


Migration: What Role for Regional Policy



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ABSTRACT

The paper provides an overview on the migratory phenomenon, observed through the lens of its territorial dimensions, and examines the degree to which this phenomenon affects territorial disparities.¹ It also reviews some of the policy responses put in place to tackle the territorial issues related to migration, focusing primarily on the social and economic integration of migrants. The inflow of foreign-born nationals in EU Member States presents both challenges and opportunities for regional development. On the one hand, it entails the need for different approaches to the provision of services and for measures aimed at actively pursuing the societal, civic and labour market integration of this growing group of actors. On the other hand, immigration can help counteract negative demographic trends, raise the levels of skills available in local labour markets, and contribute to the pool of financial resources available to fund public services in increasingly cash-strapped local authorities. The integration of migrants has both short- and long-term dimensions, and it requires a comprehensive and synergistic approach that cuts across a plurality of levels of government, types of actors, and policy sectors. The complexity of the problems tackled also requires policy responses to be designed and implemented with the active involvement of all stakeholders – foreign-born as well as nationals – at grassroots levels, to ensure that needs, opportunities and barriers are identified in a comprehensive manner. Equally, it needs to be recognised that integration policies take a long time to yield returns and that policy packages need to tackle short-term needs without prejudice for the long term. Regional policy is long-term, place-based, participative and cross-sectoral. As such, it can be a powerful tool for the integration of migrants. However, the actual and potential role that regional policy has in this sphere raises a number of open questions and trade-offs, such as: first, the need to reconcile the macro- and micro-dimensions of regional development; second, the need to maximise synergies while avoiding fragmentation; third, the achievement of a balance between the demands from different vulnerable groups and the prevention of races to the bottom; and, lastly, building the skills and cultural competencies that are necessary to respond to the migration challenge in a comprehensive and inclusive fashion.

¹ This paper was originally prepared for the 39th Meeting of the European Regional Policy Research Consortium (EoRPA) held on Loch Lomondside on 30 September – 2 October 2018. It has been updated to reflect new research and policy contributions since the EoRPA meeting.

1. INTRODUCTION

On 3 June 2018, the newly appointed Minister of Interior of Italy, Matteo Salvini, addressing crowds in Vicenza, a provincial capital of Veneto (one of the League's heartlands), declared that the new government would mean that 'the party is over' for illegal migrants (*'la pacchia e' finita'*) and that they should now 'prepare the suitcases'. Migration was at the heart of the manifesto of the government that emerged from the elections of 4 March 2018. Curbing migration was as one of the 30 programmatic points of the 'government contract' signed by the two coalition partners, the League and the Five Star Movement.

Migration has been 'a salient issue in national elections in 2017 in Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands, and contributed to the strong performances by anti-immigration political parties'.² The topic also took centre stage in the campaigns for Italy's and Sweden's 2018 general elections. The Swedish case is particularly interesting, in that Sweden enjoys a strong economy, low unemployment (esp. youth unemployment), low inflation and well-resourced public services. However, social disparities are on the increase, and the integration of immigrants, whose unemployment rate is still 10 percent above the national average and who are increasingly segregated in suburban neighbourhoods, is starting to be viewed with apprehension by parts of the population.³ This is one of the factors that led to the unprecedented performance of the Sweden Democrats achieving 17.6% of votes (in a high-turnout election).

Whether or not migration levels have reached 'crisis' proportions could certainly be the subject of debate.⁴ What is undeniable, however, is that the salience of migration in political discourses has risen sharply in recent years in all EU Member States, and the public's perception of migration is generally higher than the actual phenomenon (Figure 1).⁵


² Geddes A (2018) 'The politics of European Union Migration Governance', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56, Annual Review, 120-130, DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12763.

³ Thelocal.se 7 September and 28 August 2018 <https://www.thelocal.se/20180907/the-swedish-establishment-has-allowed-the-political-agenda-to-be-hijacked-by-the-immigration-issue>, <https://www.thelocal.se/20180903/social-democrats-head-for-record-low-score-in-swedens-election>.

⁴ The evolution of the migration crisis and emergency responses provided to it are beyond the confines of this brief paper, whose focus is on regional development implications of migration. However, excellent summative sources providing an overview of the evolution of the phenomenon and of the EU response to it are Collet E and Le Coz C (2018) 'After the Storm. Learning from the EU Response to the Migration Crisis', available open access from the Migration Policy Institute website: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/after-storm-eu-response-migration-crisis> and Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.) From Refugees to Workers: Mapping Labour Market Integration Support Measures for Asylum-Seekers and Refugees in EU Member States Volume II: Literature Review and Country Case Studies, <https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/from-refugees-to-workers-mapping-labour-market-integration-support-measures-for-asylum-seekers-and-3/>.

⁵ This overestimation was proven by a recent special Eurobarometer report (no. 469/2018). For example the report showed that in 19 EU Member States, the estimated proportion of immigrants in the population was at least twice the actual share, with peaks in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia, where estimates were over eight times (Romania, Bulgaria and Poland) and even fourteen times greater than the actual values. European Commission (2018) Special Eurobarometer 469, Integration of immigrants in the European Union, Summary, p. 5.

Figure 1: Perceptions vs. reality of proportion of immigrants in the total population



Source: European Commission (2018) Special Eurobarometer 469, Integration of immigrants in the European Union, Summary, p. 5.

This increased salience has called into question the role of the EU, and triggered policy responses at EU and national levels. Because of the territorialised nature of settlements and due to their localised effect (e.g. on the availability and cost of public service provision), these policy responses have by nature a regional policy dimension, even though this dimension may not be tackled specifically via regional policy. However, with the exception of a few studies by the OECD, this regional dimension has remained largely understudied.

The actual weight of migration and its public perception vary significantly not only across but also within countries. Migration can be considered as one of the themes of what has been labelled the ‘geography of discontent’.⁶ OECD research shows that the acceptance of migrants and people’s attitudes about the impact of migration are positively correlated with lower native-born unemployment rates; and vice-versa, regions characterised by higher native-born unemployment rates also display less support for migration from poorer countries or countries with a different ethnicity.⁷ Similarly, migrants’ contribution to the economy and society are viewed more positively in regions and countries with more substantial shares of migrant population (which are also generally regions with higher GDP levels).⁸ In other words, ‘the economic conditions of native-born are highly relevant for their attitudes towards migrants. In

⁶ Rodríguez-Pose A (2018) ‘The revenge of the places that don’t matter (and what to do about it)’, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, 11 (1), 189-209. ISSN 1752-1378.

⁷ OECD (2018) *Working Together for Local Integration of Migrants and Refugees*, OECD Publishing: Paris. p. 72.

⁸ OECD (2018) *op. cit.* and European Commission Special Eurobarometer 469, Integration of immigrants in the European Union, Summary.

contrast, migrants' actual economic contribution to a region, relative to that of the native-born, is not essential in shaping public perception on migration'.⁹

Against this background, the aim of this paper is to consider the issue of migration from a regional policy perspective. The paper will (i) provide an overview on the migratory phenomenon, examined through the lens of its territorial dimensions (Section 1), (ii) examine the degree to which this phenomenon affects territorial disparities (Section 2), and (iii) review some of the policy responses put in place to tackle the territorial issues related to migration, with a focus on the social and economic integration of migrants (Section 3).

Before proceeding further, there are two definitional issues that should be clarified. First, the focus of the paper is on the regional implications of migration of foreign nationals, not on within-country migrations. While internal migrations are important factors in regional development in some EU Member States (for example, Germany, Italy and Portugal), **this paper focuses on the migration of foreign-born nationals**, whether from within the EU or from third countries. Second, the paper does not deal with the distinction between economic migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. For the purposes of this paper, the two groups are treated in the same way and are referred together simply as immigrants, migrants or foreign-borns. However, it should be borne in mind that migration statistics, including those presented in this paper, often do not include refugees, given that this group is not included in employment statistics from which migration data generally draw.

⁹ OECD (2018) *op. cit.*, p. 72.


2. MIGRATION IN EUROPE: A TERRITORIAL OVERVIEW

According to Eurostat, circa 22 million non-EU citizens were living in the EU on 1 January 2017,¹⁰ equivalent to circa 4.3% of the total EU population at the same date of 511.8 million.¹¹

During 2016, the EU population grew by 1.5 million people. Against a neutral natural change, this increase was entirely due to net migration.¹² Not surprisingly, therefore, in his 2017 speech on the State of the Union, Commission President Juncker argued that ‘legal migration is an absolute necessity for Europe as an ageing continent’, while at the same time underlining the need for fostering equality of opportunities and fair social standards for all,¹³ once again ‘reminding’ Member States in this year’s speech of ‘the need to open legal pathways to the Union’ and that the EU needs skilled migrants.¹⁴

Considering both the migration in EU Member States from outside the EU and the migration from within the EU (i.e. from other EU countries), the majority of immigrants are concentrated in Germany (c. 12.1 million, 14.7% of the population), the United Kingdom (c. 9.3 million, 14.1% of the population), France (c. 8.1 million, 12.2% of the population), and Italy and Spain (c. 6 million, respectively c. 10 and 12.9% of the population). In percentage terms, the highest concentrations of migrants relative to national population are found in the smaller countries of Luxembourg (45.7%), Switzerland (28.4%), Cyprus (20.3%) and Austria (18.8%).

