

Zdeněk Mlynář and the Search for Socialist Opposition

From an Active Politician to a Dissident to Editorial Work in Exile

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Samizdat was not only a tool enabling the development of a substantial segment of Czech culture during the two decades after the suppression of the Prague Spring. It was also a predecessor of the media revolution, which has been so much talked about recently.¹ Bringing the extreme cases of the “samizdat archipelago” to wider attention thus means contributing to the reconstruction of an extraordinary editorial phenomenon. In the case of editorial activities coordinated by Zdeněk Mlynář (1930–1997),² the tool was specifically adapted for the purpose

1 The present study's original language is Italian (CATALANO, Alessandro: *Il samizdat tra dialogo e monologo: Le attività editoriali di Zdeněk Mlynář e la scelta degli interlocutori*. In: *eSamizdat*, 2010–2011, pp. 261–280). It was published in the proceedings of the “Samizdat between Memory and Utopia: Independent Culture in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century” conference held in Padua on 30 May to 1 June 2011. The proceedings were published as a double issue of the *eSamizdat: Rivista di culture dei paesi slavi* electronic magazine and are freely available at <http://www.esamizdat.it/rivista/2010-2011/index.htm>. They were the final output of a research project dedicated to samizdat in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, which the author, together with Simon Guagnelli, coordinated at the University of Padua (<http://www.maldura.unipd.it/samizdat/>). The Italian version of the study was translated into Czech by Alice Flemrová; the final product, however, is a result of a substantial expansion and reworking of the whole text.

2 The presented study is based on unpublished documents located in the personal archive of Zdeněk Mlynář, which was handed over to the National Archives in Prague and only recently made available to researchers without any restrictions. At the time of the preparation

of disseminating texts among the European audiences. Although only a sub-variant of the phenomenon, it represented an integral part of the extensive system of private editorial production characterising Czech culture in the 1970s and 1980s.

After 1989, the Czech dissident movement was often reprehended for not being able to overcome the phase of an anarchistic organisation dating back to its time underground and to create a concept of traditional and also realistic politics. If we accept the statement of Václav Benda in his renowned May 1978 text, namely that the circulation of samizdat texts should inspire the whole “parallel polis”³ being formed at the time, at face value, it is undoubtedly worth trying to verify, whether the environment of samizdat and independent publishing houses left, or on the contrary did not leave, deep marks in the structure of forms of political activities of those who were opposing the official “normalisation” culture.⁴

There are certainly many examples of the form of samizdat influencing the way in which both cultural and political initiatives were developing,⁵ but the transition from critical reflections and archiving of documents to dissemination of information (in this case particularly to partners abroad) to organising an association in the form of a permanent political forum is probably most obvious in projects coordinated by Zdeněk Mlynář in the 1980s. After a fashion and, to some extent, a long way from what was happening in Czechoslovakia in the last weeks of 1989, it was a transition similar to that from the “wild” samizdat to the organised protest

and publication of the in the Italian version of the paper, it was only partly accessible. The fund of Zdeněk has not yet been arranged and organised; its separate documents will therefore always be quoted as follows: *Národní archiv (National Archives – NA)*, Fund of Zdeněk Mlynář, Prof., JUDr., CSc. (f. Zdeněk Mlynář), part of the fund, cardboard box number (k.), document title.

- 3 “The second culture is, for the time being, the most developed and most dynamic parallel structure. It should also be used as a model for other spheres and, at the same time, supported by all available means, particularly in areas which have hitherto been neglected [...]” In another place, Benda says: “The parallel cultural structure is now an undeniable and significantly positive factor, and in some spheres (literature, but to some extent also in popular music and graphic arts) it fully dominates over inanimate official structures.” (BENDA, Václav: *Paralelní polis [Parallel Polis]*. In: IDEM: *Noční kádrový dotazník a jiné boje: Texty z let 1977–1989 [The Night-Time Cadre Questionnaire and Other Fights: Texts from the Years 1977–1989]*. Ed. Patrik Benda. Praha, Agite/Fra 2009, pp. 56–66, here pp. 61 and 60. The essay was first published in: HAVEL, Václav (ed.): *O svobodě a moci [On Freedom and Power]*, Vol. 1. Cologne – Rome, Index – Listy 1980, pp. 101–110.)
- 4 For comprehensive information on Czech samizdat culture, see BOLTON, Jonathan: *Worlds of Dissent: Charter 77, The Plastic People of the Universe, and Czech Culture under Communism*. Cambridge (Massachusetts) – London, Harvard University Press 2012.
- 5 Zdeněk Vašíček, for instance, highlighted, as early as in 1980, the reasons why the genre of *feuilletons* prevailed over academic analyses in Czech samizdat literature of the 1970s. (VAŠÍČEK, Zdeněk: *Co psala Karkulka ve vlkově břiše [What Little Red Riding Hood Wrote in the Wolf’s Belly]*. In: *Kritický sborník*, Issue No. 20 (2000–2001), pp. 225–234; also in: VAŠÍČEK, Zdeněk – MAYER, Françoise: *Minulost a současnost, paměť a dějiny [The Past and the Present, Memory and History]*. Praha, Triáda 2008, pp. 7–18.)

of Charter 77 and ultimately to the Civic Forum which ruled the country in the first months after the so-called Velvet Revolution.

All that has remained now is just vague awareness. One of the reasons why this is the case is that many studies on recent Czechoslovak past intentionally simplify the complex social stratification of the opposition during the two decades after the suppression of the Prague Spring. Moreover, the quick social and political changes after the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe made many characters, who had taken part in the long struggle against the system which had been increasingly perceived as totalitarian, disappear in the waste bin of history.

The last years of Zdeněk Mlynář's life are particularly symptomatic in this respect: in the early 1990s, the controversial intellectual, politician and political scientist underwent, in a relatively short time, a change from an organiser of major events in support of the legacy of the Prague Spring, which were taking place all over Europe,⁶ to a party in a political trial, accused of high treason for allegedly playing a double game in 1968 and taking part in the talks about the formation of a pro-Soviet "workers' and peasants' government with Moscow's Ambassador after the tanks had rolled into Czechoslovakia." Mlynář's case was amply covered and commented on in both the Czech and foreign media, but the polemic had already started earlier. Chess Grandmaster Luděk Pachman, for instance, had spoken very critically about his participation at the meeting of the "pro-Moscow faction of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [or the KSČ]" on several occasions. First in exile⁷ and then he did so again in Czechoslovakia shortly after November 1989.⁸ Somewhat later, on 12 February 1991, Mlynář was summoned to provide testimony on the alleged authors of the well-known "Letter of Invitation" dating back to the summer of 1968 in an investigation under the Act on the Threatening of Peace, on the basis of which he himself was indicted for high treason. As the 20-year period of limitation had already elapsed, the prosecution was suspended.⁹ But the Office for the Documentation and the Investigation of

6 See the anthology of his texts dating back to the 1970s and 1980s (however, often published in an abridged form): MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *Socialistou na volné noze* [The Freelance Socialist]. Praha, Prospektum 1992.

7 For the first time in an article in the German daily *Die Welt*, later in a published circular (PACHMAN, Luděk: Wer machte was im Hotel "Praha." In: *Die Welt*, 19 August 1981, p. 6; MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Ich hatte die Pistolen der Sowjets im Genick. In: *Ibid.*, 8 September 1981; NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 3, Circular of Luděk Pachman, 10 November 1981).

8 Zdeněk Mlynář reacted to Pachman's article *Radí nám dobře?* [Does He Advise Us Well?] published in *Lidová demokracie* on 29 April 1990, p. 6, by a letter addressed to the Attorney General (while the article was signed by Pachman's full name in the Brno edition of the daily, it was initialled just by a *re* mark in the Prague edition). The letter in question contained a "criminal charge and a request to initiate criminal proceedings in the matter" (see NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 2, Minutes of Testimony, 25 July 1990).

