorities, regardless of the strong position of Catholic Church, could be found in the legal system and the possibility of religious denomination obtaining their own legal status within the country through agreements (intese) (Introvigne, 2001).

Obtaining data on religious affiliation is excluded from Italian national census, justified by the idea that these types of questions are not in accordance with the secularist approach of the state when it comes to religion, defining it as a sensitive and private data of every individual (Giorda, 2015; Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). For that reason, it is possible to question the validity of the rest of official statistical and empirical data on religious affiliation, but in general it could be concluded that the majority of people in Italy still identify as Catholic (Ferrari in: Giorda, 2015), representing a central point to Italian collective identity, culture and national heritage, while 4% are members of other religions (Giorda, 2015). The population of people belonging to non-Catholic communities in 2013 occupied between 7-10,5% of the population, among which 26% were Italian citizens and 74% were non Italian citizens (Giorda, 2015). Nowadays, the data shows visible increase of numbers of Muslim population, specifically due to migration flows coming from Morocco. According to the data of ARDA, in the year 2015, Italy's religious landscape encompassed 78.28% Catholics, 16.55% of specified and unspecified religiously non-affiliated, 2.66% Muslim, 1.05% of Protestant, and 0.24% of orthodox Christians.

Italy has not been just recently encountered with religious diversity and multiculturalism; moreover, religious minorities have been present in Italy for longer time, and not below the radar, but in fact with a decent amount of public visibility and active movement within the social and political sphere of society regardless of their numeric prevalence (Garelli, 2012). An example of long established religious communities are Evangelic, Jews, and Jehovah's Witnesses, while in recent decades, representatives of the religions of East, like Buddhist and Hindu communities or new religious movements, as well form part of this religious landscape of Italy (Garelli, 2012). Regardless of Catholics ability to resist and withhold strong position within the Italian society, it is inevitable to say that Italy has gone through changes and that religious image of Italian society has profoundly changed not only within the quantity of new minorities but as well due to 'the presence of new actors on the national scene' (Garelli, 2012, 4). The most visible change can be noticed in the increase of communities due to migrant flows, from which Islam and Orthodox Christian communities particularly stand out. Foreign immigrants who follow those communities identify the cultural bond that serves as a factor of distinction from the larger society but at the same time offering the possibility to achieve citizens' rights within the public sphere (Garelli, 2012). However, religious minorities in Italy fought and are still fighting the strong power of Catholicism by demanding rights and equality, opposing the religious monopoly, rejecting the idea of Crucifix in public schools, devoting effort in requiring the right to religious education of minority denominations or finding a suitable alternative for confessional education in schools and so on (Garelli, 2012). Looking at the Italian legal system as a hierarchical pyramid, Zaccaria et al (2018) notices a visible influence and reflection of history and culture on the legal system of Italy, and above all favouring more traditional religions. Because of the number of followers, and special historical and cultural significance to Italian society, Catholic Church enjoys the most entitled status of all, which is sealed by the Agreement of Villa Madama from year 1984 and other laws and legal regulations. The Agreement of Villa Madama is considered as an continuance and upgraded version of

the Lateran Concordat from 1929, regulating the relations between the State and the Catholic Church. The Agreement of Villa Madama from 1984 was designed to stay aligned with the fundamentals of the Lateran Treaty though among other issues, fundamentally changed the State funding of the Church (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010), being the basis for introducing *otto per mille* tax obligation of the citizens toward religious organization introduced in 1986 (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). Below the Catholic Church are the denominations which have reached the agreement with the State, which encompasses denominations that are present within Italian society for a long time, or more recently if they are in total compatibility with Italian law. At the lower end of the pyramid, are the denominations regulated by the Law 1159, and those denominations that regardless of their number of followers, their religious activities or ideologies are in certain conflict with the public order, which excludes them from various numbers of advantages and can enjoy only the privileges guaranteed by the general Law (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010; Zaccaria et al., 2018).

2.2.3. Religious Education in Italy

In Italy, when it comes to teaching religion in public schools, the first principal idea of compulsory catechetical education dated from the year 1929 and lasted for several decades (Giorda, 2015). Around the year 1960 this idea started to be questioned, highlighting the necessity to develop new standards between school and religion, bringing up, for the first time, the issue of present cultural and religious diversity and the necessity to find a concept that could accommodate as well the children coming from different national, cultural, and religious backgrounds (Giorda, 2015). The critical debates and discussions were of crucial meaning in the 70's and they 'paved the way for the turning point in 1984' (Giorda, 2015, 80), when Bettino Craxi and Agostino Casaroli signed the renewed version of Concordat which established that Catholicism is not the only religion in Italy and granted a non-compulsory confessional period of Catholic religion (Giorda, 2015). According to Ferrari and Ferrari (2010), the signed Concordat, intended to establish religious education with a cultural approach from a Catholic point of view, leaving behind the idea of catechetical compulsory religious education. Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI) and the appropriate school authority established several criteria that refer to organizational and structural issues for every type and level of public school education, encompassing school curricula, textbooks, appointed hours, positioning within the frame of other classes, specific profile criteria of teachers of this subject etc. Pre-school children are assigned one and a half hour per week, primary school students two hours, and secondary school students one hour per week. In Italy, since the conclusion of the agreement of Villa Madama between the Catholic Church and the State, among several other agreements, Italy signed eight agreements concerning religious education in the period of time from 1885 until 2004 (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). With regards to these agreements, there is a visible difference between those provisions applied to the Catholic Church and those applied to other denominations (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). According to the data, in 1994/1995 Italian residents with foreign origin composed less than 44 000 of school students, while according to the data from 2015 they

encompassed up to 10% of the population, more precisely 851,579 people (Colombo and Ongini in: Giorda, 2015; Giorda, 2015), while the data from 2012/2013 showed that in the period from 1993 till 2014 in general attendance of Catholic religious education decreased (see Giorda, 2015, 81). Nevertheless, confessional religious education still remained closely linked to Italian culture and customs, forming an important part of Italian identity with prevailed importance to the role of Catholicism (Giorda, 2015).

Unlike is the case with minority religious groups, even those with signed agreement with the State, the financing of Catholic religious education is fully funded by the State (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). Teachers of Catholic religious education are selected by the Italian Conference of Bishops, while the curriculum is agreed between the Minister of Public Education and the Chairman of the Italian conference of Bishops, with an emphasis on teaching religion in alignment with the school aims and aspirations (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). When it comes to changes Italy confronted with the growth of religious diversity and constant migrant flows in the past two decades, different actors (NGOs, school teachers, scholars, curriculum creators etc.), actively attempted to adjust the educational system in order to be more consistent and more prepared for the encountered changes within Italian society (Giorda, 2015). Italian schools nowadays have a strong population of students coming from different cultures and religions, and the numbers are constantly increasing. Nevertheless, it seems that the systematic approach of public school education is still attached to the customs of the prevailing Catholic religion (Giorda, 2015). As well, In Italy, most of the private schools are Roman Catholic, which autonomies and freedoms are protected by the law (Giorda, 2015), whereby those private schools that are encompassed within public education have a very low State control when it comes to the level of their effectiveness and agreed standards (Ventura in: Giorda, 2015). The previous debate within Italian society regarded issues of whether private schools should be funded by the State, while nowadays those debates evolve around the equality of funding between public and private schools (Giorda, 2015). It is not only the issue of the inability of the institutions, movements and initiatives to make the change, but as well the inability of those actors to have an impact on political elites that are able to make the change, and the absence of suitable laws that could protect and provide religious freedom in all spheres of the society (Giorda, 2015).

When it comes to the issue of other religious communities and minorities, the aspect of religious education is relevant as well, since contrary to Catholic religious education, the religious teaching of other religious groups must be funded by themselves and the teaching cannot be within the time framework of regular school activities. The only possible way in which other religious groups could facilitate their religious education is if a large number of students file a request for activating this type of activity or if there are no places of worship within the school area but still the teachers should be paid by the denomination of the requested religious education (Giorda, 2015; Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). According to Giorda (2015), for those students who do not attend Catholic religious education, there are several options for alternative educational activities. For example, a school could establish a periodical educational activity that includes topics such as ethics, tolerance, and peace. As well, there is an option of tutoring with or without a teacher

within accordingly provided space and time by the school. Finally, an option that is frequently used is the early exit or delayed entry into the school depending on the time framework of religious education (Giorda, 2015). When it comes to alternative educational activities and giving opportunities for other activities in exchange for Catholic religious education, there were some cases whereby some schools organized non-confessional courses on the history of religions, but the scope was still rather thin and usually organized within the local level and through the initiative of joined denominations (Giorda, 2015). Furthermore, a range of educationalists coming from different backgrounds, anthropologists, sociologists, historians, as well as teachers of Roman Catholicism joined in order to support different projects with the purpose to create a space and opportunity for the development of suitable alternatives to confessional religious education (Giorda, 2015). Unfortunately, these initiatives never reached the national level. As Giorda (2015) claims, ‘religious pluralism requires education, reflection and inter-religious dialogue’ (Giorda, 2015, 86). Respect for religious differences and the right to have or not have religious beliefs should be mirrored within educational systems as well. As Willaime (2014) claims, among other public places, places of education are as well areas where opportunities for multi and inter-cultural exchanges should be provided, creating a space for ‘interactions and cohabitation among cultures, including religious cultures’ (Willaime in: Giorda, 2015, 78).

As we can observe educational systems as arenas of opportunities for tolerance and the development of multi-cultural dialogues, as well, through school systems, we can observe how well structured the management of diversity is. One example of this are the school canteens. According to Giorda (2015), the increasing number of migrant pupils in schools created demands for changes in each aspect of educational systems, and with this the acknowledgement of dietary practices that need to be in alignment with the demands of diversity. Regardless of the attempts and different projects, from which the most interesting was the one held in Rome, ‘the food revolution at school’ (Giorda, 2015, 86), created in order to improve not only the quality of the food that students in school eat but as well to introduce and promote tolerance, diversity and integration, but shortly after the finalization situation came back to old (Giorda, 2015). According to the research conducted in 50 Italian schools (see Giorda, p. 85), even though a large number of schools (79%) offer the ability for each family to choose menus and to request a certain modification based on medical, ethical or cultural reasons, there are several schools that refuse to offer this possibility. The reason why there are some cases of schools that do not recognize the necessity and needs for these abilities, could be partially found in the management of these services which norms and forms are defined on a local level, leaving the decision-making process to the will of each city. In this sense, denying the right to choose dietary practices is a form of cultural and religious discrimination, which results in denying respect for one’s differences (Giorda, 2015).

When it comes to the question of religious symbols and public places there are several debated aspects, especially when it comes to schools and the symbol of crucifix. According to the Italian Law and regulations defined in the ‘Charter of Values, of Citizenship and Integration’ Italy respects religious symbols of all

religious denominations, but not for the reason of Italian constitutional principles but for the reasons enshrined within Italian culture and tradition (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). This regulation basically protects the display of crucifixes within public spaces, fencing off the possibility of being accused of discriminating against other religious minorities, or those who are non-religious, since the whole idea of religious symbolism in the public space is encompassed within the idea of Italian tradition or culture. Italy, and its debates on religious symbols and the display of crucifixes in schools, certainly surpassed the scope of overall debates in comparison to rest of the Europe, especially due to the attention that the Lautsi case in Italy gained not only on the national level but as well receiving attention from Europe and human rights bodies (Giorda, 2015). Usually, the debates move in two directions. Those defending the position of displaying the crucifix, rely on different cultural and religious meanings of the crucifix, rather than having only religious reasons (Giorda, 2015). Particularly, they lean on the importance of the crucifix as a national symbol and part of cultural heritage, symbolizing national/western identity, and for those reasons, it is considered that the display of crucifix should not be banned in schools, but observed through the dimension of religious and sacred and as a symbol of tolerance and freedom (Giorda, 2015; Tokrri, 2021). The other direction of the debates on the crucifix lean on the idea of secularism and strict division of the state from religion and leaning on the idea that democracy cannot (co)exist with any form of absolutism (Tokrri, 2021). As Ferrari and Ferrari (2010) point out, the display and presence of the crucifix symbol is in a way contradictor to the idea of *laïcité*, but on the other hand, it is justified under the idea of symbolism of Italian historical cultural tradition, reflecting the Italian *laïcité*. The attitude of justifying the presence of religious symbols within public institutions is widespread in Italy, reflecting the idea that the crucifix represents national identity of Italians, and that the presence of religious symbols should not be considered as a threat toward other religious communities or freedom itself (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010). There were some weak connotations of resolving the issue of the crucifix in a way of giving the possibility for all religions to display their own religious symbols, which on the paper looks like a very open-minded and tolerant idea until you start thinking about those who are non-religious, those who's affiliations do not have religious symbols and finally, because it seems quite impossible to achieve (Rimoli in: Tokrri, 2021). Even though, within the terms of law, wearing and displaying religious symbols is allowed, this selective liberty raises issues and question. For example, within the area of courtrooms, where the judges are allowed to forbid covering head of individuals, thus annulling the rights of certain religious communities. On the other hand, Italy has a case whereby the judge was expelled from its judiciary role due to refusal of holding a judicial hearing in the courtroom with a crucifix (Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010).

2.3. Empirical Research on Religion, Religious Freedom and Citizenship in Croatia and Italy

Francis, Breskaya and McKenna (2020) developed a research leaning on the findings of The International Empirical Research Programmes in Religion and Human Rights, with a focus on two main measures – the Theology of Religion Index and the New Indices of God Images, presented as theological variables, while religious variables encompassed baptismal status and a frequency of mass attendance. The main goal of this research was to explore attitudes toward Civil Human Rights among Italian students focusing on the connection of these attitudes in relation to the religious and theological variables. The questionnaire was submitted to 1032 students of Padua University in Italy, and the analysis was based on 1046 participants that met the criteria of being under the age of thirty, lived in Italy all their lives and fully completed the relevant measures within the survey. According to data ‘the majority were baptised Catholics (92%); 10% attended mass weekly, and a further 10% attended mass at least once a month, 43% never attended mass, and 37% attended less frequently than once a month’ (Francis, Breskaya, McKenna, 2020, 9). Furthermore, according to the research, a more positive attitude toward civil human rights is connected with not being baptised Catholic and with not attending Mass. As well, Francis, Breskaya and McKenna (2020) analysed the data according to seven positions towards religion, the so-called ‘Astley-Francis Theology of Religion Index’ (AFTRI), which distinguishes between seven categories: exclusivism (‘Only one religion is really true and all others are totally false’), inclusivism (Only one religion is really true but at least one other is partly true), pluralism A (All religions are equally true), pluralism B (All religions express the same truth in different ways, interreligious perspective (Real truth comes from listening to all religions, atheism (All religions are totally false) and agnosticism (I do not know what to believe about religions). This seven-position model was a broader development of the Ziebertz model which distinguished four types of positioning but without the possibility of non-religious positioning (Astley and Francis in: Francis, Breskaya, McKenna, 2020). Leaning on the model of AFTRI, data analysis showed that 55% of participants position themselves within the Pluralism A category, while 58% of them positioned under the pluralism B category, followed by 33% of participants who endorsed the interreligious perspective, that real truth comes from listening to all religions. Even though only 3% of participants positioned themselves within the category of atheism, the data analysis showed that more positive attitudes toward civil human rights are associated with atheism. On the other hand, the least positive attitude toward civil human rights is held by participants who hold exclusivist and agnostic position toward religion (Astley and Francis in: Francis, Breskaya, McKenna, 2020). Taking into account different studies and research conducted in the field of human rights and religion leads us to observe that the ‘connections between human rights and religion may vary according to the specific conceptualisations and operationalisations of religion employed in empirical enquiry, and according to the populations studied’ (Francis, Breskaya, McKenna, 2020, 1).

Research conducted by Zaccaria et al. (2018) aimed to empirically explore ‘the role of religious variables in shaping the ideas of young Italians on political rights of immigrants and refugees’ (Zaccaria et al., 2018, 55), focusing on religious factors and finding the connection between religious beliefs and on the level of appreciation of these rights. The questionnaire used in the research was designed by a group of international scholars involved in the Religions and Human rights project. Researchers of this study (Zaccaria et al. 2018), distinguish between personal and contextual religious attitudes as independent variables, attitudes to political rights of immigrants and refugees as dependent variables and personal characteristics, religious socialization, psychological and socio-political aspects as background variables. The research was conducted on a sample of 1162 secondary school students, while the questionnaire was distributed in three different geographical areas, encompassing northern, central, and south Italy. Since Italy has a homogeny religious landscape, researchers decided to exclude those who do not affiliate as Catholics, which led to the final sample of 1087 students, between 19 and 21 years old. Researchers divided the students into four groups according to their religious identity, taking into account their self-declared church affiliation and practice: ‘Catholic churchgoers (30,8%), Catholic non-churchgoers (39,4%), generally religious (9,2%) and non-religious (20,7%)’ (Zaccaria et al., 2018, 58). Regarding statistical methods of analysis and its results, researchers analysed five research questions. Firstly, the results on the question of students’ understanding of immigrants and refugees political rights showed that students agree only with the statement that everybody should have the right to vote and choose the political leader of their preference. According to factor analysis ‘political rights of people who come to Italy for mainly economic reasons and of those who leave their country because of war, political instability or persecution, are not clearly differentiated in the mind of students’ (Zaccaria et al., 2018, 61). Second question refers to significant differences in the level of agreement with the political rights of immigrants and refugees between student groups defined by their religious affiliation and practice, and according to the results of data analysis all groups are positively ambivalent toward this item. More specifically, most sceptical towards this issue are the Catholic non-churchgoers (those who claim to attend church a few times a year, hardly ever or never). Following that, the third question that researchers analyse is the aspect of correlation between students’ views of the political rights of immigrants and refugees and their religious attitudes. According to the results, the only significant correlation is found in the critical approach to religious beliefs, meaning that those students who favour immigrants’ and refugees’ rights are more likely to think critically when it comes to religious views. Fourth question regards the background characteristics of the students, specifically personal profile, religious socialization, psychological and socio-political aspects, and the correlation of those characteristics with the rights of immigrants’ and refugees’ (Zaccaria et al., 2018). According to the analysis, researchers found moderate negative correlation between religious socialization and acknowledgment of immigrants’ and refugees’ rights, while socio-political characteristics of the respondents show a strong correlation with political rights, specifically speaking, those students who have a positive view toward intercultural society and lean toward left political spectrum support more strongly those rights.

Finally, the fifth research question analysed by the researchers regards regressive analysis of the predictive strength of religious attitudes and background characteristics of students and their views on immigrants' and refugees' rights. Analysis shows that not all religious attitudes have a positive significant predictive impact when it comes to favouring the political rights of non-citizens, and this support of political rights of foreigners is indicated by the level of trust for other religious groups, while the idea of secularism has a positive impact on immigrants' and refugees' rights. As well, research shows that the importance of adopting a mother's religion affects negatively the level of supporting rights of non-citizens, which could be connected to the idea that those who identify more strongly with their tradition, tend to have more exclusionary attitudes, especially in those circumstances where there is a perceived threat due to migrations (Zaccaria et al., 2018). All in all, students as well do not distinguish between immigrants as persons who left their countries for economic reasons and refugees that were forced to leave their countries due to social or natural disasters. This could mean two different things – first, the tendency of the Catholic Church in Italy to perceive immigrants and refugees as people in need regardless of their reasons and second, it might indicate a general rejection and exclusiveness of society toward immigrants and refugees, since they do not totally agree with providing political rights to non-citizens which questions the level of human rights culture among young Italians (Zaccaria et al., 2018).

Garelli (2012) compares the data from research done in 2007 and similar research conducted in 1994, with an aim to see how religiosity developed and transformed during this time. Research conducted in 2007 relies on the data extracted from a survey carried out on a large sample of the Italian population aged between 16 and 74. According to the data from 2007, of those who affiliate as Catholics, 22% define themselves as convinced and active believers, 32% are convinced, but not constantly active, while 35% comply with Catholicism for traditional or educational reasons. Comparing the data from 2007 and 1994, Garelli (2012) notices that the number of those who define themselves as 'religiously committed Catholics' (Garelli, 2012, 4) is more or less the same. These groups of Catholics are represented by active and convinced believers who are characterized by constant in religious practice, are involved in charitable work through their associations, and stand for religious education for their children. According to Garelli (2012) this is 'the hardcore of Italian Catholicity' and does not only evolve around religious beliefs and doctrines but as well forms an important part of their life moral choices, especially when it comes to issues about family, education, life or death and so on. Modernity has definitely had an impact on the religiosity of Italian society and this is shown in the decrease of the population who consider themselves convinced but not so active, and the increase in the amount of the population who follow Catholicism for educational, traditional, or cultural reasons, which can be called the inherited believers. Following this, Garelli (2012) concludes that indeed, Italian Catholicism could be divided into two main groups of religious believers – followers who lean on traditional and cultural reasons and followers who are convinced but not always active, and even though these two groups differ, they as well are shaped by common characteristics. Garelli (2012) emphasises the flexibility in the relation towards religion, which indicates that those who defined

themselves as believers as well shape their faith to their own terms, respecting certain aspects of Catholicism but interpreting it through the prism of personal individuality. Even though the aspect of religiosity in Italy takes many forms, such as those who believe but are detached from religious institutions, those who believe but are not very active, or those who just believe but are not religiously affiliated etc., according to Garelli (2012) Italian people will still rather declare their belonging (Catholicism) than to categorize themselves as without religion. Concerning the case of young groups, even though their relationship with religion is often complicated and blurred by disagreement with the church's perceptions of sexuality, morality and life conceptions, does not mean that young generations are prepared to abandon the idea to define themselves as Catholics and 'consider religious faith as a reference point in life' (Garelli, 2012, 7). Discussing religious practice, Garelli (2012) notices a certain trend in Italy, whereby certain public religious manifestations attract a great amount of attention, while the churches remain empty and regular church attendance has become insignificant to many Italians. Though, in comparison to other European states, Italy still enjoys a quite high level of church attendance. Regarding religious practices such as mass attendance (excluding funerals and church weddings) data from 2007 (Garelli, 2020) show that 26% attended once a week or more, 15,7% once or twice a month, 36% few times a year and 21,8% never. On the other hand, the data from 2017 (Garelli, 2020) shows slight decrease - 22% attend once a week or more, 15% once or twice a month, 33% few times a year and 30% never (Garelli, 2020, see Table 3.1., p. 67). Furthermore, when it comes to state-religious relations and opinions on different public, political and social matters according to the findings of Garelli (2012), most Italians are in favour of the crucifix in public places, the teaching of Catholicism in state schools, approve Churches receiving a share of taxes paid to the State (whether it's their or other's church) and finally, accept that religious institutions should express opinion on the important questions of the moment. According to the data from 2017 (Garelli, 2020), 76% declare themselves as Catholic, 16% as non-religious and 8% belonging to other religions, from which 3% declare as Muslim and 2,6% as Orthodox Christians. Exploring the Catholic population and their level of belief and religious activism, in one part the numbers stayed the same, while in the other there is a visible decrease or increase in comparison to the data from 1994 and 2007. For example, the number of those who defined themselves as 'convinced and active' believers is 22,5%, almost the same as in 1994 and 2007 (Garelli, 2020). On the other hand, from those that define themselves as 'convinced but not always active' the numbers decreased in comparison to former data, counting 29.8% of Catholics in 2017. From those that share some part of religious ideas, there is a minor decrease, whereby data from 2017 shows 3.8%, while in 2007 there were 8.3% of the Catholic population defining themselves within this category. And finally, from those who comply with Catholicism for traditional or educational reasons, there is a visible trend of increase in the data. In 2017, 43.6% of Catholics define themselves as affiliating Catholics for traditional and educational reasons while this number is almost 16% higher than in 1994 (Garelli, 2020, see table 2.1., p. 55).

Author Ančić (2011) analysed the data from the research European Value Study (EVS – year 1999/2000) and the Aufbruch study (2007), a cross-sectional and longitudinal study comprised of quantitative and qualitative methods’ (Ančić, 2011). This research encompasses nine countries that participated in REVECERN project (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech, Hungary and Ukraine, with the main goal of exploring ‘the position of religions and churches in the transitional countries during Communism and after the fall of Berlin wall, focusing on the public expectations about the role of religion. Ančić (2011) notes that Communism is one of the main common characteristics between all of these countries, but the path of experiencing this type of system is different in each country. In 1997, Croatia was among ten ex-communist countries that joined the research program, with a research goal to investigate value system and religious orientations within these countries. Accordingly, Ančić (2011) analyses nine countries, three of them are Orthodox and the rest Catholic. According to the results and in comparison to other researched countries, Croatia is experiencing a ‘slight but significant increase in the indicators of believing in God and frequency in prayer’, and Croatia is among the countries with the highest level of religious belonging and religious self-identification (Ančić, 2011). As Ančić (2011, 6) claims, and indicated by results, religiosity in Croatia is above all ‘traditional, as a factor of cultural, ethnic or national identification’. On the other hand, the acceptance of the role of religion in strengthening the national spirit, an official stand concerning important social issues and participation in public life is low in all the nine countries examined, including Croatia (Ančić, 2011). In (Zrinščak et al., 2014) authors emphasised a few results from the previously mentioned research²⁹, focusing on the public opinions on the possibility of religion to give answers to social and moral problems. In the case of Croatia, the results show that in majority (82,6%) of participants disagree with religion interfering with political life, in terms of elections and influencing on government. The social role of Christian Churches, in terms of more personal issues, like abortion, same-sex and extramarital relations according to more than half of the participants is not appropriate. When it comes to financing issues and religion, around 42% consider that religious organizations should pay taxes and income on assets and they should be financed on their own, through a charity fund or their own revenues. Furthermore, authors (Zrinščak et al., 2014) analyse results from ISSP (2008) and results of the research study ‘Social and Religious changes in Croatia’ (2004) stating that regarding the question “How do you perceive the relationship of the state towards religious communities in Croatia”, respondents strongly support the idea that state privileges Catholic Church, but in the same way 81% think that all religious groups should have equal rights. In general, according to authors, citizens do not support the political involvement of religion, which indicates on rejecting the socio-political role of religion, but also rejecting the unequal treatment of minorities, while mainly accepting the socio-

29 Paper ‘Church and State in Croatia: Legal framework, religious instruction and social expectations’ (Zrinščak et al., 2014) regarding this part encompasses results from empirical research studies - “Social and Religious Changes in Croatian Society” conducted by the Institute for Social Research – Zagreb in 2004, ISSP (2008) and Aufbruch (2007), analysing some specific results of a bigger research that is explained more deeply in: Ančić, B. (2011) “What Do We Want from Religion? Religiosity and Social Expectations in Central and Eastern Europe”, in *Space and Borders. Current Research on Religion in Central and Eastern Europ*, ed. A. M. Tóth and C. Rughiniş, 151-169 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter)

cultural role, which indicates that citizens approve and support 'social presence of traditional churches and their social function' (Zrinščak et al., 2014, see p. 25).

"Connection of Religiosity, Attitudes, and Experiences of Religious Freedom among Young People in Croatia Declared as Religious" is a research done in Croatia as a part of quantitative research "Religion and Human Rights" conducted in 2014. This research forms part of the international empirical program "Religion and Human Rights (2012-2019)" which included around 25 countries and twenty-five thousand young people as participants in the survey. In Croatia, the research was conducted in 2014 on a sample of young people (17-19 years old). The results, among many other findings, brought evidence that personal religiosity and religiosity inside of their own community have a positive effect on attitudes toward religious freedom. Those who attend religious services more often have a more positive view toward religious freedom. On the other hand, those who are more included in the activities of their religious communities and spend time with people from other communities were more often treated unfairly because of their religious affiliation (Kompes, 2018).

In quantitative research "Attitudes Towards Cultural Differences of Croatian Citizens", Mesić and Bagić (2011), have measured the "resistance" of Croatian citizens towards multicultural societies by questioning different statements on the topic of ethnic and religious diversity, which findings implicate that there were three main statistical predictors such as sex, level of religiosity and nationality. When it comes to ethnic and religious diversity, Croatian citizens expressed their attitude as positive, meaning that around 30% of respondents think that the existence of ethnic and religious minorities in Croatia is neither bad nor good and 21% of citizens consider it is very good. Moreover, 60% of the accessible studied population believe that Croatia should be an open and tolerant society, while more than half think that Croatia should be constitutionally formed as a 'State of all citizens regardless of their nationality'. For the latter one, it is likely to believe that respondents are firstly, not well informed about how indeed Croatia as a state is formed in the constitution; and secondly, that they are not aware of the meaning of the questioned statement. All in all, according to the results of this research, Croatian citizens have shown a positive attitude towards national and ethnic minorities, openness and tolerance to cultural differences, but not that supportive in terms of their legal rights (Mesić and Bagić, 2011).

"Religiosity and Marriage – Family Attitudes in Croatia" (Nikodem, 2010) is a research based on the results of the international European Values Study Project (EVS). The survey was designed to investigate the nature and the inter-relationship of value systems, their degree of homogeneity, and the extent to which they are subject to change across time (Ančić, 2011). Nikodem (2010) compares the results of EVS from the year 1999 when Croatia participated for the first time and the results from 2008. For this comparison, Nikodem (2010) analysed indicators of religiosity (denominational structure, the importance of religion in life, Church attendance, the social importance of religious rituals, religious self-perception etc.) and indicators of attitudes towards family and marriage (importance of family in life, statements on family and marriage etc.) According to the results, religion is important to Croatian citizens and in terms of the

denominational structure of Croatia, there have been some changes, noting that the number of Catholics is shifting, and the number of Orthodox has decreased, but data mostly indicates the stability of the denominational structure. Furthermore, EVS results indicate that there is a slight decrease of practical believers (those who attend religious services regularly – ‘every week or more often’). Results have also shown that for the events such as marriage, birth and death it is important for Croatian citizens to hold a religious service, which points to religion as strongly rooted in the culture and tradition of Croatian society. Results also show a decreasing trend regarding the social role of the Church and the solutions and answers the Church provides for certain issues, which is also evident in the system of belief. Marriage and family are still very important in Croatia, comparing the results from 1999, but concerning different issues relevant to these aspect shows a variety of results, indicating the ‘influence of modernization, especially influences of subjectivization and individualization, and to some extent the process of secularization’ (Nikodem, 2010, 192).

Topić (2013) analyses the “Teaching Plan and Programme for Elementary schools”, a document that gives a detailed description of the educational and upbringing process. According to Topić (2013), the Plan puts emphasis on European values, pushing towards European coexistence and at the same time tendency towards preserving national and cultural values and Croatian identity. Furthermore, Topić (2013) explains that the Plan is focused on four values that should be taught along with regulated education such as, ‘health education and upbringing; education for surrounding and sustainable development; culture, upbringing and education for human rights and democratic citizenship’ (Topić, 2013, para. *Teaching Plan and Programme for Elementary schools*). When it comes to the Croatian language, the Plan highlights the idea of developing a ‘sense of respect’ towards it, and according to the educational plan, pupils that belong to national minorities are entitled to study in their mother’s tongue, and schools are obligated to find a proper way for them to study on the language they prefer, but on the other hand, advises them to ‘learn Croatian in order to fully integrate into the society’ and require that the knowledge of Croatian language is on the same level like it is in case of students who study Croatian as their first language (Topić, 2013). This aspect is defined by the Constitutional Law on rights of the national minorities, however, Topić (2013) states that this idea of ‘sense of respect’ for Croatian language has a nationalist background and reflects the idea of purity and strict separation from the Serbian language. Topić (2013) argues that the Plan, within the theme of history, is contradictory to its purpose, which should be to teach them about their cultural and national roots, respect for national identity, and prepare them to live in a multi-ethnic and multicultural society because of constant attention that is given to political history. Regarding history as well, the recommendation from the EU, in terms of Europeanization and modernisation is that the proportion of national and general history should be equal, which is not the case within the Croatian education system. Surrounding countries in the region of Balkan are practically not covered in a historical sense; the accent is put on Croatia, and the struggle to gain independence, threatened by the neighbours. All of this puts minorities in an unfavourable position, highlighting the inequalities in Croatian society even in the history textbooks, where at least there, it

shouldn't be the case. According to the results of the research (mentioned in the paragraph before), Topić (2013) conducted interviews with individuals belonging to majority and minority groups. Regarding the minority group of respondents, they felt positive about the idea of being European, while ethnic Croats even though they desire Europeanization, primarily feel Croatian. In the case of minorities, the identification with being European comes more likely because of the equalisation of national and religious (Croat-Catholic), so it seems easier to adopt and fulfil requirements to be European, rather than the criteria to be Croatian, which by itself excludes minorities. The group that belongs to the majority, does not see inequality in the way it is perceived by minorities, they only notice religion as an obstacle to modernisation and Europeanization (Topić, 2013).

In the research "The Role of Value Orientations and Political Preference on Political and Judicial Human Rights Among the Croatian Youth" authors (Miloš and Novak 2018, 71) examine the relationship between value orientations and attitudes towards political and judicial rights among the Croatian youth and how political preference moderates that relationship. Looking at the levels of agreement with human rights, the highest support goes with socio-economic rights, following civil, political, and finally judicial rights. Among many other concepts, researchers debate on the concept of 'tradition' in Croatia, referring to it in the sense of the traditional Catholic faith and Christian democratic dispositions nurtured under the Catholic Church. Results of their research show that the impact of 'tradition' on all other types of human rights is negative, and only 'tradition' is negatively correlated with attitudes toward civil rights. As Miloš and Novak (2018) explain, 'to be traditional in Croatia it means to be Catholic, heterosexual, polite, peaceful, and servile and to show love for the young nation-state. It is not difficult to imagine that such an exclusive traditional identity implies the thought that not everyone should have the same rights in a legal sense.

Chapter II - Conclusion

Throughout this Chapter, we have seen how different historical and socio-political factors can change and influence the sphere of religious freedoms and citizens' rights in two different contexts –Croatia and Italy. In the case of Croatia, the nation building process was affected by the events of war, the transition from communism to democracy and directed to the path of establishing democratic norms and values within society. Unfortunately, regardless of Croatia's aspirations for a more democratic society, somewhere in between certain groups were left behind in the process of democratization, experiencing exactly the opposite of what democratic systems are about. The complexity of the interdependence of national and religious identities in Croatia produced various dynamics in the sphere of citizens' rights, thus turning a once citizen into a foreigner, and making other religions, except the Catholic one, to some extent invisible and isolated. Within this process of claiming rights, Catholic Church in Croatia saw an opportunity for empowerment, while Croatian society saw this change as an opportunity to liberate itself from everything that resembled the former system. In this sense, national identities and religious affiliation became close, indicating how and where people belong. The socio-political aspects of the 90's and the atmosphere of rising nationalism, influenced how Croatians perceive their identity, which are the main social, ethnic and cultural characteristics of Croatian identity, and finally, how others, not fitting the frame of this identity, should be perceived. The change of government in the early 2000 and Croatia's aspiration to EU certainly moved changes within State's policies in a positive direction with a goal of higher inclusiveness of minorities. While international pressures and Croatia's process for entering the EU from 2004-2013 opened new forms of opportunities for minorities to acknowledge and establish their status in society, the legacies of the past are still visible within Croatian society, resulting in discrimination in which sometimes is hard to trace whether it is based on national or religious intolerance. As it is the case with most European democratic countries, the signed declarations, democratic values, rights and obligations enshrined within the Laws of those countries, unfortunately, do not always reflect the reality on the ground.

In Italy, the rising number of immigrant population in the last few decades raised different questions and issues concerning how policies and laws on citizenship are formulated in this country. The core issue grounding the 1992 Law on citizenship was the rule of *Ius sanguinis*, which essentially served to restore or preserve relationship with the citizens of Italian descent, at the same time neglected the changes produced by immigrant flows. The delayed or as some authors call it outdated version of the citizenship Law, could not give an adequate answer to socio-demographic changes, the needs and demands for rights followed by the rising numbers of different nationalities, cultures and religions. Italian Citizenship Law was practically reflecting the idea of Italy as an emigrant country which of course ultimately caused problems once it was evident that Italy could be described as one of the most desirable immigrant destination. Within the period from 1992 until today, different governments, right and left-wing parties, introduced certain regulations within the Citizenship Law, depending on whether their ideologies were more or less pro-immigrant. The

issues on citizenship and the rising numbers of immigrants were not only causing difficulties within the legal aspects of Italy but as well among the population of Italian citizens who started feeling jeopardized by the immigrant population producing a fear of what kind of effect could this minority group have on Italian cultural and traditional values. Encountered with increased religious pluralism, Catholic Church needed to find a way to deal with the new dynamics within the society, and at the same time, retain its role as a strong public actor. One way of achieving this was to remain its strong position as the main religion of the country, but at the same time advocating for the needs of immigrants, thus showing its capability for religious tolerance and openness for interreligious dialogue. Catholic Church put emphasis on remaining an important factor in the religious life of Italians, and when it comes to the identity of Italians, it could be said that they still prefer to identify themselves on behalf of religion, thus reflecting the strong bond between Catholic affiliation and Italian identity. With time and social changes, as Catholic Church needed to adjust and assimilate to the novelties surrounding it, so did the strong Catholic identity of Italians transformed, allowing the assimilation of old religious traditions and values to new individual needs. Regardless, the old traditional favouritism of the Catholic Church, whether reflected in State-religious relations or in the perception of citizens' toward other religions, certainly produced difficulties for other religious minorities to claim their rights and status within the society.

This Chapter was a tendency to explore and grasp under the surface of complex narratives surrounding citizens' rights and religious freedoms in Croatia and Italy and to understand which are the aspects impacting the development and establishment of these two concepts within the countries. Each country, both with strong and evidently deeply rooted Catholic tradition, with different historical meanings and events, is facing two different understandings of religious and citizenship rights. While Croatia's strong ethno-religious identity is grounded within the historical legacies and national and religious issues raised in the past; Italy, on the other hand, is facing religious and national diversification and pluralism, with a fear of losing connection to its strong Italian identity, to its core traditional, religious and cultural values. All of this poses questions whether the bond between national identity and religious affiliation, coming from societies which both have a deeply rooted Catholic tradition, could be stronger in one country than in another; how these dynamics are reflected in the relation of States toward religion; and how religious freedom and citizens' rights are perceived by the majority and to which extent they are allowed.

3. Methodological Approach to Research – Why Quantitative Methodology with a Comparative Approach?

Aside from exploring different theories and concepts that fit our research framework in scientific research, adequate methodology is considered the basis for modern science and a fundamental research necessity (Engler and Stausberg, 2011). In this sense, choosing the correct and most adequate methodology for our research starts with defining our study's topic and main objectives and deciding the most manageable way to collect our data and obtain answers to our research questions. The apparent simplicity of methodological division structured on the basis of quantitative vs. qualitative concept, hides a spectrum of different methodological choices, starting from the approach to theory, research design construct, going towards the collection of data, researcher-participant relation, and finally analysis and interpretation of the results. For these reasons, it is important for the researcher to clearly establish what and who to investigate. Our research explores how religious freedom and citizenship and citizens' rights are perceived among university students in Croatia and Italy, analysing the similarities and differences between these two groups, and establishing the relations and linkages between patterns of religious freedom attitudes and perceptions of citizens' rights. More specifically, we direct our research on three main paths. First, we focus our analysis on attitudes toward religious freedom and attitudes toward equal citizenship and citizens' rights, with a tendency to look into the relations between the attitudes concerning these two concepts. Secondly, we direct our analysis on the models of State-religious relations, and how they are associated with religious freedom perceptions, particularly how the state models (support/neutrality/control) correlate with attitudes toward religious freedom protection. Thirdly, we focus on the role of religion in relation to nationality and the relationship between the national, religious and cultural identity of the participants in relation to religious freedom patterns, searching for differences among Croatian and Italian participants. From the research objectives we mentioned above, it is visible that by engaging in this type of research, besides the interest in Citizenship, we also tackle quite complex phenomena – religion, religiosity, and Religious Freedom. This leads us to the following questions - does quantitative data lack the possibility to encompass the complexity of religious phenomena? Or, does it depend on the efforts and possibilities of the researcher in terms of conducting the research? And finally, what is the scope of quantitative methods when it comes to religion?