Figure 2: Total population change in the EU Member States in 2016 (per 1,000 residents)



Source: Eurostat (2017) First population estimates EU population up to almost 521 million at 1 January 2017. Increase driven by migration, 110/2017 – 10 July 2017, available from <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-press-releases/-/3-10072017-AP>.

¹⁰ https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Foreign-born_population_by_country_of_birth_1_January_2017.png (downloaded 6 September 2018).

¹¹ <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-press-releases/-/3-10072017-AP>.

¹² <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-press-releases/-/3-10072017-AP>.

¹³ European Commission (2017) President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address 2017 (Authorised version), 13 September 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm.

¹⁴ European Commission (2018) State of the Union Address 2018. The hour of European Sovereignty, by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, 12 September 2018 [check against delivery], https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-speech_en_0.pdf.

Just as the share of foreign-born population relative to native population varies considerably across countries, so does the proportion of migration from within or outside the EU. Particularly high shares of non-EU-born population are found in Estonia (13.1% of the population, c. 172,000 individuals, against an EU share of 14.6%) and Sweden (12.4% of the population, against an EU share of 5.4%).

Table 1: Foreign-born population by country of birth, 1 January 2017

Country	TOTAL		Born in another EU Member State		Born in a non-member country	
	(thousands)	(% of the population)	(thousands)	(% of the population)	(thousands)	(% of the population)
Belgium	1876.7	16.5	876.5	7.7	1000.2	8.8
Bulgaria	145.4	2.0	52.2	0.7	93.2	1.3
Czech Rep	405.1	4.4	181.4	1.7	283.6	2.7
Denmark	668.1	11.6	228.4	4.0	439.7	7.6
Germany	12105.4	14.7	4849.9	5.9	7255.5	8.8
Estonia	192.5	14.6	20.1	1.5	172.4	13.1
Ireland	796.4	16.6	600.6	12.6	196.9	4.1
Greece	1250.9	11.8	345.8	3.2	905.2	8.4
Spain	6024.7	12.9	1943.5	4.2	4081.2	8.8
France (*)	8155.7	12.2	2220.7	3.3	5935.0	8.9
Croatia	539.6	13.0	68.4	1.6	471.2	11.3
Italy (**)	6054.0	10.0	1837.6	3.0	4216.3	7.0
Cyprus	173.8	20.3	113.8	13.3	60.0	7.0
Latvia	251.5	12.9	27.6	1.4	223.8	11.5
Lithuania	127.4	4.5	20.5	0.7	106.8	3.8
Luxembourg (**)	270.0	45.7	205.2	34.7	64.8	11.0
Hungary	513.6	5.2	321.9	3.3	191.7	2.0
Malta	69.6	15.1	33.7	7.3	35.9	7.8
Netherlands	2137.2	12.5	580.6	3.4	1568.6	9.1
Austria	1649.0	18.8	739.6	8.4	909.4	10.4
Poland (*) (***)	651.8	1.7	220.9	0.6	431.0	1.1
Portugal	876.3	8.5	240.2	2.3	636.1	6.2
Romania	421.8	2.1	180.1	0.9	241.7	1.2
Slovenia	245.4	11.9	66.4	3.2	179.0	8.7
Slovakia	186.2	3.4	153.7	2.8	32.6	0.6
Finland	349.0	6.3	122.2	2.2	226.8	4.1
Sweden	1783.2	17.8	540.4	5.4	1242.8	12.4
United Kingdom	9293.7	14.1	3612.9	5.5	5680.8	8.6
Iceland	46.1	13.6	31.4	9.3	14.7	4.4
Liechtenstein	24.6	65.2	8.3	21.8	16.4	43.3
Norway	799.8	15.2	351.2	6.7	448.6	8.5
Switzerland	2391.5	28.4	1414.2	16.8	977.3	11.6

Note: The values for the different categories of country of birth may not sum to the totals due to rounding.

(*) Provisional


(**) Break in series

(***) Estimate

Source: Eurostat, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Foreign-born_population_by_country_of_birth,_1_January_2017_.png (accessed 6 September 2018). See also https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics

Figure 3, below, shows the regional-level distribution of foreign-born immigrants relative to national-born population in European regions in the 2014-2015 period. The highest percentages of migrant population can be found in the central part of Western Europe, the Ireland and the UK, and in the Nordic and Baltic countries. Despite being the first ports of contact in many cases, the southern, eastern and western peripheries tend to be less exposed to the settlement of migrants. Migrants tend to settle in larger cities and, in percentage terms, they are more concentrated in metropolitan cities than are national-born individuals.¹⁵ Within the EU, regional disparities in the distribution of migrants are particularly strong in Belgium and the UK and, to a lesser extent, Spain, France, Sweden and Germany.¹⁶

Figure 3: Distribution of migrants across EU regions, 2014-15



Source: OECD (2018) *Working Together for Local Integration of Migrants and Refugees*, OECD Publishing: Paris, p. 46 (Extract from Figure 2.1: Distribution of migrants across OECD Regions, 2014-15). NB: The figures exclude asylum seekers, which are not included in the labour force surveys from which the figure draws.

This picture appears very different when considering the evolution of migrants' settlement in the last decade (2005-2015), as shown in Figure 4.

The highest increases over this 10-year period can be found in capital regions, in the central and northern parts of Italy, in the southern parts of Sweden and Norway, and in selected regions of Germany, Spain and the UK, as well as in Austria and Switzerland. Norway and Belgium are examples of countries where there is marked inter-regional difference in the change in the presence of migrants.¹⁷


¹⁵ OECD (2018) *op. cit.*

¹⁶ OECD (2018) *op. cit.*, p. 47.

¹⁷ OECD (2018) *op. cit.*, p. 50 and Diaz Ramirez M, Liebig T, Thoreau C and Veneri P (2018) 'The integration of migrants in OECD regions: A first assessment', OECD Regional Development Working Papers 2018/01, <https://doi.org/10.1787/fb089d9a-en>.

Generally speaking, migrants have tended to settle in more prosperous regions¹⁸ and in regions where the unemployment rate is lower than the national average.¹⁹

Figure 4: Changes in the presence of migrants, 2005-2015



Source: OECD (2018) *Working Together for Local Integration of Migrants and Refugees*, OECD Publishing: Paris, p. 50 (Extract from Figure 2.3: Changes in the presence of migrants, 2005-15).

¹⁸ OECD (2018) *op. cit.*, p. 51.

¹⁹ Diaz Ramirez M et al (2018) *op. cit.*

3. THE TERRITORIAL DIMENSION OF MIGRATION

The literature on the regional implications of international migration is limited, with few exceptions primarily represented by OECD studies. Availability of regional-level data on migration, which is comparable across the EU, is also scarce. This is because migration data in Europe are collected by the Member States, via their own systems. The results are statistics that are ‘uneven’ in terms of ‘availability, definitions and quality’.²⁰ For example, while there is evidence of the employment of foreign workers in illegal and irregular employment, actual data on the scale of this phenomenon is scarce.²¹ Statistics also struggle to keep up with the fast pace of change of migration flows and settlements.²² In brief, statistics are insufficient, scarcely comparable across countries and regions, and not sufficiently timely, and this has implications for policy-making. The awareness of the need for regionalised data on migration has steadily increased in recent years, in parallel with the intensification of the salience of the phenomenon. The awareness of this need has resulted in a joint OECD-DG Regio study and a related statistical dataset produced by the OECD in 2018.²³

There are a number of reasons that make migration relevant for regional development. Migration poses a number of **challenges to balanced territorial development**:

- **Specific forms of support tailored to need** – A perhaps self-evident issue is that immigrant communities can vary considerably. So do their needs. Immigrants require specific forms of support that can include: the provision of language courses for adults (including technical language related to trades and professions); special tutoring for children from households lacking literacy skills in the national language; job training/retraining and ad hoc support to obtain the recognition of educational qualifications acquired in the country of origin (when non-European nationals); and hands-on coaching to draft CVs and apply for jobs, as well as support to appreciate the different cultural and civic values. Immigrants may also need dedicated support to overcome the barriers that might prevent them from accessing healthcare, other social services and jobs, including specialist psychological support related to the legacy of traumas, which are frequent in the case of refugees and asylum seekers.²⁴ All of these forms of support are inherently territorial, as they need to be put in place where the recipients live, study and work. However, the nationality and ethnic concentration of migrant groups varies

²⁰ Raymer J, Wiśniowski A, Forster JJ, Smith P & Bijak J (2013) Integrated Modeling of European Migration, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 108:503, 801-819, DOI: 10.1080/01621459.2013.789435, p. 801.