9 See NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 1, k. 1, A Copy of the Ruling of the Directorate of Investigation of the Federal Police Corps – Prague Office of 11 February 1992. However, it was Public Prosecutor Vladimír Nechanický who gave the ruling so much publicity, as he saw Mlynář's case as an opportunity not to include the years spent abroad in the period

the Crimes of Communism reopened the case in the summer of 1995, when it started investigating events related to 21 August 1968.¹⁰ As a matter of fact, it is worth mentioning that Mlynář had been talking at length about his participation in the negotiations with Soviet Ambassador Stepan Chervonenko in one of his autobiographic texts written in 1977 and 1978. The information in itself thus was not exactly a big piece of news.¹¹

In Austria, Mlynář worked at the Austrian Institute for International Policy (*Österreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik*) in Laxenburg, outside Vienna, from 1982 till 1989 and, in addition, his lecturing at Innsbruck University from 1989 to 1993 is likewise still remembered.¹² In Italy, on the other hand, he attracted attention

of limitation (see the interviews with Nechanický and Mlynář, *Původně šlo o mír* [It Was Initially About Peace] and *Dokažte mi vlastizrady* [Prove I Committed High Treason], respectively, published in the *Mladá fronta* daily on 17 February 1992, p. 1 n.), together with Martin Fendrych, then the Spokesman of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (see, for instance, the article *Vnitro označilo 18 osob za vlastizrádce* [The Ministry of the Interior Labelled 18 People Traitors] published in the *Rudé právo* daily on 14 February 1992, p. 1 n.). Supported by his friends among reformist Communists, who confirmed that his presence in the Soviet Ambassador's residence had been pre-arranged, Mlynář protested against the indictment by an open letter to Marián Čalfa (*Otevřený dopis Zdeňka Mlynáře předsedovi federální vlády* [An Open Letter of Zdeněk Mlynář to the Federal Prime Minister]. In: *Rudé právo*, 22 February 1992, p. 3). His resignation to all his posts on the night of 21/22 August 1968 was published as well. (*Proč údajný "vlastizrádce" oznámil, že skládá funkce* [Why Did the Alleged "Traitor" Announce He Was Resigning His Posts]. In: *Ibid.*, 17 February 1992, p. 1 n.)

- 10 See the interview with Vladimír Nechanický, *Na usnesení o spáchání vlastizrady trvám* [I Insist on the High Treason Ruling], published in the *Rudé právo* daily on 31 July 1995. Mlynář subsequently explained his refusal to provide new testimony by his lack of trust in so-called "Benda's Office." (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 10, Mlynář's Letter to the Office for the Documentation and the Investigation of the Crimes of Communism, 22 September 1995.)
- 11 See MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *Mráz přichází z Kremlu* [published in English as *Night Frost in Prague*]. Praha, Mladá fronta 1990, pp. 208–218. Refer also to other documents: NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 10, Minutes [of Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Z. Mlynář] of the Meeting of the Presidium and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Prague on 22 August 1968, 22 September 1968, and Notes Taken during the Meeting of Members of the Presidium and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with Soviet Ambassador Comrade Chervonenko on Thursday 22 August 1968 at the Soviet Embassy; VONDROVÁ, Jitka – NAVRÁTIL, Jaromír (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Kapitulační (srpen–listopad 1968)* [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia: Capitulation (August–November 1968)]. (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. IX/3) [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970, Vol. IX/3]. Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR [Institute for Contemporary History Of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic] – Supplement 2001, pp. 37–39, Documents No. 152 and No. 153 – Minutes of Negotiations of Leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with Ambassador Chervonenko and President Ludvík Svoboda on 22 August 1968.
- 12 Mlynář was appointed Extraordinary University Professor (*ausserordentlicher Universitätsprofessor*) on 1 October 1989 by a decree dated 25 August 1989 (see NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář,

by a series of articles dedicated to the Soviet Perestroika and his personal friendship with Mikhail Gorbachev, which were published in the *Rinascita* weekly at the end of 1986 (later also as a comprehensive volume) and produced a widespread international response.¹³ However, in today's Czech Republic there may be just a few who remember his controversial attempt to assert himself, at the time of the "Velvet Revolution," as a go-between in negotiations between the KSČ authorities and reformist Communists who had been ousted from the Party after 1968 and established the *Obroda – Klub za demokratický socialismus* [Renaissance – Club for Democratic Socialism]. As late as 7 January 1990, Havel warned his co-workers that it would be necessary to "watch Zdeněk Mlynář, who might be heading for the post of leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia."¹⁴ However, Mlynář got his most significant political role only a short time before his death in 1996, when he was elected Honorary Chairman of the Left Bloc. The party in question, nevertheless, got just 1.4 percent of votes in the election and, in fact, did not make it to the House of Deputies.

Back then, it was especially Mlynář's somewhat surprising TV appearances in the so-called "Dialogue" programme on 1 and 7 December 1989, which were much discussed and criticised.¹⁵ The first of them was a discussion with Czechoslovak TV General Director Miroslav Pavel, an opportunity Mlynář had specifically asked for. Indeed, it contained some quite astonishing formulations: "[...] the importance of purely political changes is overrated," "we should not underrate what has been achieved," "no witch-hunt," "I am worried about what I have already experienced before, namely that there is hope, that there is something promising a fundamental change, all seem to believe they have won, but everything ultimately leads to a very bad end."¹⁶ It was, however, the second TV debate, initially planned as the first-ever dialogue between the Civic Forum and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,

Part 2, k. 10, Appointment Decree; also see *Ibid.*, k. 9, Pension-Related Documents).

- 13 The publication, which other authors contributed to as well, was published under the title *Il progetto Gorbaciov* as a supplement to the *Rinascita* magazine in Rome in 1987. Czech originals were published in Mlynář's book *Problémy politického systému: Texty o roce 1968, normalizaci a současné reformě v SSSR* [Problems of the Political System: Texts about the Year 1968, Normalisation and the Current Reform in the USSR]. Rome – Stockholm – Cologne, Listy – Foundation of Charter 77 – Index 1987, pp. 85–109 (also deposited in Mlynář's NA fund, Part 2, k. 32). On the topic in question, see also GORBACHEV, Mikhail – MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *Reformátoři nebyvají šťastni: Dialog o "perestrojce," Pražském jaru a socialismu* [Reformers Usually Are Not Happy: A Dialogue about the "Perestroika," the Prague Spring and Socialism]. Praha, Victoria 1995.
- 14 KAISER, Daniel: *Prezident: Václav Havel 1990–2003* [The President: Václav Havel 1990–2003]. Praha – Litomyšl, Paseka 2014, p. 27.
- 15 In recent times, the testimony of the last head of the Czech secret police, Vilém Václavek, was published. According to the testimony in question, the initiative would match Mlynář in the same way as notified by the Embassy in Vienna to Prague, where the secret police would immediately organise his arrival, with the purpose to make it appear on television. See ŠVELA, Vladimír: *Poslouchá nás Gottwald? Uřízněme mu hlavu* [Is Gottwald Listening? Cut His Head Off]. In: *Tydeník Echo*, Issue No. 47 (2015), available online.
- 16 Archives of Czech TV, "Dialogue" Programme, APV0970.

which really caused a lot of stir. Vasil Mohorita failed to turn up, and it was therefore mainly Mlynář who crossed swords with Petr Pithart on 7 December.¹⁷ He claimed, *inter alia*, that the situation had developed into a crisis, that “there are errors on both sides,” or that a demonstration “is not a dialogue, but an ultimatum.” He likewise advocated the importance of roundtable discussions with the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, claiming that “the situation is not all that rosy, it is the other way round” and “has not been developing all too well since the last week when I was here.” Pithart was speaking mainly about the danger of disintegration in the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, adding “I think it is quite symptomatic that Zdeněk Mlynář from Innsbruck or Vienna is speaking here on behalf of the Communist Party.”¹⁸ The programme even resulted in a protest of the Executive Committee of *Obroda*: “There have been protests against the emotional, unilateral and not sufficiently informed appearance of Z. Mlynář. Z. Mlynář is not a member of the club in question and it is not known to us by whom and why he was invited to take part in the debate.”¹⁹ On 14 December, Mlynář admitted in *Rudé*