In the field of research and study of religion, the past few decades have been marked by debates and discussions when researching the phenomena of religion, while on the other hand, 'these debates have remained curiously distant from issues of methodology' (Engler and Stausberg, 2011, 3). Even though some progress has been made in the past few years, still, the ongoing debates reflect the sensitivity and complexity of studying religion and defining it through categories of quantitative methods. For these reasons, most of the research on religion is narrowed to textual/theoretical methods or constructed within the framework of qualitative methodology (Engler and Stausberg, 2011). It is then important to ask why combine exploring the concept of religious freedom and citizenship with the quantitative methodology? Most of the research done by using quantitative methods, in the field of religion, is directed toward questioning religious

belonging, the frequency of religious practices, the growth, or decline of certain religious movements and the intensity of religious beliefs (Storm, 2009). On the other hand, as Storm (2009) claims, using quantitative methods in studying religion allows us to discover to what extent religious identities apply to sex, ethnicity, age, social class etc; as well, it enables us to examine how religion and religiosity are linked with 'values, attitudes and behaviour, and allows us to test theories about the causes and consequences of religious involvement' (Storm, 2009, 1), and this is what is the main interest of our research question. Our research does not aim to profoundly analyse why our participants are religious or why they go to church or pray. Suppose we were to explore these types of patterns of religious behaviour. In that case, our research should certainly take on a different methodological solution, using the qualitative or at least mixed-methodology approach. Therefore, if we have in mind that the primary goal of our research is to explore the linkage between the concept of Religious Freedom and Citizenship within the format of attitudes on a variety of levels and between two different samples, we can conclude that quantitative methodology and the instrument of questionnaire best fits the frame of our research.

In terms of empirical research in the field of religion, regardless of the improvement within the past few years, the scientific community is still in a situation of shortage, especially in relation to quantitative research within the theme of religion. Of course, due to the complexity and sensitivity of the religious phenomena, the shortage of quantitative research within this field should not surprise us. Along with this, as well comes the deficit of comparative approach and cross-national research within the study of religion. Since quantitative comparative research requires extensive preparations and expertise in different fields, being extremely time-consuming and liable to mistakes (Stausberg, 2011), it is no wonder that even with today's development and improvement within the field of research, there is still a severe lack of this type of studies. On one hand, as Stausberg (2011) claims, there is a relatively small amount of comparative religious studies, while on the other hand, there are several publications that address this problem, offering a set of advice on how to change and improve this issue in the field of research (Stausberg, 2011). According to Collier (1993), the comparative approach is considered to be one of the most fruitful tools of analysis, which brings into focus similarities and differences among cases, providing us with the possibility to discover new hypotheses and alleviate new theories within the field of science.

When it comes to the comparative approach in research, in choosing the cases for our analysis, there are two main distinctions – the most-similar system design and the most-different system design within the methodology of research (Przeworski and Teune in Stausberg, 2011). The most-similar system design emphasises the similarity within the closely related cases, whereby the dependent variable (the outcome) is different (Stausberg, 2011), which would be the case in our research. We are comparing two similar countries, based on a variety of the parameters such as - prevailing religious affiliation; democratic values and norms; formal but soft secularism; strong religious identity; equality and freedom for all religious denominations before the law; but expecting a different outcome regarding attitudes toward religious freedom and citizens' rights due to different contextual factors which produced the similarities mentioned

above. In this sense, the aspect of cultural context is of great significance and, as Storm (2009) claims, two countries can be extremely similar in terms of the frequency of church attendance, but the contextual factor can be the reason why we would say that two countries differ when it comes to religious practices. Indubitably, religion and religiosity is a context-dependent phenomena. Therefore, many religious phenomena cannot be explained without considering the circumstances of different contextual factors, such as geo-political position, and socio-political, cultural, and historical conditions.

For example, let's look at the countries of our research interest - Croatia and Italy, and we can find a lot of similarities between these two cases – both countries are predominantly and strongly Catholic. Both form part of the EU, both are established as democratic countries, both have strong and active religious dynamics within the state, and both have strong religious identities. On the other hand, if we consider certain contextual factors, we can spot the differences within the similarities, considering that even though Italy and Croatia are both marked by strong Catholicism and strong religious identities, the root of these occurrences is distinctive. While in the case of Italy, strong migration flows within the past few decades have altered the socio-demographic picture of Italian society, resulting in high levels of religious diversity, Croatia's religious landscape mostly stayed tied to the socio-demographic structure of the former country (SFRY). Looking at Croatia's history of socio-political events, we notice that building national identity in the 90s was strongly connected to religion, linking Croatian nationality with Catholicism, thus producing national and religious homogenization of Croatia. This highlights the importance of considering the contextual factor in comparative studies. Therefore, in our research, we took into account that even though we are comparing two predominantly Catholic countries with both strong religious identities, we are also dealing with the factor of different paths of building national identities and establishing democratic values, different levels of religious diversity and different backgrounds of interreligious cooperation. This variety of social, political and cultural dynamics finally resulted in different ways that these two countries accept multiculturalism, religious pluralism, and religious freedoms. Also, within the framework of comparative study, it depends on the research aims and questions, whether the approach to the research problem will be focused on exploring the differences and similarities between the objects that are compared, or it will be more aimed at exploring the singularities and particularities of each case (Stausberg, 2011). Since our research interest was focused on comparing and analysing two different groups, coming from two different countries and, searching for patterns of correlation and association among religious freedom attitudes and attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights, we perceived quantitative methodology with a comparative approach as the most suitable in our case. The scope of research opportunities using the quantitative methodology and comparative approach goes far beyond mere numbers and percentages, enabling us to explore attitudes, behaviour, groups, institutions, roles, statuses, and State-religious relations on varieties of levels within different social systems, by clearly highlighting the similarities and differences among the analysed cases (Stausberg, 2011; Yauch and Steudel in Choy, 2014).

Therefore, since we were interested in analysing students from two different countries, using two different languages, and depending on our time and resources, it was specifically important to us, that the methodology we use in our research provides us structure, clarity, and applicability to a greater extent. Regardless of the disadvantages that burden the quantitative approach, in today's world of technological developments, statistical analysis and data processing have become very sophisticated allowing the researcher to present data beyond mere numbers and percentages. Those engaging in this type of research can see that quantitative research goes beyond the mere positivist approach to science, and as John (2010) states, quantitative researchers are extremely well aware of the contextual background of their research problem (John, 2010). Having these research requirements in mind, depending on our research questions, research objectives, goals, and possibilities, we decided to conduct quantitative comparative research, using the instrument of questionnaire in order to explore the relations between the concepts we are interested in, and to tackle into the differences and similarities within perceptions of young Croatian and Italian university students.

One of the efforts to contribute to the sociological research in the field of religion is the study of social perception of religious freedom (SPRF) (Breskaya and Giordan, 2019), which identifies religious freedom as a multidimensional concept. Breskaya and Giordan (2019) emphasise that the sociological potential of religious freedom research remains faintly explored for several reasons. Usually, the topic of religious freedom is approached through the domain of limitations and violations, focusing on the role of nation-states, national and international organizations, duty-bearers, and human rights advocates (Breskaya and Giordan, 2019). Therefore, by exploring certain specificity of religious thematic, such as religious freedom, in relation to citizens' rights and citizenship equality, and comparing these perceptions within two specific groups, taking into account two different contexts, we consider our research as a valuable contribution not only to the scientific study of religion and citizenship, but as well as contribution to the empirical field of sociological research.

Within this Chapter, we will present the main steps of our methodological procedure which refers to the use of quantitative methodology with a comparative approach. In line with this, we will demonstrate our research design by explaining the main objective, questions and goal of the research; our main hypothesis and the theoretical background for its implementation; our research variables and sample selection procedure; pilot testing; and, the statistical tools that we will apply in the further analysis of the data. Furthermore, we will explain the development process of our main research instrument – the questionnaire, together with the research procedure by emphasizing the benefits and disadvantages of such methodology. We finalize Chapter 3 by highlighting certain limitations (biases) of our research procedure, thus reflecting on three main issues – convenience sampling, multi-mode methods, and the length of the questionnaire.

3.1. Research Design

After defining the topic of our research interest, research design represents the following step in the research process, helping us to build and develop clear objectives for bringing our research to realization. As Roof (2011) claims, ‘research design is the overall plan or strategy for achieving the aim(s) of a particular inquiry – involves such issues as data, methods and modes of analysis, as well as issues of ethics and public dissemination of findings’ (Roof, 2011, 68). As we mentioned before, the main topic of our research is religious freedom and citizenship in Croatia and Italy. Within this broad topic, we have focused our research on exploring how young university students perceive religious freedom and citizenship rights, specifically the attitudes toward these two concepts and the patterns of relation and association between them. To explore this, we narrowed and focused our questions on the following ideas: How citizens’ rights are perceived and how is perceived the idea of equal citizenship in relation to religious freedom?; How perceived State-religious relations are correlated with patterns of religious freedom protection attitudes? How do participants, of each country, perceive the status and position of the dominant religion, Catholicism, in relation to the model of State neutrality, State support and control over religion? What is the role of religion in relation to nationality? How strong is the linkage between national identity, culture and religion, and how this relation affects the perception of Religious Freedom?; Is the role of religion affiliated with the idea of strengthening and preserving national identity?

Following this research question, we explored and focused our research on three ideas. The first concerns religious freedom and citizens’ rights, whereby we want to explore whether more positive attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights will be associated with more positive attitudes towards religious freedom (H1). We ground our first hypothesis on Brettschneider’s (2010) idea that free and equal citizenship is the basis for religious freedom, and on the empirical findings of Zaccaria et al. (2018a) that openness to pluralism and cultural diversity has a positive impact on attitudes toward religious freedom. Secondly, we wish to explore the perception of state-religious relations regarding religious freedom protection. For our second hypothesis, we lean on the theory of Durham (2012), whereby the level of identification of the state with religion (positive or negative) affects the level of protection of Religious Freedom, differing the state-religious patterns of relations through support, neutrality and control. Following this, we hypothesise, the stronger is the identification of the State with religion, the lower is the level of protection of religious freedom; specifically, the more participants endorse the neutral position of State-religious relations and support a neutral socio-cultural attitude toward the dominant religion, the less they perceive that religious freedoms are protected in their country’ (H2). As well, for the construction of this hypothesis, we lean on the findings of research conducted by Breskaya, Giordan, Zrinščak (2021), which operationalized three state models defined by Durham (2012) in relation to religious freedom and secularism and empirically supported the hypothesis that models of an endorsed Catholic Church and state control over religion would have negative effects on the perception of Religious Freedom. Thirdly, referring to the theoretical and empirical observations (Maldini, 2006, Kumpes, 2018, Radović, 2013, Zrinščak, 1996,

Marinović Bobinac, 1996), we move our focus to identity, national culture, and religion, whereby religious identification in Croatia reflects the complexity of religious identities and tangling of religious and national identities. Thus, confessional identification in Croatia encompasses a broader meaning of identity, which is connected to a strong sense of social and cultural identification due to specific historical and socio-political events. Referring to these observations, we hypothesise that participants' identification with national culture and dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy, which will be reflected in more negative attitudes toward Religious Freedom (H3) (for a detailed explanation and elaboration of the hypotheses see Chapter 1, Conclusion).

Regarding the sampling in sociological research we differ from a random sample, on which, if it is done adequately, we can form general conclusions on the entire population, or a convenience sample, which represents a fragment of the population that is convenient, close/approachable to the researcher (Navarro-Rivera and Kosmin, 2011). Our research falls into the category of a convenience sample, whereby it was most convenient for us to reach out to the audience of university students, particularly the university students of Zagreb, Croatia and university students of Padova, Italy. The selection of participants, or acquiring participants for the research, often results in being one of the most complicated phases of research, but also one of the most important parts of conducting research (Marczyk et al., 2005). As is the case with any researcher and research, our desire was to go beyond two sample groups and reach out to different university students in different cities of Croatia and Italy. Unfortunately, due to several influencing factors, such as time, finances and COVID-19, the convenience sample which was accessible to us, at the time, narrowed to 1317 participants in total, whereby 603 were participants from Croatia and 714 were participants from Italy.

According to Storm (2009), there are two important aspects when it comes to sampling. The first concerns the sample size, whereby it is of great importance to have a sufficiently large sample that fits and adequately represents an area of our research. The second aspect refers to the importance of having a randomized sample. For this reason, even though our sample encompassed only a young cohort of university students, in two cities and two universities, we made an effort to make our sample of participants constructed based on students with different educational backgrounds, thus encompassing students from a variety of educational areas such as law, economics, social and political sciences, humanities, cinema, music and art sciences, international relations sciences etc. Naturally, it takes a lot of resources and time to meet both sampling criteria, so the field of research is not filled with many studies where we can find data on which we can generalise at a country or region level, but more often we can find smaller size samples, or convenience sample studies which conditions are often easier to meet for the researchers (Roof, 2011). In any case, we should not dismiss the wealth of knowledge encompassed within small-size sample research, because, at the end, the little pieces make the puzzle.

For the purposes of our research, the original version of the SPRF questionnaire (Breskaya and Giordan 2019) was further developed by adding sections on cultural identification, belonging, and citizenship. In the

field of methodology in sociological research, it is strongly advised that the researchers invest time in conducting pilot research or a pilot phase of the study (Harvey, 2011), which enables the researchers to spot out certain mistakes and avoids large biases. When researchers use a questionnaire as the methodological tool, the questions must be formulated clearly and understandable to all the research participants so that the data collected through this method are valid and accurate (Navarro-Rivera and Kosmin, 2011). Considering that the original version of the SPRF questionnaire was already tested in 2018, by distributing it to 1035 students of the University of Padova (Breskaya and Giordan, 2019); in the case of our research, we could say that we performed two stages of the pilot phase. The first phase was conducted in 2019, throughout the meeting with experts from different fields, whereby the design and formulation of the questionnaire were discussed, as well as working on developing questions regarding the concept of citizenship and belonging and eliminating certain questions that we considered unnecessary. The second phase of our pilot testing was conducted in 2020, by submitting our “final” version of the questionnaire to 400 young participants that form part of the association ‘Intercultura’. After this phase, we made final changes to our questionnaire and developed our last and final version of the questionnaire. Since one of the objectives of the research was to do a comparative study between Croatia and Italy, it was necessary to adequately translate the questionnaire into the Croatian language, without changing the concept and meaning of the questions within the process of translation and adjustment of the questionnaire to the Croatian context (see more in paragraph 3.2.). We submitted the questionnaire using the ‘multi-mode method’ (Posavec, 2021), thus collecting the questionnaire by paper-pencil method, telephone interviews, and online survey software (See more in paragraph 3.2.1.).

When thinking about the concept of validity, Marczyk et al. (2005), highlighted two important things – first refers to having a well-founded theoretical background for the conceptualization of our research, while the second regards developing clear, exact, and detailed operational definitions of the variables implemented in our research strategy. Regarding our variables, our research has four main sets of variables, two dependent – ‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’ and ‘State-religious relations’; and two independent variables – ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’; and ‘The role of religion in relation to identity and national culture’; and one set of control variables, which include ‘Socio-demographic characteristics of participants’.

For each set of the variables, we have constructed various scales which enabling us to measure different aspects of religious freedom and citizenship concepts. Therefore, a set of variables which refer to ‘Attitudes to religious freedom’ is consisted of three scales – ‘Socio-legal function of RF’; ‘Societal value of RF’ and ‘Religious freedom aspect: belief and practice’.

Our second set of variables, ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’ consists of four scales – ‘Citizenship status and political rights’; ‘Citizenship status and socio-economic rights’; ‘Membership and belonging’; ‘Elements of national identity and origin’; and two single variables ‘Assimilation-oriented model’ and ‘Diversity model-oriented’. These two sets of variables (‘Attitudes to Religious Freedom’ and

‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’) will serve us to test our first hypothesis which states that: more positive attitudes toward citizenship and citizens rights’ will be associated with more positive attitudes towards religious freedom.

Our third set of variables, ‘State-religious relations’ consists of four scales – ‘State-religious support’; ‘State-religious neutrality’; ‘Model of control over religion’; and ‘Protection of religious freedom’. This set of variables will serve us to test our second hypothesis, which states: the more participants endorse the neutral position of State-religious relations and support neutral socio-cultural attitude toward the dominant religion, the less they perceive that religious freedoms are protected in their country.

Finally, our fourth set of variables ‘The role of religion in relation to identity and national culture’ consists of two scales – ‘Role of religion in relation to nationality’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’, and one single variable ‘Level of cultural identification’. This set of variables will enable us to test our third hypothesis: participants’ identification with national culture and dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy (H3) (See the detailed explanation of variables in Chapter 4; Subchapter 4.2. Testing the reliability of the Computed scales used for analysing attitudes toward religious freedom and citizenship and citizens’ rights in Croatia and Italy).

Quantitative researchers explore and explain social realities through measurable data, using highly sophisticated statistical tools which allow them to translate social realities and human behaviours into numerical expressions (Tuli, 2010). One of the main aspects concerning the validity of the research, along with hypothesis and variables, refers to the statistical procedures of quantitative evaluation that affect the accuracy and plausibility of the conclusions drawn on the basis of our analysis results (Marczyk et al., 2005). Statistical analysis, representing the last step in conducting the research along with the interpretation, is of great significance since this very procedure determines whether we will bring to light significant, meaningful and interesting findings of our research, while different graphical solutions, descriptive statistic options and many other statistical possibilities have enabled quantitative researchers to fully take advantage of their possibility to interpret data in a more attractive and understandable way for the readers (John, 2010).

Our research objectives highlight the associations and linkage between the concepts of religious freedom and the concept of citizenship. Therefore, since our main research goal is exploring the attitudes toward each of these concepts and the relation between them; the linkage between State-religious relations and religious freedom protections, and the linkage of religion in relation to identity and national culture; while exploring the differences between the two samples in terms of these issues, we determined that the main statistical tools for our analysis will be Pearson correlation coefficient, Regression Analysis and T-test for independent samples. Regarding our measurements and checking the reliability of the computed scales, we will be using the Cronbach alpha reliability test, together with the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) (For a detailed explanation of the Statistical tools used and analysis see Chapter 4.)

Table 1. **Research design**

<p>TOPIC OF THE RESEARCH AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Religious freedom and citizenship in Croatia and Italy - Explore attitudes of University students toward religious freedom and citizenship - Explore the impact of attitudes toward citizenship on attitudes toward Religious Freedom - Explore how University students perceive State-religious relations and the level of protection of Religious Freedom - Explore socio-cultural attitude toward religion and its relation to State-religious relations - Explore how University students perceive role of religion in relation to nationality, dominant religion and its role within the society - Explore the main differences within these issues among two samples – Italy and Croatia
<p>RESEARCH QUESTIONS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What are the patterns of religious freedom perception and perceptions of citizenship among students of Croatia and Italy? - What is the relation between attitudes toward religious freedom and attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights? - How State-religious relations and religious freedom protections are perceived in each country? - How status and position of the dominant religion (Catholicism) is related to State-religious models (neutrality, support, control) in each country? - How strong is the linkage between national identity and religion; and how does this relation affects the perception of religious freedom? - Is the role of religion affiliated with the idea of strengthening and preservation of national identity? - Has the role of religion, in post-conflict conditions in Croatia, produced stronger associations between national identity and perceptions of religious freedom, than in Italy?
<p>HYPOTHESIS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - H1 Free and equal citizenship is the basis for religious freedom, more positive attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights will be associated with more positive attitudes toward religious freedom. - H2 The stronger is the identification of the State with religion, the lower is the level of protection of religious freedom, the more participants endorse the neutral position of State-religious relations and support a neutral socio-cultural attitude toward the dominant religion, the less they perceive that religious freedoms are protected in their country. - H3 Participants' identification with national culture and dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy, based on the socio-political and historical background of two societies.
<p>SAMPLE</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - University groups of students in Croatia and Italy - Convenience sample - students from the University of Zagreb, in Croatia; and students from the University of Padova, Italy
<p>PILOT PHASE</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The original version of the SPRF questionnaire was tested in Italy from May – October, 2018 on 1035 university students - December, 2019 - meeting with experts from different fields and universities to discuss the existing questions within the questionnaire, necessary adjustments, and formulation of the new questions regarding citizenship and citizens' rights - March/April 2021 – submitting the new version of the questionnaire; 400 questionnaires to a group of young people that form part of 'Intercultura'
<p>METHOD AND</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comparative quantitative study

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Survey method, instrument of questionnaire - Submission of the questionnaire by using multi-mode method: paper-pencil, telephone interviews and through online software - 1317 questionnaires in total (Croatia - 603 questionnaires; Italy – 714 questionnaires)
QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN / READJUSTMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Instrument for the analysis of SPRF (Social perception of Religious Freedom) (Breskaya and Giordan, 2019), tested in Italy, in 2018 and submitted to 1035 students between 20–21 years old - We applied a revised version of the SPRF questionnaire, adjusting it to the needs of our research questions and adding sections on cultural identification, belonging, and citizenship. - The questionnaire was submitted in Italian and Croatian language - Since one of the objectives of the research was to do a comparative study between Croatia and Italy, it was necessary to adequately translate the questionnaire into Croatian language, without changing the concept and meaning of the questions within the process of translation and adjustment of the questionnaire to the Croatian context
VARIABLES³⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Control variables: Socio-demographic characteristics of participants - Dependent: Attitudes toward religious freedom; State-religious relations; - Independent: Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights; The role of religion in relation to identity and national culture;
STATISTICAL TOOLS FOR THE ANALYSIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cronbach alpha reliability test for the computed scales - Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) - Pearson Correlation Coefficient - Regression analysis - T-test for independent samples
RESEARCH ETHICS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Each of the participant of the research was informed about the objectives and goals of the research - We guaranteed to each participant that the information we receive from them is completely private and confidential

3.2. The Questionnaire within the Framework of Comparison

The questionnaire is a powerful research tool used for survey studies, usually practised to explore certain social phenomena through the form of questions, enabling the researcher to explore affiliations, opinions, beliefs, behaviours, or personal characteristics (Navarro-Rivera and Kosmin, 2011). One of the great advantages of using a survey method, except the possibility to encompass a large number of participants in one research, is also the possibility to transform the collected data and answers into a numerical system thus comprehending social perspectives, interactions and opinions through the law of probability, while having the opportunity to ‘measure and compare individuals and groups on a wide variety of attributes, attitudes and behaviours’ (Navarro-Rivera and Kosmin, 2011, 396). When it comes to using the

³⁰ See the detailed explanation of variables in Chapter 4; Table 2. Conceptual model of the research and in subchapter 4.2. Testing the reliability of the Computed scales.

comparative approach in exploring different countries or different groups of the population, certain elements need to be considered while conducting this type of research (Navarro-Rivera and Kosmin, 2011), and one of the main issues that need to be resolved in conducting the cross-national study is the language, or the aspect of translation, thus giving priority to the design of questionnaire (Harkness et al., in Navarro-Rivera and Kosmin, 2011; Storm, 2009). In the case of our research, it was important that the instrument we use was applicable in two different contexts – the Croatian and the Italian one. Therefore, it was necessary that the instrument we use can be applied in two different languages and in two different contexts, so that the sole process of adjustment and applicability to two different contexts would not affect the concept and meaning of our research questions. Since questionnaires can be standardized, translated, and applied to different groups, cultures, and countries (Harkness et al., 2004 in Navarro-Rivera and Kosmin, 2011), this methodological instrument serves quite well for conducting comparative studies. Therefore, considering research questions, what we aimed to explore and the necessity to have an instrument that could be applicable in different contexts and languages, we considered the use of a questionnaire as the most adequate for our research project.

By focusing on the model of operationalization and construction of the measuring instrument of SPRF (Social Perception of Religious Freedom), the elaborated instrument for the analysis of SPRF was tested in Italy, submitting the SPRF questionnaire to 1035 students between 20-21 years old, during the period from May–October 2018 at the University of Padova (Breskaya and Giordan, 2019, 8). For the purposes of our research, we applied a revised version of the SPRF questionnaire, adjusting it to the needs of our research objectives and adding sections on cultural identification, belonging, and citizenship. The questionnaire was submitted in Italian and Croatian language. Since one of the research objectives was to do a comparative study between Croatia and Italy, it was necessary to adequately translate the questionnaire into the Croatian language, without changing the concept and meaning of the questions within the process of translation and adjustment of the questionnaire to the Croatian context. It is not only that the questionnaire needs to be translated to be understandable, but it is also extremely important the way questions are asked, their order, and wording. All of these aspects of questionnaire design affect how people will understand, and in the end, answer those same questions.

This domino effect of questions and answers mirrors the results that the researcher obtains, ultimately affecting the frame and possibilities of interpretation. This is the reason why in comparative, cross-national studies variety of expertise is required to get the most valid translation of the questionnaire, for example, a person that is not only familiar with the language but as well familiar with the field and with the professional language of the concepts that we wish to explore (Navarro-Rivera and Kosmin, 2011). As well, the researchers need to be familiarized with the contextual cultural, socio-political, and historical background of the population on which the research wants to be conducted in order to know whether some questions can be asked, and in the end, if yes, how to ask those questions in order to get the most out of the research. For these reasons, in the process of preparing and realization of our research project, we included

experts and researchers from both Croatia and Italy, which enabled us to get two necessary perspectives on how the questionnaire should be designed before going into the realization process.

Survey as a method provides simplicity in understanding, meaning that the sole action of converting opinions, actions, and attitudes into numerical expression can help simplifying the process of understanding the opinions, actions and attitudes of others across the globe (Navarro-Rivera and Kosmin, 2011). However, the simplicity of categorizing the social dimension of life through numbers does not imply that the process of constructing and developing a questionnaire should be labelled as simple and plain (Navarro-Rivera and Kosmin, 2011). This apparent simplicity of the survey method is the reason why this method is frequently used in a lot of “wannabe” research, tricking insufficiently informed and unprofessional researchers into getting involved in the survey process, later realizing that it is not as simple as it seems (Posavec, 2021), at least if our goal is to produce a scientifically meaningful and valuable research. In order to get the most out of the survey method, researchers must give a great amount of attention and effort to the process of constructing a questionnaire, and according to Roopa and Rani (2012), there are five stages of planning a questionnaire: (1) initial considerations; (2) question content, phrasing and response format; (3) question sequence and layout; (4) pre-test (pilot) and revision; and (5) final version of the questionnaire.

In the case of our research, we devoted a great amount of time and energy not only to readjusting the original questionnaire and adding the new questions but also to adjusting the questionnaire’s applicability to two different contexts – Croatia and Italy. This included translation and correct wording so we don’t change the meaning of the question while translating. As well, specific care was taken in order to spot contextual differences on time, which required us to form differently certain questions, like for example the questions concerning educational level, which is different in Croatia from the one in Italy. While readjusting and developing our questionnaire, experts from different fields and countries were included. Even after many revisions of our questionnaire, there was still a possibility that the version of our questionnaire is flawed, and sometimes these biases (mistakes) can only be revealed after submitting it to the participants. For this reason, the pilot phase of conducting research is very important. The pilot phase provides the researcher a possibility to see and interact with the participants regarding possible issues in the content of the questionnaire. The “fresh eyes” of participants can help us to see whether some questions are not understandable and whether there is a possible category of answer which might be very common for the respondents but it is missing in our set of answers. Regarding our pilot phase, we could say that the pilot phase was conducted throughout two stages, plus considering that the original version of the SPRF was already tested on a sample of Italian University students in 2018. In 2019 we revised the original version of the SPRF questionnaire, eliminating certain questions and started working on readjusting the questionnaire so it would fit the Croatian context as well. The first stage of pilot testing took place during the meeting held in 2019, whereby a group of experts from different fields of social studies worked on creating and developing new questions that could allow us to explore citizenship, belonging and cultural identification. After this, we formulated our first pre-final version of the questionnaire and initiated our second part of pilot

testing by submitting it to 400 young Italians who form part of “Intercultura”, a foundation that works on promoting the internationalisation of Italian schools, working actively in the field of intercultural education. The respondents from “Intercultura” have brought our attention to a certain issue with two of our questions which referred to religious identification and religious socialization. The issue with these two questions was actually in the formulation of the offered answers. The problem was that for certain respondents this question was not applicable. For example, they weren’t able to agree or disagree that they are religious or spiritual, or they weren’t able to say that they agree/disagree that it was important that in their childhood their parents/relatives talk with them on the topic of religious issues. For this reason, in the set of these questions, we decided to provide the option ‘not applicable for me’ whereby, for each statement, we explained in which case they should answer ‘not applicable’ (e.g. If in your childhood, your parents/relatives haven’t talked with you about religious issues, please circle ‘not applicable’).

According to Goode and Hatt (1974), generally looking, there are four types of questionnaire design: (1) contingency questions/cascade format; (2) matrix questions; (3) closed-ended questions; and (4) open-ended questions (Good and Hatt, 1974 in Roopa and Rani, 2012), even though some authors divide to only two general categories, open-ended and closed-ended questions (Navarro-Rivera and Kosmin, 2011). In the case of our research, we decided to go with the closed-ended questionnaire design, whereby the socio-demographic questions had a variety of different answers, depending on the question asked, whether it is about certain frequency or opinion, from which certain parts such as level of education or taking religious classes, was adapted to the country context. In total, the questionnaire consisted of 47 sets of questions, grouped by themes – ‘about you’ (socio-demographic questions and questions about identity), ‘about religious freedom’, ‘about religion’ and ‘about society’. The questionnaire consisted of two main parts: the first 25 questions concerned socio-demographic characteristics and cultural-identity remarks; the second part of the questionnaire consisted of different sets of questions formulated through statements with a Likert response scale, and was divided into three parts: (1) questions about religious freedom; (2) questions about religion; and (3) questions about society which included the newly added questions on citizenship and citizens’ rights. The Likert scale response was measured from 1 to 5, where ‘1’ means ‘Strongly Disagree’, while ‘5’ means ‘Strongly Agree’, except in two sets of questions where was added the possibility of NA – not applicable for the respondent.

3.2.1. Conducting the Research – Distribution of the Questionnaire (Appendix)

Nowadays, there are several ways to conduct surveys (questionnaires), but the most prevalent methods are face-to-face, by telephone, by email or through online software (Marczyk et al., 2005). As well, in terms of using methodological tools, it is very popular to use the so-called multi-mode method (Posavec, 2021) in research, as well called the mixed-mode and hybrid-mode method, which is basically a combination of two or more methodological tools. An example of the multi-mode method is researching a certain topic by

combining telephone surveys and online surveys together within the process of data collection (Posavec, 2021). The issue that arises with the use of the multi-mode method is in fact that each method creates a specific ‘mode-effect’ (Posavec, 2021, 231), which has an effect on the respondent and how questions are answered, so it is recommended to equalize the use of methods as much as possible in order to avoid possible biases (Posavec, 2021).

The questionnaires were submitted to university students during the period from March 2021 to February 2022. Due to COVID-19 limitations and our dependence on university classes and students, we collected questionnaires using three different methods (multi-mode method), depending on which was best suitable for the given situation in each country, at each specific period of the time. In Croatia, we collected 603 questionnaires through online software which allowed students to anonymously respond to the questionnaire. In the case of Italy, we collected 546 questionnaires by paper–pencil method and 168 questionnaires by conducting telephone interviews, reaching a total number of 714 submitted questionnaires to university students in Italy. Considering this, we collected 1317 questionnaires completed by university students in Croatia and Italy.

3.2.1.1. Online Survey Method – Croatian sample

Surveys conducted through the internet, by email or online software are a form of written survey. The advantages of this type of surveys are certainly a higher level of privacy for the respondent than with the other survey methods, fast distribution and minimization of error (Navarro-Rivera and Kosmin, 2011; Roopa and Rani, 2012). As well, today’s online software for creating questionnaires have the possibility to quickly transmit the data into different statistical programs, which shortens the time of data entering and evaluation. Even though in these types of surveys the distribution is fast, on the other hand, the data collection might be a little slow since it totally depends on the respondents’ time and desire to fulfil the questionnaire. As we mentioned before, due to complications with COVID-19, we needed to find a way to distribute the questionnaires to as many students as possible.

In the case of Croatia, we decided that the best solution would be to create an online survey that could be distributed during the online classes. We created a questionnaire with the online software ‘Lime Survey’ which enabled us to collect the data by distributing the web link to our participants. With the help from the University of Law in Zagreb, we reached out to other professors from different universities and departments in Zagreb, which facilitated us to contact University students from different academic backgrounds. Once the professors holding the online classes would accept our request to distribute the questionnaire to their students during the class, we would agree on a specific day and time, depending on the ability of the professor that holds the class. At the agreed time of distributing the questionnaire, we would join the online Zoom class of a specific university group (the access was granted through the professor holding the class), and during the Zoom meeting, before we distributed the link to participants, we would explain to the

students what is the research about, guaranteeing total anonymity and privacy and ask them to truthfully and openly respond to the questions. As well, after the participants would open the web link for the survey responding there was a message explaining once again, the main goals and objectives of the research, guaranteeing anonymity, confidentiality and the possibility for every participant to step out of the research at any given time.

It took around 45 minutes to complete the whole questionnaire. We were present through Zoom meeting until all of the respondents were finished in case if there were some technical issues with the link, or certain unclarity about the questions asked. We collected the data through an online survey from October 2021 until February 2022. The online software Lime Survey provided the ability to see how much of the students exactly responded to the question, giving the option to immediately see the number of participants who fully responded to all of the questions; those who only responded to a certain amount of the questions; and, those who did not respond to any of the questions but just opened the link; which facilitated effective and simple data cleaning. After we collected the survey data through Lime software, we transferred it to the Excel program and finally to the SPSS program. In total, we collected 823 questionnaires through an online survey, while with the procedure of eliminating those who did not respond at all, or those who responded only to socio-demographic questions or none of the questions in religious freedom section, we came down to a total amount of 603 collected questionnaires through online survey methods, which were further used in the data analysis.

3.2.1.2. Telephone Interviews – Italian sample

Telephone surveys are usually conducted at fixed locations, providing the researcher with the ability to cover a larger geographical area from one place and, since there is no face-to-face interaction, it gives the respondents the possibility to have a sense of anonymity, thus creating a “safe space” for them to answer questions truthfully, especially the sensitive or personal ones (Navarro-Rivera and Kosmin, 2011; Roopa and Rani, 2012). The collection of data through telephone interviews in the case of the Italian sample started in September of 2021 at the University of Padova. The language of the questionnaire was Italian, and the telephone interviews were conducted by native Italian speakers. We reached out to different professors from the University of Padova, who provided us with the lists of students and their email addresses, thus giving us the ability to contact them and possibly, if they agreed, distribute the survey to them. Within the letter sent through e-mail, we presented ourselves as the researchers of the University of Padova, explaining the purpose and main objectives of the study, as well that the questionnaire is anonymous and confidential, and that they are free to leave the conversation at any given time. As well, we provided information on the length of the questionnaire, so that participants would be aware of the time framework needed in order to carry out the questionnaire. Furthermore, within each e-mail, the participants were asked about their availability to respond to the questionnaire by telephone, adjusting ourselves to their time. Finally, if they

agreed, we asked for their telephone contact so that we could call and conduct the research. In total, we contacted 1736 students by email, but only 168 of the contacted students accepted to participate in the survey.

3.2.1.3. Paper-pencil Method – Italian sample

A paper-pencil method is a form of written and printed survey, whereby the role of the researcher is to distribute the printed versions of the questionnaires and collect it, whereby the interaction with the participants is reduced to a minimum. In the process of collecting the data, in the period from October until November of 2021, the classes at the University of Padova were held in presence. Within that period of time, we were able to collect 514 questionnaires by paper-pencil method. We asked permission from the professors that held classes at the University of Padova and if they were willing to devote a certain amount of their class time to distribute the questionnaires to the students. Depending on their availability and time, we moved forward with the process of research. The procedure before distributing the questionnaire was the same as with the telephone interviews and online survey – explaining the main objectives and purposes of the research, guaranteeing anonymity and confidentiality, as well as information on their ability to refuse participation in the research. We personally distributed and collected the responded questionnaires, and input the collected data by hand within the system of SPSS.

3.3. Limitations of the Research and the Consequences of COVID-19 Situation

In the process of conducting research, it is very important that the researcher is well aware of the limitations of its own research, which includes not only the limitations that were predicted before the process of collecting and analysing data but as well the limitations that emerged during the research process as a result of unexpected external factors. In the case of our research, we can highlight two main limitations, first concerning the sample size, and second, concerning the methods of collecting data, whereby we used the instrument of questionnaire in three different ways: paper-pencil method, telephone survey method, and online software method. As well, we can say that one of the weaknesses of our research was in the length of the survey. Within the literature on research methodology, it is advisable to avoid long and complicated questions and long formats of the questionnaires (Navarro-Rivera and Kosmin, 2011; Posavec, 2021; Corbetta in Čular, 2022). While our questions were not complexly formulated, our questionnaire turned out to be a bit longer than recommended (it took 45 minutes to complete it), which on some occasions resulted in participants' resentment to fill out the questionnaire or in some cases, quitting the questionnaire halfway responding (e.g. through online survey method). The reason why we weren't able to cut more questions from the questionnaire is that we wanted to encompass questions not only on different aspects of religion and religious life, but as well, to encompass various dimensions of religious freedom and citizenship issues. As

well, during the testing of the original version of the SPRF questionnaire (Breskaya and Giordan 2019), in 2018, as a result of analysis, certain questions came out as important so we wanted to keep them; especially those regarding different dimensions of religious freedom. On the other hand, the wide range of questions on different aspects gave us the possibility to explore relations among different sets of variables, which in the end contributed to the richness of further data analysis. In the case of the sample, this limitation was conditioned by our limited ability of sample size, by using a convenient sample, due to the issue of time and resources. While the sampling in our study explicitly includes only university students, thus disabling us to conclude our findings on a general level, our sample can serve as a well representation of the young cohort, specifically those attending universities and coming from different scientific backgrounds. Even though we knew from the beginning of this research project, that our sample size would be limited to a convenience sample of University students, the COVID-19 situation extended the time framework of our data collection and produced difficulties in terms of when and how to collect data, thus excluding the ability to potentially collect data on some other universities, besides the University of Zagreb and the University of Padova. Another issue that also refers to data collection concerned the problem of how to collect data. Initially, our idea was that all data should be collected by paper-pencil method. Since, university classes were limited due to the COVID-19 situation, and our data collection depended on University classes, we decided to submit questionnaires using the multi-mode method, specifically three different methods, depending on which was best suitable for the given situation in each country, at each specific period of the time. This produced that in Croatia, questionnaires were collected through online software, while in Italy, one part of the data was collected through telephone interviews and the other part by paper-pencil method. In terms of methodology, the multi-mode method of collecting the data can produce certain biases within the research, since each method is based on a different interaction between the researcher and the participants, thus creating a different type of atmosphere in terms of anonymity and privacy for the participants. In terms of telephone interviews, participants communicate with the person who is interviewing them one-on-one. If there is a potential unclarity or misunderstanding of the question, the researcher can provide help or additional information in order to clarify it. This aspect can be seen as an advantage and disadvantage at the same time. On the one hand, a researcher can offer clarification on a certain issue which can help participants' answer a certain question; at the same time, the researcher provides his own perception of the issue, thus affecting the potential answer of the participant. Regarding the paper-pencil method, the participants here enjoyed much more anonymity and privacy, while the researcher was present only to collect the printed versions of the questionnaire, thus minimizing the level of interaction with the participants. Finally, the online survey method, which was used in the process of collecting data in Croatia, we could say, offered an atmosphere of maximum possible anonymity, whereby each participant answered the questionnaire in the privacy of their their computers or mobile phones. While the multi-mode method is nowadays extremely frequent in conducting research due to its capacity to reach a larger scope of audience, and is extremely economical, of course, as is the case with everything in methodology, it has its disadvantages.