²¹ OECD (2018) *International Migration Outlook 2018. 42nd Edition*, OECD Publishing: Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2018-en.

²² Collet and Le Coz (2018) *op. cit.*

²³ OECD (2018) *Working Together for Local Integration of Migrants and Refugees*, OECD Publishing: Paris. The interest in migration as a factor affecting regional development is also testified by a special session on this theme planned for the forthcoming 2018 edition of the European Week of Regions and Cities, the session ‘Migrants, asylum seekers, refugees and regional economic development, taking place on 10 October 2018, https://europa.eu/regions-and-cities/programme/sessions/71_en. It should also be noted that AMIF, the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, discussed to follow, supports the European Migration Network (EMN) whose remit includes providing data on migration and asylum, exactly to support policy-making at EU and Member State levels. See European Commission (2018) Commission staff working document. Interim Evaluation of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 2014-2017 Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on interim evaluation of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and the Internal Security Fund, Brussels, 12.06.2018, SWD(2018) 339 final.

²⁴ On barriers to the provision of mental care support to migrants, see Giacco D, Matanov A & Priebe S (2014) ‘Providing mental healthcare to immigrants: current challenges and new strategies’ <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/05a8/3809c6d7ce6689597f33098484ba48f69c.pdf>. An example of a project supported by AMIF in this sphere is a project in Austria providing psychotherapy for refugees through a network of ten psychotherapy centres across the country (AT/2015/PR/1005), see European Commission, Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs (2017) SNAPSHOTs from the EU Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and the EU Internal Security Fund, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/20175691_dr0217970enn.pdf p. 11.

significantly across the EU and between different types of areas, as do the local contexts and attitudes of native-born individuals towards migrants. Thus, policies for the integration of immigrants need to be tailored to the specific contexts. To have a chance to succeed, moreover, strategies for the integration of migrants need to be participative, i.e. designed with the wide involvement of migrant and native-born communities, and of all the organisations that, from the public, private, third or social enterprise sectors, work in this sphere. In other words, the strategies and measures for the integration of immigrant communities need to be place-based.²⁵

- **Recognition of a wider client base for territorial public services** – More generally, the inflow of migrants affects the availability and cost of local public service provision, such as in the fields of housing, healthcare, education and childcare. Evidence from the above-quoted OECD studies shows that foreign-born households tend to live in deprived housing conditions and/or overcrowded dwellings more than is the case for native-born households. Eurostat data also show that immigrants are more at risk of poverty and social exclusion than native residents in virtually every EU Member State,²⁶ and that they are much more significantly affected by in-work poverty than national-born citizens.²⁷ In the EU Member States, social, healthcare and education services, and sometimes even welfare support (or aspects thereof), are devolved to sub-national governments. Thus, having a considerable share of migrant residents and the rapid increase of this group of population pose serious challenges to local and regional authorities related to the planning and resourcing of social infrastructure and service provision.
- **Impact on local labour markets** – Migration has an impact on the labour market. The more highly educated migrants tend to concentrate in regions that already have higher shares of highly educated national-born population.²⁸ This risks exacerbating further the already existing disparities between wealthier and less-well-off regions. At the same time, localised concentration of out-of-work migrants and asylum seekers can lead to pockets of deprivation and social exclusion.

However, **immigration** is relevant for regional policy not only because it poses challenges to balanced territorial development and social cohesion at the local levels, but also because it **can represent an opportunity for regional development**:

- **Immigrant labour often represents an underutilised potential.** Studies on the integration of migrants in rural regions, for example, have shown that in this type of region large proportions of international immigrant workers are employed in occupations for which they are overqualified and that do not match their qualifications.²⁹ They are often used as 'stop-gap labour' to patch temporary labour market shortages.³⁰ As highlighted by Woods (2016), this

²⁵ OECD (2018) *Working Together for Local Integration of Migrants and Refugees*, OECD Publishing: Paris.

²⁶ An exception being Hungary, whose data is however considered of low reliability. See [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:People_aged_20-64_at_risk_of_poverty_or_social_exclusion_by_citizenship_and_by_sex_2016_\(%25\)_MI18.png](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:People_aged_20-64_at_risk_of_poverty_or_social_exclusion_by_citizenship_and_by_sex_2016_(%25)_MI18.png)

²⁷ In 2016, in aggregate terms 20% of foreign-born working citizens suffered from in-work poverty against a value for working nationals of 9% https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_integration_statistics_-_at_risk_of_poverty_and_social_exclusion.

²⁸ OECD (2018) *op. cit.* and Diaz Ramirez M et al. (2018) *op. cit.*

²⁹ Woods M (2016) 'International Migration, Agency and Regional Development in Rural Europe', *Documents d'Anàlisi Geogràfica*, 62 (3), 569-593, p. 583.

³⁰ Woods M (2016) 'International Migration, Agency and Regional Development in Rural Europe', *Documents d'Anàlisi Geogràfica*, 62 (3), 569-593, p. 583.

might entail the opportunity to rethink traditional approaches to human capital investment as a way to foster regional growth and instead reorient support alongside a conception of human capital as a 'mobile resource that needs to be attracted, captured, retained and nurtured'.³¹ While evidence from rural regions suggests that this is largely not the case and that policy aimed at 'harnessing the economic potential of international migrants has been fragmented and limited at best',³² the pursuit of a fuller valorisation of migrants' skills may represent an opportunity for regions and localities.

- **Planning a desired spatial distribution of migrants might be an effective way to counteract the depopulation of rural and sparsely populated areas.** In the Nordic countries, for example, rural municipalities are increasingly recognising the opportunity represented by migration (even though the majority of immigrants continues to locate in urban areas), and migration as an opportunity is also acknowledged in the Italian Strategy for Internal Areas.³³
- **Legal immigrants**, insofar as they are integrated in the official labour market, also **support the funding of public services through their social security contributions and higher business taxation revenues generated at the local level.** They are thus not just users but also funders of public services. In similar vein, the **contributions of foreign-borns to the national pension systems** of EU Member States are in some cases essential to ensure the longer-term viability of such systems.³⁴

Thus, there is a solid rationale for economic and social policies at the local and regional levels and for regional policy to recognise the opportunity as well as the challenge represented by migration. A further opportunity derives from the broadening of the range of actors that might be involved in regional policy through the inclusion of migration-related measures in regional policy programmes. Measures related to the support and integration of migrants are often provided by **third-sector organisations and social enterprises**. The involvement of these types of actors in regional development policies has often been limited. Integrating these measures, and thus these actors, in regional policy may generate a positive cross-fertilisation between policy approaches, resulting in new ways of working and wider involvement of third-sector organisations in other dimensions of regional policy.

³¹ Woods M (2016) op. cit., p. 582.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ Grunfelder J, Rispling L & Norlén G (eds) (2018) State of the Nordic Region 2018, Theme 1: Demography, <https://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1180256/FULLTEXT01.pdf>. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (no date) Accordo di Partenariato 2012-2020, Strategia nazionale per le Aree interne: definizione, obiettivi, strumenti e governance. Documento tecnico collegato alla bozza di Accordo di Partenariato trasmessa alla CE il 9 dicembre 2013, http://www.agenziacoazione.gov.it/opencms/export/sites/dps/it/documentazione/Aree_interne/Strategia_nazionale_per_le_Aree_interne_definizione_obiettivi_strumenti_e_governance_2014.pdf and Relazione Annuale sulla Strategia Nazionale per le Aree Interne Presentata al CIPE dal Ministro per la Coesione Territoriale Claudio De Vincenti, gennaio 2018, http://www.agenziacoazione.gov.it/opencms/export/sites/dps/it/documentazione/Aree_interne/Presentazione/Relazione_CIPE_2018.pdf.

³⁴ INPS – Istituto Nazionale Previdenza Sociale (2018) XVII Rapporto Annuale, luglio 2018, https://www.inps.it/docallegatiNP/Mig/Dati_analisi_bilanci/Rapporti_annuali/INPSrapporto2018.pdf and Armstrong A and van de Ven J (2016) The impact of possible scenarios after 'Brexit' on the state pension system, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 2 June 2016, https://www.niesr.ac.uk/sites/default/files/publications/InstOfAct_NIESR_0.pdf.

4. POLICY MEASURES FOR THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS

Localised responses to the integration of immigrants are being provided in EU countries both within regional policy and outside of it. The following sections provide examples of each type of response from the experience of Italy and Sweden with paradigmatic cases of opposite migration experiences. Italy is traditionally an emigration country with relatively recent experience of, essentially EU-driven, integration policies; Sweden is a long-standing destination of choice for migrants and asylum seekers and a country with an established tradition of (domestic) policies for their integration. These brief country reviews are preceded by an overview of the support provided to EU Member States for the integration of migrants by the European budget, from which the national examples presented below also draw.

