

Those ties often led Wilson to set aside the misgivings of expert advisers to favor the Poles and Czechoslovaks, although during the peace conference he grew increasingly exasperated with them, particularly with the Poles.

Wolff handles this complex, sometimes kaleidoscopic subject deftly, but his treatment also suffers from two large flaws. One is a skewed way of viewing Wilson. "It is not necessary to take the psycho-biographical approach of [Sigmund] Freud and [William C.] Bullitt, writing about Wilson in the 1930s, to observe that the gratifications to Wilson's ego inevitably colored his map of Eastern Europe" (p. 234). Yet Wolff takes that approach repeatedly. He starts by ascribing Wilson's turcophobia to his teenage crush on British prime minister William Ewart Gladstone, who despised and worked against the Ottomans, and he ends by quoting Freud and Bullitt: "His [Wilson's] Super Ego demanded that he should accomplish God-like achievements" (p. 234). Besides being dubious and biased, this approach is totally unnecessary to understanding Wilson's views and approaches, which Wolff otherwise treats well. The other large flaw is the usually implicit but sometimes explicit argument that Wilson's "mental map" produced a bad settlement in eastern Europe. The alternatives were either preserving the Habsburg Empire, which proved impossible, or domination by Germany or Russia, both of which later came to pass, with disastrous consequences. The post-World War I settlement could have fared far better if the victors had shown the will to maintain it and perhaps refine it. These two flaws detract somewhat from but do not spoil this fine work.

John Milton Cooper Jr., *Emeritus*
University of Wisconsin–Madison
Madison, Wisconsin

doi: 10.1093/jahist/jaab013

Little Italy in the Great War: Philadelphia's Italians on the Battlefield and Home Front. By Richard N. Juliani. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2019. x, 302 pp. Cloth, \$109.50. Paper, \$37.95.)

Focusing on Philadelphia, which was then home to the second most populous Italian

American community in the nation, Richard N. Juliani offers an authoritative case study for the impact of World War I on Italian immigrants and their progeny in the United States. He draws primarily upon the city's English-language newspapers (in particular, the *Philadelphia Evening Public Ledger*) and *La Libera Parola* (but overlooks other local Italian-language weeklies such as *Il Momento*, *La Ragione*, and *La Rassegna*) to detail individual stories that illuminate the experience of Philadelphians of Italian extraction in training camps and in the trenches with the American Expeditionary Force along the French-German front. Moreover, he reconstructs the activities of women from Italian background who contributed to the war efforts of their native and adoptive countries as they worked in defense industries, promoted the purchase of U.S. Liberty Bonds to fund Washington's military machinery, and collected money for the families of Italian and American soldiers.

Juliani also documents the mobilization of Italian newcomers who volunteered in their mother country's army or made their way back across the Atlantic Ocean to answer the fatherland's call for military duty between 1915 and 1917, while the United States was still neutral, and eventually celebrated Italy's victory before supporting Rome's postwar demands for larger territorial acquisitions. Likewise, he examines the attitude of unnaturalized immigrants who were required to enlist in compliance with the U.S. Selective Service Act of 1917 but who could claim exemption from conscription as aliens and, consequently, sparked the hostility of nativists who charged them with enjoying American liberties without being ready to defend them against German authoritarianism.

The core of the volume addresses how World War I helped reshape Italian Americans' sense of belonging. The military conflict encouraged both Italy-oriented nationalistic feelings, which overcame the regional and provincial affiliations the newcomers had previously carried from their native land, and commitment to the United States. Juliani convincingly concludes that, although the immigrants and their children elaborated multiple and fragmented identities under wartime stimuli, fighting and

dying in the U.S. Army, next to comrades with other ethnic roots, as well as supporting Washington's cause on the home front, were significant steps toward Italian Americans' acculturation and assimilation.

Regrettably, the analysis is not further developed to cover other initiatives that would have cast additional light on the intricate dynamics of Italian Americans' attachments: the campaign for extending Washington's declaration of war against Germany to the Austro-Hungarian Empire; the response to the flamboyant Italian poet Gabriele D'Annunzio's 1919 seizure of the Croatian seaport of Fiume, after U.S. president Woodrow Wilson rejected Rome's chauvinistic claims over this city; and the bolt to the Republican party in the 1920 elections for the White House in retaliation for the outgoing Democratic administration's alleged betrayal of Italy's requests at the peace conference. Furthermore, Juliani's interpretation would have gained supplementary strength if he had engaged in dialogue with such Italian scholars as Patrizia Salvetti and Emilio Franzina, who have dealt with Italian expatriates' loyalty dilemmas during World War I.

Stefano Luconi
University of Padua
Padova, Italy

doi: 10.1093/jahist/jaab014

Money, Power, and the People: The American Struggle to Make Banking Democratic. By Christopher W. Shaw. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019. vi, 410 pp. \$30.00.)

The financial panic of 2008 cast a short shadow in American politics. President George W. Bush and Congress adopted emergency policies to prevent financial collapse. The Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet by trillions of dollars. In 2010 Congress adopted modest regulatory reform. Then it was back to banking as usual and demands for re-deregulation. Christopher W. Shaw's history of "banking politics" revisits the one-hundred-year campaign by a wide swath of American society to exert democratic control over money and banking. The popular argument held that

government creates money and should guarantee an expansive supply of it. Bankers, in contrast, had an interest in restricting the supply to maintain profits. Shaw's study is one of many that seek to explain how the financial panic of 2008 came about, but its unique focus is on the permutations of producerist antibanking popular culture (p. 12). Thus, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was a breakthrough, but the struggle continued into the New Deal, the "high-water mark" of banking politics, when political control of monetary policy was established (p. 256). Shaw argues that the New Deal also brought "banking politics" to an end because federal regulators checked bankers' power without deinstitutionalizing it, while social policies improved the lives of farmers and workers (p. 202). By the late twentieth century, Congress forgot the risks of unregulated finance and unleashed the bankers. The public was disarmed and unprepared to defend democratic control.

Shaw writes in the mode of Progressive historians with a lesson about the People versus the Banks. Shaw unearths original sources of farmer and laborers' journals, letters, stump speeches, oral histories, and election campaign materials, as well as elite observations in biography, memoir, popular histories, party platforms, and the *Congressional Record*. Virtually every page demonstrates that the People are hostile to bankers. The voices of the People are often colorful, but finally monotonous, hardly changing even as congressional debates unfold over decades. He includes details of some key bank laws, but the "intellectual dialogue and political confrontation" between general suspicion of financial elites and specific public policy is mostly rhetorical (p. 9). Shaw reports popular influence on postal savings accounts (abolished in 1966), bank deposit insurance, the separation of commercial and investment banking, and credit unions, but the social vision fades. Shaw includes a discussion of the Bretton Woods monetary system, but he could have noted its flexibility for collective bargaining and agricultural price fixing. Shaw criticizes the New Deal for lulling the public into "complacency," which glosses forty years of good financial government (p. 284). In the post-banking politics era, there