Even though our research, as any research, has certain flaws and biases, we could say that the main two limitations concerning sample size and the use of different methods were mostly a consequence of external factors and unpredicted situations, like COVID-19, while the shorter length of the survey was sacrificed in order to encompass various aspects of religion, religious freedom dimensions and citizenship issues within variety of variable sets. In sum, the research was conducted with the tendency to maximally utilize our abilities and take the most of it, without risking an enormous bias within the research framework. In terms of producing quality research, it is important that in these type of situations, a researcher finds a way out, and carries a research minimizing the risk of large research mistakes that could influence the validity and credibility of the research, and ultimately, always follows the basic ethical principles of research.

Chapter III – Conclusion

This chapter gives an overview of our choice of methodological approach in researching religious freedom and citizenship which refers to using the quantitative method within a comparative approach and the instrument of questionnaire, by conducting research on the convenience sample of Croatian and Italian University students. By using this type of methodology, we have shown the process of our research design and conduct, starting from our research objectives; questions and main hypotheses; toward developing the main instrument of use – the questionnaire; the process of our sample selection; pilot testing of the instrument; and finally, our procedure of conducting the research.

Even though there is a lot of debate in terms of using surveys, or in general, quantitative methods in researching religious thematic, we highlighted how quantitative methods and the instrument of the questionnaire can be applied in researching a complex and sensitive topic, like the phenomena of religion is, emphasizing the possibilities, but as well the issues that come along. In terms of religion and religious phenomena, quantitative methods do not limit us only to exploring the quantity of certain religious behaviour or practices, on contrary, they allows us to explore varieties of relations, especially if we want to explore the connection and linkage of religion to different sets of values and attitudes, while the contextualization of the research is extremely significant to comprehend the results of our analysis fully. For these reasons, in terms of exploring different aspects of religion, religiosity, religious freedom, and citizenship, we considered quantitative methodology and the using a questionnaire as the most suitable methodological concept given the nature of our research. Specifically, considering our interest in the linkage and relation between attitudes toward religious freedom and attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights, and different aspects within these two main concepts. Furthermore, the quantitative methodological approach gave us the ability to explore various sets of variables and relations/associations between them, such as – to what extent, positive attitudes toward religious freedom are linked to positive attitudes toward the concept of citizenship and citizens' rights; how perceived State-religious relations and socio-cultural attitude toward religion are correlated with perceptions of religious freedom protections; as well, enabling

us to explore participant's identification with national culture and dominant religion. Furthermore, one of the great advantages of using the quantitative methodology and the instrument of the questionnaire is its applicability to various groups of participants, which enabled us to compare different samples, spot differences and similarities within them, and determine the cause-effect relations between variables. This valuable aspect of quantitative methodology was extremely important for us, since one of the main objectives was to compare two different samples, Croatia and Italy. Therefore, it was important to us that the instrument of use was applicable to different contexts, and by that strict in its formative structure, which would allow us to translate it and adjust it. For the reason of all the benefits that the quantitative approach provides us, and in terms of our research objectives, questions and two sample groups, we considered the quantitative comparative approach and the use of a questionnaire as an adequate choice for our research.

Regarding the limitations of our research, we highlighted that the potential biases of our research methodology could be narrowed to three aspects. Sample size, use of multi-mode research methods and the questionnaire length. While the first two limitations were mostly influenced by external factors and consequences of the COVID-19 situation, the third aspect refers more to our research decision to encompass a larger set of variables in order to have the ability to explore a variety of relations among different aspects of religious freedom, citizenship and religion. As mentioned in this Chapter, while we knew from the beginning that our sample would be limited to a convenience sample, it was even more affected by COVID-19, which prohibited us from reaching a larger audience of University students. Furthermore, regarding the use of multi-mode methods, which was also a result of the unexpected pandemic situation, as we mentioned before, the limitation here is not only in the different atmospheres that each method produces in terms of the response rate but as well in terms of collecting and inputting the data. Of the three methods used in our research, online survey software was the most operative. This type of method is extremely time-saving, and not only does it allow us to reach a larger audience regardless of their location, but as well it offers the ability to quickly transfer the data from the online system to the SPSS program, thus enabling us to process the data within a short time frame, which is not the case with telephone interviews and paper-pencil method. Even though collecting the data by telephone, provided us with the ability to reach respondents regardless of their location, it was still extremely time-consuming since this way of answering questions takes more time, while the input of data was manual, and the response rate low - if we consider the time invested to reach out to the participants by this method. The paper-pencil method turned out to be a little less time-consuming, since it gave us the ability to distribute the questionnaire to a larger amount of participants, but still, the input of the data needed to be entered manually within the SPSS program.

Inevitably, conducting research is an extensive process which requires not only the researcher's time but also the capacity to adapt to unexpected situations that come along with research. A researcher can have many goals, but within any research, and with the use of any methodological approach, at least three criteria should be on the priority list of the researcher's objectives – 'validity, reliability, and generalizability' (Engler and Stausberg, 2011). While the first two criteria of good research can be achieved by following the

main principles of ethics in research, thus following the guidelines of adequate research conduct and by adapting the methodology of the research to the research questions; the criteria of a generalization depends on researchers abilities and possibilities which are highly influenced by different external factors, such as time and resources, usually disabling the scientific community to produce a lot of large sample research, that could allow us to generalize on a wider population. One way to minimize the bias of small sample research is to produce a set of standardized and clear questions which deal with certain topics, and could be easily transmitted to other surroundings, groups, cultures, or nations, and this is what we had in mind when we were developing and readjusting our questionnaire. Though, encompassing only two countries represents a beginner's step in the field of research, it is a small, but significant start in the development of an instrument that could be applicable in various contexts for further research on the concept of religious freedom and citizenship.

Conducting research is almost always liable to errors, however, one error should never be on the list of our biases, and it concerns the basic principles of research ethics and grounding the interaction with our participants on honesty and objectivity. Certainly, specific methodologies demand in some sense more attention to ethical principles than other methodologies, like research studies based on interviews, focus groups, other face-to-face methods, or research studies exploring certain vulnerable groups or sensitive topics. The closer the relation between the researcher and the subjects that are investigated; and, the higher is the level of sensitivity of the research topic; ultimately, the higher is the level of requirement of the researcher to be attentive when it comes to ethical principles in research. Either way, regardless of the methodological path we choose, researchers should always have in mind their obligation and responsibility toward ethical principles and the protection of basic human dignity. Concerning some future remarks for the research, ideally, this research methodology would be complemented with a certain qualitative approach, e.g. interviews, or focus groups with the University students, whereby we could more profoundly explore the meanings attributed to religious freedom and the concept of citizenship, thus going beyond the statistical possibilities of the research. Also, since this is a second testing of the instrument, we could be able to resonate more profoundly on the importance or unimportance of certain questions, thus adjusting the instrument to be an even better fit for future research on the concept of religious freedom and citizenship in different country contexts.

4. Analysis of Results from the Study “Religious Freedom and Citizenship: Comparative Research of Croatia and Italy”

Within this Chapter, we will provide the data on our research analysis. Our analysis is focused on three main aspects. Firstly, we will explore the effect of attitudes toward citizenship on attitudes toward religious freedom. Secondly, we focus on State-religious relations, socio-cultural attitude toward religion and its associations with the protection of religious freedom. Third, we examine the relationship between national identity and dominant religion and its association with Religious Freedom. Thus, in line with these three topics, we provide a detailed analysis to test the following hypothesis – ‘Free and equal citizenship is the basis for religious freedom, meaning, more positive attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights will be associated with more positive attitudes toward religious freedom’ (H1); ‘The stronger is the identification of the State with religion, the lower is the level of protection of religious freedom; the more participants endorse the neutral position of State-religious relations and support a neutral socio-cultural attitude toward the dominant religion, the less they perceive that religious freedoms are protected in their country’ (H2); and, ‘Participants’ identification with national culture and dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy, which is as well reflected in more negative attitudes toward Religious Freedom’ (H3).

In terms of our first hypothesis, we lean our theoretical approach on the theory of Brettschneider (2010) and empirical research of Zaccaria et al., (2018; 2018a). Brettschneider (2010) perceives that religious freedom mirrors the religious beliefs of citizens and that free and equal citizenship is the basis for religious freedom. In this sense, Brettschneider (2010) suggests that religious beliefs and religious practices should never overcome the concept of equality, especially in terms of citizenship and citizens’ rights. In terms of citizens’ rights in relation to religious freedom, empirical research (Zaccaria et al., 2018; 2018a) has shown that a positive view toward diversities and trust in religious out-group has a positive impact on attitudes toward religious freedom and the political rights of non-citizens. As well, in terms of state-religious relations, Brettschneider highlights the importance of State support in terms of equality and equal citizenship as the basis of religious freedom, indicating that the role of the State should be directed to transforming religious beliefs which oppose the concept of equal citizenship and citizens’ rights.

Our second hypothesis concerns how state-religious relations can affect the sphere of religious freedoms. Therefore, leaning on the theory of Cole Durham (2012) who emphasised that the more State identifies with religion, the more religious liberties are endangered. In this sense, Durham (2012) differentiates between positive and negative identification of the State with religion, indicating that both extremes led to suppression of religious freedoms but in a different way, while the ideal middle point is rarely achieved. State-religious relations reflect the positioning of religious freedoms and the status of religious freedom protection within a specific country, which consequently has an effect on how people perceive, embrace, and react to the religious diversification of society.

Our third hypothesis regards the aspects of national identification, dominant religion, and dominant culture, mirroring the contextual differences of historical and socio-political encounters between Croatia and

Italy. Leaning on the theoretical observations of Kumpes (2018); Maldini (2006); Marinović Bobinac (1996); Radović (2013); and Zrinščak (1998), we formulate our hypothesis reflecting the idea that, in the case of Croatia, the existence and fall of the former communist regime, the nation building and liberation of religion and religious identities created a fruitful ground for building a strong sense of nationhood and religion within Croatian society. Therefore the socio-political changes caused by historical events produced the intertwining of dominant religion and confessional identity with a “desired” national identity, thus creating an atmosphere of religious support of the Catholic Church in strengthening and preserving cultural identity and national spirit in Croatia.

Before testing each of the hypotheses and going into the details of the analysis, we provided data on the reliability of the computed scales using Cronbach alpha reliability test, as well as providing the means and Standard Deviation for each of the variable items. Moreover, for each of the computed scale that we use in testing our hypothesis, to establish whether our scale is consisted of only one factor and there are no patterns of similar response, we performed Exploratory Factor Analysis, so we do not rely only on Cronbach alpha, in terms of validity and reliability of our scales.

For H1, since we were interested in testing the effect of ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’ on ‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’, we conducted Bivariate Regression Analysis, as well as providing the data on Pearson Correlation Coefficient for each country individually. In the case of Bivariate Regression Analysis, since we have three different scales measuring ‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’, we conducted three different Bivariate Regression Analyses to test the effect of ‘Citizenship and citizens’ rights’ on ‘Socio-legal function of RF’; ‘Societal value of RF’; and, ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’.

In the case of H2, we wanted to explore if, and to what extent state-religious relations are related to the protection of Religious Freedom. In order to test our hypothesis, firstly we conducted the Pearson Correlation Coefficient test, which will show us the correlation between the tested variables. Following this, we wanted to explore the effect of two models of state-religious relations and socio-cultural attitude toward religion on attitudes toward ‘Religious Freedom protection’. Moreover, we conducted Bivariate Regression Analysis to test the effect of state-religious models; socio-cultural attitude toward religion; and, level of religiosity on general attitudes toward Religious Freedom. Within the analysis for our second hypothesis, we will highlight the differences between the Croatian and Italian samples, providing Pearson Correlation Coefficient results for each sample individually.

Finally, for our third hypothesis (H3), we search for differences between the Croatian and Italian sample, in terms of participants’ identification with national culture and dominant religion, and the role of religion in relation to nationality. In line with this, we perform Independent samples t-test. In order to test this hypothesis, we formulated one scale ‘Role of religion in relation to nationality’ and three single variables – ‘Level of cultural identification’; ‘In Croatia it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’; and, ‘The Catholic Church as a part of Croatian identity should be favoured in society’. Thus we performed four Independent samples t-tests, to explore the differences between Croatian

and Italian participants regarding these variables. And, in order to explore differences in general attitudes toward RF, we performed three Independent samples t-tests, to examine the differences between the two samples regarding ‘Socio-legal function of RF’; ‘Societal value of RF’; and, ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’.

In the last part of this Chapter, we also provide certain data analysis which falls outside the framework of our hypothesis. Thus, we provide data on differences between Croatian and Italian participants in attitudes toward the ‘Model of endorsed religions’ in three different groups (Roman-Catholic, Non-religious, minorities), by conducting ANOVA. Secondly, we provide data using Cross-tabulations on cultural identification, belief, and religious affiliation. Thirdly, we explore the effect of religiosity and cultural identification on negative attitudes toward immigrants using Bivariate Regression Analysis. Finally, we use ANOVA, to see the differences between Croatian and Italian participants regarding negative attitudes toward immigrants, in three different groups – Roman-Catholic, non-religious and minorities.

Conceptual model of the research (see Table 2.1.) represents our set of variables. Control variables include ‘Socio-demographic characteristics’ of the participants (gender, age, citizenship status etc.). Dependent variables are divided into two groups of variable sets ‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’ and ‘State-Religious relations’. The independent variables are as well divided into two groups - ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’ and ‘The role of religion in relation to identity and national culture’ (for a detailed description and elaboration see Subchapter 4.2.).

Table 2.1. **Conceptual model of the research**

Control variables	Dependent variables		Independent variables	
Socio-demographic characteristics of participants Gender, Age, Place of birth, citizenship status, university, study level	Religious freedom meaning: Socio-legal function of RF; Societal value of RF; Religious freedom aspects: belief and practice	<i>Attitudes toward Religious Freedom</i>	Citizenship status and political rights; Citizenship status and socio-political rights; Membership and belonging; Elements of national identity and origin; Assimilation-oriented model; Diversity-oriented model;	<i>Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights</i>
	State-religious support; State-religious neutrality; Model of control over religion; Protection of religious freedom; Socio-cultural attitude toward religion;	<i>State-religious relations</i>	Role of religion in relation to nationality; Level of Cultural identification; Level of religiosity; In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture; The Catholic Church as a part of Italian identity should be favoured in society	<i>The role of religion in relation to identity and national culture</i>

4.1. Socio-demographic Characteristics of Participants

In our sample, 24.6% of participants are males (N = 324), while 75.4% are females (N = 991), on average between 18 and 24 years old (85.4%). The majority of participants in our research hold Croatian or Italian citizenship (99.5% in Croatia and 94% in Italy), while 93.7% of participants are born in Croatia and 91.4% are born in Italy. In the case of Croatia, the majority of students were 1st-year students studying for bachelor's degrees (78.8%), including law, economics, as well as social and other sciences. In the case of Italy, the vast majority of students were 1st-year students studying for bachelor's degrees (77.3%), including international relations and political sciences, humanities and cinema, music, and art sciences. Regarding the religious affiliation of the participants, in Croatia, 77.4% of university students declared themselves as Roman Catholic; 19.4% as non-religious and 3.2% belonged to other religious groups, from which 1.3% were Islam. In Italy, from 714 respondents, 54.2% declared themselves as Roman Catholic, 39.1% as non-religious, while 6.8% belong to other religious minorities, from which 2.4% are Muslim and 1.7% Christian Orthodox. The sampling in our study includes only university students from both Croatia and Italy, thus enabling us to conclude our findings on a general level. The main limitation of our sample size is that it targets only a young age cohort and only university students, who come from different educational backgrounds, such as law, economy, social sciences, humanities, arts, etc., though with a lack of students studying natural sciences (See Table 2.2).

Table 2.2. Socio-demographic characteristics of participants

	Age (average)	Sex	Place of birth	Citizenship status	Religious affiliation	University type
CROATIAN SAMPLE	18-24	21.1% Male; 78.9% Female ;	93.7% in Croatia	99.5% holds Croatian citizenship	77.4% Roman Catholic; 19.4% non-religious; 1.3% Islam; 1.9% other religious groups;	43.7% Law studies; 17.4% Economy; 17.3% Social work studies; 11.5% Political sciences; 10.1% other university programs;
ITALIAN SAMPLE	18-24	27.7% Male; 72.3% Female ;	91.4% in Italy	94% holds Italian citizenship	54.2% Roman Catholic; 39.1% non-religious; 2.4% Islam; 1.7; Christian Orthodox; 2.7% other religious groups;	67.5% International relations and political sciences; 25% humanities studies (language, communication, cultural heritage, history, cinema, music, art);

4.2. Testing the Reliability of the Computed Scales used for Analysing Attitudes toward ‘Religious Freedom’ and ‘Citizenship and Citizens’ rights’ in Croatia and Italy

Cronbach’s alpha reliability test measures the reliability of the questionnaire, or rather the reliability of the scales used to measure a particular construct (Brownlow et al. 2014), which in our case is ‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’, ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’, and ‘State-religious relations’, and it is one of the most valuable methods for examining reliability (see Table 3; Table 4; Table 5). Cronbach’s alpha reliability test is a necessary part of any quantitative study since all of the analysis results would not be meaningful if the scales used in our questionnaire are unreliable (Brownlow et al. 2014). In order to test our first hypothesis we constructed the following scales – ‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’ and ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’.

H1 Free and equal citizenship is the basis for religious freedom, more positive attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights will be associated with more positive attitudes toward Religious Freedom.

Following the criteria for testing reliability for measuring ‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’ we constructed three scales – ‘Socio-legal function of RF’; ‘Societal value of RF’ and ‘Religious Freedom aspects: belief and practice’. Our scale for measuring ‘Socio-legal function of Religious Freedom’ is composed of six items referring to the meaning attributed to Religious Freedom: ‘Freedom to choose my religious/non-religious identity’; ‘Freedom to speak on religious matters openly and freely’; ‘Non-discrimination for religious minorities on the basis of religion’; Equality of various religions in society before the law’; ‘An important right in a democratic society’; and ‘Non-violent co-existence for all religions in every society’. The reliability of this scale is 0.83, which implies that the scale has a very good level of reliability (See Table 3).

Our second scale – ‘Societal value of RF’, measuring attitudes toward religious freedom consists of five items: ‘It promotes non-discrimination on the basis of religion’; ‘It promotes religious and cultural diversity in society’; ‘It promotes inter-religious dialogue between religions’; ‘It promotes equality as a principle of democratic citizenship’; ‘It is important for tolerant and peaceful co-existence of religions’. The reliability for this scale according to Cronbach’s alpha is 0.87, which as well signifies a quite high reliability (See Table 3).

Finally, as our last scale measuring ‘Attitudes toward religious freedom, we composed a scale of three items which refers to ‘Religious freedom aspects: belief and practice’. The three items composing this scale are: ‘Freedom to have no religion’; ‘Freedom to have inner personal convictions’; ‘Freedom to worship’, while the reliability of this scale is 0.68. Even though Cronbach’s alpha measured below 0.7, according to Pallant (2013), scale reliability above 0.6 is considered an acceptable and moderate level of reliability (Brownlow et al. 2014). And, since this scale is constructed of only three items, we as well refer to the inter-

item correlation mean (0.44), which implies a good correlation between the items, and this scale has good reliability (See Table 3).

Table 3. ATTITUDES TOWARD RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Scale	Items	Mean	SD	Cronbach alpha
• Socio-legal function of RF	Freedom to choose my religious/non-religious identity	4.73	0.58	0.83
	Freedom to speak on religious matters openly and freely	4.55	0.67	
	Non-discrimination for religious minorities on the basis of religion	4.70	0.63	
	Equality of various religions in society before the law	4.61	0.74	
	An important right in a democratic society	4.39	0.83	
	Non-violent co-existence for all religions in every society	4.61	0.71	
	• Societal value of RF	It promotes non-discrimination on the basis of religion	4.13	
It promotes religious and cultural diversity in society		4.27	0.79	
It promotes inter-religious dialogue between religions		4.10	0.85	
It promotes equality as a principle of democratic citizenship		4.09	0.91	
It is important for tolerant and peaceful co-existence of religions		4.25	0.82	
• Religious freedom aspects: belief and practice	Freedom to have no religion	4.46	0.87	0.68
	Freedom to have inner personal religious convictions	4.40	0.76	
	Freedom to worship	4.63	0.59	

In accordance with the procedure regarding reliability, we carried out further analysis concerning our other scales measuring ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’. In order to explore the concept of free and equal citizenship, we constructed four scales. ‘Citizenship status and political rights’; ‘Citizenship status and socio-political rights’; ‘Membership and belonging’; and ‘Elements of national identity and origin’. Together with these four scales, we constructed two single variables which refer to elements of free and equal citizenship – ‘Assimilation-oriented model’ and ‘Diversity-oriented model’, which we’ll be encompassed in further analysis.

Our first scale measuring ‘Citizenship status and political rights’ consists of three items - ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to vote’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to protest’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to form a political party’. The reliability test for this scale showed very good reliability, measuring 0.81 on the Cronbach Alpha coefficient. We as well refer to the inter-item correlation mean (0.59), which implies that items are correlated to a greater extent, and this scale has good reliability (See Table 4).

For our second scale, ‘Citizenship status and socio-economic rights’, Cronbach alpha coefficient measured an excellent reliability of 0.91. This scale consists of three items as well - ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to health care; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to education’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to employment’. Since this scale consists of only three items, we also refer to the inter-item correlation mean (0.78), which implies that items are correlated to a greater extent, and this scale has good reliability (See Table 4).

For measuring the element of ‘Membership and belonging’, we computed a scale consisting of four items: ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who speaks Croatian/Italian’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who keeps strong social relations with Croatians/Italians’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who shares Croatian/Italian cultural codes’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who donates money for civic purposes’. The reliability test for this scale according to Cronbach’s alpha is 0.77, which implies a good reliability of the computed scale (See Table 4).

Additionally, we conducted a scale regarding specifics of nationality and origin consisting of three items: ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who lives in Croatia/Italy’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who was born in Croatia/Italy’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who has Croatian/Italian descent’. The reliability test for this scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.61. Even though Cronbach’s alpha measured below 0.7, according to Pallant (2013), scale reliability above 0.6 is considered an acceptable and moderate level of reliability³¹ (Brownlow et al. 2014).

Table 4. FREE AND EQUAL CITIZENSHIP – ATTITUDES TOWARD CITIZENSHIP AND CITIZENS’ RIGHTS

Scale	Items	Mean	SD	Cronbach Alpha
• Citizenship status and political rights	‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to vote’	3.63	1.36	0.81
	‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to protest’	4.22	0.95	
	‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to form a political party’	3.47	1.26	
• Citizenship status and socio-economic rights	‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to health care’	4.56	0.70	0.91
	‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to education’	4.60	0.65	
	‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to employment’	4.57	0.67	
• Membership and belonging	‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who speaks Croatian/Italian ‘	3.35	1.15	0.77
	‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who keeps strong social relations with	3.13	1.13	

³¹ Originally we conducted one scale which consisted of items listed in ‘Membership and belonging’ together with the items concerning ‘Elements of national identity and origin’, which on the reliability test measured good reliability (0.74), but the EFA extracted two factors for the composed scale, from which Factor 1 consisted of items included in ‘Elements of national identity and origin’ and Factor 2 consisted of items included in ‘Membership and belonging’

	Croatians/Italians' 'Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who shares Croatian/Italian cultural codes'	3.41	1.11	
	'Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who donates money for civic purposes'	2.70	1.05	
• Elements of national identity and origin	'Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who lives in Croatia/Italy'	3.81	1.13	0.61
	'Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who was born in Croatia/Italy'	3.73	1.21	
	'Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who has Croatian/Italian descent'	3.38	1.23	
• Assimilation-oriented model	'We should tolerate differences in private sphere but assimilate "different culture or religion" to major/dominant culture'	Single variable		
• Diversity model-oriented	'The right to have one's 'difference' (minority religiosity, ethnicity, etc.) should be recognised in and supported in the public and private spheres'	Single variable		

Moving forward, in order to test our second and third hypothesis, we constructed scales regarding 'State-religious relations' and 'The role of religion in relation to identity and culture'. As in previous case, we followed the criteria to determine the level of reliability of the composed scales.

H2 The stronger is the identification of the State with religion, the lower is the level of protection of religious freedom; specifically, the more participants endorse the neutral position of state-religious relations and support neutral socio-cultural attitude toward the dominant religion, the less they perceive that religious freedoms are protected in their country.

In order to explore the relations and dynamics between the State and religion, we composed five scales – 'State-religious neutrality'; 'State-religious support'; 'Model of control over religion'; 'Religious Freedom protection', and 'Socio-cultural attitude'.

Our first scale, 'State-religious neutrality' consists of three items – 'The state should provide equal conditions for religious and non-religious people'; 'The state should not favour any religious group'; 'The state should be neutral and treat equally all religions and allow them to be present in public sphere'. Cronbach Alpha coefficient for this scale measured a reliability of 0.54. Even though the level of reliability goes below 0.6; we refer to the Factor analysis which extracted these three items as one factor, which allows us to proceed with using this scale in our further analysis. As well, we refer to the Inter-item correlation, which score is 0.29, implying a good correlation between the items (See Table 5).

Furthermore, our scale 'Protection of Religious Freedom' measured a very good level of reliability, exactly 0.82 on the Cronbach Alpha coefficient analysis. This scale consists of four items: 'Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for the Catholic Church and religious minorities'; 'Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for Catholics and non-religious people'; 'Croatian/Italian state does not favour any religious group'; 'Croatian/ Italian state manages religious issues very well' (See Table 4).

Our third scale refers to the models of State-religious governance patterns ('State-religious support', implying two models of religion endorsement and it is consisted of two items: 'State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture' ('Model of endorsed Catholic Church'); and 'State should guarantee special legal status of a preferred set of religions and recognize special role of them in cultural and political spheres' ('Model of endorsed religions'). This scale, 'State-religious support' measured 0.86 on the Cronbach Alpha reliability test, implying very good scale validity. As well, since this scale consists only of two items, we refer to Inter-item correlation, which in this case scored 0.76, implying that items are correlated to a greater extent, and this scale has very good reliability (See Table 5).

Lastly, our scale measuring 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' consists of two items – 'The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in society' and 'In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture'. Cronbach Alpha reliability test, for this scale, measured 0.72, implying a good reliability of the existing scale. Since this scale consists of only two items, we as well refer to Inter-item correlation, whereby the result (0.57) implies a good correlation level between the items (See Table 5).

'Model control over religion' is a single variable consisting of one item - 'It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere' (See Table 5).

Table 5. STATE- RELIGIOUS RELATIONS

Scale	Items	Mean	SD	Cronbach Alpha
• State-religious neutrality	'The state should provide equal conditions for religious and non-religious people'	4.51	0.71	0.54
	'The state should not favour any religious group'	4.29	0.94	
	'State should be neutral and treat equally all religions and allow them to be present in public sphere'	4.05	0.96	
• Protection of Religious Freedom	'Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for the Catholic Church and religious minorities'	2.45	1.12	0.82
	'Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for Catholics and non-religious people'	3.14	1.19	
	'Croatian/Italian state does not favour any religious group'	2.16	1.01	
	'Croatian/ Italian state manages religious issues very well'	2.39	0.95	
• Socio-cultural attitude toward religion	'The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in society'	2.12	1.13	0.72
	'In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture'	1.98	0.98	
• State-religious support (Model of endorsed	'State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture'	2.25	1.15	0.86

Catholic Church and Model of endorsed religions)	‘State should guarantee special legal status of a preferred set of religions and recognize special role of them in cultural and political spheres’	2.16	1.09	
• Model of control over religion	‘It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere’	2.38	0.98	Single variable

In order to conduct analysis for our third hypothesis, we formulated scales and variables to determine the role of religion in relation to identity and national culture.

H3 Participants’ identification with national culture and dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy, based on the socio-political and historical analysis of the two societies. More specifically, we are interested to test if the role of religion in the post-conflict condition in Croatia produced stronger associations between national identity and perceptions of Religious Freedom.

For assessing the role of religion and its connection to nationality we constructed a scale with two items: ‘Religions should strengthen the national spirit’ and ‘Religions should take a responsibility with the state for national culture’. Cronbach Alpha for this scale measured good reliability (0.79). Additionally, since this is scale is consisted only of two items, we as well refer to Inter-item correlations, whereby the results (0.65), imply that items are correlated to a greater extent and this scale has good reliability (See Table 6).

The three single variables ‘In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’ and ‘The Catholic Church as a part of Italian identity should be favoured in society’ and ‘Assimilation-oriented model’ are used to measure socio-cultural attitude toward religion. ‘Level of cultural identification’ is as well single variable, within which participants are asked to identify with the culture of their country on a scale from 1 to 10 (1—weak identification with Croatian/Italian culture; 10—strong identification with Croatian/Italian culture) (See Table 6).

Table 6. **RELIGION IN RELATION TO IDENTITY AND NATIONAL CULTURE**

Scale	Items	Mean	SD	Cronbach Alpha
• Role of religion in relation to nationality	‘Religions should strengthen the national spirit’	3.26	1.12	0.79
	‘Religions should take responsibility with the state for national culture’	2.17	1.18	
• Level of cultural identification		Single Variable		
• In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture		Single Variable		
• The Catholic Church as a part of Italian identity should be favoured in society		Single Variable		
• We should tolerate differences in private sphere but assimilate different culture or religion to major/dominant culture (‘Assimilation-oriented model’)		Single Variable		

4.3. Pearson Correlation Coefficient of the Computed Scales used for Analysing Attitudes toward ‘Religious Freedom’ and ‘Citizenship and Citizens’ rights’ in Croatia and Italy

Within this subchapter, we provide the results of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient, between each of the scales that we later on use to test our hypothesis. Pearson Correlation Coefficient was computed to determine the relationship between each conducted scale and its variables. The Pearson Correlation Coefficient shows how much the ‘scores of two vary together and then contrast with how much they vary on their own’ (Brownlow et al. 2004, p. 297). Therefore, within this part, we show general results of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient Correlation, for the whole sample, while the details of the results in which we differentiate between Croatian and Italian data are explained later in the Chapter, for each hypothesis individually.

- **H1** Free and equal citizenship is the basis for religious freedom, more positive attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights will be associated with more positive attitudes toward religious freedom.

In the case of our dependent variable ‘Socio-legal function of RF’, our independent variables ‘Citizenship and political rights’; ‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’; ‘Identity and origin’; ‘Assimilation-oriented model’ and ‘Diversity oriented model’; have resulted as statistically significant, except the variable ‘Membership and belonging’.

Table 7. Pearson Correlation Coefficient for Scales ‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’ and ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’ (H1)

	Socio-legal function of RF	Societal value of RF	RF aspects: Belief and practice
Citizenship and political rights	0.222**	0.291**	0.250**
Citizenship and socio-economic rights	0.256**	0.333**	0.262**
Membership and belonging	- 0.053	0.032	-0.074*
National identity and origin	- 0.068*	-0.015	-0.09**
Assimilation-oriented model	- 0.136**	-0.118**	-0.182**
Diversity-oriented model	0.292**	0.366**	0.303**
<p>These results refer to analysis of both samples together – Croatian and Italian Citizenship and political rights – ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to vote’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to protest’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to form a political party’. Citizenship and socio-economic rights – ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to health care’; ‘All people regardless of their</p>			

citizenship status should have a right to education'; 'All people regardless of their citizenship'.

Membership and belonging - 'Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who speaks Croatian/Italian'; 'Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who keeps strong social relations with Croats/Italians'; 'Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who shares Croatian/Italian cultural codes'; 'Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who donates money for civic purposes'.

National identity and origin - 'Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who lives in Croatia/Italy'; 'Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who was born in Croatia/Italy'; 'Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who has Croatian/Italian descent'.

Assimilation-oriented model - 'We should tolerate differences in private sphere but assimilate "different culture or religion" to major/dominant culture'.

Diversity-oriented model - 'The right to have one's 'difference' (minority religiosity, ethnicity, etc.) should be recognised in and supported in the public and private spheres'.

Thus, the results of Pearson Correlation results, for both samples together, indicated that in relation to 'Socio-legal function', variable 'Citizenship and political rights' measured 0.22; 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights' measured 0.25; and 'Diversity-oriented model' 0.29; all indicating a statistically significant, positive and small to medium correlation with our dependent variable. On the other side, results of Pearson Correlation Analysis show that variables 'Identity and origin' and 'Assimilation-oriented model' in relation to 'Socio-legal function of RF' are in statistically significant, but negative and small correlation ($r=0.06$; $r=0.13$) (See Table 7).

For the dependent variable 'Societal value of RF' in relation to our independent variables, four of our variables resulted as statistically significant - 'Citizenship and political rights'; 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights'; 'Assimilation-oriented model'; and, 'Diversity-oriented model'; while variables 'Membership and belonging' and 'Identity and origin' resulted as non-significant. The results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient, for both samples together, show that 'Citizenship and political rights' in relation to 'Societal value of RF' measured 0.29, indicating small to medium, positive correlation; for the variable 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights' 0.33; indicating medium, positive correlation; for the variable 'Assimilation-oriented model', -0.11, indicating negative, small correlation; while the highest Pearson Correlation Coefficient was found with the variable 'Diversity-oriented model' ($r=0.36$), indicating positive, medium correlation (See Table 7).

For the dependent variable scale 'RF aspects: belief and practice', in our results, for both, the Croatian and Italian sample together, Pearson Correlation Coefficient indicated that all of the independent variables resulted as statistically significant. Thus, for the variable 'Citizenship and political rights' Pearson Correlation Coefficient measured statistically significant, small correlation ($r=0.25$). Furtherly, analysis of the results shows that 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights' in relation to 'RF aspects: belief and practice' measures 0.26, as well indicating a small, positive correlation. 'Diversity-oriented model', according to Pearson Correlation Coefficient, measured medium, positive correlation ($r=0.30$), in relation to 'RF aspects: belief and practice', which is as well the highest measured Pearson coefficient among the tested variables. For the variables 'Membership and belonging'; 'Identity and origin'; and, 'Assimilation-oriented model'; Pearson Correlation Coefficient showed statistically significant, negative and small correlation ($r= -0.07$; $r= -0.09$; $r= -0.18$) (See Table 7).

- **H2 The stronger is the identification of religion and the State, the lower is the protection of religious freedom; the more participants endorse the neutral position of State-religious relations and support neutral socio-cultural attitude toward the dominant religion, the less they perceive that religious freedoms are protected in their country.**

Furtherly, we provide the results of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient referring to variables which we use to test our second hypothesis. Thus, we explored the relation of our dependent variable ‘Protection of Religious Freedom’ with our independent variable ‘State-religious neutrality’; ‘State-religious support’; ‘Model of control over religion’; and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’. From all of our independent variables, only one resulted as non-significant (See Table 8.)

Table 8. Pearson Correlation Coefficient for ‘State-religious models’; ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ and ‘Protection of religious freedom’

	Protection of religious freedom
State-religious neutrality	-0.220**
State-religious support	0.400**
Model of control over religion	0.027
Socio-cultural attitude toward religion	0.505**
<p>These results refer to analysis of both samples together – Croatian and Italian State-religious neutrality - ‘The state should provide equal conditions for religious and non-religious people’; ‘The state should not favour any religious group’; ‘State should be neutral and treat equally all religions and allow them to be present in public sphere’. State-religious support - ‘State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture’; ‘State should guarantee special legal status of a preferred set of religions and recognize special role of them in cultural and political spheres’. Model of control over religion - ‘It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere’. Socio-cultural attitude toward religion - ‘The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in society’; ‘In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’. Protection of religious freedom - ‘Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for the Catholic Church and religious minorities’; ‘Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for Catholics and non-religious people’; ‘Croatian/Italian state does not favour any religious group’; ‘Croatian/ Italian state manages religious issues very well’.</p>	

Thus, ‘State-religious neutrality’ in relation to ‘Protection of RF’ resulted as statistically significant, negative correlation, measuring a small correlation of – 0.22. On the other hand, according to Pearson Coefficient, ‘State-religious support’ is in statistically significant, positive relation to ‘Protection of RF’, whereby the results indicated a high correlation of 0.40; while ‘Model of control over religion’ resulted as non-significant. Lastly, ‘Socio-cultural attitude’ in relation to ‘Protection of RF’ resulted as statistically significant, measuring a positive, high correlation of 0.50. These results imply to the analysis of both samples together – Croatian and Italian (See Table 8).

Table 9. Pearson Correlation Coefficient for ‘State-religious models’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’

	Socio-cultural attitude toward religion
State-religious neutrality	-0.484**
State-religious support	0.652**
Model of control over religion	0.132**
<p>These results refer to analysis of both samples together – Croatian and Italian State-religious neutrality - ‘The state should provide equal conditions for religious and non-religious people’; ‘The state should not favour any religious group’; ‘State should be neutral and treat equally all religions and allow them to be present in public sphere’. State-religious support - ‘State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture’; ‘State should guarantee special legal status of a preferred set of religions and recognize special role of them in cultural and political spheres’. Model of control over religion - ‘It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere’. Socio-cultural attitude toward religion - ‘The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in society’; ‘In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’.</p>	

Furthermore, we tested the relation between State-religious models (neutrality, support, and control) and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’. Within the analysis of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient, results indicate that ‘State-religious neutrality’ is in statistically significant, negative, but quite good correlation with ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ ($r = -0.48$). Furthermore, Pearson Correlation Coefficient results referring to ‘State-religious support’ in relation to our dependent variable ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’, indicated statistically significant positive relations, measuring an extremely high correlation of 0.65. Finally, ‘Model of control over religion’, according to Pearson Correlation Coefficient results, indicated a statistically significant, but very small correlation with the variable ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’, thus measuring a correlation of 0.13 (See Table 9).

- **H3 Participants’ identification with national culture and dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy, which is reflected in more negative attitudes toward Religious Freedom.**

Concerning our third hypothesis, we explore our dependent variables ‘Socio-legal function of RF’; ‘Societal value of RF’ and ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’ and its relation with our independent scales ‘Role of religion in relation to nationality’; ‘Level of cultural identification’; and two single variables ‘In Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’ and ‘The Catholic Church as a part of Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured in society’. These results imply to the analysis of both samples together – Croatian and Italian.