4.1 The support from the EU budget for the integration of migrants

In 2014, the European Commission introduced a new Fund for the integration of migrants and asylum seekers: **AMIF – Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund**. With an initial financial allocation of c. €3.1 billion for the entire 2014-2020 period,³⁵ the new Fund replaces a range of previously separated instruments – the European Integration Fund, European Refugee Fund and European Return Fund.³⁶ The Fund applies to all EU Member States except Denmark, and it targets third-country nationals, asylum seekers and refugees (i.e. not migration between EU Member States). It is implemented in a mixed way via direct management, indirect management and shared management, with shared management representing the most significant approach, absorbing 88% of the Fund's total allocation.³⁷ For the shared-management component, AMIF works in similar ways to the ESI Funds, via multiannual, in this case national, programmes.³⁸ Within the Commission, the responsibility for the Fund lies with DG Migration and Home Affairs. Within AMIF, the integration of migrants is the second of four strands – Strengthening a common asylum system, Legal migration and integration, Return strategies, and Specific actions and emergency assistance – and Member States are required to allocate at least one-fifth of their total AMIF allocation to this theme, equivalent to a total of c. €765 million earmarked funding for this goal.³⁹ In this specific sphere, the Fund focuses particularly on short-term integration measures and is explicitly intended to be synergistic with the ESI Funds, with complementarities being particularly evident with the European Social Fund, as illustrated in Table 2.

³⁵ Subsequently topped-up with additional allocations for Greece, Italy and resettlement programmes. European Commission (2018) *Commission staff working document. Interim Evaluation of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 2014-2017 Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on interim evaluation of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and the Internal Security Fund*, Brussels, 12.06.2018, SWD(2018) 339 final, p. 18.

³⁶ Kraatz S and Dimova M (2016) *Labour Market Integration of Refugees: EU Funding Instruments*. European Parliament Briefing, February 2016.

³⁷ European Commission (2018) *op. cit.*, SWD(2018) 339 final, p. 14.

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁹ European Commission (2016) *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Action Plan on the Integration of third country nationals*, Brussels, 7.6.2016, COM(2016) 377 final, p. 15.

Table 2: Overview of actions and objectives related to the integration of migrants under AMIF, ESF, FEAD, ERDF, EAFRD and EMFF

AMIF Priority field	FEAD	ESF	ERDF	EAFRD	EMFF
Reception of asylum seekers and asylum systems (material aid, education, training, infrastructure, support services etc.)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, under CLLD (with the exception of infrastructure)
Setting up and developing integration strategies, including needs analysis, improvement of integration indicators, evaluation	No	Yes	No	No	No
Advice and assistance in areas such as housing, means of subsistence, administrative and legal guidance, health, psychological and social care, childcare and family reunification	Yes (OP II) with a view to their inclusion in society	Partly	Partially since the ERDF can invest in the construction/ renovation of social infrastructure for migrants	No	No
Actions introducing migrants to the receiving society and enabling them to adapt to it, to inform them about their rights and obligations, to participate in civil and cultural life and to share values enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU	Yes (OP II) with a view to their inclusion in society	Yes, if part of an integrated set of measures to help asylum seekers integrate into labour market	No	No	No
Education and training, including language training and preparatory actions to facilitate access to the labour market	No	Yes	Partially since ERDF can invest in education infrastructure	Yes	Yes
Self-empowerment actions including to enable migrants to provide for themselves	Yes (OP II) with a view to their inclusion in society (outside active labour market)	Yes, if part of an integrated set of measures to help asylum seekers integrate into labour market	Partially, i.e through business start-ups, micro-enterprises, support to self-employment	Partially	Partially, if the support is linked to start-up
Actions to promote meaningful contact and constructive dialogue between migrants and the receiving society, and actions to promote acceptance by the receiving society	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes under CLLD
Equal access and equal outcomes in dealings with public and private services, including adaptation to those services to dealing with migrants	Yes (OP II) with a view to their inclusion in society	Yes	Yes, in particular by investments in infrastructural developments of public services	Yes	No
Capacity-building of beneficiaries	Yes for partner organisations	Yes	Yes	No	No

Source: European Commission (2015) *Synergies between the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and other EU funding instruments in relation to reception and integration of asylum seekers and other migrants*, pp. 2-3 (with minor adaptations).

As underlined in the first interim evaluation of AMIF realised for the Commission, the first period of implementation has been characterised mainly by a focus on responding to the high inflow of asylum seekers, rather than on the integration of migrant communities. Nevertheless, examples of support from AMIF for the integration of foreign nationals are provided in Box 1.

Box 1: Project examples of the integration of migrants through AMIF in selected European countries

Austria – ‘NIPE Network Project – Psychotherapy for refugees’. Through a network of ten psychotherapy centres across the country, the NIPE project provides therapy to children and adults, with the support of trained therapists and interpreters, aimed at accompanying them through the challenge of resettling after trauma and shock. It aims to treat c. 2,500 patients each year and will run until end 2019 (having started in July 2015). It has received an EU contribution of almost €1 million for the years 2015-2016 (for a total investment, inclusive of national financing and other contributions of c. €3.4 million for this period) and is receiving further €2.2 million of EU contribution for the 2017-2019 period (for a total contribution for the biennium of c. €7.5 million).

Netherlands – ‘Your own tune’ – This is a project by the Dutch Council for Refugees aimed at supporting asylum seekers and refugee children and youths aged 4-17 living in refugee/reception centres of the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers. Through targeted individual assistance, information and training, the project aims to improve their welfare and empowerment. The project has run from October 2015 to April 2018 with an EU contribution of c. €1.3 million, for a total investment of c. €1.75 million.

Poland – ‘New Home Poland’ is a project by the Polish Caritas (*Caritas Polska*) that ran in 2016 and 2017 and provided both pre-integration and integration assistance to immigrants from outside the EU, primarily asylum seekers and refugees. Integration measures included the provision of financial assistance, the co-financing of nurseries, the provision of healthcare and psychological assistance, the support of children for their adaptation to attending schools in Poland, and the organisation of trips for children. The support was provided through the network of five Caritas charities, attached to the local dioceses of areas in Poland that received a particularly significant number of foreign migrants (Warsaw, Siedlce, Bialystock, Lubelska and Zielonogórsko-Gorzowska Diocese), and it entailed an EU financial allocation of c. €334,000, for a total project cost of c. €445,000.

Sweden – ‘Immigrants: a resource in Åre’ is a project that aims to integrate migrants in the area of Åre in central Sweden, stemming from the viewpoint that migrants are a resource for the local community thanks to their skills and experience. The project started in August 2016 and will run until July 2019, with a total allocation of c. €1 million, of which €762,420 are from the EU budget via AMIF. It implements training programmes linked to the needs of the labour market in the area; projects with local organisations such as churches, education centres and voluntary organisations aim at developing social networks for migrants and reducing their segregation, while at the same time preventing/contrasting anti-migrant attitudes among the local population, and others.

Source: European Commission, Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs (2017) SNAPSHOTS from the EU Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and the EU Internal Security Fund, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/20175691_dr0217970enn.pdf .

The European Social Fund, for its part, can support the integration of migrants through a variety of measures foreseen under all of its applicable Thematic Objectives:⁴⁰

- **Thematic Objective 8** – Sustainable and quality employment and labour mobility – fosters, amongst others, the integration of legal migrants into the labour market, for instance under Investment Priority 8.i, which includes the provision of individual guidance to job seekers, integrated approaches, vocational education and training (VET) systems, hiring incentives to employers, apprenticeships/traineeships and self-employment.
- **Thematic Objective 9** – Promoting social inclusion, combating poverty and discrimination – includes measures to combat poverty (IP9.i); measures for the integration of marginalised communities (IP9.ii, e.g. measures for the improvement/accessibility in educational provision, and measures for the improvement of employment, social and health services, and housing); anti-discrimination measures (IP9iii, including via awareness-raising programmes and training of stakeholder groups); interventions to assure access to services (IP9iv, including healthcare services and social services of general interest), as well as measures for the promotion of social economy and social enterprises (IP9v) and active inclusion measures in CLLD strategies (IP9vi).
- **Thematic Objective 10** – Investing in education, training and vocational training for skills and lifelong learning – includes measures for the prevention and reduction of early school-leaving and the promotion of equal access to education (10.i), as well as measures for the participation of disadvantaged groups to tertiary education (10.ii).
- **Thematic Objective 11** – Enhancing institutional capacity of public authorities and stakeholders and efficient public administration – supports the capacity-building of stakeholders delivering education, lifelong learning, training, employment and social policies (11.ii).