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- 17 Taking part in the debate were Josef Bartončík, Josef Blahož, Waltr Komárek, Josef Kotrč, Stanislav Křeček, Zdeněk Mlynář, Šimon Pánek and Petr Pithart, the moderator was Miroslav Pavel, Archives of Czech TV, “Dialogue” Programme, APV0982.
- 18 As to subsequent polemics, see, for instance, the outraged letter of dissident Pavel Bergmann of 8 December 1989 (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 4; other indignant letters of spectators are to be found *Ibid.*, k. 5); also see HÁJEK, Miloš: *Paměť české levice* [The Memory of the Czech Left]. Praha, ÚDS AV ČR 2011, p. 306 n.; PITHART, Petr: *Devětaosmdesátý: Vzpomínky a přemýšlení. Krédo* [1989: Recollections and Musings. The Creed]. Praha, Academia 2009, pp. 120–122. When referring to this episode during a discussion within the Civic Forum, Václav Havel talked about the struggle “against unbelievable Mafia” (SUK, Jiří: *Občanské fórum: Listopad–prosinec 1989* [Civic Forum: November–December 1989], Vol. 1. Brno, Supplement 1997, p. 138; Vol. 2. Brno, Supplement 1998, pp. 137–143) and a “part of a big conspiracy” (SUK, Jiří: *Labyrintem revoluce. Aktéři, zápletky a křížovatky jedné politické krize (od listopadu 1989 do června 1990)* [Through the Labyrinth of Revolution. Actors, Plots and Crossroads of One Political Crisis (from November 1989 to June 1990)]. Praha, Prostor 2009, pp. 210–211).
- 19 KOKOŠKOVÁ, Zdeňka – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav (ed.): *Obroda: Dokumenty* [The Renaissance: Documents]. Praha, Maxdorf 1996, p. 185, Document No. 92 – The Renaissance Club on the Government Crisis, 8 December 1989. The often criticised TV appearance of Zdeněk Mlynář, which he himself later apologetically commented on in the media on several different occasions, was explained by Karel Urbánek, the last General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, in an interview with Karel Sýs by a purely personal reason: “He suddenly appeared in my office without any prior notice. He came to ask me to order the release of his son from prison. [...] After a short exchange of opinions, I made him an offer: his TV appearance in defence of democracy in exchange for my assistance in the case of his son. Very surprised, he reacted: ‘You want me, after everything what has happened, to appear on TV and defend the Communists?’ ‘I really cannot want you to do that, but you can speak against the media campaign directed against people who are not guilty of anything, except of having a different opinion on the social arrangement of the state and on the period of socialism.’ ‘Mister General Secretary, you are a bargainer, but I would do anything for my son – I will appear on TV.’ Zdeněk Mlynář made a very informed appearance on TV and his son was released. Unfortunately, the release did not do him much good in the years to come.” (SYS, Karel – SPÁČIL, Dušan (ed.): *Záhady 17. listopadu: Devátý, Hegenbart,*

právo daily that he “was – particularly at the beginning of the TV debate on 7 December 1989 – nervous to irritated” and “tired,” so it could really look like he was presenting as “an advocate of the Communists.” At the same time, however, he said that he was not ashamed of that, as “honest people in the Communist Party (and also elsewhere) now need an advocate, as they have found themselves sitting in a political dock. In 1977, one of the reasons why I was one of the initiators of Charter 77 was that I shared the belief that every person charged needed a defence lawyer. In the absence of the above, there cannot be an objective assessment of guilt; this is something that a state of law and order cannot dispense with, which is what I think now as well.”²⁰

The Prague Spring

Zdeněk Mlynář was born in 1930 in Vysoké Mýto, into the family of army officer Hubert Müller (according to his son, he fought in the Czechoslovak Legions in Italy during the Great War) and Vlasta Sobotková. Because of his father’s profession, he spent a part of his childhood in a small house in a garrison town in Slovakia, in an environment he himself labelled a “ghetto of petty bourgeois wives of officers, which was oozing pretence and indifference; basically a Czech ghetto in a Slovak environment.”²¹ In May 1945, Mlynář’s father joined the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and had his surname changed, in line with the then campaign of “Czechisation” of names.²² At the end of 1946, he was transferred from the Army

Jičínský, Nevařil, Ruml, Sedlák, Uhl, Urbánek. Svědectví po 21 letech [Mysteries of 17 November: Devátý, Hegenbart, Jičínský, Nevařil, Ruml, Sedlák, Uhl, Urbánek. Testimonies after 21 Years]. Praha, BVD 2010, pp. 167–190, here p. 174.) See also documents about Jakub Dubský in Mlynář’s Fund (Part 2, k. 9 and 31).

- 20 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Tak takhle tedy také ne [Not Way This Way Either]. In: *Rudé právo*, 14 December 1989, p. 1. Mlynář also expressed his “concerns about the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in his first interview for the Czech press after the coup (Srpen 1968–Listopad 1989: Exkluzivní interview pro MF a MS s profesorem Zdeňkem Mlynářem [August 1968–November 1989: An Exclusive Interview for MF and MS with Professor Zdeněk Mlynář]. In: *Mladá fronta*, 5 December 1989, p. 3). As for Mlynář’s first trip from exile to Czechoslovakia, see also KAISER, Daniel: *Disident: Václav Havel 1936–1989* [Disident: Václav Havel 1936–1989]. Praha – Litomyšl, Paseka 2009, pp. 230–232; PLACÁK, Petr: Čekání na socialismus Zdeňka Mlynáře [Waiting for Zdeněk Mlynář’s Socialism]. In: *Necenzurované noviny*, Vol. 2, Issue No. 11 (1992), p. 16.
- 21 The quotation is taken from a private untitled text dated 1983, which is deposited in Mlynář’s NA fund (Part 2, k. 3). It is described in more detail further.
- 22 See NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 2, Permission of the Provincial National Committee in Prague, 31 July 1945. In this respect, Mlynář published an open letter in the exile *Listy* journal in 1975. In it, he protested against being accused of Zionism. (Letter of Dr. Z. Mlynář. In: *Listy*, Vol. 5, Issue No. 6 (December 1975), p. 43 n.)

to the National Security Corps and later appointed the NSC Provincial Commander in Brno. He died in a car crash in October 1948.²³

Zdeněk Mlynář became a member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1946, i.e. at the age of 16. After graduating from secondary school, he became a functionary of the Czechoslovak Union of Youth. In the first half of the 1950s, he spent five years in Moscow, studying at the Faculty of Law of Lomonosov University (and befriending his schoolmate Mikhail Gorbachev).²⁴ He subsequently advanced rapidly in the area of law. As early as 1956, he joined the Institute of State and Law of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. In 1961, he was appointed Head of the Department of General State and Law Theory at the same institution.²⁵ On 27 April 1960, he defended his dissertation on the political theory of Niccolò Machiavelli.²⁶ A year later, he habilitated at the Faculty of Law of Charles University and was appointed Associate Professor of General Theory of State and Law in 1964. In the same year, he also took the position of Secretary of the Legal Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.²⁷ In spite of undergoing his first and relatively serious life crisis, these were the years of Mlynář's intensive publication activities, initially in the field of law,²⁸ later likewise increasingly often in the field of culture.²⁹

23 See NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 1, k. 1, Mlynář's Letter to the Minister of the Interior Jaromír Obzina, 26 January 1977.

24 When in Moscow, Mlynář married for the first time, but his marriage with Eva Dušánková was divorced as early as 1954. Two years later, he married Rita Budínová (later Klímová), daughter of well-known journalist Stanislav Budín. They were married until 1967. His third wife was philosopher Irena Dubská, whom he married in 1973, after seven years of living together. Different documents concerning Mlynář's marital unions have been preserved in his NA fund located in Prague (Part 2, k. 3 and 8).

25 Regarding his ideological attitudes in the late 1950s, when he was an active opponent of so-called "revisionism," see KOPEČEK, Michal: *Hledání ztraceného smyslu revoluce: Zrod a počátky marxistického revizionismu ve střední Evropě 1953–1960* [Seeking the Revolution's Lost Meaning: The Birth and Development of Marxist Revisionism in Central Europe 1953–1960]. Praha, Argo 2009, pp. 299 n., 312–314 and 335–337. Mlynář later explained his attitudes in those days as follows: "I have already mentioned here how I fought against revisionism back in 1959, although I actually believed many of the opinions of the Yugoslav Communists were correct. However, if I had said so then, I would have rendered my political role in 1968 impossible." (GORBACHEV, M. – MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Reformátoři nebývají šťastni*, p. 34 – see Footnote 13.)