Table 10. Pearson Correlation Coefficient for ‘Role of religion in relation to nationality and national culture’ and ‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’

	Socio-legal function of RF	Societal value of RF	RF aspects: Belief and practice
Role of religion in relation to nationality	-0.127**	0.007	-0.147**
Level of cultural identification	-0.036	0.026	-0.036
‘In Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’	-0.285**	-0.182**	-0.300**
‘The Catholic Church as a part of Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured in society’	-0.221**	-0.076**	-0.259**
‘We should tolerate differences in the private sphere but assimilate “different culture or religion” to major/dominant culture’	-0.136**	-0.118**	-0.182**
<p>These results refer to analysis of both samples together – Croatian and Italian</p> <p>Role of religion in relation to nationality – ‘Religions should strengthen the national spirit’; ‘Religions should take responsibility with the state for national culture’</p> <p>Level of cultural identification – How do you identify with the culture of your country on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 – weak identification; 10 – strong identification).</p> <p>‘In Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’ – single variable</p> <p>‘The Catholic Church as a part of Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured in society’ - single variable</p> <p>‘We should tolerate differences in private sphere but assimilate “different culture or religion” to major/dominant culture’ (Assimilation-oriented model) – single variable</p>			

According to Pearson Correlation Coefficient, 'Role of religion in relation to nationality' is in statistically significant, negative relation to 'Socio-legal function of RF', indicating a small correlation ($r = -0.12$). 'Level of cultural identification' resulted as non-significant. Our single variables 'In Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture' and 'The Catholic Church as a part of Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured in society'; both resulted as statistically significant, measuring small and negative correlation in relation to 'Socio-legal function of RF' ($r = -0.28$; $r = -0.22$) (See Table 10).

In the case of 'Societal value of RF' and its relation to our independent variables, two of the variables resulted as statistically significant, and two were statistically non-significant. According to Pearson Correlation Coefficient, our independent single variable 'In Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture' resulted as statistically significant, measuring a negative, small correlation with 'Societal value of RF'. Likewise, our single variable 'The Catholic Church as a part of Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured in society' as well resulted as statistically significant, whereby the Pearson Coefficient results indicated small, negative relation to our dependent variable ($r = -0.07$). 'Role of religion in relation to nationality' and 'Level of cultural identification' resulted as non-significant (See Table 10).

Finally, we explore the relation of 'RF aspects: belief and practice' with our independent variables. According to Pearson Correlation Coefficient analysis, three of our variables resulted as statistically significant. Thus, 'Role of religion in relation to nationality', according to the Pearson Coefficient, resulted as statistically significant, measuring a negative and small correlation ($r = -0.14$). Our single variable 'In Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture', as well resulted as statistically significant, whereby Pearson Coefficient measured a negative, medium correlation of 0.30. Furtherly, results show that our second single variable, 'The Catholic Church as a part of Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured in society' as well resulted as statistically significant, whereby Pearson Coefficient measured a negative and small correlation ($r = -0.25$). 'Level of cultural identification' resulted as non-significant (See Table 10).

4.4. Exploratory Factor Analysis of the Computed Scales used for Analysing Attitudes toward 'Religious Freedom' and 'Citizenship and Citizens' rights' in Croatia and Italy

In our analysis of the data, each of the conducted scales was tested by Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), computing the principal components method (PCA). Exploratory Factor Analysis is a statistical technique that relies on the linear correlation between variables in large sets of data (Brownlow et al. 2014). As Brownlow et al. (2014) claim, it is a procedure of summarizing or reducing data by analysing the associations between variables to examine whether there are underlying factors (similar response patterns) and which factors are most important. EFA requires a sample of minimum 100 participants, and there should always be more participants than the variables (Brownlow et al. 2014), which

is the case with our research. The principal component method (PCA) serves to obtain the clearest idea of how the original variables are associated with their factors, performing a method of rotating factors (Brownlow et al. 2014). In terms of computing the Exploratory Factor Analysis, the authors Brown (2012) and Coolican (2014) highlight the need that the results of the EFA must fulfil two key criteria, the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity, which measure the homogeneity of variance between test matrix and identity matrix. Following the assumptions for these two key criteria, Harrington (2009) suggests that the KMO statistics should be above 0.5, while according to Pallant (2013), Bartlett’s test must be statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. Once these two key criteria were fulfilled, we proceeded with further aspects of the factor analysis, whereby, the total ought to be at a minimum of 50% (Hair et al. 2010), while the communalities, which measure the amount of variance for each variable should have a high common variance, usually a minimum of 0.4 or above (Yong and Pearce 2013; Costello and Osborne 2005). For our analysis, factor loadings below 0.3 were suppressed, and the Guttman–Kaiser criterion was applied, considering only the components whose eigenvalue would be 1.0 or above.

Table 11. Factor analysis results for computed scales – KMO, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, Variance explained, Number of components extracted

	KMO (>0.50)	Bartlett’s Test (p<0.05)	Variance explained (>50%)	Number of components
Socio-legal function of RF	0.864	0.001	55.55%	1
Societal value of RF	0.875	0.001	66.37%	1
Religious freedom aspects: belief and practice	0.637	0.001	63.06%	1
Citizenship status and political rights	0.697	0.001	73.28%	1
Citizenship status and socio- economic rights	0.734	0.001	85.63%	1
Membership and belonging	0.757	0.001	59.89%	1
Elements of the national identity and origin’	0.554	0.001	59.96%	1
Protection of Religious Freedom	0.849	0.001	51.03%	1
State-religious support	0.500	0.001	88.28%	1
State-religious neutrality	0.565	0.001	54.17%	1
Socio-cultural attitude toward religion	0.500	0.001	78.81%	1
Role of religion in relation to nationality	0.500	0.001	82.94%	1

For the scale, ‘Socio-legal function of RF’, consisting of six items, the KMO statistic measured $0.864 > 0.50$, while Bartlett’s test of Sphericity indicated statistical significance. ($p < 0.001$), thus satisfying both criteria for performing further analysis of Factor extraction. The analysis extracted one factor, which explains 55.55% of the variances. All of the communalities measured above 0.4, whereby for this specific scale the minimum measured was 0.448 for item ‘Religious freedom is an important right in a democratic

society', followed by 0.461 for 'Freedom to speak on religious matters openly and freely'; 0.571 for item 'Equality of various religions in society before the law', followed by 0.557 for item 'Freedom to choose my religious/non-religious identity', 0.615 for 'Non-violent co-existence for all religions in every society', and finally measuring highest communalities of 0.681 for item 'Non-discrimination for religious minorities on the basis of religion' (See Table 11).

For the scale, 'Societal value of RF', the KMO statistic was $0.875 > 0.50$, and Bartlett's test of Sphericity resulted as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), for the 5 items consisting this scale. Factor analysis extracted one factor, explaining 66.37% of the variance. All of the communalities measured higher than 0.4, whereby the lowest communality was 0.640 for item 'It promotes equality as a principle of democratic citizenship'; followed by 0.665 for the item 'It is important for tolerant and peaceful co-existence of religions'; 0.657 for 'It promotes religious and cultural diversity in society'; and finally, 0.674 for the item 'It promotes non-discrimination on the basis of religion' and highest communality (0.682) for the item 'It promotes religious and cultural diversity in society' (See Table 11).

Furthermore, for the scale 'Religious freedom aspects: belief and practice', the factor analysis procedure showed KMO statistic of $0.637 > 0.50$, and statistically significant according to Bartlett's test of Sphericity ($p < 0.001$). According to the results of Factor analysis, this scale is extracted as one factor explaining 63.06% of the variances. None of the communalities were less than 0.4, whereby the lowest measured communality was 0.492 for item 'Freedom to have no religion'; followed by 0.686 for item 'Freedom to worship' and the highest measured communality was for item 'Freedom to have inner personal convictions', exactly 0.714 (See Table 11).

For the scale, 'Citizenship status and political rights', the KMO statistic measured $0.697 > 0.50$, while Bartlett's test of Sphericity was statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), satisfying the criteria for both assumptions in order to carry out the CFA. According to the results of the conducted Factor analysis, one factor was extracted, which explains 73.28% of the variance. All of the communalities measured higher levels of communalities, whereby 'A right to protest' had the lowest level measuring 0.651, followed by 0.772 for the item 'A right to form a political party' and finally, the highest communality measured 0.776 for the item 'A right to vote' (See Table 11).

Regarding the scale 'Citizenship status and socio-economic rights', KMO statistic was $0.734 > 0.50$ and Bartlett's test of Sphericity turned as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). Thus, satisfying both criteria, we proceeded further with Factor analysis. According to the results, factor analysis extracted one factor explaining 85.63% of the variance, whereby all of the communalities measured higher than 0.8, indicating that variables are well represented by this one factor. The minimum measured communality was 0.826 for the item 'A right to health care'; followed by 0.842 for item 'A right to employment' and finally, the highest measured communality 0.901 for the item 'A right to education' (See Table 11).

Furthermore, we computed a factor analysis for the following scales: 'Membership and belonging' and 'Elements of national identity and origin'. Originally, we conducted one scale that

consisted of seven items in total, listed in 'Membership and belonging' together with the items concerning 'Elements of national identity and origin', which on the reliability test measured good reliability (0.74); however, the EFA extracted two factors for the composed scale, from which Factor 1 consisted of four items included in 'Membership and belonging' and Factor 2 consisted of three items included in 'Elements of national identity and origin'. According to this, we divided the seven items of membership, belonging, and national elements into two separate scales (see Table 4 for Cronbach's alpha for each scale), and conducted an exploratory factor analysis separately for the scales. In the case of the scale 'Membership and belonging', which consisted of four items, the KMO statistic was $0.757 > 0.50$, while Bartlett's test indicated a statistical significance ($p < 0.001$), and in line with this, having met both assumptions, we proceeded with the analysis. The factor analysis resulted in extracting these four items of the scale as one factor, which explains 59.89% of the variance. All of the communalities measured above 0.4, whereby the minimum measured was 0.428; followed by 0.558 for the second item; 0.671 for the third; and finally, 0.738 for the last item of the conducted scale (See Table 11).

Following this, we computed EFA for the scale 'Elements of the national identity and origin', and according to the results, KMO statistic measured $0.554 > 0.50$, while Bartlett's test of sphericity was statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). In line with these results, we proceed with the analysis, according to which one factor was extracted, explaining 59.96% of the variance. The lowest communalities measured 0.35732; followed by 0.612; and 0.739 for the third item (See Table 11).

For our scale 'Protection of Religious Freedom', which consisted of seven items, the KMO statistic was $0.849 > 0.50$, while the Bartlett's test showed a statistical significance ($p < 0.001$). Thus, fulfilling both necessary criteria for Factor analysis we proceeded with further analysis in order to carry out the CFA. The factor analysis resulted in extracting these four items of the scale as one factor, explaining 51.03% of the variance. All of the communalities measured above 0.4; except for two items whereby the lowest measured was 0.386 for item 'In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture' and 0.396 for item 'Croatian state provides equal conditions for Catholic and non-religious people'. For other items, each of the item measured communalities above 0.4 (See Table 11).

Following this, we conducted the procedure of EFA for the scale 'State-religious support', consisted of two items. In the case of this scale, the KMO statistic measured $0.500 = 0.50$, and the Bartlett's test of sphericity appeared as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). The extraction method resulted in one factor, explaining 88.28% of the variance, resulting in quite a high per cent. All of the communalities for this scale measured above the necessary 0.4; thus, resulting in 0.883 for the item 'State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture'; and a high communality for the item 'State should guarantee special legal status of a preferred set of religion and recognize special role of them in cultural and political spheres' (0.883) (See Table 11).

32 It is advisable to remove any item with a communality score less than 0.2 (Child 2006). Items with low communality scores may indicate additional factors which could be explored in further studies by developing and measuring additional items (Costello and Osborne 2005).

Furthermore, the scale 'State-religious neutrality', consisted of three items, and, according to KMO statistic measured $0.565 > 0.50$, and Bartlett's test of sphericity resulted as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), in this way fulfilling both criteria necessary for the further procedure regarding Factor Analysis. The Factor Analysis extracted one factor consisted of three measured items, explaining 54.17% of the variance. Two out of three of the items measured communalities above 0.4; thus, for the item 'The state should provide equal conditions for religious and non-religious people' communality measured was 0.654; while for the item 'State should not favour any religious group', the measured communality was 0.682. The lowest communality was found for the item 'State should be neutral and treat equally all religions and allow them to be present in the public sphere', measuring 0.290; which we considered acceptable since it measured above 0.2 (See Table 11).

Finally, for the set of scales referring to state-religious relations, we conducted EFA for the scale measuring 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion', which consisted of two items – 'In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture' and 'The Catholic Church as part of Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured in society'. KMO statistic for this scale measured exactly $0.500 = 0.50$, while Bartlett's test of sphericity resulted as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). EFA resulted in extracting this scale as one factor; which explains 78.81% of the variance. These two items' communalities measured above 0.4, exactly 0.788 for both (See Table 11).

Lastly, we conducted the EFA for our last set of variables, which deals with the role of religion in relation to identity and national culture. For our scale 'Role of religion in relation to nationality', the KMO statistic measured 0.50, and Bartlett's test of sphericity showed statistical significance ($p < 0.001$), as with the previous scale. EFA extracted one factor for this particular scale, which measures 82.94% of the variance. Both of the items' communalities measured above 0.4; specifically 0.829 for both items – 'Religions should strengthen the national spirit' and 'Religions should take responsibility with the state for national culture' (See Table 11).

4.5. Analysis for H1 – 'Religious Freedom and Citizenship'

In order to conduct the necessary analysis for our first hypothesis, we decided to first and foremost provide the data regarding correlations between each specific scale measurement/variable, thus splitting the data in two cases – one regarding Croatia, and the other regarding Italy. We tested each of our dependent variables – 'Socio-legal function of RF'; 'Societal value of RF'; and, 'RF aspects: belief and practice' in relation to our independent variables – 'Citizenship and political rights'; 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights'; 'Membership and belonging'; 'Identity and origin'; 'Assimilation-oriented model' and 'Diversity oriented model', by splitting the data in two cases – one concerning Croatia, other concerning Italy (see Table 12 and Table 13).

Table 12. Pearson Correlation Coefficient – Croatia

	Socio-legal function of RF	Societal value of RF	RF aspects: belief and practice
Citizenship and political rights	0.201**	0.309**	0.243**
Citizenship and socio-economic rights	0.246**	0.334**	0.270**
Membership and belonging	- 0.056	0.060	-0.086*
Identity and origin	- 0.059	0.001	-0.092*
Assimilation-oriented model	- 0.019	0.049	-0.087*
Diversity-oriented model	0.292**	0.321**	0.295**
<p>These results refer to Croatian sample. Citizenship and political rights – ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to vote’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to protest’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to form a political party’. Citizenship and socio-economic rights – ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to health care’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to education’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship’. Membership and belonging - ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who speaks Croatian/Italian’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who keeps strong social relations with Croats/Italians’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who shares Croatian/Italian cultural codes’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who donates money for civic purposes’. National identity and origin - ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who lives in Croatia/Italy’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who was born in Croatia/Italy’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who has Croatian/Italian descent’. Assimilation-oriented model - ‘We should tolerate differences in private sphere but assimilate “different culture or religion” to major/dominant culture’. Diversity-oriented model - ‘The right to have one’s ‘difference’ (minority religiosity, ethnicity, etc.) should be recognised in and supported in the public and private spheres’.</p>			

In the case of Croatian data, regarding the scale ‘Socio-legal function of RF’ (dependent variable), in relation to our independent variable ‘Citizenship and political rights’, Pearson Correlation Coefficient results have shown statistically significant, positive relationship, measuring a small correlation of 0.20. As well, in the case of our independent variable scale ‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’ in relation to ‘Socio-legal function of RF’, Pearson Correlation Coefficient also showed a statistically significant positive relationship, measuring a small correlation ($r=0.24$). Scales ‘Membership and belonging’; ‘Identity and origin’; and, ‘Assimilation-oriented model’ resulted as statistically non-significant, with a negative correlation. On the other hand, our variable ‘Diversity-oriented model’ in relation to ‘Socio-legal function of RF’ resulted as statistically significant, measuring a positive relationship with a medium level of correlation ($r=0.29$) (See Table 12).

Following this, we continue with the results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient for our second scale ‘Societal value of RF’ (dependent variable), by exploring its relation to our independent variables - ‘Citizenship and political rights’; ‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’; ‘Membership and belonging’; ‘Identity and origin’; ‘Assimilation-oriented model’ and ‘Diversity oriented model’. Pearson Correlation Coefficient results indicate that ‘Societal value of RF’ in relation to ‘Citizenship and political rights’ is in a statistically significant positive relationship of medium correlation ($r=0.30$). This is the case as well with our second independent variable ‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’, whereby Pearson Correlation Coefficient showed a statistically significant positive relationship, with a medium level of correlation as well ($r=0.33$). Furtherly, in the case of scales ‘Membership and belonging’; ‘Identity and origin’; and,

‘Assimilation-oriented model’, Pearson Correlation Coefficient resulted as non-significant, as well as in the case of ‘Socio-legal function of RF’, only that here, Pearson Coefficient measured positive relationship. ‘Diversity-oriented model’ in relation to ‘Societal value of RF’ resulted as statistically significant, measuring positive medium correlation ($r=0.32$) (See Table 12).

Finally, we explored the relation of ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’ in relation to our independent variables, whereby the results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient showed statistical significance between all of the independent variables and the scale ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’. Analysis results show that ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’ in relation to ‘Citizenship and political rights’; ‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’; and, ‘Diversity-oriented model’ show statistically significant, positive, small to medium correlation – 0.24 for ‘Citizenship and political rights’; 0.27 for ‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’; and, 0.29 for ‘Diversity-oriented model’. In the case of ‘Membership and belonging’; ‘Identity and origin’; and ‘Assimilation-oriented model’, Pearson Correlation Coefficient results showed statistically significant, but negative and small correlation. In the case of ‘Membership and belonging’ Pearson Coefficient measured 0.08; for ‘Identity and origin’ 0.09; and for ‘Assimilation-oriented model’ 0.08. From the tested variables, the highest Pearson Coefficient correlation was found between the variable ‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’ and ‘Societal value of RF’, indicating a positive, medium correlation between the variables ($r=0.33$) (See Table 12).

Table 13. Pearson Correlation Coefficient – Italy

	Socio-legal function of RF	Societal value of RF	RF aspects: Belief and practice
Citizenship and political rights	0.199**	0.244**	0.209**
Citizenship and socio-economic rights	0.311**	0.336**	0.271**
Membership and belonging	- 0.009	0.028	-0.029
Identity and origin	0.019	0.021	-0.016
Assimilation-oriented model	-0.142**	-0.173**	-0.176**
Diversity-oriented model	0.293**	0.391**	0.301**
<p>These results refer to Italian sample. Citizenship and political rights – ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to vote’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to protest’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to form a political party’. Citizenship and socio-economic rights – ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to health care’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to education’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship’. Membership and belonging - ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who speaks Croatian/Italian’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who keeps strong social relations with Croats/Italians’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who shares Croatian/Italian cultural codes’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who donates money for civic purposes’. National identity and origin - ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who lives in Croatia/Italy’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who was born in Croatia/Italy’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who has Croatian/Italian descent’. Assimilation-oriented model - ‘We should tolerate differences in private sphere but assimilate “different culture or religion” to major/dominant culture’. Diversity-oriented model - ‘The right to have one’s ‘difference’ (minority religiosity, ethnicity, etc.) should be recognised in and supported in the public and private spheres’.</p>			

In the case of Italian data, Pearson Correlation Coefficient results show that for our dependent variable 'Socio-legal function of RF' in relation to our independent variable 'Citizenship and political rights', there is statistical significance, indicating a positive and small correlation ($r=0.19$). For our variable scale 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights' in relation to 'Socio-legal function of RF', Pearson Correlation Coefficient analysis of results shows a statistically significant, positive correlation, indicating a medium level of correlation ($r=0.31$). In the case of scales 'Membership and belonging' and 'Identity and origin' in relation to 'Socio-legal function of RF', Pearson Correlation Coefficient resulted as non-significant, whereby in the case of 'Membership and belonging' it measured negative correlation, and for 'Identity and origin' positive correlation. Finally, 'Assimilation-oriented model' and 'Diversity-oriented model' both resulted as statistically significant, according to Pearson Correlation Coefficient. For the variable 'Assimilation-oriented model', results indicate a negative, small correlation ($r=0.14$), while for the 'Diversity-oriented model', results indicated a positive, medium, correlation with 'Socio-legal function of RF' ($r=0.29$) (See Table 13).

Furtherly, as with the previous analysis of Pearson Correlation results, we move forward to our second dependent variable scale 'Societal value of RF'. Thus we explore the relation of this variable scale with 'Citizenship and political rights', our independent variable scale, whereby the results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient show a statistically significant, positive and small correlation ($r=0.24$). Following this, we explore 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights', whereby the Pearson Correlation Coefficient showed as well, statistically significant, positive, but medium correlation ($r=0.33$). Here as well, as with our previous two dependent scales, 'Membership and belonging' and 'Identity and origin' resulted as non-significant, indicating a positive correlation for both scales. 'Assimilation-oriented model' in relation to 'Societal value of RF' resulted as statistically significant according to Pearson Correlation Coefficient results, indicating a negative, small correlation of 0.17. On the other hand, 'Diversity-oriented model', according to the results, is as well statistically significant, but indicates a positive, medium to high correlation of 0.39 (See Table 13).

Lastly, we analyse the relation of 'RF aspects: belief and practice' with our independent variables. Here as well, 'Citizenship and political rights' and 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights' resulted as statistically significant in relation to 'RF aspects: belief and practice'. For both of the scales Pearson Correlation Coefficient showed a positive, small correlation – 0.20 for 'Citizenship and political rights'; and, 0.27 for 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights'. 'Membership and belonging' and 'Identity and origin' again resulted as non-significant, indicating a negative relationship with 'RF aspects: belief and practice'. As well, like in relation to previous dependent scales, 'Assimilation-oriented model' again resulted as statistically significant, and in small, negative correlation to 'RF aspects: belief and practice' ($r=0.17$). Finally, according to the results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient, 'Diversity-oriented model' resulted as statistically significant in relation to 'RF aspects: belief and practice', whereby the results indicated a positive, medium correlation ($r=0.30$). Among the tested variables, the highest correlation has been found

between our independent variable 'Diversity-oriented model' and our dependent variable 'Societal value of RF', indicating a medium to high correlation ($r=0.39$) (See Table 13).

Regarding Pearson Correlation Coefficient for the Croatian and Italian samples, the results indicated certain similar patterns of significance and level of correlation. The variable 'Citizenship and political rights' resulted as statistically significant, and in positive relation, with all three scales regarding religious freedom ('Socio-legal function of RF'; 'Societal value of RF'; 'RF aspects: belief and practice'), for both Croatian and Italian samples. As well, for both samples in the case of these variables, Pearson correlation showed a similar level of correlation (between small and medium), though, the results indicated a bit higher levels of Pearson correlation in the case of the Croatian sample. In the case of the variable 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights', Pearson Correlation Coefficient as well resulted as statistically significant, positive, for all three variables of religious freedom attitudes, and as well in the case of both samples. The results implied extremely similar levels of Pearson Correlation Coefficient for both samples, especially in the case of 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights' and 'Societal value of RF'; and, 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights' and 'RF aspects: belief and practice'. While the variables 'Membership and belonging' and 'Identity and origin' resulted as statistically non-significant in relation to variables regarding religious freedom in the case of the Italian sample; for the Croatian sample, the results implied statistically significant, small correlation only in the case of one variable scale regarding Religious Freedom. Thus, statistically significant small correlation appeared in the case of variables 'Membership and belonging' and 'RF aspects: belief and practice'; and, 'Identity and origin' and 'RF aspects: belief and practice'. On the other hand, the variable 'Assimilation-oriented model' in relation to 'Socio-legal function of RF'; 'Societal value of RF'; and 'RF aspects: belief and practice', according to Pearson Correlation Coefficient, showed different results for Croatian and for Italian sample. In the case of Italian samples the variable 'Assimilation oriented model' resulted as statistically significant and in negative relation to all three scales regarding Religious Freedom, while for the Croatian set of data, two of three variables resulted as statistically non-significant ('Socio-legal function of RF' and 'Societal value of RF'). As well, for the Croatian data, even though the variable 'Assimilation-oriented model' in relation to 'Societal value of RF' resulted as statistically non-significant, the result as well indicated a positive relation, unlike is the case with the Italian sample, where this relation was negative and statistically significant. However, the variable 'Diversity oriented model' in relation to scales regarding religious freedom resulted as statistically significant, and positive, in the case of both samples – Croatian and Italian. The results as well showed a similar level of correlation for both samples, mostly implying a medium level of correlation in all three cases – 'Socio-legal function of RF'; 'Societal value of RF' and 'RF: aspects: belief and practice', whereby the results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient indicated a bit higher levels of correlation in the case of Italian sample (see Table 12 and Table 13).

Thus, in the case of both the Croatian and Italian samples, more positive attitudes toward 'Citizenship and citizens' rights' are positively correlated with more positive attitudes toward 'Religious Freedom'. On the contrary, and as well, in the case of both samples, higher levels of support toward the assimilation of

differences to dominant religion or culture is correlated with lower levels of positive attitudes toward ‘Religious Freedom’; and higher levels of support toward public and private recognition of differences (religious, national, etc.) is correlated with higher levels of positive attitudes toward various aspects of ‘Religious Freedom’ (socio-legal; societal value; belief and practice) (see Table 12 and Table 13).

4.5.1. The Effect of ‘Attitudes toward Citizenship and citizens’ rights’ on ‘Attitudes toward Religious Freedom’ - Regression Analysis

Bivariate regression analysis is a statistical method used to analyse whether one variable predicts another variable, specifically determining whether one variable will be more important in predicting variation within the dependent variable than the other, while the multiple correlation coefficient shows us the strength of this relationship (Brownlow et al. 2004). In our research, we used a Bivariate Regression Analysis to explore to what extent our independent variables concerning citizenship and citizens’ rights can predict the variations in our three dependent variables concerning attitudes toward religious freedom - ‘Socio-legal function of Religious Freedom’; ‘Societal value of RF’; and, ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’. For each of the dependent variables, we will conduct individual Bivariate Regression Analysis. More specifically, we want to explore the effect of different scales constructed for measuring ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’, such as ‘Citizenship and political rights’; ‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’; ‘Membership and belonging’; ‘Identity and origin’; ‘Assimilation-oriented model’ and ‘Diversity oriented model’ on our independent variables - ‘Socio-legal function of Religious Freedom’; ‘Societal value of RF’; and, ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’ (‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’) (Table 14).

Table 14. Standardized Beta Coefficient for ‘Socio-legal function of RF’; ‘Societal value of RF’; ‘RF aspects: belief and practice and ‘Attitudes toward Citizenship and Citizens’ rights’

	‘Socio-legal function of RF’	‘Societal value of RF’	‘RF aspects: belief and practice’
	β	β	β
‘Citizenship and political rights’	0.06	0.08*	0.09*
‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’	0.14 ***	0.17***	0.13***
‘Membership and belonging’	-0.03	0.03	-0.05
‘Elements of national identity and origin’	-0.57	-0.03	-0.06
‘Assimilation-oriented model’	-0.09***	-0.07*	-0.12***
‘Diversity-oriented model’	0.189***	0.26***	0.20***
	$R^2 = 0.126$	$R^2 = 0.182$	$R^2 = 0.151$
*** $p < 0.001$; * $p < 0.05$			
<p>These results refer to analysis of both samples together – Croatian and Italian Citizenship and political rights – ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to vote’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to protest’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to form a political party’. Citizenship and socio-economic rights – ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to health care’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to education’; ‘All people regardless of their citizenship’. Membership and belonging - ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who speaks Croatian/Italian’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who keeps strong social relations with Croats/Italians’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who shares Croatian/Italian cultural codes’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who donates money for civic purposes’. National identity and origin - ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who lives in Croatia/Italy’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who was born in Croatia/Italy’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who has Croatian/Italian descent’.</p>			

Assimilation-oriented model - 'We should tolerate differences in private sphere but assimilate "different culture or religion" to major/dominant culture'.
Diversity-oriented model - 'The right to have one's 'difference' (minority religiosity, ethnicity, etc.) should be recognised in and supported in the public and private spheres'.

- **The effect of 'Attitudes toward Citizenship and Citizens' rights' on 'Socio-legal function of RF'**

Our first model of Bivariate regression analysis concerned exploring the effect of 'Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights' on six items consisting the scale measuring 'Socio-political function of RF', such as - 'Freedom to choose my religious/non-religious identity'; 'Freedom to speak on religious matters openly and freely'; 'Non-discrimination for religious minorities on the basis of religion'; 'Equality of various religions in society before the law' 'An important right in a democratic society'; 'Non-violent co-existence for all religions in every society'.

In order to determine how the above-mentioned items of independent variables predict 'Socio-legal function of RF', firstly we performed Pearson correlation coefficient analysis to establish to what extent our dependent variables correlate with our independent variables. According to Pearson correlation coefficient results, all of our independent variables ('Citizenship and political rights'; 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights'; 'Membership and belonging'; 'Identity and origin'; 'Assimilation-oriented model' and 'Diversity oriented model') resulted as statistically significant in relation to our dependent variable 'Socio-legal function of RF'. Three of the tested variables ('Citizenship and political rights'; 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights'; 'Diversity oriented model') are in a statistically significant, positive relationship, while the other three tested variables ('Membership and belonging'; 'Identity and origin'; 'Assimilation-oriented model' resulted as statistically significant and negative in relation to our dependent variable 'Socio-legal function of RF'. The highest level of Pearson correlation coefficient was found between the variable 'Diversity-oriented model' and 'Socio-legal function of RF' ($r(1146)=0.28, p<0.001$).

In 'Socio-legal function of RF' scores, 12.6% of the variance is explained by 'Citizenship and political rights'; 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights'; 'Membership and belonging'; 'Identity and origin'; 'Assimilation-oriented model' and 'Diversity oriented model' ($R^2=0.126$). The results of ANOVA were statistically significant ($p<0.001$), so the slope of our regression line is not zero, and our scales constructing 'Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights' significantly predict 'Socio-legal function of RF' ($F(6,1139)=27,47, p<0.001$).

The linear regression results show that the 'Citizenship and political rights' appeared as a non-significant predictor ($p=0.08$), with a positive effect on 'Socio-legal function of RF' ($B=0.047$). On the other hand, 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights' resulted as having a significantly positive effect ($p<0.001$), indicating that higher levels of agreement among participants with the statement - all people regardless of their citizenship status should have access to basic socio-economic rights (health care, education

employment), will result in higher levels of agreement with perceiving religious freedom meaning through social-legal function (For me religious freedom means ‘Freedom to choose my religious/non-religious identity’; ‘Freedom to speak on religious matters openly and freely’; ‘Non-discrimination on the basis of religion’; ‘Equality of various religions before the law’: ‘An important right in democratic society’; ‘Non-violent coexistence for all religions in every society’) (B = 0.119). More specifically, if the level of agreement with ‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’ increases by one unit, the level of agreement with perceiving ‘Religious Freedom through socio-legal functions will increase by 0.119 units, while other conditions remain unchanged. Furthermore, ‘Membership and belonging’ resulted as non-significant ($p = 0.20$), with a negative effect on perceiving the meaning of ‘Religious Freedom as socio-legal function’ (B = -0.023). As well, ‘Identity and origin’ resulted as non-significant ($p = 0.06$), with a negative effect on ‘Socio-legal function of RF’ (B = -0.033). Regarding ‘Assimilation-oriented model’, this scale resulted as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), with a negative effect on ‘Socio-legal function of RF’ (B = - 0.042). More specifically, these results indicate that as the level of agreement with the statement ‘We should tolerate differences in private sphere but assimilate “different culture or religion” to major/dominant culture’ increases by one unit, the level of agreement with perceiving the meaning of ‘Religious Freedom as socio-legal function’ will decrease for 0.042 units, while other conditions remain unchanged. ‘Diversity-oriented model’ as well resulted as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), with a positive effect on ‘Religious Freedom as socio-legal function’ (B = 0.124). To be precise, the more participants agree with the statement ‘The right to have one’s ‘difference’ (minority religiosity, ethnicity, etc.) should be recognised in and supported in the public and private spheres’, the more they perceive the meaning of religious freedom through socio-legal functions’. Results indicate, as the levels of agreement with ‘Diversity-oriented model’ increases by one unit, the level of agreement with perceiving the meaning of ‘Religious freedom as socio-legal function’ increases for 0.124 units, while other conditions remain unchanged. According to the Standardized Beta Coefficient, ‘Diversity oriented model has the largest influence on ‘Religious freedom as socio-legal function’ (0.198) (See Table 14).

The Durbin–Watson statistic is 1.945, whereby values ranging from 1 to 3, are acceptable according to Field (2009). Therefore, the assumption that there is independence of observations has been met. According to the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of normality, a significant finding of $p < 0.001$; indicates that the sample distribution is significantly different from the normal distribution. In this case, if the test shows that the data cannot be normally distributed and if the sample is larger than 30 - that is, each empirical distribution of data weighs the normal amount by the central limit theorem: $N > 30$ - the distribution of the data can be considered as normally distributed (Jovetić, 2015). This was the case with our data, so we call upon the central limit theorem in the case of our sample, whereby for each item the number of participants exceeded 1000. The residuals are homoscedastic, meaning the assumption has been met.

- **The effect of ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’ on ‘Societal value of RF’**

Furtherly, we conducted Bivariate Regression Analysis by exploring another set of variables concerning attitudes toward Religious Freedom. Specifically, we wanted to explore the effect of ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’ on the ‘Societal value of RF’. Our scale ‘Societal value of RF’, consists of five items – ‘It promotes non-discrimination on the basis of religion’; ‘It promotes religious and cultural diversity in society’; ‘It promotes inter-religious dialogue between religions’; ‘It promotes equality as a principle of democratic citizenship’; and, ‘It is important for tolerant and peaceful co-existence of religions’.

As with our first model of Bivariate regression analysis, here as well, we performed Pearson Correlation Coefficient to determine the level of correlation between our dependent variable – ‘Societal value of RF’ and our independent variables composing ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’. According to Pearson Correlation Coefficient, ‘Citizenship and political rights’; ‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’; ‘Assimilation-oriented model’; and, ‘Diversity-oriented model’ resulted as statistically significant, while variables ‘Membership and belonging’ and ‘Identity and origin’ resulted as non-significant, whereby ‘Identity and origin’ is in negative relation to our dependent variable ‘Societal value of RF’. From the variables that resulted as statistically significant, Pearson Correlation showed positive correlation, except for the independent variable ‘Assimilation-oriented model’. Furthermore, regarding the levels of correlation between the tested variables, the highest level of correlation was found between the variable ‘Diversity oriented model’ and ‘Societal value of RF’ ($r(1142)= 0.36, p<0.001$).

In the scores of our dependent variable ‘Societal value of RF’, 18.2% of the variance is explained by ‘Citizenship and political rights’; ‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’; ‘Membership and belonging’; ‘Identity and origin’; ‘Assimilation-oriented model’ and ‘Diversity oriented model’ ($R \text{ square} = 0.182$). Additionally, the results of ANOVA indicated statistical significance ($p<0.001$), implying that the slope of our regression line is not zero, and our scales constructing ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’ significantly predict ‘Societal value of RF’ ($F(6,1135)=42.06, p<0.001$).

The linear regression analysis shows that ‘Citizenship and political rights’ resulted as statistically significant ($p=0.02$), indicating that with higher levels of agreement with the statement ‘All people in Croatia/Italy, regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to vote/protest/form a political party’; results in higher levels of agreement with the statements such as ‘Religious Freedom is important because it promotes non-discrimination on the basis of religion/ religious and cultural diversity in society/ inter-religious dialogue between religions/ equality as a principle of democratic citizenship/ of tolerant and peaceful co-existence of religions (‘Societal value of RF’). Unstandardized Beta Coefficient results show that our independent variable ‘Citizenship and political rights’ has a positive effect on the ‘Societal value of RF’ ($B=0.081$). Meaning, if the level of agreement with ‘Citizenship and political rights’ increases by one unit, the level of agreement with ‘Religious Freedom is important because it promotes non-discrimination on the basis of religion/ religious and cultural diversity in society/ inter-religious dialogue between religions/

equality as a principle of democratic citizenship/ of tolerant and peaceful co-existence of religions; will increase for 0.081 units, while other conditions remain unchanged.

Analysing in details the results of regression analysis led us to explore the effect of another independent variable scale 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights' on our dependent variable 'Societal value of RF'. The results of regression bivariate analysis show that the variables scale 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights' as well, resulted as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), with a positive effect on 'Societal value of RF' ($B = 0.189$). In line with this, the results show if the level of agreement with the statement 'All people in Croatia/Italy, regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to education/employment/health' ('Citizenship and socio-economic rights') increases by one unit, the level of agreement with 'Religious Freedom is important because it promotes non-discrimination on the basis of religion/ religious and cultural diversity in society/ inter-religious dialogue between religions/ equality as a principle of democratic citizenship/ of tolerant and peaceful co-existence of religions; will increase for 0.189 units, while other conditions remain unchanged.

We move forward to the following two scales that showed statistical significance in relation to 'Societal value of RF' – the 'Assimilation-oriented model' and 'Diversity-oriented model'. In the case of 'Assimilation-oriented model', which refers to the statement 'We should tolerate differences in private sphere but assimilate "different culture or religion" to major/dominant culture'; the regression analysis results indicated that this scale is statistically significant ($p = 0.01$), with a negative effect on 'Societal value of RF' ($B = -0.044$). These results imply that as level of agreement with the 'Assimilation-oriented model' increases by one unit, the level of agreement with 'Societal value of RF' statements decreases by 0.044.

With regards to 'Diversity-oriented model', results of Bivariate Regression Analysis show as well statistical significance ($p < 0.001$), but with a positive effect on 'Societal value of RF' ($B = 0.222$). Thus, as the level of agreement with the statement 'The right to have one's 'difference' (minority religiosity, ethnicity, etc.) should be recognised in and supported in the public and private spheres' increases by one unit, the level of agreement with 'Religious Freedom is important because it promotes non-discrimination on the basis of religion/ religious and cultural diversity in society/ inter-religious dialogue between religions/ equality as a principle of democratic citizenship/ of tolerant and peaceful co-existence of religions; will increase for 0.222 units, while other conditions remain unchanged.

Regarding our independent variables – 'Membership and belonging' and 'Identity and origin', results of Bivariate Regression Analysis indicate these two scales as non-significant ($p = 0.23$; $p = 0.19$), with both of the scales having a negative effect on 'Societal value of RF' ($B = -0.030$; $B = -0.044$) (See Table 14).

The Durbin–Watson statistic is 1.960, whereby values ranging from 1 to 3, are acceptable according to Field (2009), signifying no autocorrelation between variables. Regarding the normality of data distribution, we again call upon the central limit theorem, like in the previously conducted regression analysis, whereby, for samples larger than 30 ($N > 30$), the distribution of the data can be considered as normally distributed

(Jovetić, 2015), while the residuals are homoscedastic, thus meeting the acquired assumptions for this specific analysis.

- **The effect of ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’ on ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’**

As a third part of our Bivariate Regression analysis, we explored the effect of our independent variables ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’ on our dependent variable ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’. Our set of variables regarding ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’ consists out of three items referring to different aspects of religious freedom importance – ‘Freedom to have no religion’; ‘Freedom to have inner personal convictions’; and, ‘Freedom to worship’.