Within the ESF, circa €21 billion have been allocated by Member States to tackling social inclusion, poverty and discrimination.⁴¹ However, this allocation and the above-described measures are not necessarily targeted solely at migrants. According to the summary report of ESF Annual Implementation Reports 2017, foreign-born immigrants and individuals with an immigration background (e.g. second or third generations) are targeted explicitly in only 13 Member States: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Sweden.⁴² As of end 2016, cumulatively circa 1.1 million individuals from this target group had been involved in ESF projects, representing about 17% of the total number of participations in ESF programmes (16% and 1.2 million participants, when considering ESF and YEI).⁴³ Examples of projects for the support of immigrants funded by the ESF in selected European countries are provided in Box 2 below.

⁴⁰ European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2017) *Synthesis Report of ESF 2017 Annual Implementation Reports. Final report*, written by Fondazione G. Brodolini, November 2017.

⁴¹ European Commission (2016) *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Action Plan on the Integration of third country nationals*, Brussels, 7.6.2016, COM(2016) 377 final, p. 16.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 110.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

Box 2: Examples of recent ESF-funded projects in support of migrants (2014-2020 ESF OPs) in selected European countries

Austria (Vorarlberg) – ‘Start2Work’ is a project by the Caritas of Vorarlberg providing language courses and professional training to refugees. A 2-year project (2017-2018), it is worth c. €1.6 million, of which €795,000 from the ESF. It supports c. 800 participants (400 per year) with up to 10 weeks on intensive German language course, followed by one-to-one and group employment training and work placements. The project is still ongoing, but so far two-thirds of participants have found a stable job upon completion of the training.

<http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=46&langId=en&projectId=2840>.

Germany (Rheinland-Pfalz) – The ‘Refugee employment pilot scheme’ aimed at the timely integration of refugees into the labour market by assessing and recording the educational and professional competencies of asylum seekers across different municipalities and cities in the Land, and by providing information regarding existing employment, training and networking opportunities in the period between the formalisation of the asylum application and the conclusion of the asylum process (during which asylum seekers cannot work). The project ran during 2016 and absorbed almost €900,000 of ESF resources, for a total allocation of c. €1.8 million. It involved almost 7,000 participants. <http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=46&langId=en&projectId=2337>

Italy (Sardinia) – ‘Diamond enterprise’ is a project funded by the ESF ROP of Sardinia with c. €2 million to support migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, who have been unemployed and have lived in Sardinia for at least six months, to start their own business. The funding has been allocated to eight projects managed by business associations and third-sector operators distributed across the regional territory (e.g. Confartigianato, Isfor API) who will support c. 200 recipients, half of which are women, with assistance and training to become self-employed. Of the 200 recipients, who have been selected from an initial pool of 600, it is estimated that c. 40 will start an entrepreneurial activity. These latter are set to benefit from additional legal and marketing assistance for two years after the launch of the entrepreneurial activity.

<http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=67&langId=en&newsId=2833> and

<https://www.buongiornopalghero.it/contenuto/0/11/95001/dal-fondo-sociale-europeo-risorse-per-progetti-d-impresa-per-gli-immigrati>

Sweden (Småland) – ‘A house by the sea’ is a project that provides on-the-job training and language classes (Swedish for immigrants) to long-term unemployed who are either new to Sweden or who were born abroad. On-the-job training relates to selected sectors that are relevant to the area, namely catering, conference organisation, organic farming, property maintenance and property rental. The project started in 2016 and will run until 2019. It has an ESF contribution of almost €1 million and a total value of almost €1.5 million. Each of the planned 60-90 recipients will be working with a dedicated counsellor to create a personal development plan for up to six months, after which they are expected to enter the job market.

<http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=46&langId=en&projectId=2797>

Source: European Commission, DG Employment Projects Database,

<http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=46&langId=en&keywords=&theme=0&country=0&list=1> .

It is clear from both Table 2 and from the sample projects described in Boxes 1 and 2 that there are considerable areas of overlaps between AMIF and the ESF in relation to the types of activities that the two funds can support for the integration of foreign-borns. According to the findings of the interim evaluation of AMIF,

Measures were taken during the Fund's design, planning and programming stages to ensure coherence and complementarity to, and be strategically aligned with other financial instruments (especially ISF-BV, ESF, ERDF, EAFRD, EMFF, FEAD, EUTF, DCI, EU Health Programme) and with relevant key EU policy strategies, in the case of Union actions and the EMN. During the implementation stage, the Commission services actively worked together and with the Member States, mostly in ad hoc settings, to ensure that EU funds with similar objectives were used in a coordinated way. On a national level, the vast majority of Member States ensured coherence and complementarity through the establishment of coordination mechanisms, mainly monitoring committees involving different responsible authorities.⁴⁴

However, the report was compiled when the AMIF was still in its early days and, as has been discussed, had been mainly deployed for the other pillars of support. Thus, it will be important in the coming years to monitor and evaluate whether the desired level of coordination and synergy between AMIF and the ESI Funds, especially ESF, has actually been realised.

4.2 Integration policies operated in synergy with regional development programmes in Italy

4.2.1 Migration and regional development

Italy has traditionally been an emigration rather than immigration country and, historically, a significant issue in regional development has been the mass migration from the South to the North. Internal migratory flows, particularly of the young, continue to the present day, and there is now also a significant portion of Mezzogiorno residents that migrates outside Italy. According to the latest annual analysis of regional development trends carried out by SVIMEZ, the migration flow of southern Italians in the 2002-2016 period involved almost 1.9 million people, of which 51.5% were in the age bracket 15-34 (13.6% of the total, 22.8% of which with a university degree).⁴⁵ Over the same period, the Mezzogiorno had a net migration balance of -783,511 units, a trend that is anticipated to continue for the foreseeable future.⁴⁶ According to SVIMEZ calculations, migration from the South to the Centre-North regions entails a net loss for the Mezzogiorno of c. €2 billion related to public investments in education, while the flow of students from the South to the Centre-North is estimated to feed an amount of private and public consumption of c. €3 billion/year in these regions (and corresponding loss in the South).

Nevertheless, since the 1990s Italy has also become an immigration country.⁴⁷ Flows of foreign migrants have increased steadily following the Balcan crises (late 1990s), the EU enlargements (mid-

⁴⁴ European Commission (2018) Commission staff working document. Interim Evaluation of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 2014-2017 Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on interim evaluation of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and the Internal Security Fund, Brussels, 12.06.2018, SWD(2018) 339 final, p.45.

⁴⁵ SVIMEZ (2018) 'Anticipazioni del Rapporto SVIMEZ 2018 sull'economia e la società del Mezzogiorno', 1 August 2018, http://www.svimez.info/images/RAPPORTO/materiali2018/2018_08_01_anticipazioni_testo.pdf.

⁴⁶ SVIMEZ (2018) *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁴⁷ Venturini A (2016) Case Study Italy, in Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed) From Refugees to Workers: Mapping Labour Market Integration Support Measures for Asylum-Seekers and Refugees in EU Member States Volume II: Literature Review and Country

2000s), the Arab Springs (2008-2011) and the recent crises in Syria and other Middle Eastern and African countries. In 2014-2015, there were major increases in the number of migrants arriving from the Mediterranean, which in 2014 reached a peak of over 170,000 individuals.⁴⁸ Increasingly, moreover, Italy has become a country of settlement rather than simply a country of passage: on 1 January 2017, the resident foreign-born population exceeded 5 million, representing 8.3% of the total population.⁴⁹

Overall, and in line with trends observed also in other OECD countries (discussed in Section 2), legal foreign residents in Italy are concentrated in the most developed regions and in the metropolitan cities, particularly Milan and Rome, which together account for over one-fifth of the total legal immigrant population from outside the EU.⁵⁰ On 1 January 2017, 86.1% of legal immigrants from non-EU countries resided in the Centre-North (

Figure 5 below). Foreign residents in the Centre-North are on average also more educated than those living in the Southern regions.⁵¹ The metropolitan cities each have a particular concentration of migrants, e.g. Naples has a strong concentration of migrants from the Ukraine, Genoa from Ecuador, Bari from Albania, while Catania and Reggio Calabria have particularly high percentages of asylum seekers.⁵²

Employment and unemployment figures also reflect a North-South divide and diverse territorial distribution of migrant workers (Figures 6 and 7). Employment rates of non-EU legal migrants vary from just under 50% in Reggio Calabria (49.3%) to almost 70% of the metropolitan area of Rome (69.1%); while unemployment varies from 9.9% in Rome to 25.8% in Genoa. Migrants also represent an important asset in terms of self-employment, particularly concentrated in Milan, Florence and Rome.⁵³

Case Studies, pp. 79-92, <https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/from-refugees-to-workers-mapping-labour-market-integration-support-measures-for-asylum-seekers-and-3/>

⁴⁸ Venturini A (2016) *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81

⁴⁹ Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali (2018) *Eight Annual Report: Foreigners in the Italian Labour market. Summary of the Main Findings*, [http://www.lavoro.gov.it/documenti-e-norme/studi-e-statistiche/Documents/Ottavo%20Rapporto%20Annuale%20-%20Gli%20stranieri%20nel%20mercato%20del%20lavoro%20in%20Italia%20\(2018\)/Sintesi-Ottavo-Rapporto-Annuale-ENG.pdf](http://www.lavoro.gov.it/documenti-e-norme/studi-e-statistiche/Documents/Ottavo%20Rapporto%20Annuale%20-%20Gli%20stranieri%20nel%20mercato%20del%20lavoro%20in%20Italia%20(2018)/Sintesi-Ottavo-Rapporto-Annuale-ENG.pdf), p. 1.