26 A copy of the dissertation is kept in Mlynář's NA fund (Part 2, k. 3).

27 See documents in Mlynář's NA fund (Part 4, k. 17).

28 See at least two monographs: MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *K teorii socialistické demokracie* [On the Theory of Socialist Democracy]. Praha, Státní nakladatelství politické literatury 1961; IDEM: *Stát a člověk: Úvahy o politickém řízení za socialismu* [The State and the Individual: Contemplations on Political Management under Socialist Rule]. Praha, Svobodné slovo 1964.

29 He published, for instance, in journals such as *Literární noviny*, *Kultura*, *Plamen*, *Kulturní tvorba*, *Divadelní noviny*, as indicated by numerous *curricula vitae* and bibliographies preserved in Mlynář's NA fund (Part 1, k. 2; Part 2, k. 3).

In 1966, he was appointed manager of an important interdisciplinary research project named “The Development of Democracy and the Political System in Socialist Society.” In the atmosphere of a rapidly advancing ideological détente in the 1960s, the establishment of four interdisciplinary teams between 1963 and 1966 was supposed to mark an important phase of the re-evaluation of the foundations which Czechoslovak socialist society was based on.³⁰ The team of Ota Šik focused on economic reform issues; Machonin concentrated on sociological research while the objective of the team led by Radovan Richta, who was the best known both at home and abroad, was to investigate the social and human consequences of the scientific and technological revolution. Mlynář’s team – whose research programme was, by the way, similar to projects he later managed abroad – produced within just one year (“there were altogether nine thematic discussion meetings between March 1967 and March 1968) almost 50 expert studies which could not have been published because of an intervention from above.³¹ Mlynář himself prepared an opening theoretical analysis (Study Document No. 1, *Náměty k teoretické koncepci výzkumu rozvoje politického systému* [Topics Concerning the Theoretical Concept of Research of the Political System]),³² which was later regarded as one of the fundamental texts of so-called “right-wing opportunism.”³³ According to his own words, the conclusions of the team’s research were to be “the starting point for the team’s own long-term (approximately five years) research project on the one hand, and also one of the documents to be used in preparations for the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, scheduled to take place in 1970.”³⁴ At the end of 1967, however, the team’s activities were regarded as “politically suspicious,” and both top leaders of the Communist Party and the Attorney General’s

30 DEVÁTÁ, Markéta: *Marxismus jako projekt nové společnosti. Dvě studie ke společenským vědám (1945–1969)* [Marxism as a Project of a New Society. Two studies on Social Sciences (1945–1969)]. Praha, ÚSD AV ČR 2011, pp. 37–41.

31 Zdeněk Mlynář presented their list in his publication *Československý pokus o reformu 1968: Analýza jeho teorie a praxe* [The Czechoslovak Attempt at Reform 1968: Analysis of Its Theory and Practice] (Cologne – Rome, Index – Listy 1975, pp. 100–103), in which he also outlined the focus of the research (pp. 91–107). A copy of these works, including Mlynář’s notes, handwritten minutes of discussions taking place during the team’s meetings, and official reports are kept in Mlynář’s NA fund (Part 4, k. 13–16). See also BROKL, Lubomír: Prof. Dr. Zdeněk Mlynář, CSc. (1930–1997): Mlynářův tým a jeho místo v české politické vědě [Prof. Dr. Zdeněk Mlynář, CSc. (1930–1997): Mlynář’s Team and Its Place in Czech Political Science]. In: *Politologická revue*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1997), pp. 164–175. See also DEVÁTÁ, M.: *Marxismus jako projekt nové společnosti*. pp. 48–51 – see Footnote 29.

32 The first part of the text was published in two articles: MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Některé problémy charakteru politiky a státu v socialistické společnosti [Some Issues of the Nature of Politics and the State in the Socialist Society]. In: *Právník*, Vol. 107, No. 10 (1967), pp. 928–942; IDEM: Poznámky o vztahu socialistické politiky a vědeckotechnické revoluce [Comments on the Relationship between Socialist Politics and the Scientific and Technical Revolution]. In: *Ibid.*, Vol. 108, No. 2 (1968), pp. 81–89.

33 See the analysis of this issue in Mlynář’s book *Československý pokus o reformu 1968*, pp. 13–107.

34 *Ibid.*, p. 93.

Office were viewing Mlynář's team with an increasingly suspicious eye, primarily because of the influence he seemed to have on the young generation of lawyers.³⁵

After the turn in political power in January 1968,³⁶ Mlynář quickly became one of the prominent reformers, the author of several political reforms and also of a substantial part of the *Action Programme* of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In June 1968, he was elected Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, a position which enabled him to participate in the creation of many texts formulating the programme of the Prague Spring.³⁷ However, he became a member of the Presidium only after the invasion, on the last day of August 1968. The words he said about his attitudes during a roundtable

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- 35 See KAPLAN, Karel: *Kronika komunistického Československa: Kořeny reformy 1956–1968. Společnost a moc* [Chronicle of Communist Czechoslovakia: Roots of the Reform 1956–1968. Society and the Power]. Brno, Společnost pro odbornou literaturu – Barrister & Principal 2008, pp. 679 n. and 759. Mlynář's name was also allegedly included on "the list of functionaries of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia who were to be watched and potentially interned in the event of 'an extraordinary political situation posing a threat to interests of the state.'" (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář's "Information on the Case of Josef Hodic," p. 1, and "Supplement to 'Information on the case of Josef Hodic.')" A copy of this important text is also kept in the Rome-located fund of Jiří Pelikán, which is a part of the Historical Archives of the House of Deputies in Rome (*Archivio Storico della Camera dei Deputati* (hereinafter *ASCD*), Fondo (f.) Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, Busta (cardboard box – k.) 14).
- 36 Petr Pithart claims that when he and Mlynář were talking about Dubček having been elected the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on 5 January 1968, Mlynář told him: "Just do not be too elated. With my Russian, I will always have a job, I will interpret for the commander of Soviet occupation forces, but knowing your poor Russian, I really do not know what is going to happen to you." (PITHART, P.: *Devětaosmdesátý*, p. 121 – see Footnote 14.)
- 37 As to the editing of the answer of Czechoslovak KSČ leaders to the "Warsaw Letter" of the so-called "fraternal parties," whose authors were Zdeněk Mlynář and Čestmír Císař, see VONDROVÁ, Jitka – NAVRÁTIL, Jaromír (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Konsolidace (květen–srpen 1968)* [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia: Consolidation (May–August 1968)]. (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. IX/2) [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970, Vol. IX/2]. Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR – Supplement 2000, pp. 197 n. and 211 n., Document No. 105 – A Stenographic Record of the Discussion on the Letters of the Five Communist Parties Addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia during the 83rd Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 8 July 1968; *Ibid.*, p. 139 n., Document No. 108 – Stenographic Record of the Discussion Regarding the Letters of the Five Communist Parties Addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Proposed Position Document of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia during the 85th Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 12 July 1968; see also CÍSAŘ, Čestmír: *Paměti: Nejen o zákulisí pražského jara* [Memoirs: Not Just about the Background of the Prague Spring]. Praha, SinCon 2005, p. 889 n. According to Císař, Mlynář, who was then returning from a meeting of leading politicians of socialist countries in Bratislava, referred to Brezhnev and other CP secretaries as "senile old men" unable to understand problems of modern times (*Ibid.*, p. 939). Various handwritten comments and notes of Mlynář dating back to the Prague Spring era (hitherto unused) are found in Mlynář's NA fund (Part 1, k. 1).

discussion the record of which was published in the *Reportér* magazine early in March 1968 were quite symptomatic: “We have built a firmly rooted system which has so far made it possible to enforce central directives and prevented making any democratic decisions. It is a dictatorship of a single interest, and that single interest can of course be anything which finds its way to the centre of the power structure. [...] In my opinion, the only realistic way to democratic guarantees in our country is, for the time being, to provide opportunities for a confrontation of opinions within the Communist Party, which has identified itself with the power mechanism – this is a problem of intra-party democracy; using this as a starting point, the Party must abandon the position of a monopolistic political subject.”³⁸

In his famous book *Night Frost in Prague*, which has been translated into many languages (the first Czech edition was published in Cologne in 1978), Mlynář was one of just a few to have decisively dealt with his own Stalinist past.³⁹ Indeed, he likewise analysed his political career and position in the turbulent months of 1968 with an extraordinary fineness:

“I was usually included among the centrists. I did not mind; I knew why this was the case: I defended the state’s right to interfere with the freedom of the press in cases where the interests of the state demanded so, clearly defined by law and with restrictions being imposed by courts.