Here as well, as with the previous two conducted Bivariate Regression Analyses, we firstly performed Pearson Correlation Coefficient in order to explore the relations between our dependent and our independent variables. According to the observed results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient, all of our independent variables - ‘Citizenship and political rights’; ‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’; ‘Membership and belonging’; ‘Identity and origin’; ‘Assimilation-oriented model’; and, ‘Diversity-oriented model’ resulted as statistically significant in relation to our dependent variable ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’. Pearson correlation Coefficient showed a positive correlation for variables - ‘Citizenship and political rights’; ‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’; and, ‘Diversity-oriented model’, while for the variables - ‘Membership and belonging’; ‘Identity and origin’; and, ‘Assimilation-oriented model’, showed negative correlation with our dependent variable - ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’. The highest level of Pearson Correlation, regarding the relation of our dependent and independent variables, was found between the variables ‘Diversity oriented model’ and ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’ ($r(1147)=0.30, p<0.001$).

In ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’ scores, 15.1% of the variance is explained by ‘Citizenship and political rights’; ‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’; ‘Membership and belonging’; ‘Identity and origin’; ‘Assimilation-oriented model’ and ‘Diversity oriented model’ ($R \text{ square} = 0.151$). Furthermore, the results of ANOVA showed statistical significance ($p<0.001$), so the slope of our regression line is not zero, and our scales for measuring ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’ significantly predict ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’. ($F(6,1140)=33.84, p<0.001$).

The linear regression results show that the independent variable ‘Citizenship and political rights’ is statistically significant ($p=0.007$), with a positive effect on ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’ ($B=0.081$). These results indicate that higher levels of agreement with the statements ‘All people regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to vote/protest/form a political party’; result in higher levels of agreement with the statements – ‘For me, it is important: freedom to have no religion/ freedom to have inner personal convictions/ freedom to worship’ (‘RF aspects: belief and practice’). More specifically, if the level of agreement with ‘Citizenship and political rights’ increases by one unit, the level of agreement with the importance of ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’ will increase by 0.081 units, while other conditions remain unchanged. Furtherly, we analyse the scale concerning ‘Citizenship and socio-economic rights’. According

to the results, this variable, as well came out as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), with a positive effect on 'RF aspects: belief and practice' ($B = 0.118$). Meaning, that higher levels of agreement with the statement - all people regardless of their citizenship status should have access to basic socio-economic rights (health care, education employment), will result in higher levels of agreement with the importance of 'RF aspects: belief and practice' ('For me, it is important: freedom to have no religion/ freedom to have inner personal convictions/ freedom to worship'). Specifically, if the level of agreement with 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights' increases by one unit, the level of agreement with importance of 'RF aspects: belief and practice' will increase by 0.118 units, while other conditions remain unchanged. Following this, we explored the scale 'Identity and origin' and its effect on 'RF aspects: belief and practice'. The results show statistical significance of the independent variable 'Identity and origin' ($p = 0.036$), with a negative effect on 'RF aspects: belief and practice' ($B = -0.041$). This effect signifies that as the level of agreement with the statements 'Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who lives/is born in Croatia/Italy and has Croatian/Italian descent' increases by one unit, the level of agreement with the importance of 'RF aspects: belief and practice' ('For me, it is important: freedom to have no religion/ freedom to have inner personal convictions/ freedom to worship') will decrease for 0.041 units, while other conditions remain unchanged. This is, as well the case with the independent variable 'Assimilation-oriented model', which refers to the statement - 'We should tolerate differences in private sphere but assimilate "different culture or religion" to major/dominant culture'. For this variable, the results of Bivariate Regression Analysis show statistical significance ($p < 0.001$), with a negative effect on 'RF aspects: belief and practice' ($B = -0.065$). More specifically, these results indicate that as the level of agreement with the statement 'We should tolerate differences in private sphere but assimilate "different culture or religion" to major/dominant culture' increases by one unit, the level of agreement with the importance of 'RF aspects: belief and practice' will decrease for 0.065 units, while other conditions remain unchanged. On the other hand, 'Diversity-oriented model' resulted as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), but with a positive effect on 'RF aspects: belief and practice' ($B = 0.141$), indicating that higher levels of agreement with 'Diversity-oriented model' will result in higher levels of agreement with 'RF aspects: belief and practice'. Concretely, as level of agreement with the statement 'The right to have one's 'difference' (minority religiosity, ethnicity, etc.) should be recognised in and supported in the public and private spheres' increases by one unit, the level of agreement with 'For me, it is important: freedom to have no religion/ freedom to have inner personal convictions/ freedom to worship' will increase for 0.141 units, while the other conditions remain unchanged. The only variable that resulted as non-significant was 'Membership and belonging' ($p = 0.079$), with a negative effect on 'RF aspects: belief and practice' ($B = -0.035$) (See Table 14).

The Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.886, signifying no autocorrelation between variables³³. Regarding the normality of data distribution, we again call upon the central limit theorem, like in the previously conducted regression analysis, whereby for samples larger than 30 ($N > 30$), the distribution of the data can be

³³ Values ranging from 1 to 3, are acceptable according to Field (2009).

considered as normally distributed (Jovetić, 2015), while the residuals are homoscedastic, thus meeting the acquired assumptions for this specific analysis.

4.5.2. Main Conclusions on the Findings for Hypothesis 1

Our first hypothesis regards attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights and its association with attitudes regarding religious freedom, and it was tested by conducting Bivariate Regression Analysis. This type of analysis has served us to explore whether attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights have an affect on attitudes toward religious freedom. To test our hypothesis – *'Free and equal citizenship is the basis for Religious Freedom, more positive attitudes toward equal citizenship and citizens' rights will be associated with the more positive attitudes toward religious freedom'* we performed Bivariate Regression Analysis on three different aspects of religious freedom attitudes – 'Socio-legal function of RF'; 'Societal value of RF' and 'RF aspects: belief and practice', testing the impact of six scales concerning citizenship and citizens' rights – 'Citizenship and political rights'; 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights'; 'Membership and belonging'; 'Identity and origin'; 'Assimilation-oriented model'; and, 'Diversity-oriented model'. The results of the analysis in the case of our first hypothesis have shown that, in all three cases of RF variables, 'Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights' significantly predict 'Attitudes toward religious freedom. Specifically, in the case of 'Socio-legal function of RF', 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights'; 'Assimilation-oriented model'; and, 'Diversity-oriented model' resulted as statistically significant, whereby variable 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights' and 'Diversity-oriented model' had a positive impact, while 'Assimilation-oriented model' had a negative impact on attitudes toward RF. In other words, the more participants agreed that all people regardless of their citizenship status should have access to basic socio-economic rights (health care, education employment), the more they agreed with the idea that religious freedom means 'Freedom to choose my religious/non-religious identity'; 'Freedom to speak on religious matters openly and freely'; 'Non-discrimination on the basis of religion'; 'Equality of various religions before the law': 'An important right in democratic society'; 'Non-violent coexistence for all religions in every society' ('Socio-legal function of RF'). As well, higher levels of agreement with the statement, 'The right to have one's 'difference' (minority religiosity, ethnicity, etc.) should be recognised in and supported in the public and private spheres', result in higher levels of agreement with 'Socio-legal function of RF'. And finally, the more participants agree with 'We should tolerate differences in private sphere but assimilate "different culture or religion" to major/dominant culture'; the less they agree that RF meaning should be seen through the prism of 'Freedom to choose my religious/non-religious identity'; 'Freedom to speak on religious matters openly and freely'; 'Non-discrimination on the basis of religion'; 'Equality of various religions before the law': 'An important right in democratic society'; 'Non-violent coexistence for all religions in every society'. Furtherly, in the case of 'Societal value of RF', the results of Bivariate Regression Analysis showed that 'Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights' significantly predict

attitudes toward 'Societal value of RF'. Three of the tested scales resulted as statistically significant, with a positive impact – 'Citizenship and political rights'; 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights'; 'Diversity-oriented model'; while 'Assimilation-oriented model' resulted as statistically significant, but with a negative impact, as well as in the previous model. Thus, the results indicate, with higher levels of agreement with the statement that a person regardless of their citizenship status should have a right to vote/ protest/ form a political party/education/ health care/ employment; will result in higher levels of agreement with statements that RF is important because it promotes 'non-discrimination on the basis of religion; religious and cultural diversity in society'; 'inter-religious dialogue'; 'equality as principle of democratic citizenship'; and it is 'important for tolerant and peaceful co-existence of religions'. As well, the results indicate that higher levels of agreement with the statement 'The right to have one's 'difference' (minority religiosity, ethnicity, etc.) should be recognised in and supported in the public and private spheres', results in higher levels of agreement with perceiving the importance of religious freedom through concepts of equality, peaceful co-existence, inter-religious dialogue, non-discrimination; and, cultural and religious diversity. Lastly, we tested the impact of 'Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights' on attitudes toward 'RF aspects: belief and practice', and here as well, the results of Bivariate Regression Analysis showed that attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights significantly predict attitudes toward 'RF aspects: belief and practice'. Specifically, five out of six tested variables concerning attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights resulted as statistically significant, whereby 'Citizenship and political rights'; 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights' and 'Diversity oriented model' again resulted as statistically significant with a positive effect. On the other hand 'Assimilation-oriented model' and 'Identity and origin' resulted as statistically significant with a negative impact on attitudes toward 'RF aspects: belief and practice'. Meaning, the more participants agreed with statements concerning 'Citizenship and political rights'; 'Citizenship and socio-economic rights' and 'Diversity oriented model'; the more participants agreed that it is important to have 'Freedom to have no religion'; 'Freedom to have inner personal convictions'; and, 'Freedom to worship'. Having in mind the results, the analysis as well showed us, that the more participants agree with 'Assimilation-oriented model', and the more they perceive Croatian/Italian citizen is only a person who lives/was born/ has Croatian/Italian descent; the less they perceive freedom of worship, inner personal convictions and freedom to have no religion as an important aspects of religious freedom. In all three cases ('Socio-legal function of RF'; 'Societal value of RF'; 'RF aspects: belief and practice'), the highest level of Pearson correlation coefficient was found between these scales and variable 'Diversity-oriented model'.

4.6. Analysis for H2 – ‘State-religious Relations and Protection of Religious Freedom’

In order to test our second hypothesis – ‘The stronger is the identification of religion with the State, the lower is the protection of religious freedom’, we decided to compute Pearson Correlation Coefficient in order to determine the relation between our independent variables which concern State-religious models and socio-cultural attitude toward religion, and our dependent variable concerning ‘Protection of Religious Freedom’. Our independent variables are – ‘State-religious neutrality’; ‘State-religious support’; ‘Model of control over religion’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’. For the purposes of our research and in order to get a more clear idea of the relation between ‘State-religious relations’ and ‘Protection of RF’, we will as well perform Pearson Correlation Coefficient analysis for each sample individually – Croatian and Italian one. Before we go into the details of Pearson Correlation Coefficient results, we will more closely explain the variables on which we lean our analysis.

Our dependent variable ‘Protection of Religious Freedom’ consists of four items: ‘Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for the Catholic Church and religious minorities’; ‘Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for Catholics and non-religious people’; ‘Croatian/Italian state does not favour any religious group’; ‘Croatian/ Italian state manages religious issues very well’. Furthermore, our scale ‘Protection of Religious Freedom’ measured a very good level of reliability, exactly 0.82 on the Cronbach alpha coefficient analysis. ‘State-religious neutrality’ is a scale composed of three items - ‘The state should provide equal conditions for religious and non-religious people’; ‘The state should not favour any religious group’; ‘State should be neutral and treat equally all religions and allow them to be present in public sphere’. This scale, according to Cronbach alpha measured a moderate reliability of 0.54. Furtherly, the scale concerning ‘State-religious support’ consists of two items – ‘State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture’ (Model of endorsed Catholic Church) and ‘State should guarantee special legal status of a preferred set of religions and recognize special role of them in cultural and political spheres’ (Model of endorsed religions). Finally, the last variable which concerns models of State-religious relations, is a single variable ‘Model of control over religion’ - ‘It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere’. We will use these three sets of variables to establish the perception of preferred State-religious models by participants, with a tendency to determine the relation of independent variables which refer to State-religious relations with our dependent variable ‘Protection of religious freedom’. Additionally, we will add the aspect of ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ to determine whether perception of dominant religion (Catholic Church) and culture is related to attitudes toward ‘Protection of religious freedom’, and how ‘Socio-cultural attitude’ is related to preferred view on ‘State-religious relations’. The scale ‘Socio-cultural attitude’ consists of two items – ‘The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in

society’ and ‘In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’ (Cronbach alpha = 0.72) (for more details on scales see Subchapter 4.2; Table 5).

- **Pearson Correlation coefficient results for ‘State-religious relations’; ‘Socio-cultural attitude’ and ‘Protection of religious freedom’**

Furtherly, we will provide the details on Pearson Correlation Coefficient results, in order to determine the relation of our independent variables (‘State-religious neutrality’; ‘State-religious support’; ‘Model of control over religion’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’) on our dependent variable – ‘Protection of Religious Freedom’.

Table 15. **Pearson Correlation Coefficient results for ‘State-religious models’; ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ and ‘Protection of religious freedom’**

	Protection of religious freedom
State-religious neutrality	-0.220**
State-religious support	0.400**
Model of control over religion	0.027
Socio-cultural attitude toward religion	0.505**
<p>These results refer to analysis of both samples together – Croatian and Italian State-religious neutrality - ‘The state should provide equal conditions for religious and non-religious people’; ‘The state should not favour any religious group’; ‘State should be neutral and treat equally all religions and allow them to be present in public sphere’. State-religious support - ‘State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture’; ‘State should guarantee special legal status of a preferred set of religions and recognize special role of them in cultural and political spheres’. Model of control over religion - ‘It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere’. Socio-cultural attitude toward religion - ‘The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in society’; ‘In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’. Protection of religious freedom - ‘Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for the Catholic Church and religious minorities’; ‘Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for Catholics and non-religious people’; ‘Croatian/Italian state does not favour any religious group’; ‘Croatian/ Italian state manages religious issues very well’.</p>	

According to the results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient, our first scale ‘State-religious neutrality’ in relation to ‘Protection of RF’ resulted as statistically significant, implying a negative and small correlation ($r = -0.22$). These results imply that the more participants agree that State should be neutral, avoid religious favouritism, and provide equal conditions for all religious groups, the less they agree that religious freedoms are protected in Croatia and Italy. More specifically, they perceive that Croatia/Italy do not provide equal conditions for all religious groups. Concerning ‘State-religious support’ in relation to ‘Protection of RF’, Pearson Correlation Coefficient showed, statistically significant, high correlation for these two variables ($r = 0.40$). Specifically, the more participants perceive special role of Catholic Church (model of endorsed Catholic Church), the more they agree that Croatia and Italy provide equal conditions for Catholic Church and religious minorities/non-religious people, or they believe that Croatia/Italy handle religious issues very well. Our last model concerning State-religious relations, ‘Model of control over religion’ resulted as statistically significant, but with an extremely small correlation with regards to ‘Protection of Religious Freedom’ ($r = 0.02$) (See Table 15). Finally, we explore the relation of ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ which refers to perceiving the Catholic Church and Croatian/Italian culture as a part of identity that should be favoured; in relation to ‘Protection of RF’. Pearson Correlation Coefficient resulted as statistically significant in the case of these two variables, indicating a positive, quite high correlation of 0.50.

Specifically, the more the participants perceive that ‘The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in society’; and the more they agree with the statement ‘In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’; they more agree that Croatia/Italy offers equal conditions for all religious groups/and handle religious issues very well (See Table 15).

In order to grasp more into the details of the analysis, we as well, explored the differences between Croatian and Italian samples with regard to correlations between the above-mentioned variables. Therefore, we will firstly provide results of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient for the Croatian sample, regarding the relation of our independent variables (‘State-religious neutrality’; ‘State-religious support’; ‘Model of control over religion’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’) on our dependent variable – ‘Protection of Religious Freedom’. Following this, we will explore the relation of these variables in the case of the Italian sample. This way, we will be able to see whether and how much the results of Pearson Coefficient Analysis vary in data of the whole sample, likewise, determining the differences between the Croatian and Italian samples in terms of relation between the explored variables.

Table 16. **Pearson Correlation Coefficient results for ‘State-religious models’; ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ and ‘Protection of religious freedom’ – Croatia and Italy**

	Protection of religious freedom	
	CROATIA	ITALY
State-religious neutrality	-0.262**	-0.155**
State-religious support	0.454**	0.337**
Model of control over religion	0.022	0.010
Socio-cultural attitude toward religion	0.600**	0.421**

These results refer to analysis of Croatian and Italian sample separately.
State-religious neutrality - ‘The state should provide equal conditions for religious and non-religious people’; ‘The state should not favour any religious group’; ‘State should be neutral and treat equally all religions and allow them to be present in public sphere’.
State-religious support - ‘State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture’; ‘State should guarantee special legal status of a preferred set of religions and recognize special role of them in cultural and political spheres’.
Model of control over religion - ‘It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere’.
Socio-cultural attitude toward religion - ‘The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in society’; ‘In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’.
Protection of religious freedom - ‘Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for the Catholic Church and religious minorities’; ‘Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for Catholics and non-religious people’; ‘Croatian/Italian state does not favour any religious group’; ‘Croatian/ Italian state manages religious issues very well’.

Looking at the overall general differences, in comparison to the Italian sample, Croatia had slightly higher levels of correlation between our independent variable ‘State-religious neutrality’; ‘State-religious support’; ‘Model of control over religion’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ and our dependent variable – ‘Protection of Religious Freedom’ (See Table 16). Statistical significance was the same for both samples, and as well, within the analysis of both samples together (See Table 15 and Table 16). Therefore, ‘State-religious neutrality’; ‘State-religious support’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude’ in relation to ‘Protection of RF’ resulted as statistically significant in both, the Croatian and Italian samples. The largest difference is notable in terms of the relation between the variable ‘Socio-cultural attitude’ and ‘Protection of RF’. Hereby, the results imply that in the case of Croatian sample, Pearson Correlation Coefficient measured 0.60; implying a very strong, positive correlation, while in the case of the Italian sample, Pearson

Correlation Coefficient measured 0.42. This implies that the variables ‘The Catholic Church as part of identity should be favoured in society’ and ‘In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’ is in much higher correlation with the level of agreement with ‘Croatia/Italy offers equal conditions for all religious groups/and handle religious issues very well’, in the case of Croatian sample (See Table 16).

Furtherly, we explore the relation between ‘State-religious models’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’, whereby Pearson Correlation Coefficient results indicated several interesting results which support our second hypothesis.

Table 17. Pearson Correlation Coefficient results for ‘State-religious models’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’

	Socio-cultural attitude toward religion
State-religious neutrality	-0.484**
State-religious support	0.652**
Model of control over religion	0.132**
<p>These results refer to analysis of both samples together – Croatian and Italian State-religious neutrality - ‘The state should provide equal conditions for religious and non-religious people’; ‘The state should not favour any religious group’; ‘State should be neutral and treat equally all religions and allow them to be present in public sphere’. State-religious support - ‘State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture’; ‘State should guarantee special legal status of a preferred set of religions and recognize special role of them in cultural and political spheres’. Model of control over religion - ‘It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere’. Socio-cultural attitude toward religion - ‘The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in society’; ‘In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’.</p>	

Perception of participants regarding ‘State-religious neutrality’ in relation to ‘Socio-cultural attitude’ is in statistically significant correlation, thus indicating a negative high correlation. Meaning, the more participants agree that State should provide equal conditions for all religions, the less they agree that Catholic Church and Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured within the country due to the dominant position. As well, according to Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the variable ‘State-religious support’ is statistically significant in relation to ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’. The results indicate a positive, high correlation ($r=0.65$), implying that the more participants prefer the model of endorsed Catholic Church and model of endorsed religions (‘State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture’; ‘State should guarantee special legal status of a preferred set of religions and recognize special role of them in cultural and political spheres’), in terms of state-religious relations; the higher are the levels of agreement of participants that Catholic Church and Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured within the country due to the dominant position. As well, Pearson Correlation Coefficient results imply that ‘Model of control over religion’ in relation to ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ is in statistically significant, but small correlation ($r=0.134$), showing a positive correlation. Meaning, the more participants agree with the statement ‘It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere’, the more they agree with statements ‘The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in society’; and ‘In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’ (See Table 17).

As in the previous case, here as well, we explored the differences between the Croatian and Italian samples, in terms of the relationship between ‘State-religious models’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ (See Table 18).

Table 18. Pearson Correlation Coefficient results for ‘State-religious models’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ – Croatia and Italy

	Socio-cultural attitude toward religion	
	CROATIA	ITALY
State-religious neutrality	-0.554**	-0.336**
State-religious support	0.570**	0.668**
Model of control over religion	0.124**	0.094**
<p>These results refer to analysis of Croatian and Italian sample separately. State-religious neutrality - ‘The state should provide equal conditions for religious and non-religious people’; ‘The state should not favour any religious group’; ‘State should be neutral and treat equally all religions and allow them to be present in public sphere’. State-religious support - ‘State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture’; ‘State should guarantee special legal status of a preferred set of religions and recognize special role of them in cultural and political spheres’. Model of control over religion - ‘It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere’. Socio-cultural attitude toward religion - ‘The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in society’; ‘In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’.</p>		

The results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient for each individual sample, slightly differ from the results of the overall sample analysis, but only in terms of the level of the correlation values. Statistical significance, as well as the positivity and negativity of the values, were the same as in the results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient of the Croatian and Italian sample together. Here as well, the Croatian sample had higher correlation values between the variables than the Italian sample, except in the case of variable ‘State-religious support in relation to ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’. In the case of these two variables, according to Pearson Correlation Coefficient, measured correlation was 0.66 for the Italian sample, and 0.57 for the Croatian sample – in both cases implying a very high correlation. Regarding the rest of the variables ‘State-neutrality’ and ‘Control over religion’, the level of correlation was higher for the Croatian sample than for the Italian sample. The highest Pearson Correlation Coefficient was found between the variable ‘State-religious support’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ in both Croatian and Italian sample, implying that the more participants agree with the model of endorsed Catholic Church and model of endorsed religions in terms of state-religious relations; the higher are the levels of agreement of participants that Catholic Church and Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured within the country due to the dominant position (See Table 18).

4.6.1. The Effect of ‘State-religious models’ and ‘Socio-cultural Attitude toward Religion’ on ‘Protection of Religious Freedom’ - Regression Analysis

Leaning on the theory of Durham, and on empirical research data provided by Breskaya, Giordan, Zrinščak (2021), which support the hypothesis that ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’ and ‘State control over religion’ has a negative effect on the perception of religious freedom³⁴; we further conduct analysis in

³⁴ In five cases out of seven, when the predictive power of state-religion relations on the SPRF was depicted, the results indicated that the less the young people favored the models of an endorsed Catholic Church or state control over religion, the stronger they supported various dimensions of religious freedom (Breskaya, Giordan, Zrinščak, 2021, p. 297)

order to explore the effect of ‘State-religious models’ on perception of ‘Religious Freedom protection’ within the countries – Croatia and Italy, adding as well the aspect of socio-cultural attitude toward religion. Following this, we formulate our hypothesis stating that ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’ and ‘Model of state-control over religion’, together with ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ would have an effect on how participants perceive ‘Protection of RF’ in Croatia and Italy. More specifically, the more they agree with the ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’, as something that should be followed within their countries, the more they believe that ‘Croatia/Italy provides equal conditions for Catholic Church and minorities or non-religious groups, as well as believing that Croatia/Italy handles religious issues very well. Later on, we will test as well the impact of these variables on ‘Religious Freedom attitudes’ – specifically, concerning the freedom to change religion, freedom to have inner personal convictions, and, freedom to have no religion (‘RF belief and practice’).

Table 19. Standardized Beta Coefficient for ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’; ‘Model of control over religion’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude’ on ‘Protection of Religious Freedom’

‘Protection of Religious Freedom’	
β	
‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’	0.12***
‘Model of control over religion’	0.04
‘Socio-cultural attitude’	0.43***
R ² = 0.263	
*** $p < 0.001$; * $p < 0.05$	
These results refer to analysis of both samples together – Croatian and Italian ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’ - ‘State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture’; Model of control over religion - ‘It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere’. Socio-cultural attitude toward religion - ‘The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in society’; ‘In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’. Protection of religious freedom - ‘Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for the Catholic Church and religious minorities’; ‘Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for Catholics and non-religious people’; ‘Croatian/Italian state does not favour any religious group’; ‘Croatian/ Italian state manages religious issues very well’.	

Within this analysis, we show the effect of two single variables – ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’ and ‘Model of control over religion’ and one variable scale ‘Socio-cultural attitude’ on how participants perceive ‘Religious Freedom protection’. According to Pearson Correlation Coefficient, two of the variables resulted as statistically significant (‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude’), while the variable ‘Model of control over religion’ resulted as non-significant. ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’ is in positive, medium correlation ($r=0.39$) with ‘Protection of RF’, likewise is ‘Socio-cultural attitude’, whereby Pearson Correlation Coefficient measured statistically significant, positive and high correlation with ‘Protection of RF’. The highest level of Pearson correlation coefficient was found between the variable ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’ and ‘Socio-cultural attitude’ ($r(1172)=0.64$, $p<0.001$) (See Table 19).

In ‘Protection of RF’ scores, 26,1% of the variance is explained by ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’; ‘Model of state-control over religion’, and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ (R square = 0.263). The results of ANOVA were statistically significant ($p<0.001$), so the slope of our regression line is

not zero, and our variables ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’; ‘Model of state-control over religion’, and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ significantly predict attitudes on ‘Protection of RF’ ($F(3,1168)=138,81, p<0.001$) (See Table 19).

The linear regression results show that the ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’, which refers to the statement ‘State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture’ appeared as statistically significant ($p<0.01$), with a positive effect on ‘Protection of RF’ ($B=0.088$). Meaning, as the level of agreement with the ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’ increases by one unit, the level of perceiving ‘Croatia/Italy as the states which treat all religions equally, and handle religious issues very well’; increases for 0.088 units, while other conditions remain unchanged (See Table 19).

Furthermore, the ‘State-control model’ which refers to the statement ‘It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere’, has resulted as non-significant ($p=0.08$), with a positive effect ($B=0.037$).

Lastly, the case of ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ resulted as having a statistically significant, positive effect ($p>0.01$) on ‘Protection of RF’ ($B=0.386$). Specifically, as the level of agreement with statements ‘The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in society’ and ‘In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’ increases by one unit, the level of agreement with perceiving Croatia/Italy as the states that treat equally all religion, and handle religious issues very well will increase for 0.386 units, while other conditions remain unchanged (See Table 19).

The Durbin–Watson statistic is 1.901, whereby values ranging from 1 to 3, are acceptable according to Field (2009), signifying no autocorrelation. According to the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of normality, a significant finding of $p<0.001$; indicates that the sample distribution is significantly different from the normal distribution. In this case, if the test shows that the data cannot be normally distributed and if the sample is larger than 30 — that is, each empirical distribution of data weighs the normal amount by the central limit theorem: $N > 30$ — the distribution of the data can be considered as normally distributed (Jovetić, 2015). This was the case with our data, so we call upon the central limit theorem in the case of our sample, whereby for each item the number of participants exceeded 1000. The residuals are homoscedastic, meaning the assumption has been met.

4.6.2. The effect of ‘State-religious models’, ‘Socio-cultural Attitude toward Religion’ and ‘Level of religiosity’ on ‘Attitudes toward RF’ - Regression Analysis

Following the previous case, we further wanted to explore specifically the effect of state-religious models on attitudes toward religious freedom. Breskaya, Giordan and Zrinščak (2021), within their empirical analysis, showed that state-religious relations, specifically the ‘Model of endorsed Catholic

Church’ and the ‘Model of control over religion’ has a negative impact. Specifically, the analysis of various dimensions of religious freedom indicated that, the more young people favoured the models of an endorsed Catholic Church or state control over religion, the less they supported various dimensions of religious freedom (Breskaya, Giordan, Zrinščak, 2021, 297). Thus, leaning on these empirical findings, we will explore the effect of ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’; and ‘Model of control over religion’, as well adding the aspect of ‘Socio-cultural attitude’ and ‘Level of religiosity’ on ‘Attitudes toward RF’, specifically, choosing the category of ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’. In particular, we will explore whether in the case of our data, there is as well a negative impact of state-religious models, ‘Socio-cultural attitude’, and ‘Level of religiosity’ on attitudes toward ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’. In our case, the variable ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’ refers to – Important aspects of religious freedom are ‘Freedom to have no religion’; ‘Freedom to worship’; and, ‘Freedom to have inner personal convictions’. Our scale measuring ‘Level of religiosity’, is composed of four items –‘I am a religious person’; ‘I believe in God’; ‘My religious beliefs give my life a sense significance and purpose’; and, ‘My religious beliefs have a great influence on my life’. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale measured excellent reliability, 0.94, and a good inter-item correlation (0.80)³⁵.

Table 20. **Standardized Beta Coefficient for ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’; ‘Model of control over religion’ ‘Socio-cultural attitude’ and ‘Level of Religiosity’ on ‘Attitudes toward RF’**

	‘RF aspects: belief and practice’
	β
‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’	-0.07*
‘Model of control over religion’	-0.10***
‘Socio-cultural attitude’	-0.19***
‘Level of religiosity’	-0.10***
	R ² = 0.121
*** $p < 0.001$; * $p < 0.05$	
These results refer to analysis of both samples together – Croatian and Italian ‘Model of endorsed Catholic Church’ - ‘State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture’; Model of control over religion - ‘It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere’. Socio-cultural attitude toward religion - ‘The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in society’; ‘In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’. ‘Level of religiosity’ - ‘I am a religious person’; ‘I believe in God’; ‘My religious beliefs give my life a sense significance and purpose’; and, ‘My religious beliefs have a great influence on my life’ RF aspects: belief and practice - ‘Freedom to have no religion’; ‘Freedom to worship’; and, ‘Freedom to have inner personal convictions’	

Following this, we will explain the effect of our independent variables – ‘Model of endorsed Catholicism’; ‘Model of control over religion’; ‘Socio-cultural attitude’; and, ‘Level of religiosity’ on ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’. Firstly, we will present the data of Pearson Correlation Coefficient. According to the results, all of our independent variables have appeared as statistically significant and in negative relation to our dependent variable ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’. ‘Model of endorsed Catholicism’, according to Pearson, resulted as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), and in negative, small, correlation to ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’ ($r = -0.26$). Specifically, the more participants agree with the statement

35 Response scale for ‘Level of Religiosity’: 1—strongly disagree; 2—disagree; 3—not certain; 4—agree; 5—strongly agree; 6—not applicable for the respondent.

'State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture', the less they agree that RF aspects, such as 'Freedom to have no religion'; 'Freedom to worship'; and, 'Freedom to have inner personal convictions' are important to them. Furtherly, exploring the relation of 'Model of control over religion' on 'RF aspects: belief and practice', Pearson Correlation Coefficient resulted as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), showing a small, negative correlation ($r = -0.13$). As in the previous case, the more participants agree with the statement 'It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere', the less they agree with the importance of 'RF aspects: belief and practice'. Moreover, exploring the correlation between 'Socio-cultural attitude' and 'RF aspects: belief and practice', Pearson Correlation Coefficient results as well indicate statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), negative correlation, of medium level ($r = -0.31$). As the level of agreement with the statements 'The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in society' and 'In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture' increases; the level of agreement with the importance of 'RF aspects: belief and practice' decreases. Lastly, exploring the relation of 'Level of religiosity' and 'RF aspects: belief and practice'; Pearson Correlation Coefficient results as well indicated a statistically significant, negative relationship, as with the previous three variables ($p < 0.001$). The results imply a small, negative correlation ($r = -0.23$) between the variables, implying that with higher levels of religiosity, level of agreement with the importance of RF aspects, such as 'Freedom to have no religion'; 'Freedom to worship'; and, 'Freedom to have inner personal convictions' decreases. The highest level of Pearson Correlation Coefficient was found between the variable 'Socio-cultural attitude' and 'RF aspects: belief and practice' ($r(1171) = 0.31, p < 0.001$) (See Table 20).

In 'RF aspects: belief and practice' scores, 12,1% of the variance is explained by 'Model of endorsed Catholicism'; 'Model of control over religion'; 'Socio-cultural attitude'; and, 'Level of religiosity' (R square = 0.121). The results of ANOVA were statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), so the slope of our regression line is not zero, and our scales 'Model of endorsed Catholicism'; 'Model of control over religion'; 'Socio-cultural attitude'; and, 'Level of religiosity' significantly predict attitudes toward the importance of 'RF aspects: belief and practice' ($F(4,1166) = 40,27, p < 0.001$) (See Table 20).

The linear regression results show that the 'Model of endorsed Catholic Church', which refers to the statement 'State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture' appeared as statistically significant ($p = 0.03$), with a negative effect on 'RF aspects: belief and practice' ($B = -0.039$). Meaning, as the level of agreement with the 'Model of endorsed Catholic Church' increases by one unit, the level of agreement on the importance of RF aspects, such as 'Freedom to have no religion'; 'Freedom to worship'; and, 'Freedom to have inner personal convictions' will decrease for 0.039 units, while other conditions remain unchanged (See Table 20).

Furthermore, the 'State-control model' which refers to the statement 'It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere', has resulted as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), whereby the results of Regression Analysis imply a negative effect, ($B = -0.060$). Specifically, as the level of

agreement with ‘Model control over religion’ increases by one unit, the level of agreement with importance of having the ‘Freedom to have no religion’; ‘Freedom to worship’; and, ‘Freedom to have inner personal convictions’ (‘RF aspects: belief and practice’) will decrease by 0.060 units, while other conditions remain unchanged (See Table 20).

Furtherly, we explore the effect of ‘Socio-cultural attitude’ on attitudes toward the importance of ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’. According to the analysis, data as well indicate a statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), negative effect of ‘Socio-cultural attitude’ on ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’ ($B = -0.119$). Thus, as the level of agreement with statements ‘The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favoured in society’ and ‘In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’ increases by one unit, the level of perceiving ‘Freedom to have no religion’; ‘Freedom to worship’; and, ‘Freedom to have inner personal convictions’ as important will decrease for 0.119 units, while other conditions remain unchanged (See Table 20).

Finally, we explore the impact of ‘Level of religiosity’ on attitudes toward the importance on ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’. The results of the analysis, here as well indicated a statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), negative impact of religiosity on ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’ ($B = -0.043$). Thus, as the level of religiosity increases by one unit, the level of agreement with perceiving ‘Freedom to have no religion’; ‘Freedom to worship’; and, ‘Freedom to have inner personal convictions’ as important will decrease for 0.043 units, while other conditions remain unchanged (See Table 20).

The Durbin–Watson statistic is 1.929, whereby values ranging from 1 to 3, are acceptable according to Field (2009), signifying no autocorrelation. In the case of this conducted Bivariate Regression Analysis, as well, the sample distribution is significantly different from the normal distribution, so we call upon the central limit theorem³⁶.

4.6.3. Main Conclusions on the Findings for Hypothesis 2

In the case of our second hypothesis - *‘The stronger is the identification of the State with religion, the lower is the level of protection of religious freedom, the more participants endorse the neutral position of state-religious relations and support neutral socio-cultural attitude toward the dominant religion, the less they perceive that religious freedoms are protected in their country’*, we conducted Pearson Correlation Coefficient to test whether and how, different state-religious models (neutrality; support; control) and ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ are correlated to attitudes toward ‘Protection of religious freedom’. The results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient indicated statistically significant relationship of all of our independent variables ‘State- religious neutrality’; ‘State-religious support’; ‘Model of control over religion’

³⁶ In this case, if the test shows that the data cannot be normally distributed and if the sample is larger than 30 — that is, each empirical distribution of data weighs the normal amount by the central limit theorem: $N > 30$ — the distribution of the data can be considered as normally distributed (Jovetic 2015). This was the case with our data, so we call upon the central limit theorem in the case of our sample, whereby for each item the number of participants exceeded 1000. The residuals are homoscedastic, meaning the assumption has been met.

and; 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' in relation to attitudes toward 'Protection of religious freedom'.

According to the results, the more participants agreed that the State should be neutral in relation to religiosity, thus providing equality of religious and religious identities and their presence in the public spheres, and not favouring any religious group; the less our participants agreed that the Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for Catholic and non-religious people; does not favour any religious group, and they disagreed more that Croatian/Italian state handles religious issues very well. In the case of State-religious support, which is a model that encompasses two aspects – model of endorsed Catholicism and model of endorsed religions; the Pearson Correlation Coefficient has shown that there is a statistically significant, positive relation with our dependent variable – 'Protection of religious freedom'. Meaning, higher levels of agreement that the State should act in line with endorsing Catholicism and endorsing religions; results in higher levels of agreement with statements that the Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for Catholic and non-religious people; handles religious issues very well; and, does not favour any religious group. Model of control over religion resulted as statistically significant, but with a very small level of correlation with 'Protection of RF' variables. The highest level of Pearson Correlation Coefficient was found between the variable 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' and 'Protection of religious freedom'. This result indicated that higher levels of agreement of our participants with idea that the Catholic Church as a part of identity should be favoured and enjoy greater attention due to its prevalence within the society; is correlated to higher levels of agreement that the Croatian/Italian state provides equal conditions for all religious group, as well as for non-religious people, handles religious issues very well, and, does not favour any particular religious group within the society.

As well, we wanted to explore the relation between 'State-religious relations' and 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion', analysing the patterns of the relationship between state-religious models (support, neutrality, control) in terms of attitudes toward the dominant religion and culture of our participants. The variable 'Socio-cultural attitude is composed of two items – 'The Catholic Church as a part of Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured in society' and 'In Croatia/Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture'. According to the results, all three variables indicating state-religious relations resulted as statistically significant in relation to 'Socio-cultural attitude'. Pearson Correlation Coefficient results have shown that those participants leaning to higher levels of agreement with the perception that State should be neutral and provide equal conditions for all religious and non-religious groups, tend to disagree more that Catholic Church and dominant religion and culture should be favoured within both societies – Croatian and Italian. In terms of 'State-religious support', Pearson Correlation Coefficient, showed a statistically significant, positive relationship, indicating that those participants who agree more that Catholicism and preferred religions should enjoy a special legal status within society, and be engaged within the public political and cultural spheres of society; as well agree more with statements 'The Catholic Church as a part of Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured in society' and 'In Croatia/Italy it

would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture'. The first two variables ('State-religious support' and 'State-religious neutrality'), resulted in having an extremely strong Pearson Correlation Coefficient in relation to 'Socio-cultural attitude'. Finally, regarding the model of state control over religion, Pearson correlation showed a small, but statistically significant correlation toward the variable 'Socio-cultural attitude'. In this sense, the results indicated, the more participants agreed that Catholicism should be favoured and the main attention should be leaning toward dominant culture and religion; the more participants agreed that 'It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere'. The highest Pearson Correlation Coefficient was found between the variable 'State-religious support' and 'Socio-cultural attitude'.