⁵⁰ For more detail see Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali (2017) *La Presenza dei migranti nelle città metropolitane. Sintesi Rapporti*, <http://www.lavoro.gov.it/documenti-e-norme/studi-e-statistiche/Documents/La%20presenza%20dei%20migranti%20nelle%20aree%20metropolitane,%20anno%202017/Quaderno-Sintesi-RAM-2017.pdf>; and <http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/Approfondimenti/Pagine/La-presenza-dei-migranti-nelle-aree-metropolitane.aspx>. The same can be said about asylum seekers and refugees: while until 2013 asylum seekers were mainly concentrated in the Southern regions, the 2014/2015 refugee crisis also entailed a gradual shift in the territorial distribution of asylum seekers, so that by 2015 Lombardy had the same share of asylum seekers as Sicily (circa 13%), becoming the first region the following year, with a share of 12.6% (followed by Lazio 9.3%, Sicily 8.8%, Piedmont 7.9%, Campania 7.9% and Veneto 7.7%). See Venturini A (2016) *op. cit.*, p.83 and <http://www.regioni.it/newsletter/n-3266/del-10-11-2017/migranti-rapporto-protezione-internazionale-in-italia-2017-17318/>.

⁵¹ Istat (2018) *Noi Italia 2018*, http://noi-italia.istat.it/index.php?id=3&tx_usercento_centofe%5Bcategoria%5D=4&tx_usercento_centofe%5Bdove%5D=REGIONI&tx_usercento_centofe%5Baction%5D=show&tx_usercento_centofe%5Bcontroller%5D=Categoria&cHash=51ff43808464ac67716bf4436cbc69c3

⁵² <http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/Approfondimenti/Pagine/La-presenza-dei-migranti-nelle-aree-metropolitane.aspx>.


⁵³ <http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/Approfondimenti/Pagine/La-presenza-dei-migranti-nelle-aree-metropolitane.aspx>.

Figure 5: Distribution of foreign residents in Italy (1 January 2017)



Source: Istat, Noi Italia 2018, http://noi-italia.istat.it/index.php?id=3&tx_usercento_centofe%5Bcategoria%5D=4&tx_usercento_centofe%5Bdove%5D=REGIONI&tx_usercento_centofe%5Baction%5D=show&tx_usercento_centofe%5Bcontroller%5D=Categoria&cHash=51ff43808464ac67716bf4436cbc69c3

Figure 6 and Figure 7: Percentage of employed foreigners within total employment and percentage of unemployed foreigners within total unemployment by region



Source: Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali (2018) Eight Annual Report. Foreigners in the Italian Labour Market. Summary of the Main Findings. [http://www.lavoro.gov.it/documenti-e-norme/studi-e-statistiche/Documents/Ottavo%20Rapporto%20Annuale%20-%20Gli%20stranieri%20nel%20mercato%20del%20lavoro%20in%20Italia%20\(2018\)/Sintesi-Ottavo-Rapporto-Annuale-ENG.pdf](http://www.lavoro.gov.it/documenti-e-norme/studi-e-statistiche/Documents/Ottavo%20Rapporto%20Annuale%20-%20Gli%20stranieri%20nel%20mercato%20del%20lavoro%20in%20Italia%20(2018)/Sintesi-Ottavo-Rapporto-Annuale-ENG.pdf)

A similar territorial distribution can be found in the younger sections of the population, with the highest concentration of school-age foreign nationals found in Lombardy (circa one-fourth of the total of almost 800,000 from pre-school to secondary), Emilia-Romagna (95,703), Veneto (84,230) and Piedmont

(73,795).⁵⁴ Foreign students in schools represent about 9% of the total. 60% of these were born in Italy and have never been in the country of origin.⁵⁵

This territorial distribution of migration in Italy has regional policy implications at both macro level – as migration trends both of national population and of foreign nationals exacerbates the North-South divide – and at micro level, related to the diverse territorialised challenges posed by migrant settlements in the different regions and localities.

4.2.2 Main funding sources and policies for the integration of migrants

Despite their numerical relevance, immigrants in Italy have not enjoyed high levels of dedicated support. Legal migrants have access to the same benefits and services as the rest of the population. Immigrants from non-EU countries and individuals recognised as refugees, or that are afforded subsidiary or humanitarian protection, receive a residence permit, which allows them to enjoy (at least in principle) the same treatment as nationals with regard to social, welfare, health and housing assistance, as well as the same rights and opportunities with regard to employment, self-employment, and inclusion in training programmes and professional registers.⁵⁶

However, recognising the needs arising from the increasing numbers of asylum seekers, the Ministry of Interior launched a first special Plan for the integration of holders of international protection status in 2017. The Plan comprises interventions related to a range of fields, including preventing and combating discrimination, active citizenship, and social inclusion. With regard to the latter, measures include supporting inter-religious dialogue, the provision of language courses, support for access to education (for example via fee waivers) and recognition of education titles, and measures for the removal of barriers that might prevent this vulnerable group of actors from accessing the available employment, healthcare and housing services. Support is also foreseen for family reunions and in relation to the provision of information on individual rights and duties. As explicitly mentioned by the programme, ‘the financial support for the interventions foreseen by the Plan ... comes predominantly from the European Funds. [...] such as the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)’, which the Plan aims to mobilise in a synergistic manner, so as ‘to utilise in the most effective manner the resources that can be activated’.⁵⁷

In the Italian context, thus, AMIF and the ESI Funds (particularly ESF but also the ERDF) play a fundamental role in supporting the reception and integration of migrants. The FAMI Programme in Italy is managed under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. However, the part that relates to the integration of migrants is mostly delegated to the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, which is also acting as Managing Authority for the two National Operational Programmes funded by the ESF related to Employment and Education.⁵⁸ Migrant integration actions are implemented in a synergistic manner with the NOP Inclusion (for the part that relates particularly to anti-discrimination measures, since most of the NOP is dedicated to anti-poverty measures), the NOP Systems for Active Employment Policies

⁵⁴ <http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/Notizie/Pagine/Al-via-un-nuovo-anno-scolastico-.aspx> .

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁶ Venturini A (2016) *op. cit.*, p. 84.

⁵⁷ Ministero dell’Interno. Dipartimento per le Libertà Civili e l’Immigrazione (2017) *Piano Nazionale d’Integrazione per i titolari di protezione internazionale*, ottobre 2017, http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/piano_nazionale_integrazione_0.pdf , p. 37.

⁵⁸ With the exception of language and civic education, capacity-building for local prefectures, police headquarters and local authorities that had already been involved in the European Integration Fund, and interventions related to non-accompanied minors. <http://www.lavoro.gov.it/temi-e-priorita/immigrazione/focus-on/politiche-di-integrazione-sociale/Pagine/Attivita-e-servizi.aspx#1> .

(for the part that relates to the integration of migrants in the labour market), the ESF and multi-fund Regional Operational Programmes, the NOP Education and the NOP Legality. This latter focuses primarily on strengthening legality, fighting corruption and organised crime, and enhancing social cohesion and the safety of communities. It was reprogrammed in January 2018 to extend the applicability of its measures for social inclusion also to legal migrants and to expand its geographical remit from the five Less-Developed Regions to also include the Metropolitan Cities across Italy.⁵⁹ The integration of migrants in internal peripheries and scarcely populated areas is also supported via the Strategy for Internal areas.

Overall, a number of key issues emerge from a review of support to the integration of migrants in Italy:

- First, the focus on the economic and social integration of migrants has increased in the 2014-2020 period compared to the previous period. It has also increased throughout the 2014-2018 period, in response to the increased salience of migration in political narratives and because of the shift from the emergency responses of 2014-2015 to more structural and longer-term measures. The increased focus on this topic is evidenced amongst other factors by the reprogramming of selected OPs (the NOP Legality *in primis*) and of the Partnership Agreement.
- Second, the main financial resource for migration-related measures is represented by European Funds: AMIF and the ESI Funds. Thus, regional policy, namely the EU-co-funded side of it, is a primary source of funding for the integration of migrants in Italian society.
- Third, migration impacts on regional development in Italy at both macro (North-South disparities) and micro levels (rural/peripheral v. core areas cleavage, localised impact of migration, particularly in metropolitan cities). The policy response focuses on the latter. While the interventions funded by the Italian ESI Funds programmes are likely to have a positive impact on the economic development, social cohesion and safety of the areas targeted (whether neighbourhoods in metropolitan cities or localities in the rural inner areas), the migration inflow of foreign nationals, with its concentration in the most-developed regions, is likely to contribute to a further widening of the North-South gap.
- Lastly, the implementation of the interventions for the integration of migrants is fragmented in many different types of projects, delivered by many actors at different territorial scales (national ministries, regional authorities, municipalities and metropolitan cities, prefectures, local police headquarters, local NHS providers, third-sector organisations and social enterprises, private actors). The Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Employment and Social Policies (and its Agency ANPAL) are the key players, but given the lack of an overarching single coordinating body, reconstructing the wide array of instruments and funding streams is a difficult endeavour. It is made even more complicated by the small scale of many of the projects funded and by the involvement of a variety of localised third-sector organisations as implementing actors.