[...] At that time, I was – and, for that matter, I still am – sorry that the Czechs had so little understanding for politics as the art of the possible in moments like that, when it might have been possible to change many important things, but when it was not possible to turn our national backyard, littered for so many years, into a ‘paradise on earth’ overnight. I was and still am sorry how many intelligent, honest and selfless Czech people keep striving for unfeasible utopias until they lose the chance to improve what may have been improved.”⁴⁰

38 Hovoříme o demokracii v politice [We Are Talking about Democracy in Politics]. In: *Reportér*, Vol. 3, No. 10 (1968), pp. I–VIII, here p. VII. Refer also to two articles of Mlynář published in the *Rudé právo* daily: *Naše politická soustava a dělba moci* [Our Political System and the Division of Power] (13 February 1968, p. 3) and *Co dál s naší demokracií* [What to Do Next about Our Democracy] (26 March 1968, p. 3). Both articles have been reprinted in the following anthology: HOPPE, Jiří (ed.): *Pražské jaro v médiích: Výběr z dobové publicistiky* [The Prague Spring in the Media: A Selection from Period Journalism]. (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. XI [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970, Vol. XI]). Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR – Supplement 2004, pp. 44–48 and 99–103. Regarding these articles, Mlynář later wrote that “at the time, I had not yet been co-opted as a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia or its Plenum, and I was trying to assert my influence through CP media.” (MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Československý pokus o reformu 1968* – see Footnote 27.)

39 MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Mráz přichází z Kremly*, pp. 11–87 – see Footnote 11.

40 *Ibid.*, p. 89. See also Mlynář’s keynote speeches at meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on 4 April 1968 and 31 May 1968 (VONDROVÁ, Jitka – NAVRÁTIL, Jaromír – MORAVEC, Jan (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Pokus o reformu (říjen 1967–květen 1968)* [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia: The Attempted Reform (October 1967–May 1968)]. (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. IX/1 [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970,

Mlynář's "tactical" interventions during the Prague Spring were indeed numerous, both with respect to restrictions of press liberties and as regards his obstructive attitudes to the renovation of different "opposition" platforms.⁴¹ Mlynář himself later wrote that "seen from this angle, a spontaneous social movement striving for a remedy of deformations will look like a factor that should and must be regulated by politics, if such politics intends to achieve its objectives (and also maintain the whole process within the limits it itself regards as optimal). In this broad sense of the word, politics is always a manipulation, no matter how democratic it may be."⁴² It is thus no coincidence that various protagonists of the Prague Spring, for

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- Vol. IX/1], Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR – Supplement 1999, pp. 278–282, Document No. 40 – Record of Zdeněk Mlynář's Speech during the April Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on 4 April 1968; VONDROVÁ, J. – NAVRÁTIL, J. (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Konsolidace*, pp. 65–69, Document No. 81 – Record of Zdeněk Mlynář's Speech during the May Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on 31 May 1968.)
- 41 Mlynář's numerous opinions voicing his resolute support for a decisive government supervision over everything that may endanger "essential interests of the republic, particularly in the field of foreign policy" are listed in Jiří Hoppe's monograph *Opozice '68: Sociální demokracie, KAN a K 231 v období pražského jara* [Opposition '68: Social Democracy, KAN and K 231 during the Prague Spring]. Praha, Prostor 2009, p. 114; also pp. 76 n., 94, 102–106, 112–115, 118, 128–130, 144 n., 159–161, 169–171, 183 n., 188–197, 241–243, 291 n., 295 and 309. After the publication of the manifesto "Two Thousand Words" at the end of June 1968, Mlynář speaking at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia opined that the reaction had to be extraordinarily unyielding (see VONDROVÁ, J. – NAVRÁTIL, J. (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Konsolidace*, pp. 153 n. and 158 n., Document No. 100 – Notes Taken during the Discussion at the 81st Meeting of the Presidium and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Manifesto "Two Thousand Words," 27 June 1968). At meetings of the Party Presidium during the last month before the invasion, he demanded "a legal norm [...] in the event of an emergency" and the reintroduction of censorship (*Ibid.*, p. 290, Document No. 120 – Notes Taken during the Discussion at the 89th Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Draft of Legal Measures of the Presidium of the National Assembly on Extraordinary Measures of the State, 22 July 1968), his motive being particularly the "shocking experience" of the meeting with the Soviets in Bratislava and the mood of the general public (*Ibid.*, p. 320, Document No. 130 – Notes Taken during the Discussion at the 91st meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on Politico-Organisational Measures Subsequent to Conclusions of the Meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Čierna nad Tisou and Bratislava; also see *Ibid.*, pp. 303–305, 313, 384 n., 429 n., 443 n. and 451).
- 42 MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Československý pokus o reformu 1968*, p. 114. In another place, he adds: "In a normally functioning democratic pluralistic system, the media could never be just a tool used to transfer directives and opinions of political leaders. However – and especially if the media are in the hands of the state (radio, TV) – political information and positions they disseminate must be subjected (albeit by democratic methods) to political interests and policies of the state, so that they are in line with sometimes fairly complex requirements of these domestic and international policies." (*Ibid.*, p. 128.)

instance historian Michal Reiman not so long ago, more or less explicitly criticised Mlynář for his “manipulative” political manners or talked about his not always positive influence on Alexander Dubček.⁴³ After all, Mlynář later characterised his political belief in those days by the words “I was a reformist Communist, not a non-communist democrat.”⁴⁴

Mlynář’s acts during the critical days of August 1968 might look outwardly controversial. As soon as the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia learned about the invasion of foreign troops at its night meeting, Mlynář and Čestmír Císař started drafting a protest statement.⁴⁵ The episode of the meeting with Soviet Ambassador Stepan Chervonenko has already been mentioned above. However, it may also be worthwhile to mention two unknown texts in which Mlynář recalled the moment in question and explained his internal motives.

The first one contains Mlynář’s comments concerning a draft screenplay of the film documentary titled *Invasion* and based on his book *Night Frost in Prague*, which he sent to script writer and producer Eva Kolouchová in the summer of 1979 and in which he emphatically demanded a correction in connection with his absence at what is known today as the Extraordinary Communist Party Congress held in Vysočany. In the first version, he wrote: “It is *absolutely necessary* to add to my monologue a few sentences explaining why I am not going to Vysočany and why I am heading for the Central Committee building instead. This is important for understanding my role. As it is, the spectator *may think* I am simply trying to find out which way things will turn – and then join the side offering a safer perspective. [...] However, this is an *essential* issue for me. [...] At that time, I and several other comrades came to the conclusion that I should go to the Central Committee building; all who matter will be in Vysočany, but there will be no one in the Central Committee building, except maybe for Biřák, Indra, Kolder, Jakeš, and the whole clique that wants to cooperate with the Russians. I was not very pleased with the

43 See REIMAN, Michal: *Rusko jako téma a realita doma a v exilu: Vzpomínky na léta 1968–1990* [Russia as a Theme and Reality at Home and in Exile: Recollections of the Years 1968–1990]. Praha, ÚSD AV ČR, 2008, pp. 75, 80, 89–91, 99–101, 168, 184–188, 235–240, 244–252 and 289 n. Historian Miloš Hájek wrote in his memoirs, for instance, he remembered the disagreement with the invitation of Zdeněk Mlynář to a meeting of the “reformers” before the April 1968 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, as “he participated in the liquidation of *Literární noviny*” (HÁJEK, Miloš: *Paměť české levice*, p. 207 – see Footnote 17).