Regarding the difference between the Croatian and Italian samples, with regards to Pearson Correlation Coefficient, in terms of the relation between 'State-religious models' and 'Religious Freedom protection'; the analysis has shown mostly similar results for both the Croatian and Italian samples, in terms of statistical significance and positivity and negativity of the variables relations. Thus, in regard to levels of correlation, Croatia had slightly higher levels of correlation between our independent variable 'State-religious neutrality'; 'State-religious support'; 'Model of control over religion' and 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' and our dependent variable – 'Protection of religious freedom'. On the other hand, statistical significance for each item was the same for both samples, and as well, within the analysis of both samples together. The highest correlation difference, between the two analysed samples was noticed in terms of 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' and 'RF protection', whereby the Croatian participants' responses resulted in higher levels of agreement. Furthermore, we have provided Pearson Coefficient results for each sample with regards to the relation of 'State-religious models' and 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion'. Here as well, the Croatian sample had higher correlation values between the variables than the Italian sample, except in the case of the variable 'State-religious support' in relation to 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion', whereby the analysis measured 0.66 for the Italian sample, and 0.57 for Croatian sample – in both cases implying a very high correlation. Regarding the variables 'State-neutrality' and 'Control over religion', the level of correlation was higher for the Croatian samples than for the Italian sample. The highest Pearson Correlation Coefficient was found between the variables 'State-religious support' and 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' in both Croatian and Italian samples. Meaning, the more participants agree with the model of endorsed Catholic Church and the model of endorsed religions in terms of state-religious relations; the higher are the levels of agreement of participants that the Catholic Church and Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured within the country due to the dominant position.

Within the analysis for our second hypothesis, we as well wanted to see the effect of certain State-religious models and 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' on attitudes toward 'Religious freedom protection'. In order to explore this issue, we conducted a Bivariate Regression analysis, analysing what is the effect of 'Model of endorsed Catholicism'; 'Model of control over religion' and 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' on attitudes toward 'Protection of religious freedom'. The result has shown that our

variables concerning State-religious models and socio-cultural attitude toward religion significantly predict attitudes toward 'Protection of RF'. Specifically, the results indicated a statistically significant, positive effect in the case of two variables – 'Model of endorsed Catholicism' and 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion'. Accordingly to the results, the more participants agree with 'Model of endorsed Catholicism' and the more participants believe that Catholicism and dominant culture should be favoured due to its prevalence within the society; the more participants perceive that Croatia and Italy handle religious issues very well, provide equal conditions for all religious groups and do not favour any religious group. In the case of this Bivariate Regression Analysis, 'Model of control over religion' resulted as non-significant, which was previously indicated by the results of Pearson Correlation coefficient results as well.

Leaning on the empirical data concerning the state-religious model and its effect on attitudes toward religious freedom (Breskaya, Giordan, Zrinščak, 2021), we also conducted analysis to explore whether in the case of our data, 'Model of endorsed Catholicism' and 'Model of control over religion' will as well have a negative impact on 'Attitudes toward religious freedom', moreover adding the aspect of religiosity and socio-cultural attitude toward religion to our analysis. Specifically, we took the aspect of religious freedom attitudes which refer to belief and practice – 'Freedom to have no religion'; 'Freedom to have inner personal convictions'; and, 'Freedom to worship'. The results of Bivariate Regression Analysis have shown that all of our independent variables have appeared as statistically significant and in negative relation to our dependent variable 'RF aspects: belief and practice'; and our scales 'Model of endorsed Catholicism'; 'Model of control over religion'; 'Socio-cultural attitude'; and, 'Level of religiosity' significantly predict attitudes toward the importance of 'RF aspects: belief and practice'. In this sense, participants with higher levels of religiosity, who perceive that Catholicism and dominant culture should be favoured and believe that State should guarantee special legal status to Catholicism, as well that the State should control religion; will result in having more negative attitudes toward religious freedom aspects of practice and belief, such as freedom to worship; freedom to have no religion and freedom to have inner personal convictions. Accordingly, the results of this analysis support the empirical findings of Breskaya, Giordan and Zrinščak (2021), and in our case as well, 'Model of endorsed Catholicism' and 'Model of control over religion' together with the 'Level of religiosity' and 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' has a negative impact on 'Attitudes toward RF'.

4.7. Analysis for H3 - Identification with National Culture and Dominant Religion – Independent samples t-test.

In order to test our third hypothesis - Participants' identification with national culture and dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy, we decided to perform independent samples t-tests, since this analysis is used to search for differences among two samples/groups. Independent samples t-test is a parametric test, commonly used when we want to compare between two unrelated samples/groups of participants, and explore differences between them within a particular aspect (Brownlow et al., 2004). In


line with this, we performed four Independent samples t-tests, to capture the differences between Croatian and Italian participants within the aspect of identification with national culture and dominant religion, conducting analysis on five different variables – ‘Role of religion in relation to nationality’; ‘Level of cultural identification’; ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’; and ‘Assimilation-oriented model’.

Our scale ‘Role of religion in relation to nationality’ is composed of two items – ‘Religion should strengthen the national spirit’ and ‘Religion should take responsibility with the state for national culture’, measured by Likert scale from 1 to 5. ‘Level of cultural identification’ is a single variable, measuring the level of participants’ identification with the culture of the country on a scale from 1 to 10, which, for the purposes of this analysis has been recoded from 1 to 5, to be in accordance with other measuring scales³⁷. Finally, we use three single variables, from which two regard participants’ ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’, and one refers to ‘Assimilation-oriented model’. Socio-cultural attitude refers to ‘In Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’ and ‘The Catholic Church as a part of Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured in society’, while ‘Assimilation-oriented model’ refers to ‘We should tolerate differences in private sphere, but assimilate “different culture or religion” to major/dominant culture’.

Conducting analysis by performing Independent samples t-test, firstly requires fulfilling certain conditions which allow us to proceed further with the analysis by using Independent samples t-test. These conditions regard – normality of data distribution and Levene’s Test for equality of variances – which forms part of Independent samples t-test. Regarding the first condition, according to the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of normality, a significant finding of $p < 0.001$; indicates that the sample distribution is significantly different from the normal distribution. However, we call upon the central limit theorem, whereby, if the test shows that the data cannot be normally distributed and if the sample is larger than 30, the distribution of the data can be considered as normally distributed (Jovetić, 2015). Regarding the second condition, if Levene’s test is non-significant ($p > 0.05$) this means that the assumption of equal variance is fulfilled. On the other hand, if the Levene’s Test of equality of variances resulted as significant ($p < 0.05$), indicating that the samples variances are unequal, according to (Brownlow et al., 2004) it is up to the researcher and our own academic judgement whether we will accept the values which come under the condition ‘Equal variances not assumed’.

Following this, we performed further analysis, by comparing two groups of sample – Croatian participants (N=547) and Italian participants (N=669) regarding differences in the means on ‘Role of religion in relation to nationality’. In our case, Levene’s test resulted as non-significant ($p=0.10$), so we can move on to the statistics for the tests under the condition of equal variances assumed. According to Independent samples t-test results, there is a statistically significant difference in means between the Croatian and Italian samples, regarding attitudes toward religion in relation to nationality, $t(1214) = 11.862$, $p < 0.001$. The average mean for the Croatian sample was 3.58, while for the Italian sample, the average mean

was 2.90³⁸. Specifically, Croatian participants on average were not certain, leaning toward agreement, while Italian participants, in average disagreed, leaning toward a neutral attitude toward the statements ‘Religion should strengthen the national spirit’ and ‘Religion should take responsibility with the state for national culture’. Mean difference between the two samples is 0.681, while the results of Cohen’s d indicate the level of this difference, which in our case measured 0.684, implying a medium level of differences between Croatian and Italian sample³⁹ (See Figure 1).




Furthermore, we proceed with the analysis by exploring the differences between Croatian (N=603) and Italian (N=700) participants with regards to ‘Level of Cultural identification’. In the case of ‘Level of cultural identification’ Levene’s test resulted as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), thus implying that equal variances are not assumed. Following this, the Independent samples t-test resulted as statistically non-significant ($p > 0.005$), implying that there is no significant difference between the two samples. This was as well visible from the average means of level of cultural identification between the samples, whereby both samples correspond to a medium level of cultural identification. This variable originally measured the level of cultural identification on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 – weak identification; 10 – strong identification). Though, for the purposes of this analysis, we have recoded this variable with new values, 1 – very low level of identification; 2 – low level of identification; 3 – medium level of identification; 4 high level of identification; and, 5 – very high level of cultural identification. Cohen’s d was smaller than 0.20 (-0.14), indicating that the differences between the two samples can be neglected (See Figure 2).

³⁷ 1 – Very low level of identification; 2 – Low level of identification; 3 – Medium level of identification; 4 - High level of identification; and, 5 – Very high level of cultural identification.

³⁸ Response scale for ‘Role of religion in relation to nationality’: 1—strongly disagree; 2—disagree; 3—not certain; 4—agree; 5—strongly agree; thus, in average, Croatian participants were not certain, leaning to agreement with the statements; while Italian participants, in average disagreed, leaning to neutral attitude.


³⁹ Values for Cohen’s d: 0.20 – small effect, 0.50 – medium effect, 0.80 – large effect. If the difference is lower than 0.20; the difference should be neglected, even if statistically significant.

Figure 2.




Moving forward, we explore the differences between Croatian and Italian participants in terms of attitudes toward the statement ‘In Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’. Levene’s test resulted as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), indicating that equal variances are not assumed, and we continue with the t-test results, looking at the values under the condition ‘Equal variances are not assumed’. The results of the Independent samples t-test resulted as statistically significant, indicating that there is a statistically significant difference between Croatian and Italian participants regarding the attitudes toward the statement ‘In Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’, $t(992.22) = 8.169$, $p < 0.001$. The average means, regarding this statement, for Croatian participants ($N=522$), is 2.24; while, for Italian participants ($N=678$), the average mean was 1.78. These results indicated, that in average, Italian participants strongly disagreed, while Croatian participants only disagreed with the statement. For these two samples, the mean difference was estimated to 0.466, while Cohen's d measured an effect of 0.488, implying, a moderate/medium effect of differences between the Croatian and Italian samples. Since, in the case of this analysis, equal variances are not assumed, we as well took into account the Mean Difference and Standard Error Difference. The Mean Difference is the difference between the means of our two groups, and if the null hypothesis is true, then the real difference in the population means is zero, while the Std. Error Difference estimates the standard deviation of all the differences in sample means when the null hypothesis is true (Brownlow et al., 2014). Thus, in our case, the t value of 8.169 indicates that the difference in our sample means (Mean Difference) of 0.466 is over eight times larger than the Std. Error Difference of 0.057, which enables us to reject the null hypothesis that the difference in population means is zero (See Figure 3).

Figure 3.




In addition to that, we performed Independent samples t-test in order to explore the differences between Croatian and Italian participants on attitudes toward the statement 'The Catholic Church as a part of Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured in society'. Levene's test resulted as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), indicating that equal variances are not assumed. Following the analysis, the results of the Independent samples t-test imply, that there is a statistically significant difference in average means on attitudes toward the statement 'The Catholic Church as a part of Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured in society', $t(1273) = 8.726$, $p < 0.001$. Croatian participants' ($N = 576$) average mean on this statement is 2.42; while Italian participants' average mean is 1.88. Here as well, the results of average means imply that Italian participants strongly disagree, while Croatian participants only disagreed with the statement. As well, the results show that the mean difference is 0.543, while Cohen's d test measured an effect of 0.491, implying a moderate/medium effect on differences between the two explored samples. Here as well, having the condition of equal variances not assumed, we look at the Mean Difference and Std. Error Difference. The t value of 8.726 indicates that the difference in our sample means (Mean Difference) of 0.543 is over eight times larger than the Std. Error Difference of 0.063, which enables us to reject the null hypothesis that the difference in population means is zero (See Figure 4).

Figure 4.



Finally, we conducted Independent samples t-test with a tendency to explore the differences between Croatian and Italian participants in regard to attitudes toward ‘Assimilation-oriented model’. Further analysis of the t-test, specifically Levene’s Test for equality of variances, has shown statistical significance ($p < 0.001$), which leads us to the conclusion that equal variances are not assumed. In line with this, Independent samples t-test results indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between Croatian and Italian participants in terms of attitudes toward ‘Assimilation-oriented model’. In this case, the mean difference between the analysed samples is 0.720, while the results of Cohen’s d indicate a quite high effect (0.676), on differences between the two analysed samples ($t(1193) = 11.600$, $p < 0.001$). In average means, Croatian participants ($N=527$), scored 3.20, while Italian participants (668), in average means scored 2.48. Meaning, in average means, Italian participants disagree more with the statement ‘We should tolerate differences in private sphere, but assimilate “different culture or religion” to major/dominant culture’ (‘Assimilation-oriented model’). Since we don’t have the assumption of equal variances in this case, we as well look at the Mean Difference and Std. Error difference, whereby our t value of 11.748 indicates that the Mean Difference of 0.720 is eleven times larger than the Std. Error Difference of 0.061, which enables us to reject the null hypothesis that the difference in population means is zero (See Figure 5).


Figure 5.



4.7.1. Differences between Croatian and Italian Participants in Attitudes toward Religious Freedom – Independent samples t-test


Within the framework of H3, we as well wanted to explore the differences between Croatian and Italian participants with regards to attitudes toward Religious Freedom, specifically, we are interested to see whether there are differences between the two samples in attitudes toward ‘Socio-legal function of RF’; ‘Societal value of RF’; and, ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’. As with the previously performed Independent samples t-test, we again lean on the central limit theorem regarding the normality of data distribution, whereby for samples with a size greater than 30, the distribution of the data can be considered as normally distributed (Jovetić, 2015). We then proceed with analysing the differences between the Croatian and Italian samples.

Therefore, we performed Independent samples t-test to explore the differences between the Croatian and Italian samples regarding attitudes toward ‘Socio-legal function of RF’. In the case of Levene’s test for equality of variances, the p value resulted as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), indicating that equal variances are not assumed in the case of the variable ‘Socio-legal function of RF’. In line with this, the results of Independent samples t-test results imply, that there is a statistically significant difference between Croatian and Italian participants when it comes to attitudes toward ‘Socio-legal meaning of RF’, $t(1307) = -8.402$, $p < 0.001$. In the case of ‘Socio-legal function of RF’, for Croatian participants ($N=603$), the average means measured was 4.47, while for Italian participants ($N=706$), the average mean was calculated to 4.71. Specifically, the mean difference is set to -0.244, while Cohen’s d indicates a moderate/medium effect (-0.485) regarding the differences between the two samples. Since we presented the data under the condition of unequal variances, we will as well provide the data concerning Mean Difference and Std. Error Difference. Our t value of -8.402 indicates that the Mean Difference of -0.244 is eight times larger than the Std. Error Difference of 0.029, which enables us to reject the null hypothesis that the difference in population means is zero (See Figure 6).




Furtherly, we analyse the variable ‘Societal value of RF’. Levene’s test resulted as non-significant ($p=0.733$), which implies that equal variances are assumed in the case of attitudes toward ‘Societal value of RF’. Independent samples t-test resulted as statistically significant, implying that there is a statistically significant difference between Croatian and Italian participants in average attitudes toward ‘Societal value of RF’, $t(1296) = -5.229$, $p < 0.001$. In terms of differences between Croatian and Italian participants, in average means, Croatian participants (602) scored 4.06, while Italian participants ($N=696$) scored 4.26 in average means of attitudes toward ‘Societal value of RF’. The mean difference was measured to -0.204, while Cohen’s d test showed a small effect on differences between the two analysed samples (-0.291), with regards to attitudes to ‘Societal value of RF’ (See Figure 7).

Figure 7.



Finally, we explored the differences regarding 'RF aspects: belief and practice' using the Independent samples t-test. The p-value in Levene's test for equality of variances resulted as statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), implying that equal variances are not assumed. According to the overall results of the Independent samples t-test, in terms of differences between the Croatian and Italian samples, in regards to 'RF aspects: belief and practice', the results imply a statistically significant difference ($p < 0.001$), $t(1042.90) = -6.795$, $p < 0.001$. With regards to 'RF aspects: belief and practice', in the case of Croatian participants (603), the average means score was 4.38, while, in the case of the Italian sample ($N=708$), the average means score was 4.60. In the case of this variable, the mean difference is -0.223, while Cohen's d test indicates a small effect on differences (-0.387). Since we conducted this analysis under the condition 'Equal variances not assumed', we as well, provide the data concerning Mean Difference and Std. Error Difference, whereby our t value of -6.795 indicates that the Mean Difference of -0.223 is more than six times larger than the Std. Error Difference of 0.033, which enables us to reject the null hypothesis that the difference in population means is zero (See Figure 8).

Figure 8.



4.7.2. Main Conclusion on the Findings for Hypothesis 3

For our third hypothesis – *‘Participants’ identification with national culture and dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy, which is reflected in more negative attitudes toward Religious Freedom*’ we performed five Independent samples t-tests explore the relation between religion and nationality, and three Independent samples explore the differences in religious freedom attitudes between Croatian and Italian participants. For this analysis, we used five variables which served us as aspects of identification with national culture and dominant religion – ‘Role of religion in relation to nationality’; ‘Level of cultural identification’; ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’; and ‘Assimilation-oriented model’. For the variable ‘Role of religion in relation to nationality’, the analysis has shown that there is a statistically significant difference of medium level between the Croatian and Italian samples, whereby Italian participants disagreed more with the statements ‘Religion should strengthen the national spirit’ and ‘Religion should take responsibility with the state for national culture’, than Croatian participants. Furthermore, regarding ‘Level of cultural identification’, the Independent samples t-test showed that there is no statistically significant difference between the Croatian and Italian samples, while both samples appertain to medium level of cultural identification with the country, according to the average means. Moving forward, we analysed the differences between the samples in terms of ‘Socio-cultural attitude toward religion’ and tested two variables – ‘In Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’ and ‘The Catholic Church as a part of Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured in society’. For the first variable, the Independent samples t-test has indicated that there is a statistically significant difference of medium/moderate level, between Croatian and Italian samples regarding the level of agreement with the statement. Specifically, Croatian participants, on average, agree more, than the Italian participants, with the idea that ‘In Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture’. In the case of our second variable concerning socio-cultural attitude toward religion - 'The Catholic Church as a part of Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured in society', the Independent samples t-test, here as well has shown a statistically significant difference of medium/moderate level. Accordingly to the results, Italian participants disagree more that the Catholic Church as a part of identity should be favoured in society, than Croatian participants. Lastly, exploring differences between the samples concerning ‘Assimilation oriented model’, Independent samples t-test, as well showed statistical significance. Thus, the results implied that, in average means, Croatian participants agree more with the idea that ‘We should tolerate differences in private sphere, but assimilate “different culture or religion” to major/dominant culture’, than Italian participants. The results of the Independent samples t-test implied that this difference between the two samples has a high effect. Within the scope of our third hypothesis, we as well, searched for the differences among Croatian and Italian participants with regards to attitudes toward Religious Freedom, particularly attitudes toward the ‘Socio-legal function of RF’; ‘Societal value of RF’ and ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’. Thus, we conducted Independent samples t-test, exploring the average means for the above-mentioned scales of the

Croatian and Italian samples. In the case of ‘Socio-legal function of RF’ the results of Independent samples t-test, imply that there is a statistically significant difference between Croatian and Italian participants, of a medium/moderate level. In average means, Croatian participants disagreed more than Italian participants with statements regarding the ‘Socio-legal function of RF’. Meaning, Croatian participants disagree more that religious freedom means: freedom to choose religious/non-religious identity; speak on religious matters openly; non-discrimination of religious minorities on the basis of religion; equality of various religions before the law; an important right in democratic society; and, non-violent co-existence. Following this, we explored ‘Societal value of RF’, whereby we were interested how our participants perceive the importance of different aspects of Religious Freedom, and the difference among Croatian and Italian participants. Here as well, the t-test showed a statistically significant difference, however indicating a small effect between the Croatian and Italian samples. In average means, Italian participants agreed more that certain aspects of RF are important, such as – it promotes non-discrimination on the basis of religion; cultural and religious diversity; inter-religious dialogue; equality as a principle of democratic citizenship; and, it is important for tolerant and peaceful co-existence of religions. Lastly, we analysed the differences among the samples regarding ‘RF aspects: belief and practice’. Independent samples t-test results implied that there is a statistically significant difference between Croatian and Italian participants, though with a small effect. Accordingly, the t-test analysis showed that Croatian participants disagreed more with the importance of having the freedom to have no religion; freedom to worship; and, freedom to have inner personal convictions, than the Italian participants in this case.

4.8. Other Analysis

4.8.1. Differences between ‘Croatian and Italian participants’ in attitudes toward ‘Model of endorsed religions’ – ANOVA


Conducting ANOVA allows us to compare various conditions of independent variables and to explore the effect of these conditions on our dependent variable, and as in other analyses, various assumptions must be met in order to perform it (Brownlow et al. 2014). In ANOVA, the null hypothesis indicates that there is no difference among group means. If the ANOVA results as statistically significant, means from the analysed groups (in our case—‘Croatian/Italian participants’ and ‘Religious affiliation’) differ from the overall group means. Specifically, we want to explore whether ‘Religious affiliation’ and ‘Croatian/Italian participants’ differ in average means in supporting the ‘Model of endorsed religions’. In our research, ANOVA was performed to analyse the effect of ‘Religious affiliation’ and ‘Croatian/Italian participants’ on attitudes toward the statement ‘State should guarantee special legal status of preferred set of religions and recognize special role of them in cultural and political spheres’. The results of ANOVA revealed that there was a significant interaction effect of ‘Croatian/Italian participants’ and ‘Religious

affiliation' ($F(2,1193)= 8.123, p<0.001, \eta= 0.013$). Simple main effects analysis showed that 'Religious affiliation' has a statistically significant effect on attitudes toward 'State-religious support' ($p<0.001, \eta=0.110$). As well, the main effect of 'Croatian and Italian participants' also has a statistically significant effect on 'Model of endorsed religions' ($p<0.001, \eta=0.019$)⁴⁰.

In the case of Croatian participants who affiliate as Roman-Catholic and non-religious, on average agree more with the statement 'State should guarantee special legal status of preferred set of religions and recognize special role of them in cultural and political spheres', than the Italian participants affiliated as Roman-Catholic or non-religious. In other words, that Croatian participants, affiliating as Roman-Catholic or non-religious, agree more with statement 'State should guarantee special legal status of a preferred set of religion and recognize the special role of them in cultural and political spheres' (Model of endorsed religions'); than the Italian participants affiliating as Roman-Catholic or non-religious. On the other hand, participants belonging to minority groups in Italy are more supportive of 'Model of endorsed religion' than the Croatian participants belonging to minority groups (See Figure 9).

Croatian participants, affiliated as Roman-Catholic, are more supportive of the two models (mean=2.91), than non-religious participants (mean=1.95) and participants that belong to minority groups (mean=2.13). On the other hand, from the Italian sample, participants belonging to minorities have the highest level of support for the 'Model of endorsed religions' (mean=2.16), followed by participants affiliated as Roman-Catholic (mean=1.98), and the least supportive are non-religious participants (mean=1.37) (See Figure 9).

Figure 9.



⁴⁰ Since in the case of our analysis, the results showed that equal variances were not assumed, we as well, conducted additional tests – Brown-Forsythe and Welch. The results as well confirmed that there is a statistically significant difference between Croatian and Italian participants in terms of attitudes toward 'Model of endorsed religions'

4.8.2. Level of Cultural Identification, Belief, and Religious Affiliation


When it comes to cultural identification, we asked the participants to identify themselves with the culture of their country on a scale from 1 to 10 (1—weak identification with Croatian/Italian culture; 10—strong identification with Croatian/Italian culture). Only 1.2% of participants identified with 1 (weak identification) and 7.4% with 10 (strong identification), while the average answer of participants was around 7 (mean = 6.96) on the cultural identification scale. We as well questioned participants who do not hold Croatian or Italian citizenship or have a different family origin, to what extent (1–10) they identify with their culture of origin. From 484 respondents, 10% of the respondents weakly identified with their culture, scoring 1; 2.5% identified strongly with the culture of their origin and 4.7% marked their identification with 5 on a scale from 1 to 10.

Looking at some other aspects of attitudes when it comes to the position and purpose of religion and attitudes toward religious diversity, our participants usually had open minds and tolerance toward these issues. For example, 39.8% disagree and 5.8% of our participants agree that it is better to pay attention to the dominant religion and culture, while 44.2% believe that having people of different religiosity in the country is enriching.

In the figure below (Figure 10) we display how participants of different religious affiliations (Roman-Catholic, Minorities and Non-religious) grade their cultural identification with their country and which statement comes closest to their belief – ‘Only one religion is true and all others are totally false’ (exclusivism); ‘Only one religion is true but at least one other is partly true’ (Inclusivism) ‘All religions are equally true’ (Pluralism A); ‘All religions express the same truth in different ways’ (Pluralism B); Real truth comes from listening to all religions (Interreligiosity); ‘All religions are totally false’ (Atheism); ‘I do not know what to believe about religions’ (Agnosticism)⁴¹

According to our data, almost half of our participants lean to Pluralism B (45.1%), followed by Agnosticism (21.9%), Pluralism A (10%), Atheism (7.6%), Inclusivism (3.9%) and finally, Atheism (2.6%). When it comes to non-religiously affiliated students, the highest values are found in the position of Agnosticism (35%) and Pluralism B (25.4%). On the other hand, both Roman-Catholic affiliated students and students belonging to minorities consider the position of Pluralism B as the closest to their beliefs, more precisely 54% of Roman Catholic students, and 47.5% of students belonging to minorities. In terms of differentiating between Croatian and Italian participants, most of the participants from both of the groups chose Pluralism B ‘All religions express the same truth in different ways’ (Croatian participants – 50%; Italian participants – 40.7%).

Figure 10.



4.8.3. The Effect of Religiosity and Cultural Identification on ‘Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants’— Regression Analysis⁴²

In our research, we used a bivariate regression analysis to see to what extent our independent variables can predict the variations in our dependent variable ‘Negative attitudes toward immigrants’. In our case, Bivariate Regression Analysis was conducted for two different models examining its effect on negative attitudes toward immigrants. Our scale measuring Negative attitudes toward immigrants is composed of three items - ‘Immigrants take jobs away from Italians’; ‘Immigrants make problems with crimes worse’ and ‘Immigrants are a strain on a country’s welfare system’, while the reliability of this scale is 0.86 according to Cronbach’s alpha, which implies that the scale has a very good level of reliability. Since this scale consists of only three items, we also refer to the inter-item correlation mean (0.68), which implies that items are correlated to a greater extent, and this scale has good reliability⁴³. The first model included ‘Cultural identification’, ‘Level of religiosity’, ‘Membership and belonging’, and ‘Elements of national identity and origin’ in order to determine how these items predict ‘Negative attitudes toward immigrants’. For the second model, we added the variable ‘Frequency of religious practice’, which encompassed the frequency of church attendance and frequency of religious prayer. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale measuring the frequency of religious practice is 0.77, implying a good reliability of the computed scale. In the case of our first model, religiosity was defined through religious beliefs, while items measuring religiosity in the second model also encompassed the aspect of religious behaviour/practice along with items measuring religious beliefs.

⁴¹ Asthley and Francis (2016) Theology of religions Index -study proposes a new multi-choice index that distinguishes between six current positions within the theology of religions, characterised as Atheism, Agnosticism, Exclusionism, Inclusivism, Pluralism, and Interreligious perspective, with a further subdivision between two expressions of the pluralism perspective to Pluralism A and Pluralism B.

⁴² This analysis forms part of published article - Stipišić, T. (2022) Attitudes toward Immigrants Intertwined with Religion: Comparison of Croatia and Italy. *Religions* 13, no. 7: 664. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13070664>

⁴³ These items were incorporated into the SPRF instrument from the European Values Study (EVS)

Table 21. Standardized Beta Coefficients for ‘Level of cultural identification’; ‘Level of religiosity’; ‘Elements of national identity and origin’ ‘Frequency of religious practice and ‘Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants’

	Model 1	Model 2
	β	β
Level of cultural identification	0.05 *	0.05 *
Level of religiosity	0.29 ***	0.33 ***
Membership and belonging	0.001	0.001
Elements of national identity and origin	0.11 ***	0.11 ***
Frequency of religious practice		0.05
*** $p < 0.001$; * $p < 0.05$	$R^2 = 0.123$	$R^2 = 0.125$
These results refer to analysis of both samples together – Croatian and Italian. Level of cultural identification – How do you identify with the culture of your country on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 – weak identification; 10 – strong identification). ‘Level of religiosity’ - ‘I am a religious person’; ‘I believe in God’; ‘My religious beliefs give my life a sense significance and purpose’; and, ‘My religious beliefs have a great influence on my life’. Membership and belonging - ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who speaks Croatian/Italian’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who keeps strong social relations with Croatians/Italians’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who shares Croatian/Italian cultural codes’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who donates money for civic purposes’. National identity and origin - ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who lives in Croatia/Italy’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who was born in Croatia/Italy’; ‘Croatian/Italian citizen is a person who has Croatian/Italian descent’. Frequency of religious practice - Frequency of church attendance and frequency of religious prayer.		

For our first model, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient results indicated a statistically significant positive relationship between all our independent variables (‘Level of Cultural identification’, ‘Level of religiosity’, ‘Membership and belonging’, and ‘Elements of national identity and origin’) and our dependent variable, ‘Negative attitudes toward immigrants’. The highest level of Pearson correlation coefficient was found between the variable ‘Level of religiosity’ and ‘Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ ($r(1167) = 0.32, p < 0.001$) (See Table 21).

In ‘Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ scores, 12.3% of the variance was explained by ‘Cultural identification’, ‘Level of religiosity’, ‘Membership and belonging’, and ‘Elements of national identity and origin’ ($R^2 = 0.123$) The results of ANOVA were statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), so the slope of our regression line is not zero, and ‘Cultural identification’, ‘Level of religiosity’, ‘Membership and belonging’ and ‘Elements of national identity and origin’ significantly predict ‘Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ ($F(4, 1162) = 40.90, p < 0.001$) (See Table 21).

The linear regression results show that the ‘Level of cultural identification’ has a statistically significant positive effect ($p = 0.05$), indicating that with higher levels of cultural identification, the levels of negative attitudes toward immigrants increase ($B = 0.028$); if ‘Level of cultural identification’ increases by one unit, negative attitudes toward immigrants will increase for 0.028 units, while all other conditions remain unchanged. Furthermore, a regression analysis indicated that ‘Level of religiosity’ also has a significant positive effect on ‘Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ ($p < 0.001$), which implies that a higher level of religiosity influences higher levels of negative attitudes toward immigrants ($B = 0.205$); if the level of religiosity increases by one unit, negative attitudes toward immigrants will increase by 0.205, while all other conditions remain the same. ‘Membership and belonging’ was non-significant, ($p = 0.98$), with a negative effect on negative attitudes toward immigrants ($B = -0.001$). Additionally, in the case of ‘Elements of

national identity and origin', the regression analysis showed a statistically significant, positive effect on negative attitudes toward immigrants ($p = 0.001$). In this sense, the more participants that perceive a citizen is a person who is born, lives, and comes from a specific country, the more they have negative attitudes toward immigrants ($B = 0.127$). According to Standardized Beta Coefficient, 'Level of religiosity' has the largest influence on 'Negative attitudes toward immigrants' (0.297) (See Table 21).

The Durbin–Watson statistic is 1.787, whereby values ranging from 1 to 3, are acceptable according to Field (2009), signifying no autocorrelation between variables. According to the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of normality, a significant finding of $p < 0.001$; indicates that the sample distribution is significantly different from the normal distribution. In this case, if the test shows that the data cannot be normally distributed and if the sample is larger than 30—that is, each empirical distribution of data weighs the normal amount by the central limit theorem: $N > 30$ —the distribution of the data can be considered as normally distributed (Jovetić, 2015). This was the case with our data, so we call upon the central limit theorem in the case of our sample, whereby for each item the number of participants exceeded 1000. The residuals are homoscedastic, meaning the assumption has been met. For our second model, the Pearson correlation coefficient indicated a statistically significant positive relationship between all our variables, including the added variable— frequency of religious practice and our dependent variable 'Negative attitudes toward immigrants'. The ANOVA was statistically significant, indicating that model 2, which includes 'Frequency of religious practice' significantly predicts 'Negative attitudes toward immigrants, while the linear regression results for each of the variables shows that 'Frequency of religious practice' was non-significant (See Table 21).


4.8.4. Differences between Croatian and Italian Participants in Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants - ANOVA

In ANOVA, the null hypothesis indicates that there is no difference among group means. If the ANOVA results as statistically significant, means from the analysed groups (in our case - 'Croatian/Italian participants' and 'Religious affiliation') differ from the overall group means. In our research, ANOVA was performed to analyse the effect of 'Religious affiliation' and 'Croatian/Italian participants' on 'Negative attitudes toward immigrants'.

The results of ANOVA revealed that there was a significant interaction effect of 'Religious affiliation' and 'Croatian/Italian participants' ($F(2, 1214) = 3.842, p = 0.022, \eta = 0.006$). A simple main effects analysis showed that 'Religious affiliation' has a statistically significant effect on 'Negative attitudes toward immigrants' ($p = 0.001, \eta = 0.057$). Additionally, the main effect of 'Croatian or Italian participants' also has a statistically significant effect on 'Negative attitudes toward immigrants' ($p = 0.001, \eta = 0.026$). In the case of participants from the Croatian sample, all three groups of religious affiliation (Roman Catholic, minorities and non-religious), on average have more negative attitudes than participants from Italy (see

Figure 11). Croatian participants who affiliate as non-religious have lower levels of negative attitudes (mean = 2.23), than those affiliating as Roman Catholic (mean = 2.86), while participants belonging to minority groups have the lowest levels of negative attitudes toward immigrants in our Croatian sample (mean = 2.13). Regarding Italian participants, those declared as Roman Catholics have higher levels of negative attitudes toward immigrants (mean = 2.05), while minority groups are more negative toward immigrants (mean = 1.83) than non-religious participants (mean= 1.69) (See Figure 11). Looking at the specific difference between Croatian and Italian participants, the results show that Croatian participants have more negative attitudes toward immigrants, and specifically, participants affiliated with Roman Catholic Church in Croatia are more negative than participants declared as Roman Catholic in Italy. The results show the same difference for those declared as non-religious in Croatia and non-religious participants in Italy (see Figure 11).

Figure 11.



4.9. Main Findings within the framework of Theoretical and Empirical observations

Throughout this Chapter, we attempted to analyse different aspects and patterns of attitudes toward religious freedom and citizenship, as well as, patterns of attitudes toward religious and national identities, in two similar, yet different Catholic countries – Croatia and Italy. Our analysis is focused on three main aspects – citizenship and religious freedom; State-religious models and protection of religious freedom; and, role of the religion in relation to national identity and culture, together with its associations with religious freedom attitudes. In our research, we have tested three main hypotheses: (1) ‘Free and equal citizenship is the basis for religious freedom, more positive attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights will be associated with more positive attitudes toward religious freedom’ (H1); (2) ‘The stronger is the identification of the State with religion, the lower is the level of protection of religious freedom’, specifically, the more participants endorse the neutral position of state-religious relations and support neutral socio-cultural attitude toward the dominant religion, the less they perceive that religious freedoms are protected in their country’ (H2); and, (3) ‘Participants’ identification with national culture and the dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy, which is also reflected in more negative attitudes toward religious freedom’ (H3).

The essence of Brettschneider (2012) theory is held in the idea that religious beliefs are reflected in the religious freedoms of citizens. Therefore, in order to preserve and fully respect religious freedom, those beliefs, which oppose the concept of equal citizenship must be transformed, in order to be aligned with the concept of equality. If the idea of free and equal citizenship forms the basis for religious freedom, and if religious beliefs are reflected in the religious freedoms of citizens’ (Brettschneider, 2012), then the beliefs and meanings attributed to religious freedom could be reflected in the views on citizenship and citizens’ rights. As Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul (2008) claim, ‘the lens of citizenship reveals not only the legal borders of nation-states, but also their social boundaries’ (Bloemraad et al., 2008, 155), which poses a question how much attitudes toward citizenship border the perceptions of religious freedom. Following this idea, we explored whether more positive attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights are associated with more positive attitudes toward religious freedom. An empirical study on civil rights in Italy (Zaccaria et al. 2018a), which included rights regarding religious freedom, indicated that among other things, openness to multiculturalism and pluralism, positive attitudes toward cultural diversity, trust in religious out-group and spiritual function of religion, has a positive predictive power on religious freedom rights attributed to non-citizens. While, exploring the political rights of non-citizens, studies (Francis et al., 2018; Zaccaria et al. 2018), have shown that interreligious openness, support of interculturalism, openness and trust in religious out-group and, separatist view of state-religious relations, have a significant positive effect on political rights of non-citizens. As well, according to the research, stronger identification with traditional values has an exclusivist outcome on the political rights of non-citizens (Zaccaria et al. 2018). These findings similarly correspond to the findings in our research, in testing our first hypothesis. Our research has shown that,

positive attitudes toward ‘Citizenship and citizens’ rights’ have a predictive positive impact on attitudes toward various aspects of religious freedom. Specifically, higher levels of support of political and socio-economic rights regardless of citizenship status, together with higher levels of recognition and support of national, religious, and cultural diversities within the public and private sphere (‘Diversity-oriented model’) results in more positive attitudes toward socio-legal function of religious freedom, societal values of RF, and freedoms of religious belief and practice. As well, lower levels of support toward the assimilation of diversities to major/dominant culture (‘Assimilation-oriented model’) has a positive impact on attitudes toward religious freedom in all three aspects (socio-legal function, societal value and freedom of belief and practice). ‘Socio-economic rights’, ‘Assimilation-oriented model’ and ‘Diversity-oriented model’, resulted as having a statistically significant impact on all three aspects of RF - socio-legal function, societal value and freedom of belief and practice. On the other side, ‘Political rights’ appeared as having a statistically significant effect on two out of three dimensions of religious freedom - ‘Societal value of RF’ and ‘Freedom of belief and practice’. While Pearson Correlation Coefficient showed statistical significance ‘Citizenship and political rights’ attitudes to the third aspect of religious freedom (‘Socio-legal function of RF’) as well, Bivariate Regression Analysis indicated a non-significant effect of ‘Political rights’ on ‘Socio-legal function of RF’, suggesting that the relationship between these two variables cannot be explained by a linear model. From our research findings, we can observe that scales measuring attitudes toward religious freedom were particularly more sensitive to one of the models of linkage between equal citizenship and cultural assimilation (Modood and Kastoryano, 2007) – ‘Diversity oriented model’, indicating specific sensitivity to views on diversity groups positioning within the society, and their visibility in the private and public spheres. In particular, the ‘Diversity-oriented model’ resulted as having the highest correlation levels and largest influence on all three aspects of Religious Freedom. Analysis as well depicted a particular sensitivity of religious freedom scales to socio-economic rights. Therefore, ‘Socio-economic rights’, in comparison to political rights, had much more predictive power over the attitudes toward religious freedom. This notion tells us that positive attitudes toward religious freedom are associated more positively with socio-economic rights, than with political rights, possibly due to the perception that the right to health care, education and employment are perceived as basic human needs, and form part of human dignity, which can be related to religious freedom meanings. Lower levels of agreement on the rights to vote, protest, or form a political party, regardless of citizenship status, reflects the concerns in the everlasting debates regarding if, and to what extent, political rights should be guaranteed to non-citizens? (Zaccaria et al., 2018). Despite the openness toward diversity and recognition of the necessity of socio-economic rights, the dimension of political rights still represents an unapproved category for non-citizens (Mesić and Bagić, 2011; Zaccaria et al., 2018). Political rights form the basis for changes within a society, serving as an arena to gain equality and overcome discriminatory practices. It is then questionable, how much this inability to fight for equality creates an endless loop of inequality. Furthermore, it is important to highlight that the highest effect of ‘Citizenship and citizens’ rights’ is produced within the importance of ‘Societal value’ of religious freedom,

defined through categories of non-discrimination, religious and cultural diversity, inter-religious dialogue, democratic citizenship, tolerance, and peaceful coexistence.