⁵⁹ Commissione europea (2018) Decisione della Commissione del 9.1.2018 che modifica la decisione di esecuzione C(2015) 7344 che approva determinati elementi del programma operativo "PON Legalità FESR FSE" per il sostegno del Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale e del Fondo sociale europeo "Investimenti a favore della crescita e dell'occupazione" in Italia, CCI 2014IT16M2OP003, Brussels, 9.1.2018, C(2018) 20 final. The NOPs Inclusion, Education and Active Employment Policies operated across the entire country from the start.

4.3 Integration policies operated in synergy with regional development programmes in Sweden

4.3.1 Migration and regional development

Population across the Nordic countries (including in Sweden) has been growing, but this has been largely thanks to immigration. Migrants have been important to all Nordic countries in the face of slowing population growth and ageing. In 2017, one in eight Nordic residents had been born outside the country of residence. As can be seen from Figure 8, a large number of areas, highlighted in yellow in the map, would have seen their population stagnate without the settlement of immigrants.⁶⁰

Figure 8: Role of International Migration in Population Change (2016)



Source: Nordregio, <http://www.nordregio.org/maps/role-of-international-migration-in-population-change-in-2016/>.

In Sweden, even though migrants (and many of the services and jobs they require) are concentrated in urban centres, rural areas are increasingly recognising the important contribution that they could make to their communities.⁶¹ The increase in the number of foreign-born immigrants in future is seen as

⁶⁰ Grunfelder J, Rispling L and Norlen G (2018) State of the Nordic Region 2018, Report prepared for the Nordic Council of Ministers.

⁶¹ Ibidem.

entailing both opportunities and challenges for the receiving municipalities and counties in Sweden. On the one hand, migrants constitute a significant labour potential while, on the other hand, just like in other European countries, the settlement pattern amplifies the urbanisation trend of the country. Although employment opportunities are often better in the urban areas and migrants tend to prefer settling in these, there are challenges associated with rapid population increases, related to the availability of housing (increasingly an issue also in rural areas⁶²), healthcare and schooling,⁶³ as well as issues of segregation and safety.⁶⁴

4.3.2 Main funding sources and policies for the integration of migrants

Sweden has for a long time been at the forefront of immigrant integration. The Swedish integration policy system is considered amongst 'the most responsive, evidence-based and financially well-supported'⁶⁵ among the EU and other advanced economies, as testified by the country's leading position in international rankings such as the Migration Policy Index (MIPEX).⁶⁶ Perhaps as a result of this, it is also one of the countries in Europe whose population is considered to be particularly well informed about migration and integration issues (second after Denmark). It is also the EU Member State with the highest share of population that regards migration more as an opportunity than a threat.⁶⁷

However, a recent study for the European Parliament reports signs of overburdening and 'fatigue' in recent years: within society in general and among key service providers (such as the migration agency, employment services, police and municipalities), as well as bottlenecks in the reception system. According to the same report, in policy terms, this 'fatigue' has translated in: (i) a 'downgrading' of immigration policies to the minimum standards set by the EU Directives; (ii) the introduction of temporary measures to curb the number of asylum seekers, such as the issuance of temporary, rather than permanent, residence permits; and (iii) a narrower policy focus on labour market integration, to speed-up the participation of foreign-borns in the labour market.⁶⁸

⁶² Parusel B (2016) Sweden's Asylum Procedures, Bertelsmann Stiftung, https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/Projekte/28_Einwanderung_und_Vielfalt/IB_Studie_Asyum_Procedures_Sweden_Parusel_2016.pdf, p.21.

⁶³ Regeringskansliet (2015) En nationell strategi för hållbar regional tillväxt och attraktionskraft 2015-2020 available at <https://www.regeringen.se/informationsmaterial/2015/10/en--nationell-strategi-for-hallbar-regional--tillvaxt-och-attraktions-kraft-20152020/>.

⁶⁴ See for example the case of Rosengård, near Malmö, Milne R (2017) 'Sweden's immigrants struggle with jobs and integration', *Financial Times*, 26 March 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/838d60c2-0961-11e7-97d1-5e720a26771b>; Scarpa S (2015) Immigration policy regimes, welfare states and urban in equality patterns: A comparison between Malmö and Genoa, *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 23(4) 862–877.

⁶⁵ Bucken-Knapp G, Fakh Z and Spehar A (2018) Talking about Integration: The Voices of Syrian Refugees Taking Part in Introduction Programmes for Integration into Swedish Society, *International Migration*, first published 5 March 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12440>, p.2.

⁶⁶ See Konle-Seidl (2018) Integration of Refugees in Austria, Germany and Sweden: Comparative Analysis. Study for the Directorate General for Internal Policies, European Parliament, IP/A/EMPL/2016-23, January 2018, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/614200/IPOL_STU\(2018\)614200_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/614200/IPOL_STU(2018)614200_EN.pdf), p.26. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) measured the performance of national policies to integrate migrants into the respective societies of 38 Countries (all EU Member States, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA), through a composite set of 167 indicators covering eight policy areas. See <http://www.mipex.eu/what-is-mipex>.

⁶⁷ European Commission (2018) Special Eurobarometer 469, Integration of immigrants in the European Union, Summary, p.4 and p.13.

⁶⁸ Konle-Seidl R (2018) *op. cit.*, p.26.

The Swedish National Reform Programme⁶⁹ acknowledges that it has taken 10 years for half of the newly arrived immigrants to become established in the Swedish labour market, and there is widespread consensus that reabsorbing labour market differentials between migrants and nationals will take time.⁷⁰ The fact that the gap in employment rates between Swedes and foreign-borns widened in the 1990s and has remained stable since is seen as something that needs to be addressed.⁷¹ Even though, according to Statistics Sweden, the situation has improved in the most recent years – with almost half (48.5 percent) of those arrived in 2011 being in a job after five years –⁷² Sweden displays the second highest gap in the long-term unemployment rates between nationals and foreign borns in Europe,⁷³ an employment rate differential between migrants and native-borns amongst the highest in the EU⁷⁴ and the highest differential between Swedish citizens and non-EU nationals in the relative proportion of those at risk of poverty and social exclusion.⁷⁵

Despite these challenges, the Swedish government has taken a rather positive view of migration and focused on the benefits for the country. Migrant integration is considered in pragmatic terms and evaluated in terms of measurable outcomes in key areas, such as in relation to migrants' labour market participation, housing, segregation, language proficiency or social benefits uptake.⁷⁶ Until recently, at least, 'symbolic or value-related matters, such as migrants' adaptation to the host country's traditions' have not been as salient in Sweden as in some other EU Member States.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, more recently the country's comprehensive and multi-level migrant integration policy, last reformed in 2009, is being increasingly questioned. While this policy has been anchored on the desire to enable every resident, whether Swedish or foreign, to enjoy equal opportunities, increasing emphasis is now being placed on ensuring that granting access to certain services to immigrants should not be perceived at odds with caring for the native population (healthcare being a case in point) and there is increased recognition that integration programmes need to be more tailor-made to suit individual needs, including those of vulnerable groups. Further recommendations providing more support to local communities and civil society organisations and enabling local adaptations of national programmes, as

⁶⁹ Government Offices of Sweden (2018) Sweden's National Reform Programme 2018. Europe 2020 – the EU's strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, <https://www.government.se/49bfaf/contentassets/8c870068125e4941aadaf4dad740b4e/swedens-national-reform-programme-2018.pdf>

⁷⁰ Konle-Seidl R (2018) *op. cit.*.

⁷¹ Konle-Seidl R (2018) *op. cit.*, p.26.; Wiesbrock, A. (2011) The Integration of Immigrants in Sweden: a Model for the European Union?, *International Migration*, 49(4), 48-66; see also Konle-Seidl R and Bolits G (2016) Labour Market Integration of Refugees: Strategies and good practices, Study for the Directorate General for Internal Policies, European Parliament, IP/A/EMPL/2016-08, March 2016.

⁷² Konle-Seidl R (2018) *op. cit.*

⁷³ Eurostat (2017) Migrant Integration. 2017 Edition, Publications Office of the European Union, 2017, Luxembourg, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/8787947/KS-05-17-100-EN-N.pdf/f6c45af2-6c4f-4ca0-b547-d25e6ef9c359>.