44 MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Mráz přichází z Kremly*, p. 94.

45 See DUBČEK, Alexander: *Naděje umírá poslední: Vlastní životopis Alexandra Dubčeka* [Hope Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubček]. Ed. Jiří Hochman. Praha, Svoboda 1993, p. 191 n. There are also other memoirs mentioning Mlynář’s activities in those days, including: DIENSTBIER, Jiří – LÁNSKÝ, Karel – ŠILHÁN, Věněk – ŠIMON, Bohumil: *Srpen 1968* [August 1968]. Praha, Práce 1990, pp. 52 n., 142–144 and 183–187; *Paměti Vasilu Biřáka: Unikátní svědectví ze zákulisí KSČ* [Memoirs of Vasil Biřák: A Unique Testimony from the Backstage of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia], Vol. 2. Praha, Agentura Cesty 1991, pp. 104–145. Compared to the players mentioned above, Biřák was very critical of Mlynář’s activities.

prospect; it was a very ungrateful role, and not a very safe one, but I agreed with the arguments that I had to accept it.” In another, March 1980 version of his comments, he demanded some changes “to be respected unconditionally,” the changes including, *inter alia*, “the fact that I, too, was a delegate of the Extraordinary Congress. But after a meeting with its organisers, I did not go there. I went to a meeting of the remnants of the Party Presidium.”⁴⁶

On the other hand, the second text is utterly private and is mentioned here only because it was partly published not so long ago.⁴⁷ It is a very interesting attempt at a psychological self-analysis, which Mlynář wrote in 1983, probably for his psychiatrist. When describing the part of his personality which seeks logical conclusions, Mlynář also analysed his own behaviour during the difficult months of the Prague Spring and after the Soviet occupation: “Thanks to Individual D, I am able to act in a way consistent with the logic of my opinions, for instance in a political situation when such acts result in my downfall and are not in line with the calculation (whose alternative is supplied by Individual C basically without any error, but I do not follow the advice); an example of the above is, for example, my political acts in 1968, particularly in August and later, my resignation, etc.”⁴⁸

In any case, Mlynář subsequently travelled to Moscow together with the delegation of President Ludvík Svoboda and also as a representative of the participants of the Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia held in

46 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 6, Mlynář’s Comments on the Draft Screenplay of the Documentary Movie *Invasion* of Summer 1979 and March 1980 (the fund in question also contains many other documents dealing with this issue).

47 I intentionally do not make use of any family correspondence in this work, which is why even this text should be left aside – primarily because it was written in a difficult situation in life, and it is not quite clear to what extent it reflects Mlynář’s previous and subsequent health condition. Nevertheless, I came across the latest work of Vladimír Čermák, which quotes and summarises the text, which the author himself named “Soul Searching,” in its annexes, shortly before submitting this work (ČERMÁK, Vladimír: *Operace Listopad 1989: O putování české společnosti odnikud nikam a zpět a o jejím hledání cesty jinudy a jinam* [Operation November 1989: On Travels of Czech Society from Nowhere to Nowhere and Its Searching of a Way Elsewhere and to Another Place]. Praha, Naše vojsko 2012, pp. 322–328). The author attempts to point out, very unconvincingly, Zdeněk Mlynář’s allegedly crucial role in the creation of the Soviet Perestroika; his argumentation follows lines similar to those appearing in his previous book, in which he was trying to prove Mlynář’s key role in August 1968 (see IDEM: *Operace Srpen 1968: O ‘psyopu’ české společnosti, problémech sovětského vládnutí a o mnoha dalších faktorech událostí* [Operation August 1968: On the ‘Psyops’ of Czech Society, Problems of Soviet Rule and Many Other Factors of the Events]. Praha, Naše vojsko 2011).

48 The text does not have a title. It starts with the following words: “I. Childhood, relationship to father and mother.” It has 57 pages and was repeatedly corrected (see different versions in Mlynář’s NA fund, Part 2, k. 3).

Vysočany,⁴⁹ with the task to deliver letters to imprisoned Czechoslovak leaders.⁵⁰ As is well known, even Mlynář later added his signature to the notorious Moscow Protocol,⁵¹ and disputes subsequently broke out around what many saw as a “conciliatory” attitude.⁵² During the weeks that followed, he repeatedly stood

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- 49 One opinion voiced during the Vysočany Congress was that “the person of Comrade Mlynář, although he has been acting bravely now, is not quite clear in the course of time. People who have known him for years, fellow members of his local CP cell, claim he often changed his opinions.” (VONDROVÁ, J. – NAVRÁTIL, J. (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Kapitulace*, p. 75, Document No. 159 – Stenographic Record of the 1st Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Elected by the Extraordinary 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 23 August 1968; see also pp. 52, 62 and 74.) In addition, refer also, in particular, to *14. mimořádný sjezd KSČ: Protokol a dokumenty* [14th Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia]. Vienna – Rome, Salemi 1970. The introduction and conclusion were written by Jiří Pelikán (regarding the election of Mlynář to the new Central Committee of the Party, see p. 86 n.). On 23 August 1968, Leonid Brezhnev stated that, according to his information, Mlynář had refused to take part in the the so-called Extraordinary Congress, claiming that “if the line-up elected by the congress is allowed to rule the country, Czechoslovakia will immediately become a bourgeois country.” (VONDROVÁ, Jitka – NAVRÁTIL, Jaromír (ed.): *Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize 1967–1970: Červenec–srpen 1968* [The International Context of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970: July–August 1968]). (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. IV/2 [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970, Vol. IV/2]). Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR – Supplement 1996, p. 240, Document No. 156 – Soviet Stenographic Record of the Discussion between Soviet Representatives Led by L. Brezhnev and by A. Dubček and O. Černík, 23 August 1968; see also p. 245; the exact words uttered by Mlynář in the presence of the Soviet Ambassador are cited *Ibid.*, p. 249 – see Footnote 11.)
- 50 See IDEM. (ed.): *Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize 1967–1970: Zář 1968–květen 1970* [The International Context of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970: September 1968–May 1970]. (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. IV/3 [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970, Vol. IV/3]). Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR – Supplement 1997, pp. 82–88, in particular p. 83, Document No. 190 – A Soviet Stenographic Record of the Meeting of Leading Representatives of “The Five” in Moscow Discussing the Situation in Czechoslovakia and Measures for Its Full Normalisation, 27 September 1968; MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Mráz přichází z Kremly*, pp. 228–230; DUBČEK, A.: *Naděje umírá poslední*, p. 204; Rozhovor Ondřeje Pitra s Josefem Smrkovským: Nedokončený rozhovor [An Interview with Josef Smrkovský by Ondřej Pitr: An Unfinished Interview]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (March 1975), p. 20 (the name Ondřej Pitr was an alias/pen name of Jiří Dienstbier). According to Miloš Jakeš, who picked up Mlynář in Hloubětín before the departure for Moscow, Mlynář “was somewhat afraid, hiding behind litter bins and observing what is going to happen from there” (JAKEŠ, Miloš: *Dva roky generálním tajemníkem* [Two Years as the General Secretary]. Praha, Regulus 1996, p. 48).
- 51 Mlynář writes about the tough decision to sign the Moscow Protocol in his book *Mráz přichází z Kremly* (pp. 249–263). Mlynář later also informed the Federal Assembly of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic about its contents (see CIGÁNEK, František – FELCMAN, Oldřich (ed.): *Národní shromáždění: Srpen 1968–leden 1969* [National Assembly: August 1968–January 1969]). (Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967–1970, sv. III/3 [Sources on the History of the Czechoslovak Crisis 1967–1970, Vol. III/3]). Praha – Brno, ÚSD AV ČR – Supplement 2009, pp. 65–80).
- 52 For instance, many sources mention the exasperation of František Kriegel, as Mlynář did not allegedly pass the messages from Vysočany to him. (See REIMAN, M.: *Rusko jako téma*

in defence of at least some parts of the reform policy which had started in January 1968, although he never forgot to add a warning that “there is no time to play with fire.”⁵³ As early as the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia held on 31 August 1968, however, he asked “to be relieved of my duties because in these few days I have found out I am not up to them.” In a situation that did not offer any chance of carrying on with the policy formulation in the *Action Programme of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia*, Mlynář clearly sensed how immensely difficult it would be to manoeuvre between the Scylla of excessive compromises and the Charybdis of unswerving principles: “If we relent, some of our people will rise against us tomorrow. [...] or we face the situation with defiance and bring it to bankruptcy.”⁵⁴