Even though our first hypothesis does not regard differences between the two analysed samples, we have conducted Pearson Correlation Coefficient, to see how much one sample results differ from the other. With regards to it, the results show higher levels of correlation between 'Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights' and 'Attitudes toward religious freedom' in the case of the Croatian sample, with two main differences in comparison to the Italian sample. The first difference, regards the statistical significance of two scales in the results of the Croatian sample, which do not appear as statistically significant in the Italian sample. The second difference, refers to 'Assimilation-oriented model'. Therefore, in the results of Croatian sample, scales 'Membership and belonging' and 'Identity and origin' as parts of 'Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights' resulted as statistically significant, and in negative relation to 'RF belief and practice'. This means, Croatian participants, who were more supportive of the idea that a citizen is only a person who speaks Croatian/ shares Croatian culture/ keeps strong relations/ lives and is born in Croatia/ and, has Croatian descent; were less supportive of freedom to have or change religion. The fact that these two scales were more significant in the case of the Croatian sample indicates higher levels of sensitivity of Croatian participants to categories of defining a citizen through shared social categories and cultural values (language, culture, descent, social relations, place of birth, and place of living). These findings, imply a specific perception of what it means to be a Croatian citizen and, can be understood within the aspect of strong national components in cultural and social markers of Croatian identity (Kumpes, 2018; Mesić and Bagić, 2011), while the complexities of relations between Croatian State, nationality and religion affected the sphere of what it means to be Croatian, but as well influenced how other identities are viewed and accepted (Kumpes, 2018). Second exception concerns the variable 'Assimilation-oriented model', which represents a second model of the relation between equal citizenship and cultural assimilation developed by Modood and Kastoryano (2007). Though, in our research, we used an adjusted version of it, developed by Breskaya and Giordan (2019), which highlights its semantic division from the first model - 'Diversity oriented model' (Breskaya and Giordan, 2019). From the conducted analysis, 'Assimilation-oriented model' resulted in statistical significance only to freedom of belief and practice in the Croatian sample, while in the Italian sample, this variable was significant in all three aspects of religious freedom (Socio-legal function of RF; Societal value of RF' and RF belief and practice'). This indicates that Italian participants were much more sensitive to the aspect of assimilating subordinate cultures to major/dominant culture, perceiving this type of action with higher levels of disapproval than the Croatian participants, and this was reflected in their views on various aspects of religious freedom. This finding can be seen as a reflection of different experiences and approaches to migratory issues in Croatia and Italy, which ultimately affected how diversity is perceived in the public and private spheres. As well, it indicates the importante role of religion and a strong public voice of the Catholic Church in Italy in the process of accepting diversity. Catholic Church in Italy strategically cultivated its importance and value in the lives of its' citizens', at the same time, taking a

strong stand against discriminatory practices of government and social injustices, emphasizing the necessity to embrace and accept others by demonstrating a welcoming attitude toward foreigners (Pace, 2014, Zaccaria et al., 2018). On the other hand, in Croatia, the role of the Catholic Church was strongly connected to empowerment and preservation of values attributed to Croatian identity, while the role in advocating for the rights of migrants was purely charitable (Giordan and Zrinščak, 2018).

Durham (2012) examined the nature and role of state-religious relations and its reflection within the frame of religious freedoms. Within this exploration, Durham (2012) identified two possible continuums. First refers to state action or inaction with the religious sphere, which is reflected in religious freedoms, ranging from total restriction to total freedom. The second continuum refers to identification of the government institutions with religious institutions, and this level of identification can be marked as a positive (full) identification of the State with religion or as a negative identification (Durham, 2012). Negative identification of the State with religion corresponds to the separation of the State with religion or excessive oppression of religion (Durham, 2012). The essence of Durham (2012) theory on State-religious relations is hold in the position - stronger identification of the State with religion impacts negatively on the levels of religious liberties. With several exceptions to this rule, both extreme positive and extreme negative identification of the State with religion, can result in religious freedom repression, thus affecting the dominant and minority religious groups. Therefore, according to Durham (2012), the ideal middle point, reflected in State-religious neutrality, would be in correspondence with higher levels of religious freedom. Several studies (Grim and Finke, 2006; Fox, 2009; Fox et al., 2018; Sarkissian, 2015; Breskaya, Giordan and Zrinščak, 2021) have highlighted the importance and significant effect of state-religious patterns and governmental practices on religious freedom, continuously emphasizing the perplexities and entanglement notions of this relation. According to Richardson (2014), questioning how people respond to religious diversity, level of their legal rights and privileges, level of discrimination, and questioning public role and place of religious minorities can ‘reveal much about the degree of tolerance and religious freedom in a society, and also will indicate to what degree minority religious groups are allowed to exist and function within society’ (Richardson, 2014, 32). In this sense, development of legal pluralism in certain societies, largely depends on the openness and responsiveness of a given society towards religious diversity (Richardson, 2014), meaning that the perception of religious freedom and perception towards religious minorities shapes the possibility of a certain State to develop and successfully implement and protect religious freedom. Since State-religious relations are mirrored in religious freedoms of the countries, we search whether views on preferable state-religious relations can be reflected in perceptions toward religious freedom protections, adding as well the aspect of socio-cultural attitude to it. Following this concept we have established our second hypothesis - *‘The stronger is the identification of the State with religion; the lower is the level of protection of religious freedom in the society, specifically, the more participants endorse the neutral position of State-religious relations and support neutral socio-cultural attitude toward the dominant religion, the less they perceive that religious freedoms are protected in their country’*. While

legal acceptance of minorities and their diversities is a high priority, it is fairly to observe that these changes within the legal spheres, will be reflected in the views and beliefs of people (Mesić and Bagić, 2011), causing positive or negative reactions. Durham (2012) claims that countries are never in a static position on the continuum, but continuously shifting from one end to another. For this reason, an extreme change from one type of state-religious relation to another, like the fall of communism in Croatia, can be extremely critical for religious groups and their freedoms. Durham (2012) elaborates on various types of religion-State structures, one of which is 'endorsed religions' and 'preferred set of endorsed religions', indicating that it is very common that countries fall into different categories at the same time. 'Endorsed religions' model of State-religious relation represents countries which do not formally affirm one specific religion, but acknowledge its special position in the society tied to the culture and tradition of the country itself (Durham, 2012). Italy would fall within the category of endorsed religions, since the Catholic Church, due to its historical meaning and tradition, enjoys certain privileges that other communities don't. Croatia, like many other countries, legally looking, would fall into the category of cooperative models, whereby the State and the Church are separated but there is a positive view on religion in terms of religious freedoms of other communities. The issue here is, as Durham (2012) claims, that there is a thin line between a positive cooperative view on religion and State preference of religion, especially when it comes to the real, on-the-ground situation. By preferred set of endorsed religions, Durham (2012) implies State-religious relation which favours multiple (preferred) religions. In terms of measuring State-religious relations, we have encompassed in our research 'Model of Endorsed Catholic Church' and 'Model of Endorsed religions', which we have defined as 'State-religious support'. The other two types of state-religious relations are defined as 'State-religious neutrality' and 'Model of control over religion'. In our research, 'State-religious neutrality' encompassed equal conditions for religious and non-religious people, equality (anti-favouritism), and the presence of religion in public and private spheres. On the other hand 'Model of control of religion' encompassed total control of religion and prohibition of public and private recognition and expression of religion. The three models which we developed for our research - 'State-religious support'; 'State-religious neutrality'; and, 'Model of control over religion'; can be seen as the three parts of Durham (2012) continuum, whereby the 'State-religious neutrality' is seen as an ideal middle point, which we observe within the framework of RF protections. Therefore, in terms of our second hypothesis, the more participants perceive neutral State-religious relations as desirable, and the less they support favouritism of the dominant religion; the more they perceive religious freedoms in their country as unprotected. Relating to the argument that State-religious relations are crucial and decisive in different spheres of meanings attributed to religious freedom (Breskaya, Giordan and Zrinščak, 2021), our findings as well confirm the dynamics of these relations in the sphere of how religious freedom protections are perceived. The results of our research imply that the more participants agree that State should be neutral, avoid religious favouritism, and provide equal conditions for all religious groups, the less they agree that religious freedoms are protected in Croatia and Italy. Furtherly, higher levels of support towards 'Model of Endorsed Catholic Church' and 'Model of

Endorsed Religions' is reflected in more positive perceptions toward the levels of religious freedom protections in Croatia and Italy. In terms of socio-cultural attitude toward the position of the dominant religion in the society in relation to State-religious models, the results imply, the more participants perceive that Catholic Church should be favoured and protected within the society, the more they believe that the Croatian/Italian State treats equally and provides equal conditions for all religious groups, including the non-religious. These findings reflect the notions that privileged positioning of religion usually results in the unsuccess of countries effectively protecting religious freedoms of religious groups (Cross, 2015). As well implying on the importance of socio-cultural attitude toward religion in exploring State-religious relations, whereby research on State-religious relation patterns should not be alienated from social perceptions of religion (Zrinščak et al.,2014). 'Model of control over religion' resulted as statistically significant, but with an extremely low level of correlation to perceptions of levels of religious freedom protection in the country. Furthermore, in our research, we explore the correlation between 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' and different models of State-religious relations. Results indicated that the highest level of correlation was found between 'Model of endorsed Catholicism' and 'Model of endorsed religions' ('State-religious support') in relation to favouritism and protection of the dominant religion (Catholic Church). Specifically high, significant, and negative correlation was found as well, between 'State-religious neutrality' and 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion'. This implied that those participants who prefer their State taking a neutral position toward religion, and treat all religious groups equally, have particularly lower levels of favouritism toward the Catholic Church and its dominant position in the society. These findings support our second hypothesis – *'The more participants prefer the neutral position of State-religious relation and support a neutral socio-cultural attitude toward religion, the less they perceive that religious freedoms are protected in their country'*.

Leaning on the theory of Durham, and on empirical research data provided by Breskaya, Giordan, Zrinščak (2021), which support the hypothesis that the 'Model of endorsed Catholic Church' and 'State control over religion' have a negative effect on the perception of religious freedom⁴⁴; we conducted analysis in order to explore the effect of State-religious models on perception of 'Religious Freedom protection' within the countries – Croatia and Italy, adding as well the aspect of socio-cultural attitude toward religion. Following this, within the framework of our first hypothesis, we explored whether 'Model of endorsed Catholic Church' and 'Model of state-control over religion', together with 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' would have an effect on how participants perceive 'Protection of RF' in Croatia and Italy. Our analysis implied that 'Model of endorsed Catholic Church'; 'Model of state-control over religion', together with 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion', significantly predict attitudes toward 'Protection of RF' in Croatia and Italy. The highest significance depicted in the perceptions of religious freedom protections was found in Socio-cultural attitude toward religion, followed by 'Model of endorsed Catholic Church', while

⁴⁴ 'In five cases out of seven, when the predictive power of state-religion relations on the SPRF was depicted, the results indicated that the less the young people favored the models of an endorsed Catholic Church or state control over religion, the stronger they supported various dimensions of religious freedom' (Breskaya, Giordan, Zrinščak, 2021, p. 297).

'Model of state-control' had no statistical significance in the regression model. Therefore, the more participants endorsed the special legal status of the Catholic Church, and the more participants believe that the dominant religion should be favoured, the more they perceive that religious freedoms in Croatia and Italy are protected.

In terms of differences between the Croatian and Italian samples, higher levels of correlations have been found in the results of the Croatian sample, specifically, within the aspect of 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' and perceptions on the levels of religious freedom protection in the country. Results imply that Croatian participants were much more sensitive to favouritism of the Catholic Church, which highly correlated with how religious freedom protections are perceived in Croatia. The largest difference between Croatian and Italian samples can be noted in the levels of correlation between 'State-religious neutrality' and 'Socio-cultural attitude', whereby the scale measuring neutrality was much more sensitive to the aspect of Catholic Church favouritism in the Croatian sample. These findings reflect that even though in Italy, Catholic confessionality represents a central point of Italian collective identity (Giorda, 2015, Ferrari and Ferrari, 2010), the process of "croatization", empowered by the 'rise of religion' (Zrinščak, 2006), produced necessity to protect the main symbols of nationhood under the veil of religion. As well, these specific differences between Croatian and Italian samples emphasise the significance of social and political circumstances in State-religious relations which, in the case of Croatia, conditioned privileging of the Catholic Church and selective discrimination (Zrinščak et al., 2014). Thus, equalization of national and religious identities, and encouraging religious favouritism triggered the waves of negative notions toward other religious minorities and their levels of freedom (Marinović Bobinac, 1996), ultimately affecting the levels of their protection within the society.

Various research has shown that young people hold positive attitude toward religious freedoms (Kompes, 2018; Zaccaria et al. 2018, 2018a; Breskaya and Giordan, 2018, Giordan et al. 2020), and tend to be more open and less prejudiced toward diversities (Mesić and Bagić, 2011), usually more positively endorsing the idea of changing religion or freedom to have religion (Giordan et al., 2020). These characteristics of young identities and patterns of their attitudes in relation to religious freedom, bring us to question what are the particularities influencing differences between two young cohorts, leading us to the importance of exploring the socio-cultural context in conducting research (Bohman and Hjerm, 2014; Kumpes, 2018). As Scolnicov (2011) claims, religion represents a system that provides values and norms for various aspects of life, and as such, it can play an important role in building the identity of the State, it can be in line with the change of regime/system or against it, and finally, it can support the values of democracy or help boosting stronger divisions in the society. Acknowledging the national component (Kumpes, 2018), together with the revitalization of the religion, is of extreme relevance in understanding countries that emerged from the fall of communism, as is the case of Croatia (Kumpes, 2018). According to Kumpes (2018) the intertwining of national and religious components of Croatian identity should never be

neglected, as one aspect of identity does not go without the other. In the empirical study on exploring attitudes toward immigrants in Croatia, Kumpes (2018) indicated a high, statistical significance of interrelation between national components and religious components of Croatian identity, characterized by higher levels of social distance toward foreigners. Some of the items from this research (Kumpes, 2018), which correlated strongly with social distance toward foreigners were – ...‘Only Catholic can be a real Croatian’; ‘Religious minorities cannot be real Croats’; ‘Religious confession is an important mark of national belonging’... etc. This tells us a lot about the mentality of Croatian citizens toward their religious and national identity and questions the possible outcomes on the perceptions of religious freedom. On the other hand, Italy’s experience of mass migration flows affected majority-minority relations within social, political, and cultural spheres of identity, causing unrest and insecurity, and changing the way minority groups are perceived by the dominant population. Following the theoretical background of several studies (Maldini, 2006, Kumpes, 2018, Radović, 2013, Zrinščak, 1996, Marinović Bobinac, 1996) within the field of interrelation between religious and national identities, we formulated our third hypothesis - *‘Participants’ identification with national culture and dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy, which is also reflected in more negative attitudes toward Religious Freedom’*. As previously highlighted, the diverse historical experiences and trajectories of democratic development have highly influenced the markers of religious and national identities in Croatia and Italy. Our research analysis has shown that Croatian participants significantly differ from Italian participants in perceptions of the role of the Catholic Church, dominant religion and culture, and, in attitudes toward the role of the religion in relation to nationality. These findings confirm theoretical and empirical frameworks discussing the strong bond between Croatian markers of nationality and religious identity, implying a high influence of the Catholic Church in supporting those patterns. As Maldini (2006) claims, in Croatia, confessional identification extends beyond mere religiosity and captures different spheres of cultural and national identity. This is visible from our findings, whereby, on average, Croatian participants support more the idea that religion should strengthen the national spirit and take responsibility for the national culture, than the Italian participants. A strong vision of the chosen religion for the State, enforced by nationalism, created an atmosphere of intolerance toward the significant other (Zrinščak, 1998), while placing the Catholic Church on a pedestal of Croatian society. The notions of these patterns are visible in attitudes toward Catholic Church and its role in Croatian society. From our research findings, it is visible that Croatian participants support more the idea of favouritism toward the Catholic Church and prefer favouring the dominant religion and culture, than it is the case with the Italian participants. The findings of our research regarding the third hypothesis highlight the connection of confessional identification to a strong sense of national, cultural, and social identification (Maldini, 2006).

Results on attitudes toward religious freedom show that generally, our participants as part of the young cohort hold positive attitudes toward religious freedom, which is in line with the empirical evidence of other research (Kumpes, 2018; Zaccaria et al. 2018, 2018a; Breskaya and Giordan, 2018, Giordan et al. 2020). On

the other hand, in terms of comparison between a young cohort of Croatia and a young cohort of Italy, the results again implied significant differences. Our analysis confirmed that Croatian participants have more negative attitudes toward various aspects of religious freedom, than the Italian participants. These results confirm the second part of our third hypothesis, that stronger identification of religious and national identities, and higher levels of favouritism toward dominant religion and culture, will be reflected in more negative attitudes toward religious freedom.

Within the last part of this Chapter we as well provided data regarding different analyses, concerning various aspects of the research. Therefore, we performed ANOVA to search for differences between Croatian and Italian participants, in three different groups (Roman-Catholic, non-religious, religious minorities) in attitudes toward model of 'State-religious support', specifically 'Model of endorsed religions'. The analysis showed that religious affiliation and country belonging has a significant effect on attitudes toward the 'Model of endorsed religions'. As well, we provided data using Cross-tabulations on cultural identification, belief, and religious affiliation, which results supported the notions of young people supporting the pluralist view of religious belief (Francis et al., 2020). Bohman and Hjerm (2012) emphasise the significant lack of comparative studies in terms of empirical research on the interrelation of migration and religion, therefore our further analysis and findings contribute to the development of the scientific knowledge in the field of interrelation of migration and religion. In line with this, we explored the effect of religiosity and cultural identification on negative attitudes toward immigrants using Bivariate Regression Analysis. The results show that higher levels of religiosity together with higher levels of cultural identification cause more negative attitudes toward immigrants. Our analysis showed that levels of religiosity, the level of cultural identification, and elements of national identity and origin predict negative attitudes toward immigrants. Finally, we use ANOVA, to see the differences between Croatian and Italian participants regarding negative attitudes toward immigrants, in three different groups – Roman-Catholic, non-religious and minorities. Analysis implied that different religious affiliation (Catholicism, minorities, and non-religious) and differentiation based on country of origin (Croatia/Italy) has a significant effect on negative attitudes toward immigrants. More precisely, the results indicated that Croatian participants have more negative attitudes toward immigrants than Italian participants, while participants affiliated as Roman-Catholics are more negative toward immigrants than Italian participants affiliated as Roman-Catholic. Our findings which implies that religiosity and cultural identification has a significant impact on attitudes toward immigrants is in line with several other research studies (Bohman and Hjerm, 2014; Kumpes, 2018; Kumpes et al. 2012; Foner and Alba, 2018; Scheepers et al. 2002). As well, results indicating the connection of religion with negative out-group attitudes reflect the notion that stronger attachment to certain religious identity results in stronger resistance toward other groups (Hall, Matz and Wood in Bohman and Hjerm, 2012). Furthermore, with regards to these results, higher levels of negative attitudes toward immigrants in the case of the Croatian sample in comparison to the Italian sample, emphasise the significance of contextual factors within socio-political dimensions (Bohman and Hjerm, 2014). In line with our findings, it is

important to note that citizens of the former Communist countries tend to be more prejudiced and closed toward other diversities, than the citizens with a longer tradition of democratic values, therefore, producing more negative out-group views (Scheepers et al., 2002; Kumpes, 2018). Therefore, certain contextual factors can be a main trigger for negative out-group attitudes, especially if social cohesion is based on ethnicity or religion (Bohman and Hjerm, 2014), which is, according to several empirical and theoretical research (Maldini, 2006, Kumpes, 2018, Radović, 2013, Zrinščak, 1996, Marinović Bobinac, 1996), and according to our other data analysis, the case of Croatia.

FINAL CONCLUSION

- **Key findings**

This thesis addresses the particularities of the linkage between ‘Religious freedom’ and ‘Citizenship and citizens’ rights’, examining the patterns of perception by comparing Croatia and Italy. The relation between the concept of religious freedom and the concept of citizenship in our research is viewed through three main aspects. Firstly, we explored the linkage and the effect of attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights on attitudes toward religious freedom. Secondly, we focused our attention on the connection of State-religious relations and socio-cultural attitudes toward religion with views on the protection of religious freedom. Lastly, we observed the perplexities and associations between nationality, religion, and culture, with a specific focus on the patterns of this interrelation and how this reflects on views regarding religious freedom. Following this framework, we have developed and tested three main hypotheses. Our research discovered that particular positive notions of public and private recognition of diversities, socio-economic and political rights, and disapproval of assimilating cultural and religious minorities to the dominant society, is reflected in positive perception of religious freedom in Croatia and Italy. Furthermore, the preference of neutral State-religious relations and disapproval of favouritism of the Catholic Church, dominant religion and culture is reflected in the perceived unprotection of religious freedom in Croatia and Italy. Finally, our research implies that there are significant differences between Croatian and Italian samples in perceiving role of the religion in relation to nationality and favouritism of the Catholic Church, dominant culture and religion. As well, significant differences between Croatian and Italian participants were found in attitudes toward religious freedom. Specifically, our research has shown that Croatian participants perceived more strongly that religion should strengthen national spirit and take responsibility for the national culture, approved more favouritism of the Catholic Church, dominant religion and culture, and perceived more negatively religious freedoms, than Italian participants.

Our first hypothesis – *‘Free and equal citizenship is the basis for religious freedom - more positive attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights will be associated with more positive attitudes toward religious freedom’* was tested to see whether attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights will have an effect on attitudes toward religious freedom. Our research has shown that ‘Attitudes toward citizenship and citizens’ rights’ have a predictive power on ‘Attitudes toward religious freedom’. Specifically, higher levels of support of political and socio-economic rights regardless of citizenship status, together with higher levels of recognition and support of national, religious, and cultural diversities within the public and private sphere (‘Diversity-oriented model’) results in more positive attitudes in all three aspects of religious freedom – socio-legal function, societal value and, freedoms of religious belief and practice. As well, lower levels of support toward the assimilation of diversities to major/dominant culture (‘Assimilation-oriented model’) has a positive impact on attitudes toward ‘Religious freedom’ in all three aspects. Furthermore, concerning the

testing for our first hypothesis, scales measuring attitudes toward religious freedom were particularly more sensitive to the 'Diversity oriented model', indicating specific sensitivity of participants toward the views of diversity groups positioning within the society and their visibility in the private and public spheres. Analysis as well depicted a particular sensitivity of religious freedom scales to socio-economic rights, showing much stronger predictive power on religious freedom attitudes than political rights.

In other words, the results of the analysis for the first hypothesis showed three main findings. First concerns socio-legal function of RF. The more participants complied with the idea of basic socio-economic rights for all people regardless of their citizenship status, and, the more participants were opened toward public and private expression and visibility of diversity; the more they acknowledged various aspects of religious freedom in terms of liberties of religious identity, non-discrimination, equality, democratic values, non-violence, freedom of religious expression, and recognized religious freedom as an important aspect of democratic society. Second finding refers to societal values attributed to religious freedom. Specifically, those participants who approved more that basic political rights, such as voting, protest and political engagement, should be enabled to all people regardless of their citizenship status; were more supportive of the idea that religious freedom promotes non-discrimination; religious and cultural diversity; inter-religious dialogue; equality and peaceful co-existence. Third finding refers to freedom of belief and practice. The more participants were supportive of basic political, socio-economic rights for all people regardless of their citizenship status; and, the more participants were open to public and private expression and recognition of diversity; the more they supported the freedom to have no religion, freedom to worship, and freedom to have inner personal convictions.

With regard to differences between Croatian and Italian participants, the analysis showed two particularities. First, Croatian participants, who were more supportive of the idea that a citizen is only a person who speaks Croatian/ shares Croatian culture/ keeps strong relations/ lives and is born in Croatia/ and, has Croatian descent; were less supportive of freedom to have or change religion. Secondly, Italian participants were much more sensitive to the aspect of assimilating subordinate cultures to major/dominant culture, perceiving this type of action with higher levels of disapproval than the Croatian participants, and this was reflected in their views on various aspects of religious freedom.

Based on the data analysis which we have provided throughout this thesis, and according to the results of our research, we can confirm, that in our case, the *null hypothesis* can be rejected, and that more positive attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights are associated with more positive attitudes toward religious freedom.

For our second hypothesis, *'The stronger is the identification of religion and the State; the lower is the level of protection of religious freedom in the society; specifically, the more participants endorse the neutral position of State-religious relations and support a neutral socio-cultural attitude toward the dominant religion, the less they perceive that religious freedoms are protected in their country'*; we conducted

Pearson Correlation Coefficient to test whether and how, different State-religious models (neutrality; support; control) and 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' are correlated to attitudes toward 'Protection of religious freedom'. The results of Pearson Correlation Coefficient indicated a statistically significant relationship of all of our independent variables 'State- religious neutrality'; 'State-religious support'; 'Model of control over religion' and; 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' in relation to attitudes toward 'Protection of religious freedom'. The results of our research imply that the more participants agree that State should be neutral, avoid religious favouritism, and provide equal conditions for all religious groups, the less they agree that religious freedoms are protected in Croatia and Italy. As well, our research analysis indicates that the more participants perceive the special role of Catholic Church within society, and support the idea of closed ties between Catholicism, politics and culture; the more they agree that Croatia and Italy provide equal conditions for Catholic Church, religious minorities, and non-religious people, or are more convinced that Croatia and Italy handle religious issues very well and do not favour any religious group.

Additionally, in terms of 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' and 'State-religious relations', the analysis showed high correlations of neutral and supportive State-religious model and socio-cultural attitude toward religion, implying two opposite effects. The more participants agree that State should provide equal conditions for all religions, the less they agree that Catholic Church and Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured within the country due to its dominant position. While, on the other hand, the more participants supported the idea that State should have close ties with Catholicism and support its role within political and cultural spheres, the more participants agreed Catholic Church and Croatian/Italian identity should be favoured within the country. The Model of control over religion resulted as statistically significant but with a small effect, implying that the more participants perceived that 'It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere'; the more they perceived that Croatia and Italy provide adequate protection of religious freedoms; and supported more the idea that Catholic Church and dominant culture as a part of identity should be favoured and have a main focus within the society.

Regarding the differences between the Croatian and Italian samples in terms of the relation between 'State-religious models' and 'Religious freedom protection'; the analysis has shown higher levels of correlation between our 'State-religious neutrality'; 'State-religious support'; 'Model of control over religion' and 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' in relation to 'Protection of religious freedom'. Specifically, concerning the differences between the two analysed samples with regards to relation of 'State-religious models' and 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion', Pearson Correlation results indicated that the Croatian sample had higher correlation values between the variables than the Italian sample, except in the case of the variable 'State-religious support' in relation to 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion'. Meaning, in the case of Croatia, the more participants accepted the model of endorsed Catholicism and preferred set of religions; the more they favoured the Catholic Church, dominant identity, and culture. The largest difference was found in correlations regarding socio-cultural attitude toward religion in relation to 'State-religious models' and 'Religious freedom protections'.

Additionally, our analysis showed that Model of endorsed Catholic Church'; 'Model of state-control over religion', and 'Socio-cultural attitude toward religion' significantly predict attitudes on 'Protection of RF'. As well, with regard to testing the impact of certain models, we conducted analysis by adding the dimension of religiosity. Therefore, we tested whether 'Model of endorsed Catholic Church'; 'Model of control over religion'; 'Socio-cultural attitude'; and, 'Level of religiosity' will have a negative effect on attitudes toward religious freedom. The results of our second model, which included dimension of religiosity, implied that participants with higher levels of religiosity, who perceive that Catholicism and dominant culture should be favoured and believe that State should guarantee special legal status to Catholicism, as well as, that the State should control religion; will have more negative attitudes toward different religious freedom aspects, such as freedom to worship; freedom to have no religion and freedom to have inner personal convictions.

According to these findings, we can reject the *null hypothesis*, and confirm, that the stronger is the approval of state-religious model of support and control over religion; and, the more participants favour and acknowledge the importance of dominant religion and culture, the less they perceive that certain aspects of religious freedom protections are at risk in their country.

In the case of our third hypothesis – *'Participants' identification with national culture and dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy, which is also reflected in more negative attitudes toward Religious Freedom'* we performed five Independent samples t-tests, in order to discover the differences between Croatian and Italian samples in terms of identification with national culture and dominant religion; and four Independent samples t-test to explore the differences between Croatia and Italy concerning religious freedom attitudes. Our research analysis has shown that Croatian participants significantly differ from Italian participants in terms of how each sample group perceives the role of religion in relation to nationality and how they perceive the role of the Catholic Church, dominant religion, and dominant culture within the society. On average, Croatian participants support more the idea that religion should strengthen the national spirit, take responsibility for the national culture, and support more the idea of favouritism toward the Catholic Church and dominant religion; than the Italian participants. In the case of 'Cultural identification', the results of the t-test implied that there is no statistically significant difference, which was visible from the average means whereby both samples correspond to a medium level of identification with the culture of the country, though Italian participants identify bit more with the culture of a country than the Croatian participants.

With regards to the second part of our third hypothesis, concerning 'Religious freedom attitudes', our analysis confirmed that Croatian participants have more negative attitudes toward certain aspects of religious freedom, than the Italian participants. Accordingly, the t-test analysis showed that Croatian participants disagreed more with 'Socio-legal functions of RF'; 'Societal value of RF' and with the importance of having the freedom to have no religion; freedom to worship; and, freedom to have inner

personal convictions, than the Italian participants. This supports our previous data findings, which imply, even though young generations are more open to various aspects of religious freedom, there is a significant difference between Croatian and Italian young people not only in how they perceive the role of religion in relation to nationality, but as well in terms of how they perceive various dimensions of religious freedom.

Based on these findings, we are able to reject the *null hypothesis* and conclude that there is a statistically significant difference between Croatian and Italian participants in terms of how the role of religion is perceived in relation to identity and national culture. Therefore, we confirm that, in the case of our research, participants' identification with national culture and dominant religion is stronger in Croatia than in Italy.

- **Limitations and potential biases of the research**

Research, even though a fruitful ground for producing new knowledge, also simultaneously produces certain biases and limitations. These biases are not only weaved from the limitations of using a certain methodology but as well, from certain unexpected factors that influence the process and successful outcome of the research. Our research reflects three main limitations – sample size, use of multi-mode methodology and, questionnaire length. First limitation, sample size, refers to the issue that our research encompasses only a young cohort of university students, disabling us to conclude our findings on a more general level. While in the process of conducting research, sample size is the most common issue, in the process of our data collection, we attempted to capture various profiles of university students to minimize the bias of a small sample size. In addition to that, the Covid-19 situation affected the process of collecting our data, excluding the ability to potentially collect data on some other universities, besides the University of Zagreb and the University of Padova. The second main limitation of our research refers to the process of collecting data in terms of methodology use. Our initial plan to collect data by using only the paper-pencil method for distributing the questionnaire was disabled due to the effect of the Covid-19, since our data collection depended on students' attendance of University classes. This unexpected situation caused difficulties and extended the time framework of our data gathering. Therefore, depending on the situation and time, we distributed the questionnaire by using three different methods – paper-pencil, online survey software and, through telephone interviews. In terms of methodology, the use of multi-mode methods can be very time effective and economical; however, each type of applied method brings a different kind of interaction between the researcher and participants, influencing the sphere of anonymity and privacy during the response time. In order to minimize the negative effects of this limitation, we attempted to lower the amount of methodology dispersion by applying multi-mode methods. Therefore, in Croatia, we used only online software to collect all of the data, while in Italy, part of the data was collected by paper-pencil method, and part, through telephone interviews. A third limitation of our research concerns the length of the questionnaire used in our research. While it is advisable to produce shorter questionnaires, our questionnaire was designed to encompass various aspects of religion, religiosity, religious freedom, and citizenship, which

resulted in a longer version of the questionnaire. While our questions were not complexly formulated, our questionnaire turned out to be a bit longer than recommended (it took 45 minutes to complete it), which on some occasions resulted in participants' resentment to fill out the questionnaire, or in some cases, quitting the questionnaire halfway responding.

While our research, as any other research, has certain disadvantages, we can observe that the two primary limitations of our study, namely limited sample size and application of multi-mode methods for distributing and collecting data, are mostly an outcome of external circumstances, such as time and resources, and a consequence of unforeseen events, such as Covid-19. On the other hand, the shorter length of the questionnaire was sacrificed for the ability to have a broad set of variables encompassing various facets, such as religious freedom dimensions and elements of citizenship and citizens' rights. Finally, none of our limitations go beyond the respect of the research ethics, to which no adherence would be an enormous research flaw. Our research was conducted with the aim of maximizing its capabilities and minimizing any significant or potential biases. Including in the process of research gives us a spectrum of possibilities, and within this spectrum of possibilities it is completely natural that certain errors may occur. In this sense, the researcher's awareness of the biases is extremely important, and for this reason, we highlighted, what we considered as our main research limitations.

- **Main contributions and recommendations for future research**

In the field of empirical research, there are many studies that grasp into the thematic and problematic of religious freedom and citizenship separately but rarely explore the linkage between them, analysing how one concept affects the other on a comparative level, which is one of the main aims of this study. This research, even though is based only on young cohort experiences, provides certain answers on the patterns of attitudes and meanings attributed to religious freedom and citizenship, opening new perspectives on young population attitudes, and providing an overlook of the dynamics of the relation between religious freedom and citizenship in two countries – Croatia and Italy.

Our research has several important contributions to the field of empirical studies on religious freedom and citizenship. Firstly, in the significant lack of comparative research in the field of empirical data, the quantitative comparative approach of our research provides an overlook of religious freedom and citizenship attitudes in two countries – Croatia and Italy. Secondly, most of the quantitative studies within the field of religion usually deal with frequencies of religious practice, religious belonging and religious beliefs, rarely grasping into perceptions of religious freedoms and their associations to elements of citizenship, State-religious relations and sphere of national and religious identities, which are the main research perspectives of our study. Thirdly, unlike the studies which usually explore the effect of religiosity on religious freedom and issues of non-citizens and immigrants, our study aims its attention on how attitudes toward citizenship and citizens' rights affect attitudes toward religious freedom. Furthermore, in terms of empirical and

theoretical research in the field of State-religious relations, our study does not only grasp into the effect of State-religious models of relations on religious freedom but explores as well how certain preferable state-religious relations in the views of young cohorts influence how protections of religious freedom in each country are perceived. Lastly, in the case of Italy and Croatia, there are many empirical studies exploring religious identities, the role of the Church and the meaning of religion in these two countries individually, but rarely at a comparative level. Specifically in Croatia, a lot of empirical studies are devoted to the linkage and entanglement of religious and national identities, but unoften do those studies tackle the aspect of religious freedom and its association with the perception of religious and national identities. Therefore, one of the significant particularities of our research is that it explores the patterns of connection between religious and national identity, the role of religion within the sphere of those identities, and connects it to attitudes toward religious freedom on a comparative level.

In terms of future research in the field of religious freedom and citizenship, there are several interesting possibilities. Firstly, in our research, we have explored two Catholic countries with different trajectories of democratic values and different experiences within the dynamics of citizenship, and within that, we have discovered differences in young cohort opinions in each country. While both samples have shown openness and acceptance toward diversity, pluralism, and multiculturalism, one young cohort was more prejudiced than the other, and one young cohort was more attached to the meaning attributed to what constitutes being a Citizen, while the other young cohort disapproved more the idea of assimilating minority groups to dominant religion or culture. It would be interesting to explore this issues within a different contextual background, for example, comparing another country of former SFRY with Croatia, to examine whether similar historical and socio-political events of the countries are reflected in the similarities of attitudes toward citizenship and religious freedom or there are significant differences depending on the national and religious context. Another possibility would be to compare the sample of Italy with a country that has a different religious structure, thus more deeply exploring the impact of religious contextual factors on attitudes toward religious freedom and citizenship.

Furthermore, one of the possibilities that our questionnaire gives is exploring the dimension of belief, religiosity, and religious socialization on attitudes toward religious freedom and citizenship. As well, this research could be advanced by expanding the research more thoroughly on the differences between various religious affiliations and their effect on the patterns of religious freedom and citizenship attitudes. In terms of methodology, it would certainly be prospering if the design of the questionnaire could be complemented by adding more specific and direct questions concerning the interrelation between national and religious identity. Finally, adding a qualitative dimension to this research, whether in terms of interviews or focus groups could be a fruitful tool to enrich the knowledge on attitude patterns of young people regarding religious freedom and citizenship.

List of references

- Ančić, B. (2011). 'What Do We Want from Religion? Religiosity and Social Expectations in Central and Eastern Europe' in A. M. Tóth, A.M., Rughiniş, C. (eds.) *Space and Borders. Current Research on Religion in Central and Eastern Europe*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, p. 151-169.
- Arendt, H. (1951). *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Banchoff, T., Wuthnow, R. (2011). *Religion and the Global Politics of Human Rights*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Basilli, M., Zincone G. (2013). EUDO Citizenship Observatory, Reports on Citizenship Policy Making in EU Mediterranean states. Country Report: Italy. Revised and updated. European University Institute, Florence. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.
- Bloemraad, I., Korteweg, A., Yurdakul, G. (2008). Citizenship and immigration: Multiculturalism, assimilation, and challenges to the nation- state. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 34, 153–179. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134608>
- Bogdanić, A. (2004). Multikulturalno građanstvo i Romkinje u Hrvatskoj. *Migracijske i etničke teme*, 20(4), 339-365.
- Bohman, A., Hjerm, M. (2014). How the religious context affects the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward immigration. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 37:6, 937-957.
- Bratić, V. (2020). Financiranje Vjerskih Zajednica Sredstvima Državnog Proračuna: Primjer Hrvatske, *Ekonomski pregled*, 71(3), 215-238. <https://doi.org/10.32910/ep.71.3.2>
- Breskaya, O., Giordan, G. (2019). Measuring the Social Perception of Religious Freedom: A Sociological Perspective. *Religions*. 2019; 10(4):274. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10040274>
- Breskaya, O., Giordan, G. and Zrinščak, S. (2021). 'Social perception of religious freedom: Testing the impact of secularism and state-religion relations', *Social Compass*, 68(3), 282–300. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/00377686211017493>
- Breskaya, O., Giordan, G., and Richardson, J.T. (2018). Human Rights and Religion: A Sociological Perspective', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 57, 419–43.
- Brettschneider, C. (2010). 'A Transformative Theory of Religious Freedom: Promoting the Reasons for Rights', *Political Theory*, 38(2), 187–213. doi: 10.1177/0090591709354868.
- Brown, A. T. (2012). *Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research*. NY: Guildford Press.