⁷⁴ Bucken-Knapp et al (2018), *op. cit.*

⁷⁵ Eurostat (2017) *op.cit.*

⁷⁶ Konle-Seidl R (2018) *op. cit.*.

⁷⁷ Parusel B (2016) Sweden's Asylum Procedures, Bertelsmann Stiftung, https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/Projekte/28_Einwanderung_und_Vielfalt/IB_Studie_Asylum_Procedures_Sweden_Parusel_2016.pdf, quoted in Konle-Seidl R (2018) *op. cit.*

a complement to the more traditional investments in the education and training systems, social services and active citizenship.⁷⁸

According to the National Reform Programme of 2018, the Government has intensified its focus on measures to continue to create sustainable reception and effective establishment of newly arrived immigrants.⁷⁹ As part of the Government's initiatives to encourage more unemployed people to make the transition to education and training, the Swedish government introduced for the first time an education and training obligation, which came into force on 1 January 2018. Under this obligation, all newly arrived immigrants who benefit from the 'Public Employment Service's Introduction Programme', and who are considered to be in need of education or training to find a job, can be referred to undergo compulsory education and training.

Funding-wise, in 2015, Sweden spent SEK 534 million (equivalent to circa €57.8 million) for integration measures, such as new language initiatives and reforms of the 'Swedish for Immigrants' scheme, skills assessments and validation for asylum seekers.⁸⁰ A dedicated compensation scheme also provides lump sums to municipalities per new arrival. This was recently increased, of c. SEK 1.1 billion in 2016 (€119 million) and SEK 2.6 billion in 2017 (€272 million). Additional funds (in 2017-2020) were made available from the national budget to improve the introduction system and to promote early intervention measures such as skills assessments and fast tracks aimed at speeding up new arrivals' establishment in the labour market. Overall, the total cost of Introduction programmes in 2016 was equivalent to €754 million.⁸¹

AMIF is being used to support projects tackling the integration of migrants, and the ESI Funds are also mobilised as part of the wider strategy by the Swedish government in this regard. The Government has for instance launched a strategy to reduce and address segregation in the municipalities,⁸² and there is co-financing from the ESF. In terms of funding, however, it is difficult to separate the amounts from the ESF (and the ERDF) that have gone directly to support the integration of migrants. Nevertheless, the Swedish ESF Council (Svenska ESF-rådet), which is the MA for ESF, has for a long time worked with issues related to the integration of migrants. For instance in 2007-13, the ESF Council was responsible (alongside the ESF) for the management of the European Integration Fund.⁸³ The Swedish national ESF OP, which is implemented in eight regions in Sweden, allows an integration perspective particularly under Priority 1 (Competence development) and Priority 2 (Improved access to work). For instance, foreign-borns who have received a residence permit are included as a target group under Priority 2, and there have also been various calls for proposals for projects with a direct focus on new arrivals. Under Priority 1, efforts can be directed to strengthen those professions that can be matched with the refugees, asylum seekers and other new arrivals. However, the utilisation of the ESF for measures directly targeting the integration of migrants by the Public Employment Service (which, since 2010, is

⁷⁸ Levarlet F, Brignani N, Gramillano A, Ledan Prade A, Stumm T & Greve Harbo L (2017) Research for REGI Committee – Integrated use of ESI funds to address social challenges, European Parliament, Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies, Brussels, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/601968/IPOL_STU\(2017\)601968_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/601968/IPOL_STU(2017)601968_EN.pdf)

⁷⁹ Government Offices of Sweden (2018) *op. cit.*

⁸⁰ OECD (2017) International Migration Outlook 2017. OECD Publishing: Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2017-en.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*. Also Levarlet F et al. (2017) *op. cit.*

⁸² Regeringskansliet (2018) Regeringen drar upp inriktningen för arbetet med att minska och motverka segregationen med ny strategi och miljardstöd till 32 kommuner <https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2018/06/regeringen-drar-upp-inriktningen-for-arbetet-med-att-minska-och-motverka-segregationen-med-ny-strategi-och-miljardstod-till-32-kommuner/> (accessed 10 July 2018)

⁸³ The Integration Fund was used for projects that aimed to improve the system of receiving and integrating third-country nationals in Sweden (i.e. citizens from outside the EU).

the key coordinating authority for integration policies) has reduced significantly compared to 2007-2013, due to the perceived excessive administrative onus associated with the Fund. Sweden also utilises the EAFRD for the integration of migrants. For instance, it supports multicultural business development. The Swedish rural network includes a working group dedicated to integration. Amongst others, it is exploring how to integrate migrants and provide them with housing opportunities in rural areas.⁸⁴

On the whole, while migration of foreign-born nationals in Sweden has a territorial dimension, which is being recognised, especially in rural areas, and while the ESI Funds (and AMIF) are also utilised to support the integration of migrants, it is fair to conclude that the Swedish approach to the integration of migrants and refugees pre-dates the relatively recent EU focus on this theme, is largely informed by domestic rather than EU policy choices, and it is largely intended as horizontal, social policy more so than territorial policy.

⁸⁴ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/key-migration_en.pdf

5. CONCLUSIONS

The paper has reviewed the territorial dimensions of migration across the EU and its regional policy implications. It has also discussed selected responses for the integration of immigrants, at EU and Member State levels, highlighting the important role played by the ESI Funds.

The inflow and settlement of foreign-born nationals in EU Member States presents both challenges and opportunities for regional development. On the one hand, it entails the need for different approaches to the provision of services and for measures aimed at actively pursuing the societal, civic and labour market integration of this growing group of actors. On the other hand, immigration can help counteract negative demographic trends, it can contribute to raising the levels of skills available in local labour markets, and it can contribute to the pool of financial resources available to fund public services in increasingly cash-strapped local authorities.

The integration of migrants has both short- and long-term dimensions, and it requires a comprehensive and synergistic approach that cuts across a plurality of levels of government, types of actors, and policy sectors. The complexity of the problems tackled also requires policy responses to be designed and implemented with the active involvement of all stakeholders at grassroots levels – both foreign-born as well as nationals – to ensure that needs, opportunities and barriers are identified in a comprehensive manner. Equally, it needs to be recognised that integration policies take a long time to yield returns and that policy packages need to tackle short-term needs without prejudice for the long term.

Regional policy is long-term, place-based, participative and cross-sectoral. As such, it can be a powerful lever for the integration of migrants. However, the examination of the role that regional policy plays in this sphere raises a number of open questions and difficult trade-offs.

- **Reconciling the macro and micro dimensions.** In contexts characterised by a macro-regional territorial question – such as the North-South divide in Italy, West-East divide in Germany or coast-hinterland divide in Portugal – policies aimed at the localised integration of migrants can exacerbate regional disparities.
- **Maximising synergies while avoiding fragmentation.** The challenges posed by migration cut across a range of policy fields. Achieving synergies across policies – for instance, taking into account interactions between social protection systems, educational provision and employment policies – is essential, and this requires coordination not only across government departments at the central level but also between national and sub-national governments, as well as with the wide array of actors that participate in delivering integration policies and public services at the local level (third sector, social enterprises, employer associations, civil society organisations, including migrant communities and faith-based organisations).⁸⁵ At the EU level, various forms of coordination have been introduced, such as the European Integration Network and European Migration Forum, intended as platforms bringing together national governments/civil society organisations and EU institutions.⁸⁶ Yet, the actual scope for overlap

⁸⁵ Noya A and Clarence E 'Improving social inclusion at the local level through the social economy', 12 September 2008, working document, CFE/LEED, OECD, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/3/44688716.pdf?contentId=446887 and European Commission (2016) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Action Plan on the Integration of third country nationals, Brussels, 7.6.2016, COM(2016) 377 final.

⁸⁶ European Commission (2016) *Ibidem*, p. 14.

between the different funding sources that can be mobilised for the integration of migrants, particularly between AMIF and the ESF, seems considerable.

- **Balancing competing demands and counteracting perception bias.** Since the economic crisis, local finances have become increasingly constrained in many EU Member States. In this context, regional policy has played an important part in supporting the creation and maintenance of local social infrastructure, and the provision of basic and social services (e.g. housing, healthcare, education) and, specifically, in the support of migrant communities. Yet, migrant communities are only one of many vulnerable groups requiring special assistance. The deterioration of social and economic conditions that has derived from the economic crisis has meant that migrants are just one of many target groups for measures tackling poverty, joblessness and social exclusion. Public authorities need to manage the expectation of different vulnerable groups and avoid generating a false sense of competition between them, which risks feeding the populist narratives that use migration instrumentally to foster discontent for electoral gain.
- **Building capacities.** Integrating different types of migrant communities requires both specific skills and cultural competencies. Adequate measures need to be put in place to foster these capacities among the variety of actors involved in the delivery of these measures as well as to promote knowledge exchange, transfer and cross-fertilisation.

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