At the end of September 1968, Leonid Brezhnev’s opinion of Mlynář took a rapid turn for the worse. Brezhnev now regarded Mlynář not only as a ubiquitous “cunning man,” who was a long way from being an honest friend of the Soviet Union and lacked a “firm ideological orientation,” but also as an individual creating “a legal

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- a realita doma a v exilu*, p. 168 – see Footnote 42; HAVEL, Václav – JANOUCH, František: *Korespondence 1978–2001* [Correspondence 1978–2001]. Praha, Akropolis 2007, p. 234, Janouch’s March 1986 Letter to Havel.) As early as in March 1979, František Janouch wrote to Jiří Pelikán that “Franta [Kriegel] is indeed outraged by Zdeněk’s book and asks us to do something about it. His main argument is that Zdeněk speaks about the negotiations of the delegation in Moscow and thus in fact legalises the occupation.” (JANOUGH, František – PELIKÁN, Jiří: *Korespondence* [Correspondence]. Praha, Novela bohémica 2015, p. 136.)
- 53 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *Zákonnost a právní jistota občanů – podmínky normalizace našich poměrů* [Rule of Law and Legal Certainty of Citizens – Conditions of Normalisation of Our Situation]. In: *Rudé právo*, 10 September 1968, p. 3. The ambiguity of accents also characterised his TV and radio speech in September 1968: “However, you are fully entitled to require more from us now,” admitted Mlynář, conceding that “the most important question of today is hidden under the term ‘normalisation of the situation in Czechoslovakia.’” On the other hand, he expressed regret over activities of “irresponsible demagogues,” highlighting that “it is detrimental to look for a way other than strict compliance with the Moscow accords.” He prophetically concluded that “provoking a faction fight within the Communist Party would be tantamount to playing into the hand of those who underestimated the unity of people from the Party, who thought that the situation would open a way to times prior to January 1968 and perhaps even further back.” (Všichni spoluodpovídáme za další vývoj naší politiky: Z televizního a rozhlasového projevu člena předsednictva a tajemníka ÚV KSČ doc. Zdeňka Mlynáře [We Are All Responsible for the Future Development of Our Policy: An Excerpt from the TV and Radio Speech of Member of the Presidium and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Associate Professor Zdeněk Mlynář]. In: *Ibid.*, 15 September 1968, p. 5.) He also voiced similar thoughts in an interview for the *Mladá fronta* daily (O mládeži se Zdeňkem Mlynářem [About the Youth with Zdeněk Mlynář]. In: *Mladá fronta*, 28 September 1968, p. 1 n.).
- 54 VONDROVÁ, J. – NAVRÁTIL, J. (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Kapitulace*, pp. 203–211, here pp. 203 and 206, Document No. 177 – Notes Taken during the Discussion at the 98th Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on Personal Changes in the Leadership of the Party, 31 August 1968.

base for a hostile line of mass information media” among Czechoslovak leaders.⁵⁵ During Czechoslovak-Soviet negotiations in Moscow on 3 and 4 October 1968, the Soviet leader openly demanded Mlynář’s dismissal.⁵⁶ A request he repeated during a telephone conversation he later had with Alexander Dubček.⁵⁷ As Mlynář was increasingly convinced that the reformist political line no longer stood any chance, he repeatedly tried to explain to Dubček and other Party leaders that, under such circumstances, a more honest option was to resign,⁵⁸ but no one gave him an ear.⁵⁹ On 16 November 1968, the Central Committee finally accepted his request and Mlynář, by that time without a pinch of illusions, resigned his membership in the Presidium and position of Secretary of the Central Committee.⁶⁰ In September 1969, he was dismissed from the Central Committee and in March 1970 also from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia itself.⁶¹

55 IDEM (ed.): *Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize 1967–1970: Zář 1968–květen 1970*, pp. 77–110, here pp. 82 and 87, Document No. 190 – see Footnote 49.

56 The negotiations are summarised *Ibid.*, pp. 116–150, Documents No. 196.1–196.3. The matter of the harsh criticism was Mlynář’s alleged “wasteful use of hackneyed phrases” and “absence of a clear political line” (*Ibid.*, p. 126, Document No. 196.1 – Record of the Negotiations between the Delegation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with the Leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on “Issues of Mutual Interest,” Held in Moscow on 3 and 4 October and 8 October 1968; see also p. 145 n.).

57 The record of the telephone conversation between Brezhnev and Dubček on 5 November 1968 expressly mentions “the solution of Comrade Mlynář’s problem” and “cadre issues that have been agreed to” (*Ibid.*, pp. 168 and 170, Note 4, Document No. 208).

58 Mlynář clearly expressed his embarrassment during the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia held on 8 October 1968, when he refused to carry on with the “ostrich policy” and “to stick his head into sand,” because new requirements of Moscow were a “qualitatively new fact” and signalled that the reformist line had already been defeated: “I refuse to be involved in illusionist politics. [...] Let us admit to ourselves that politics means that one can lose from time to time, but it does not mean we should pull people’s legs. [...] I can no longer lie to people. [...] Let us tell them the truth!” (VONDROVÁ, J. – NAVRÁTIL, J. (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Kapitulace*, pp. 343–351, here pp. 344 and 349, Document No. 203 – Notes Taken during the Discussion at the 102nd Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Negotiations of the Delegations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Held in Moscow on 3 and 4 October and 8 October 1968.)

59 MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Mráz přichází z Kremle*, pp. 269–273.

60 Refer to Mlynář’s un-presented contribution (VONDROVÁ, J. – NAVRÁTIL, J. (ed.): *Komunistická strana Československa: Kapitulace*, pp. 616–619, Document No. 249 – Un-Presented Contribution of Zdeněk Mlynář, Prepared for the November Meeting of the Central Committees of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 17 November 1968).

61 Canadian historian Harold Gordon Skilling mentions the opinion of Petr Pithart of 1969 to the effect that Mlynář had, by that time, already accepted the idea of political pluralism (GORDON SKILLING, H.: *Československo – můj druhý domov: Paměti Kanadana* [Czechoslovakia – My Second Home: Memoirs of a Canadian]. Praha, Prostor 2001, p. 405). See also PITHART, P.: *Devětaosmdesátý*, p. 122 – see Footnote 17.

In his report dated 11 December 1968, the commentator of Radio Free Europe Fred Eidlin evaluated Mlynář's resignation as a clear signal of the failure of the "manoeuvring tops" policy:

"Although Zdeněk Mlynář's resignation of all his posts in the Party was not unexpected, it was one of the most ominous moments of the November Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

[...]

Nevertheless, after the visit of the delegation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to Moscow early in October, Mlynář's public appearances were increasingly rarer, although he had been one of the principal speakers of the Czechoslovak leadership before the visit.

[...]

During the weeks after the August congress, Mlynář was generally considered to be one of the fastest-rising men among Communist Party leaders. His speeches often created an impression that he belonged to those most willing to implement Soviet requirements in order to win the Soviets' trust. In this respect, he was frequently compared to Husák.

On the other hand, Mlynář was the principal author of the progressive *Action Programme of the Party* and was also closely associated with post-January 1968 reforms. Seen from today's perspective, it looks like the harshness of some of Mlynář's speeches may have been a tactical move. Although he was trying to pursue a 'realistic' line, this was probably where his willingness for a compromise ended.

It is quite likely that Mlynář came to the decision that, under the circumstances, he would not have been able to implement his ideas. If he had stayed in the leadership of the Party, he would have been regarded as co-responsible for the unpopular measures which had been adopted and which might have tarnished his reputation and threatened the chance he, aged 38, had – namely to return among the leaders of the Communist Party later and under more favourable circumstances.⁶²

"The Normalisation"

In the years that followed, Mlynář avoided political life entirely, working in the Entomological Department of the National Museum in Prague.⁶³ It was only later that he took over from Josef Smrkovský as head of former reformist Communists

62 EIDLIN, Fred: The November Plenum, 11 December 1968, p. 11 n. The text is available at <http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/19-3-151.shtml> (downloaded on 13 November 2011).