- Brownlow, C., Mc Murray, I., and Hinton, P.R. (2014). *SPSS Explained*, 2nd ed. London and New York: Routledge.
- Brownlow, C., Mc Murray, I., Hinton, P.R., and Cozens, B. (2004). *SPSS Explained*, 1st ed. London and New York: Routledge.
- Child, D. (2006). *The essentials of factor analysis*. 3rd Edition. New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing Group.
- Choy, L.T. (2014) The Strengths and Weaknesses of Research Methodology: Comparison and Complimentary between Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. *Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 19, 99-104.
- Collier, D. (1993). 'The Comparative Method' in A.W. Finifter (ed.) *Political science: the state of discipline II*. American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1540884>
- Coolican, H. (2014). *Research Methods and Statistics in Psychology* 6th Edition. New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Coomans, A. P. M., Kamminga, M. T., and Grünfeld, F. (2010). Methods of Human Rights Research: A Primer. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 32(1), 179-186. <https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.0.0127>
- Corbetta, P. (2003). *Social Research: Theory, Methods and Techniques*. SAGE Publications, London.
- Translated by Jelovica, V., Čular, G. (2022) *Istraživanje u društvenim znanostima. Teorija, Metode I Tehnike*. Fakultet političkih znanosti, Zagreb.
- Costello, A. B., Osborne, J. W. (2005). Best practices in exploratory factor analysis: Four recommendation for getting the most from your analysis. *Practical Assessment, Research, and Evaluation* 10:7, 1-9.
- Cross, F. B. (2015). *Constitutions and Religious Freedom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy). doi: 10.1017/CBO9781139649674.
- Črpić, G., Tanjić, Z. (2015). 'Religion and Human Rights in Croatia', in Ziebertz, H. G., Crpic, G. (eds.), *Religion and Human Rights. An international Perspective*, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 19-31.
- Dimitrijević, V. (2012). 'Constitutional Ethno-Nationalism after Fifteen Years' in Hudson, R., Bowman, G. (eds.), *After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics within the Successor States*. UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 20-26.

- Dingley, J. (2011). Sacred communities: religion and national identities, *National Identities*, 13:4, 389-402. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2011.629427>
- Durham, C. (2012). Patterns of religion state relations. In: Witte J and Green CM (eds) *Religion and human rights: An introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.360–378
- Engler, S., Stausberg, M. (2011). ‘Introduction: Research methods in the study of religion/s’ in S. Engler, M. Stausberg, (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion*. Routledge. London and New York, 3-21, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003222491>
- Ervas, E. (2017). The Agreements Between Church and State: The Italian Perspective. 2017 BYU L. Rev. 869. Available at: <https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2017/iss4/6>
- Ferrari, A., Ferrari, S. (2010). ‘Religion and the Secular State: The Italian Case’. In: Martínez-Torrón, J., Durham, W. C. (eds.) *Religion and the Secular State. La religion et l’État laïque*. Provo, Utah: The International Center for Law and Religion Studies, Brigham Young University:431-448
- Field, A. (2009) *Discovering Statistics Using SPSS 3rd edition*, London: SAGE.
- Finke, R. (2013). Origins and Consequences of Religious Freedom: A Global Overview. Presidential address. *Sociology of Religion* 74:297–313.
- Finke, R., Martin R. (2014). Ensuring Liberties: Understanding State Restrictions on Religious Freedoms. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 53(4):687–705.
- Foner, N., Alba, R. (2008). Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western Europe: Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?. *International Migration Review* 42, pp. 360 - 392.
- Fox, J. (2009). Quantifying Religion and State: Round Two of the Religion and State Project. *Politics and Religion*. Cambridge University Press, 2(3), pp. 444–452. doi: 10.1017/S1755048309990216.
- Fox, J. (2014). Is it Really God’s Century? An Evaluation of Religious Support and Discrimination from 1990 to 2008. *Politics & Religion*, 7 (1), 4–27
- Fox, J. (2015). Religious Freedom in Theory and Practice. *Hum Rights Rev.* 16, 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-014-0323-5>
- Fox, J., Finke, R., Mataic, R.D. (2018). New Data and Measures on Societal Discrimination and Religious Minorities. *Interdisciplinary journal of research on religion*, 14, 1-37

- Francis L.J., Breskaya O., McKenna U. (2020). Attitudes toward Civil Human Rights among Italian Students of Sociology: The Effects of Religion and Theology. *Religions* 11(12):643. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11120643>
- Garelli, F. (2010). *Catholicism in Italy in the Age of Pluralism*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Garelli, F. (2012). Flexible Catholicism, Religion and the Church: The Italian Case. *Religions*. 4. 1-13. [10.3390/rel4010001](https://doi.org/10.3390/rel4010001).
- Garelli, F. (2020). *Gente di poca Fede: il sentimento religioso nell'Italia incerta di Dio*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Giorda, M.C. (2015). 'Religious Diversity in Italy and the Impact on Education: The History of a Failure' in Astor, A., Griera, M. (eds.) *Engaging with the Other: Religion, Identity and Politics in the Mediterranean. New Diversities*, 17(1), 77-93.
- Giordan, G., and Zrinščak, S. (2018). One pope, two churches: Refugees, human rights and religion in Croatia and Italy. *Social Compass*, 65(1), 62–78. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0037768617745481>
- Giordan, G., Trophimov, S., and Breskaya, O. (2020). Religious Socialization and Perception of Religious Freedom in Italy and Russia: Findings from a Comparative Research on Youth. *Studi di Sociologia* 4: 429–444.
- Grim, J.B., Finke, R. (2006). International religious indexes: Governmental Regulation, Government Favouritism, and Social Regulation of Religion. *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* 2(1)., available at: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4254791>
- Hair, F. J. Jr., Black, W. C., Babin B.J., and Anderson, R. J. (2010). *Multivariate data analysis* 7th Edition. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall.
- Harrington, D. (2009). *Confirmatory factor analysis*. Oxford University Press: New York.
- Harvey, G. (2011). 'Field research: Participant observation' in S. Engler, M. Stausberg, (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion*. Routledge. London and New York, 81-107, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003222491>
- Hayden, R. (1992). 'Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics', *Slavic Review*, 51, 4, 654–673.
- Introvigne, M. (2001). Italy's Surprisingly Favorable Environment for Religious Minorities. *Nova Religio, The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions*. 4 (2): 275–280. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1525/nr.2001.4.2.275>

- Introvigne, M., and Stark, R. (2005). Religious Competition and Revival in Italy: Exploring European Exceptionalism. *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion*.
- Isin, E. F., Nyers, P. (2014). Introduction: Globalizing Citizenship studies. In: Isin, E. F., Nyers, P. (eds) *Routledge Handbook of citizenship studies*. Routledge: Abingdon, pp. 1-12.
- Jakulj, I. (2015) Legal Status of the Catholic Church in the Republic of Croatia: From Totalitarianism to Democracy, *Crkva u Svijetu*, 50(3), 478–513.
- John, P. (2010). Quantitative methods in (eds)D. Marsh, G. Stoker, (eds.), *Theory and methods in political science: 3rd edition*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Joppke, C. (2007). Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity. *Citizenship Studies*.
- Jovetić, S. (2015). Merenje performansi preduzeća. Ekonomski fakultet Univerziteta u Kragujevcu.
- Jukić, J. (1994). Hrvatski katolici u vremenu postkomunizma. *Crkva u svijetu*, 29(4), 363-378. <https://hrcak.srce.hr/52572>
- Knezović, S. and Grošinić, M. (2017). Migration Trends in Croatia. Institute for Development and International Relations and Hanns Seidel Foundation.
- Kompes, M. (2018). ‘Povezanost religioznosti te stavova i iskustava o vjerskoj slobodi kod religiozno deklariranih mladih u Hrvatskoj’, *Nova prisutnost*, 16(2), 213-228
- Koska, V., Matan, A. (2017). ‘Croatian Citizenship Regime and Traumatized Categories of Croatian Citizens: Serb Minority and Croatian Defenders of the Homeland War’, *Politička misao*, 54(1-2), 119-149.
- Kuburić, Z., and Moe, C. (2006). Religion and Pluralism in Education. Comparative Approaches in the Western Balkans. CEIR, Kotor Network.
- Kumpes, J. (2018). Religioznost i stavovi prema imigrantima u Hrvatskoj. *Migracijske i etničke teme* 34: 3, pp. 275-320.
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford University Press: New York.
- Levy, G. (2014). Contested citizenship of the Arab Spring and beyond. . In: Isin, E. F., Nyers, P. (eds) *Routledge Handbook of citizenship studies*. Routledge: London and New York, pp. 23-38
- Maldini, P. (2006). ‘Renewed Religiosity and Democratisation of the Croatian Society’, *Društvena istraživanja: časopis za opća društvena pitanja*, 15(6 (86)), 1105-1125.

- Marczyk, G., DeMatteo, D., and Festinger, D. (2005) *Essentials of Research Design and Methodology*. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
- Marianski, J. (2006). 'The Religiosity of Polish Society from the Perspective of Secularized Europe', in Borowik, I. (ed.), *Religions, Churches, and Religiosity in Post-Communist Europe*. Krakow: Nomos, 81–92.
- Marinović Bobinac, A., Marinović Jerolimov, D. (2006) "Religious education in Croatia", in *Religion and Pluralism in Education: Comparative Approaches in the Western Balkans*, ed. Z. Kuburić and C. Moe, 39-71 (Novi Sad : CEIR)
- Marinović Jerolimov, D., Zrinščak, S. (2006). Religion Within and Beyond Borders: The Case of Croatia. *Social Compass*, 53(2), 279–290.
- Marinović Bobinac, A. (1996). Manjinske crkve i tolerancija. *Društvena istraživanja: časopis za opća društvena pitanja* 5(2(22)), pp. 399-416.
- Mesić, M., Bagić, D. (2011). 'Stavovi hrvatskih građana prema kulturnim različitostima' *Migracijske i etničke teme*, 27(1), 7-38.
- Mihaljević, V. (2005). 'Društveni kontekst i teorijsko-hipotetski okvir istraživanja. Novi laički crkveni pokreti u Hrvatskoj', *Društvena istraživanja: časopis za opća društvena pitanja*, 14(1-2 (75-76)), 3-25.
- Miloš, D., Novak, K. (2018). 'The Role of Value Orientations and Political Preference on Political and Judicial Human Rights Among the Croatian Youth' in Sterkens, C., Ziebertz, H. G. (eds.), *Religion and Human Rights. An international Perspective*. Volume 3. Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 71-95
- Modood, T. (2019). *Essays on Secularism and Multiculturalism*. London: ECPR Press.
- Modood, T., and Simon, T. (2021). Othering, Alienation and Establishment. *Political Studies*.
- Modood, T., Kastoryano, R. (2007). Secularism and the Accommodation of Muslim Identities. 10.1057/9780230590960_2.
- Morgan, R. (2009). Introduction: human rights research and social sciences. In: Morgan, R., Turner, S. B. (eds) *Interpreting Human Rights. Social science perspective*. Routledge: London and New York, pp. 1-22.
- Nash, K. (2009). Democratic human rights. In: Morgan, R., Turner, S. B. (eds) *Interpreting Human Rights. Social science perspective*. Routledge: London and New York, pp. 87-104.

- Navarro-Rivera, J., Kosmin, A.B. (2011). 'Surveys and questionnaires' in S. Engler, M. Stausberg, (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion*. Routledge. London and New York, p. 395-421, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003222491>
- Nikodem, K. (2010). Religiosity and Marriage/Family Attitudes in Croatia in Pickel, G., Sammet, K. (eds), *Transformations of Religiosity; Religion and Religiosity in Eastern Europe 1989 – 2010*. Wiesbaden: Springer, 175 - 196.
- O'Halloran, K. (2019). *Human rights, religion and international law*. Routledge. New York.
- Pace, E (2014). 'Increasing Religious Diversity in a Society Monopolized by Catholicism' in Giordan, G., Pace, E. (eds.) *Religious Pluralism. Framing Religious Diversity in the Contemporary World*. Springer. Department of FISPPA: University of Padova. Padova, Italy.
- Pallant, J. (2013). *SPSS Survival Manual. A step by step guide to data analysis using IBM SPSS*, 4th Edition. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen and Unwin.
- Posavec, L.V. (2021). *Metodologija društvenih istraživanja: temeljni uvidi*. Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar. Zagreb.
- Radović, M. (2013). *Citizenship and Religion in the Post-Yugoslav States*. CITSEE Working Paper 2013/35.
- Richardson, J. T. (2006). The Sociology of Religious Freedom: A structural and socio-legal analysis. *Sociology of Religion*. 67(3): 271-294.
- Richardson, J. T. (2014). Religious Diversity, Social Control, and Legal Pluralism: A Socio-Legal Analysis, In: Giordan, G., Pace, E. (eds) *Religious Pluralism framing Religious diversity in the contemporary world*. Cham: Springer, pp. 31-49.
- Richardson, J. T. (2015). Managing Religion and the Judicialization of Religious Freedom. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. 54(1):1–19.
- Richardson, J. T. and Lee, B. M. (2014). The Role of the Courts in the Social Construction of Religious Freedom in Central and Eastern Europe. *Review of Central and Eastern Europe Law* 39(3/4):291–313.
- Roof, C. (2011). 'Research design' in S. Engler, M. Stausberg, (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion*. Routledge. London and New York, p. 68-81, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003222491>

- Roopa S., Rani M. (2012). Questionnaire Designing for a Survey. *Journal of Indian Orthodontic Society*. 46(4), p. 273-277. doi:10.5005/jp-journals-10021-1104
- Sarkissian, A. (2015). *The Varieties of Religious Repression: Why Governments Restrict Religion*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Scheepers, P., Gijsberts, M., and Hello, E. (2002). Religiosity and Prejudice against Ethnic Minorities in Europe: Cross-National Tests on a Controversial Relationship, *Review of Religious Research* 43:3, pp.242–265.
- Schubert, E. (2006). Religion and Citizenship: Multiple identities in the modern world. *Journal Institute for humanities*. SFU. Vo (4)
- Scolnicov, A. (2011). *The Right to Religious Freedom in International Law: Between group rights and individual rights*. Routledge: London.
- Somers, M.R., and Roberts, C. (2008). Toward a New Sociology of Rights: A Genealogy of “Buried Bodies” of Citizenship and Human Rights. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, 4, 385-425.
- Spajić-Vrkaš, V. (2003). ‘Visions, Provisions and Reality: Political changes and education for democratic citizenship in Croatia’, *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 33(1), 33-51.
- Staničić, F., Ofak, L. (2011). ‘Registracija vjerskih udruga i vjerskih zajednica u svjetlu Europske konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda’, in Šalković, J. (ed.), *Vjernici, društva, pokreti*. Zagreb: Glas Koncila, 217-242
- Stausberg, M. (2011). ‘Comparison’ in S. Engler, M. Stausberg, (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion*. Routledge. London and New York, p. 21-40, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003222491>
- Steenbergen, V. B. (1994). *The Condition of Citizenship: An Introduction*. In: Steenbergen, V. B. (ed.) *The Condition of Citizenship*. SAGE: London.
- Štiks, I. (2010). ‘The Citizenship Conundrum in Post-Communist Europe: The Instructive Case of Croatia’, *Europe-Asia Studies*. Routledge: London.
- Štiks, I. (2015). *Nations and citizens in Yugoslavia and the post-Yugoslav states: One hundred years of citizenship*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Storm, I. (2009). *Researching religion using quantitative methods*. Institute for Social Change, University of Manchester.

Stubbs, P., Zrinščak, S. (2015). 'Citizenship and Social Welfare in Croatia: Clientelism and the Limits of Europeanisation', *European Politics and Society*, 16(3), 395-410.

Tokri, R. (2015). From tolerance to the secular State in Italy. *Academicus International Scientific Journal*, Entrepreneurship Training Center Albania, issue 11, pages 51-62

Topić, M. (2013). Religion and the Education system in Croatia: A critique. *The South Slav Journal*, Vol. 32, No. 1-2, Pp. 53-86.

Tuli, F. (2010). The Basis of Distinction between Qualitative and Quantitative Research in Social Science: Reflection on Ontological, Epistemological, and Methodological Perspectives. *Ethiopian Journal of Education and Sciences*, 6, p. 1-12, <https://doi.org/10.4314/ejesc.v6i1.65384>

Turner, S. B. (2009). A sociology of citizenship and human rights: does social theory still exist? In: Morgan, R., Turner, S. B. (eds) *Interpreting Human Rights. Social science perspective*. Routledge: London and New York, pp. 177-200.

Verdery, K. (1998). 'Transnationalism, Nationalism, Citizenship, and Property: Eastern Europe since 1989', *American Ethnologist*, 25(2), 291–306.

Vrcan, S. (1999). Novi izazovi za suvremenu sociologiju religije - Politizacija religije i religizacija politike u postkomunizmu. *Revija za sociologiju*, 30 (1-2), 45-64. Preuzeto s <https://hrcak.srce.hr/154407>

Woodwiss, A. (2009). Taking the sociology of human rights seriously. In: Morgan, R., Turner, S. B. (eds) *Interpreting Human Rights. Social science perspective*. Routledge: London and New York, pp. 104-121.

Yong, A.G., and Pearce, S. (2013). A Beginner's Guide to Factor Analysis: Focusing on Exploratory Factor Analysis. *Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology*, 9, 79-94. <https://doi.org/10.20982/tqmp.09.2.p079>

Zaccaria, F., Francis-Vincent, A., Sterkens, C. (2018). 'Religion for the Political Rights of Immigrants and Refugees? An Empirical Exploration Among Italian Students' in Sterkens, C., Ziebertz, G. H. (eds.) *Political and Judicial Rights through the Prism of Religious Belief*. Springer: Religions and Human Rights (3).

Zaccaria, F., Francis-Vincent, A., Sterkens, C. (2018a). Religion and Civil Rights in Italy: An Empirical Exploration Among Secondary School Students in in Sterkens, C., Ziebertz, G. H. (eds.) *Religion and Civil Human Rights in Empirical Perspective*. Religion and Human Rights (2)

Žagi, K. (2021) Perceiving the Migrant as "Other": Analysis of Three Main Categories in the European Migration Context. *Sic* 11:2.

- Zanfrini, L. (2020). Introduction: General Description of the Study, Key Issues, and Provisional Conclusions. In *Migrants and Religion: Paths, Issues, and Lenses: A Multidisciplinary and Multi-Sited Study on the Role of Religious Belongings in Migratory and Integration Processes*. Edited by Laura Zanfrini. Brill, pp. 3-52.
- Zincone, G. (2010). EUDO Citizenship Observatory, Reports on Citizenship Policy Making in EU Mediterranean states. Citizenship Policy Making in Mediterranean EU States: Italy. European University Institute, Florence. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
- Zincone, G., and Basili, M. (2013). *Country Report: Italy*. Revised and Updated Version. [GLOBALCIT], EUDO Citizenship Observatory, Country Reports. Cadmus, EUI Research Repository. <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/19619>.
- Zlatković, J. (2015). 'Pravna i socijalna isključenost u novoj Europi: usporedba baltičkih zemalja, Slovenije i Hrvatske', *Revija za socijalnu politiku*, 22(1), 59-79
- Zrinščak S., Marinović Jerolimov D., Marinović A., Ančić B. (2014). Church and State in Croatia: Legal Framework, Religious Instruction, and Social Expectations. In: Ramet S.P. (ed) Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe. Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137330727_6
- Zrinščak, S. (1998). 'Religija i Hrvatsko društvo', *Društvena istraživanja*, 7(3 (35)), 339-357.
- Zrinščak, S. (2005). 'Religija, civilno društvo, socijalni problemi', *Društvena istraživanja*, 14(1-2 (75-76)), 71-96.
- Zrinščak, S. (2006). 'Anonymous Believers as a Sociological Challenge: Religions and Religious Changes in Post-Yugoslav States'. in Borowik, I. (ed.), *Religions, Churches and Religiosity in Post-Communist Europe*, Krakow: Nomos, 68–80.
- Župarić-Iljić, D. (2013). 'The Number, Status and Organizational Aspects of Serbs in Zagreb', *Stanovništvo*, 51(1), 43-68.

Appendix

Religion and Citizenship in Italy

This questionnaire looks at what you think about religion, religious freedom, and citizenship. Please say what you really think and try to be as honest and accurate as possible. There are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers to these questions. We want to know your views. Everything you tell us is completely private and confidential. Thanks for your help!

A – About you Please tick (✓) the appropriate box

1. What is your sex?

Male	1	
Female	2	

2. Do you have Italian citizenship?

No	1	
Yes	2	

3. What is your age?

Number		
--------	--	--

4. What year of University are you in?

BA 1 year	1	
BA 2 year	2	
BA 3 year	3	
MA 1 year	4	
MA 2 year	5	

5. Where were you and your parents born?

	5_a you	5_b your mother	5_c your father
Italy	1	1	1
Europe	2	2	2
Africa	3	3	3
America	4	4	4
Asia	5	5	5
Australia	6	6	6

6. What is the highest level of your and your parents' education?

	6_a your	6_b your mother	6_c your father
Primary School	1	1	1
Secondary School	2	2	2
University	3	3	3

7. Which of the following best describes the area you were born?

Urban	1	
Suburban	2	
Rural	3	

8. What is your religion? Please tick only one answer.

No religion	1	
Roman-Catholic	2	
Protestant	3	
Christian-Orthodox	4	
Pentecostal	5	
Other Christian tradition	6	
Muslim	7	
Jewish	8	
Buddhist	9	
Hindu	10	
Sikh	11	
Other (please specify)	12	

9. How often do you pray in your home or by yourself?

Never	1	
Occasionally	2	
A few times a year	3	
At least once a month	4	
At least once a weak	5	
Nearly every day	6	

10. Apart from special occasions (like weddings and funerals), how often do you attend a religious worship service (e.g. in a church, mosque or synagogue)?

Never	1	
Occasionally	2	
A few times a year	3	
At least once a month	4	
Nearly every week	5	
Several times a week	6	

11. Tick the **one** statement that comes closest to your own belief

Only one religion is really true and all others are totally false	1	
Only one religion is really true but at least one other is partly true	2	
All religions are equally true	3	
All religions express the same truth in different ways	4	
Real truth comes from listening to all religions	5	
All religions are totally false	6	
I do not know what to believe about religions	7	

12. Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take part in social activities (events/encounters with other people, by choice and for enjoyment rather than for reasons of work or duty)?

Much less than most	1	
Less than most	2	
About the same	3	
More than most	4	
Much more than most	5	

13. How often do you follow politics on media?

Never	1	
Occasionally	2	
At least once a month	3	
At least once a weak	4	
Nearly every day	5	

14. Did you vote in the last election?

No	1	
Yes	2	

15. Did you during the last 12 months participate in a meeting arranged by any political organization or trade union?

No	1	
Yes	2	

16. In political matters people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? **Circle a number**

left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 right

17. I have attended classes on religion (please tick all that apply)

At elementary school	No	1	Yes	2
At secondary school	No	1	Yes	2
At high school	No	1	Yes	2

18. I have learnt about religious freedom in any of my classes (please tick all that apply)

At elementary school	No	1	Yes	2
At secondary school	No	1	Yes	2
At high school	No	1	Yes	2

19. How would you describe the level of your family income?

Low	1	
Middle	2	
High	3	

20. How many languages do you speak?

Only Italian/hrv	1	
Italian and one more language	2	
Italian and two more languages	3	
More than three languages	4	

21. Tick the **one** statement that comes closest to your socialisation

I was socialised in Italian/ culture	1	
I was socialised partially in Italian and partially in another culture	2	
I was socialised in a non-Italian culture	3	

22. In terms of cultural identity people talk of 'weak' and 'strong' identification with their cultural heritage. How would you place your identification with Italian culture on this scale, generally speaking? **Circle a number**

Weak identification with Italian culture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strong identification with Italian culture*

23. If you have other origin than Italian, please specify your cultural identification with your native culture on this scale. **Circle a number**

Weak identification with native culture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *Strong identification with native culture*

24. Have you had any experience studying abroad?

At least three months	1	
At least six months	2	
At least one year	3	

24_a. If you had experience abroad, please specify where was located the country of your destination?

In Europe	1	
In North America	2	
In Central or South America	3	
In Asia or Oceania	4	
In Africa	5	

25. After your participation in the exchange program, could you please specify your satisfaction with the intercultural experience you got on the following scale. **Circle a number**

Low satisfaction with 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *High satisfaction with*

B. About Religious Freedom The following questions are about your attitude toward different issues. Please read each statement and think: 'how true is this?'

If you *Agree Strongly* put a ring around..... AS A NC D DS
 If you *Agree* put a ring around..... AS A NC D DS
 If you are *Not Certain* put a ring around..... AS A NC D DS
 If you *Disagree* put a ring around..... AS A NC D DS
 If you *Disagree Strongly* put a ring around..... AS A NC D DS

intercultural experience

intercultural experience

26. For me, Religious Freedom means:

26 a	Freedom to choose my religious/non-religious identity	AS A NC D DS
26 b	Freedom to speak on religious matters openly and freely	AS A NC D DS
26 c	Protection from the state interference on religious issues	AS A NC D DS
26 d	Non-discrimination for religious minorities on the basis of religion	AS A NC D DS
26 e	Equality of various religions in society before the law	AS A NC D DS
26 f	An important right in a democratic society	AS A NC D DS
26 g	Non-violent co-existence for all religions in every society	AS A NC D DS

27. Please indicate how much you agree with the following aspects of Religious Freedom

27 a	It is important for everyone to be free to change their religion	AS A NC D DS
27 b	Children should be brought up in the religion chosen by their parents	AS A NC D DS
27 c	Everyone should be free to teach their religion, either in public or in private	AS A NC D DS
27_d	Everyone should be free to observe dietary practices prescribed by their religion	AS A NC D DS
27_e	Everyone should be free to invent a new religion	AS A NC D DS
27_f	Every religious leader/group should be free to renew their religion	AS A NC D DS
27_g	Every religious group should be free to establish houses of worship in the localities of their choosing	AS A NC D DS
27_h	Every religious group should be free, in some case, to place their religious beliefs above national law	AS A NC D DS

28. How much do you agree that the following aspects of Religious Freedom are important for you?

28 a	Freedom to have no religion	AS A NC D DS
28 b	Freedom to have inner personal religious convictions	AS A NC D DS
28_c	Freedom to worship	AS A NC D DS
28_d	Freedom to wear religious clothes/symbols in public places	AS A NC D DS
28 e	Freedom to establish religious group	AS A NC D DS
28 f	Freedom to express religious views in the media	AS A NC D DS
28 g	Freedom to write, issue and disseminate religious publications	AS A NC D DS
28 h	Freedom to criticize religious leaders	AS A NC D DS
28 i	Freedom to criticize religious concepts/principles/dogmas	AS A NC D DS

29. How much do you agree that Religious freedom is important because:

29 a	It is connected with the idea of human dignity	AS A NC D DS
29 b	It is connected with search for individual truth	AS A NC D DS
29 c	It allows everyone to pursue their personal spiritual fulfillment	AS A NC D DS
29 d	It promotes non-discrimination on the basis of religion	AS A NC D DS
29 e	It promotes religious and cultural diversity in society	AS A NC D DS
29 f	It promotes inter-religious dialogue between religions	AS A NC D DS

29_g	It promotes equality as a principle of democratic citizenship	AS A NC D DS
29_h	It is important for tolerant and peaceful co-existence of religions	AS A NC D DS
29_i	It is an important legal principle for secular state	AS A NC D DS
29_j	Religious freedom is not important for me	AS A NC D DS
29_k	Religious freedom is more important than other freedoms	AS A NC D DS

30. How much do you agree with the following cases related to Religious Freedom protection in Italy?

30_a	People should be prohibited to wear religious clothes and religious symbols at the workplace	AS A NC D DS
30_b	No religious symbols of any religion should be allowed in public schools	AS A NC D DS
30_c	Students should be offered time, space and a room in schools to do their prayers	AS A NC D DS
30_d	The state should not prevent female teachers from wearing a head scarf for religious reasons	AS A NC D DS
30_e	History of religions classes should be taught by lay people in all primary and secondary public schools	AS A NC D DS
30_f	The state should allow the presence of symbols of religious minorities in public schools, since Catholic symbols are present there	AS A NC D DS

31. How much do you agree that the following social changes/challenges create a need for Religious Freedom in Italy?

31_a	Increasing numbers of non-religious people in Italian society	AS A NC D DS
31_b	The growth of alternative spirituality practices	AS A NC D DS
31_c	Hate crimes motivated by religious hatred	AS A NC D DS
31_d	Issues in public policy such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia	AS A NC D DS
31_e	The growth of Orthodox Christian population	AS A NC D DS
31_f	The growth of Muslim population	AS A NC D DS
31_g	The growth of refugees in Italy	AS A NC D DS

32. How much do you agree that the state should not interfere with the following affairs of religious groups?

32_a	The core beliefs and religious teaching	AS A NC D DS
32_b	The core ministry including matters of liturgy, confession, education of clergy	AS A NC D DS
32_c	The core administration including the right to appoint and dismiss employees, church discipline, and financial issues	AS A NC D DS

33. How much do you agree that?

33_a	Religious freedom should be aimed to protect more religious institutions than individuals	AS A NC D DS
33_b	Religious freedom should be aimed to protect individuals even against their religions	AS A NC D DS
33_c	Religious freedom should only apply to religions recognised by the state	AS A NC D DS
33_d	Religious freedom of religious minorities should be restricted during public emergencies	AS A NC D DS
33_e	Secular states should put principles of secularism over the right to freedom of religion	AS A NC D DS

34. How much do you agree with the following statements related to current situation with Religious Freedom in Italy?

34_a	Italian state provides equal conditions for the Catholic Church and religious minorities	AS A NC D DS
34_b	Italian state provides equal conditions for Catholics and non-religious people	AS A NC D DS
34_c	Italian state does not favor any religious group	AS A NC D DS
34_d	Italian state manages religious issues very well	AS A NC D DS

34 e	Discrimination on the grounds of religion does not happen in Italy	AS A NC D DS
34 f	The Catholic Church as part of Italian identity should be favored in society	AS A NC D DS

35. How much do you agree with the following claims about how the state should regulate religions in Italy?

35 a	The state should not interfere with missionary activities in majority religion	AS A NC D DS
35 b	The state should not interfere with missionary activities in minority religion	AS A NC D DS
35 c	The state should not interfere with public activities in majority religion	AS A NC D DS
35 d	The state should not interfere with public activities in minority religion	AS A NC D DS
35 e	The state should provide equal conditions for religious and non-religious people	AS A NC D DS
35 f	The state should not favor any religious group	AS A NC D DS
35 g	The state should educate the public to accept religious freedom	AS A NC D DS

36. How much do you agree with the following statements regarding various rights?

36 a	Women should have the right to be equally paid for equal work	AS A NC D DS
36 b	The state should protect women's right to adequate job opportunities	AS A NC D DS
36 c	Women should have the same rights during the dissolution of marriage	AS A NC D DS
36 d	Women should have the same right to become religious leaders as men	AS A NC D DS
36 e	The government should provide a decent standard of living for refugees	AS A NC D DS
36 f	The government should guarantee refugees access to education	AS A NC D DS
36 g	Refugees should have access to medical care	AS A NC D DS
36 h	The state should prosecute behaviour that discriminates against homosexuals	AS A NC D DS
36 i	Homosexuals should have the right to hold any public office	AS A NC D DS
36 j	Homosexuals should have the right to marry	AS A NC D DS
36 k	The government should provide health care for the sick	AS A NC D DS
36 l	The government should provide a decent standard of living for the old	AS A NC D DS
36 m	State should guarantee a decent living for all citizens and their families	AS A NC D DS
36 n	People should be free to express any opinion whatsoever	AS A NC D DS
36 o	People should be free to discuss all moral ideas, no matter what	AS A NC D DS
36 p	People should be free to post on Twitter/Facebook whatever they like	AS A NC D DS
36 q	People should be prevented from expressing provocative religious ideas	AS A NC D DS

C – About Religion

37. Do you agree with the following definitions about you? NA - NOT APPLICABLE

37 a	I am a religious person	AS A NC D DS NA
37 b	I am a spiritual person	AS A NC D DS NA
37 c	I believe in God	AS A NC D DS NA
37 d	My spiritual beliefs give my life a sense of significance and purpose	AS A NC D DS NA
37 e	My religious beliefs give my life a sense of significance and purpose	AS A NC D DS NA
37 f	My spiritual beliefs have a great influence on my daily life	AS A NC D DS NA
37 g	My religious beliefs have a great influence on my daily life	AS A NC D DS NA

38. It was important for me that in my childhood:

NA – NOT APPLICABLE

38_a	My parents (relatives) talked with me on religious issues <i>(If your parents or relatives did not talk with you on religious issues, the answer will be NA)</i>	AS A NC D DS NA
38_b	I grew up in a religious family <i>(If you did not grow up in a religious family, the answer will be NA)</i>	AS A NC D DS NA
38_c	We had religious symbols at home <i>(If you had no religious symbols at home, the answer will be NA)</i>	AS A NC D DS NA
38_d	We prayed together with my family <i>(If you did not pray together with your family, the answer will be NA)</i>	AS A NC D DS NA
38_e	We read religious texts together with my family <i>(If you did not read religious texts together with your family, the answer will be NA)</i>	AS A NC D DS NA
38_f	We celebrated religious holidays together in the family <i>(If you did not celebrate religious holidays together with your family, the answer will be NA)</i>	AS A NC D DS NA
38_g	It was important not to have religious socialization in my family <i>(If you had religious socialization in your family, the answer will be NA)</i>	AS A NC D DS NA

D – About Society

39. How much do you agree with the following statements about your life in Italy?

39_a	I take part in a lot of social activities	AS A NC D DS
39_b	I often meet with (or talk to) relatives or friends	AS A NC D DS
39_c	I feel that I am included within political life in Italy	AS A NC D DS
39_d	I am interested in politics	AS A NC D DS
39_e	Belonging to groups in Italian civil society is important to me	AS A NC D DS
39_f	I have close friends with whom I can discuss important matters	AS A NC D DS

40. How much do you agree with the following roles of religions in society? According to me, religions should:

40_a	Publicly stand up for the underclass	AS A NC D DS
40_b	Alleviate social needs of marginalised people	AS A NC D DS
40_c	Teach people to help the disadvantaged	AS A NC D DS
40_d	Reconcile people with each other in society	AS A NC D DS
40_e	Facilitate interfaith cooperation to end religious-based violence	AS A NC D DS
40_f	Facilitate humanitarian dialogue with non-religious people	AS A NC D DS
40_g	Provide spiritual guidance for their members	AS A NC D DS
40_h	Create places for deep spiritual experiences	AS A NC D DS
40_i	Take care of the spiritual well-being of their members	AS A NC D DS
40_j	Influence public opinion on social problems	AS A NC D DS
40_k	Intervene in societal affairs	AS A NC D DS
40_l	Have their own perspective on social problems	AS A NC D DS
40_m	Nurture people into the faith	AS A NC D DS
40_n	Strengthen religious experiences through collective practices	AS A NC D DS
40_o	Help people in their search for the sacred	AS A NC D DS
40_p	Offer solutions to moral problems of individuals	AS A NC D DS
40_q	Support morality in human relations	AS A NC D DS
40_r	Provide guidelines about right and wrong in human actions	AS A NC D DS
40_s	Go along with changing ideas in society	AS A NC D DS
40_t	Always keep up with current social trends	AS A NC D DS
40_u	Support social development	AS A NC D DS
40_v	Strengthen the national spirit	AS A NC D DS
40_w	Take a responsibility with the state for national culture	AS A NC D DS
40_x	Offer answers to questions about the meaning of life	AS A NC D DS
40_y	Give sense of purpose in life	AS A NC D DS
40_z	Give meaning to the social order	AS A NC D DS
40_a1	Shape social identity for people	AS A NC D DS

40 b1	Give people social connections in modern individualised society	AS A NC D DS
40 c1	Promote the freedom of religion	AS A NC D DS
40 d1	Promote tolerance towards other religions	AS A NC D DS

41. How much do you agree with the following statements about immigrants in Italy?

41 a	Immigrants take jobs away from Italians	AS A NC D DS
41 b	Immigrants make problems with crimes worse	AS A NC D DS
41 c	Immigrants are a strain on a country's welfare system	AS A NC D DS

42. How much do you agree with the following statements about relations between state, society, and religion in Italy?

42_a	State should be neutral and treat equally all religions and allow them to be present in public sphere	AS A NC D DS
42_b	State should be neutral and treat equally all religions and confine religious expression to private sphere	AS A NC D DS
42_c	State should guarantee special legal status of Catholicism and support close ties between Catholicism, politics, and culture	AS A NC D DS
42_d	State should guarantee special legal status of a preferred set of religions and recognize special role of them in cultural and political spheres	AS A NC D DS
42_e	State should be legally separated from all religions but support religious pluralism and participation of various religions in political and cultural spheres	AS A NC D DS
42_f	It is better if state controls religion and does not allow it to be present in public sphere	AS A NC D DS
42_g	We should tolerate differences in private sphere but assimilate "different culture or religion" to major/ dominant culture	AS A NC D DS
42_h	The right to have one's 'difference' (minority religiosity, ethnicity, etc.) should be recognised and supported in the public and the private spheres	AS A NC D DS

43. How much do you agree with the statements that all people in Italy regardless of their citizenship status should have:

43 a	A right to vote	AS A NC D DS
43 b	A right to protest	AS A NC D DS
43 c	A right to form a political party	AS A NC D DS
43 d	A right to health care	AS A NC D DS
43 e	A right to education	AS A NC D DS
43 f	A right to employment	AS A NC D DS

44. How much do you agree with the following statement that Italian citizen is a person who:

44 a	Holds Italian passport	AS A NC D DS
44 b	Lives in Italy	AS A NC D DS
44 c	Was born in Italy	AS A NC D DS
44 d	Has Italian descent	AS A NC D DS
44 e	Speaks Italian	AS A NC D DS
44 f	Keeps strong social relations with Italians	AS A NC D DS
44 g	Shares Italian cultural codes	AS A NC D DS
44 h	Makes active contribution to determining the future of Italian society	AS A NC D DS
44 i	Participates in voluntary civil society organizations	AS A NC D DS
44 j	Donate money for civic purposes	AS A NC D DS
44 k	Respects the Italian law	AS A NC D DS

45. People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Do you agree with the definition that you feel close to:

45 a	Your town/city	AS A NC D DS
45 b	Your region	AS A NC D DS
45 c	Your country	AS A NC D DS
45 d	Europe	AS A NC D DS

45_e	To the world	AS A NC D DS
-------------	--------------	--------------

46. How much do you agree with the following statements about religious diversity in Italy?

46_a	Having people from different religion in Italy is enriching	AS A NC D DS
46_b	Having many different religious points of view is good for Italian society	AS A NC D DS
46_c	Increasing numbers of religions groups in Italy cause unrest and tension	AS A NC D DS
46_d	In Italy it would be better to pay attention to one dominant religion and culture	AS A NC D DS

47. How much do you agree with the following statements?

47_a	I am satisfied with how Catholicism has developed in Italy during the last 10 years	AS A NC D DS
47_b	I am satisfied with how democracy has developed in Italy during the last 10 years	AS A NC D DS
47_c	I am satisfied with the political system in Italy	AS A NC D DS
47_d	It is important to me to live in a democratically governed country	AS A NC D DS
47_e	It is important to me to have together with the Italian citizenship the citizenship of European Union	AS A NC D DS