63 In the self-analytical text quoted above, he described his decision as an attempt "at a solution in the form of a 'thick line' after his recent role" (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 3). Mlynář's NA fund also contains a copy of his employment contract with the National Museum, dated 12 February 1969 (Part 3, k. 2), as well as copies of Mlynář's entomological publications (Part 2, k. 14) and entomological correspondence (Part 2, k. 7).

opposing the policy of Gustáv Husák.⁶⁴ Even in those days, he certainly had information from the horse's mouth, as indicated by a warning from Irena Dubská to historian Miloš Hájek in the late summer of 1971 to the effect that the State Security were monitoring his "group."⁶⁵ The secret police indeed noticed the increasing importance of his role and it was certainly no coincidence that they confiscated Mlynář's passport in the summer of 1973 (moreover, in 1970, he had not received a permission to take part in an entomological expedition to Iran).⁶⁶ At the end of 1973, he discovered a bug in his apartment. He immediately tried to contact the Federal Minister of the Interior Jaromír Obzina (and also sent a copy of his letter to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Gustáv Husák), and later also to Zdeněk Hrazdára, Chairman of the Czech Bar Association, with a request for "a personal meeting": "It would deal, in my opinion, with politically important issues concerning the use of security and repressive methods against former functionaries and members of the Party," Mlynář wrote. As a "man with long years of political experience," he purported to be able "to bring some fairly specific opinions and suggestions which might, with a bit of goodwill, help resolve some existing and future internal political problems."⁶⁷

As is well known, the establishment of a numerically strong group of Communists stripped of all offices and posts in the Party (and usually also of the membership) represented one of the principal centres of resistance against the policy of "normalisation."⁶⁸ As also indicated by the decision to send demoted Czechoslovak

64 He repeatedly described the situation as follows: "After the death of Josef Smrkovský [...] I, together with a few other members of the reformist leadership of the Party, took over the baton. Before his death, Smrkovský also wished that I, Jiří Hájek and Václav Slavík went on with his political opposition activities." (MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistou na volné noze*, p. 9 – see Footnote 6.)

65 HÁJEK, M.: *Paměť české levice*, p. 241 – see Footnote 17.

66 See Mlynář's appeal against the decision (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 2). Another attempt of the State Security to compromise him in his private life is indicated by Mlynář's untitled text quoted above (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 3).

67 See *Ibid.*, Part 1, k. 1, Mlynář's Letter to Jaromír Obzina, 21 December 1973, and Mlynář's Letter to Zdeněk Hrazdára, 30 January 1974; *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 2, Protocol of the Inspectorate of the Ministry of the Interior. The case involving a bug in Mlynář's apartment was used in the *Akce Krajan a Bříza* [Operations "Countryman" and "Birch"] episode of the *Tajné akce StB* [Secret Operations of the State Security] TV series (see <http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/porady/10209991308-tajne-akce-stb/409235100221021-akce-krajan-a-briza/?from=2050>, downloaded on 16 April 2013).

68 As for the consolidation of the socialist opposition and the harsh reaction of the communist government, see at least PELIKÁN, Jiří: *Qui Praga: Cinque anni dopo la primavera. L'opposizione socialista parla*. Rome, Coines edizioni 1973; CUHRA, Jaroslav: *Trestní represe odpůrců režimu v letech 1969–1979* [Criminal Repression of Opponents of the Regime between 1969 and 1979]. Praha, ÚSD AV ČR 1997; OTÁHAL, Milan: *Opozice, moc, společnost 1969–1989: Příspěvek k dějinám "normalizace"* [The Opposition, Power, Society 1969–1989: A Contribution to the History of the "Normalisation"]. Praha, Maxdorf 1994, pp. 11–48; and also a newer publication by IDEM: *Opoziční proudy v české společnosti 1969–1989* [Opposition Currents in the Czech Society 1969–1989]. (Česká společnost po roce 1945 [Czech Society after 1945]), Vol. 7. Praha, ÚSD AV ČR 2011, pp. 15–123.

TV Director Jiří Pelikán to the Czechoslovak Embassy in Rome, the group was trying to keep international attention paid to Czechoslovakia alive and, in particular, to develop “a parallel diplomacy” focusing primarily on contacts with the Communist Party of Italy, which had expressed its “profound disagreement with and condemnation of” the Soviet invasion.⁶⁹ Although the tactics brought fewer benefits than the ex-Communist opponents in Prague had expected, letters and requests were appearing one by one, especially on the pages of the Italian CP press (perhaps the best-known of these acts was the publication of an interview with Josef Smrkovský in the *Giorni – Vie nuove* weekly in 1971).⁷⁰ After a decline caused by Czechoslovak political trials in 1971 and 1972⁷¹ and the failure of contacts which Soviet authorities had established with Smrkovský (Smrkovský’s July 1973 letter to Leonid Brezhnev was allegedly attributable to these contacts),⁷² the initiatives of the group of the former reformist Communists were particularly intensive in 1974 and 1975 when its regular meetings became a “political salon” of sorts.⁷³

- 69 CACCAMO, Francesco: *Jiří Pelikán a jeho cesta socialismem 20. století* [Jiří Pelikán and His Journey through the Socialism of the 20th Century]. Brno – Praha, Supplement 2008, pp. 66–69. In his unpublished autobiographic notes, Luciano Antonetti, one of the key characters of relations between Czech and Italian Communists, confirms that it was mainly Pelikán who made documents of the Czechoslovak dissent available to Italian media. (ANTONETTI, Luciano: *Vivere all’ombra (della Cecoslovacchia, e non solo): Materiali per un’autobiografia*, p. 157; the unpublished manuscript was kindly provided by the author.)
- 70 Smrkovský ci parla del socialismo in Cecoslovacchia e invita alla pacificazione. In: *Giorni – Vie nuove*, Vol. 5, No. 22 (1971), pp. 13–19; the Czech translation of the interview was published in September 1971 under the title *Mluví Josef Smrkovský* [Josef Smrkovský Speaking] as a special edition of the *Listy* journal in Rome. The topic was also covered by Milan Otáhal in his book *Opoziční proudy v české společnosti 1969–1989*, pp. 24–26.
- 71 The changed tactics of the opposition was also known to the State Security (see *Ibid.*, pp. 74–76).
- 72 See NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář’s “Information on the Case of Josef Hodic,” p. 2. Jan Šling (the son of executed KSC functionary Otto Šling) wrote about Smrkovský’s strategy to Pelikán in September 1970; according to the letter, “Smrkovský sends a message to the effect that there could be a possibility of influencing the leaderships of western parties toward a so-called honourable settlement between us and Moscow.” In another letter, he added: “In my opinion, [Smrkovský] is aware of the situation and asks only for moral action. As to the request for an interview with Zanfognini, I will pass the message and let you know.” (ASCD, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 15, Correspondence 0015, Šling’s Letters to Pelikán, 2 and 8 September 1970.) The letters indicate that the interview with Smrkovský could be covered by Giancarlo Zanfognini, then a journalist working for the *Il resto del Carlino* daily. For a summary of the opposition tactics, see OTÁHAL, M.: *Opoziční proudy v české společnosti 1969–1989*, pp. 90–93.
- 73 See HÁJEK, M.: *Paměť české levice*, p. 245 – see Footnote 14. In this respect, Jiří Hájek mentioned several groups that were providing information to one another. One of them was concentrated “around Zdeněk Mlynář – it included some of the people who had attended the Vysočany Congress, including Jiřina Zelenková, Vladimír Kabrna, Jiří Judl, Miloš Hájek, Rudolf Slánský, and Zdeněk Jičínský. They were younger people, competent and educated.” (HÁJEK, Jiří: *Paměti* [Memoirs]. Praha, Ústav mezinárodních vztahů [Institute of International Relations] 1997, p. 313; see also OTÁHAL, M.: *Opoziční proudy v české společnosti 1969–1989*, pp. 82–90.)

Roughly at the same time, deposed reformist Communists sent a fairly high number of letters of protest both to the Czechoslovak authorities and to western Communist Parties,⁷⁴ starting with Smrkovský's "memoirs."⁷⁵ Alexander Dubček also joined the "campaign" by an open letter dated 28 December 1974 and addressed to the Federal Assembly and the Slovak National Council,⁷⁶ and another letter dated 29 March 1975 and addressed to leaders of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Polish United Workers' Party, and also the Communist Party of Italy.⁷⁷ However, in the Italian case the fate of the letter is somewhat shrouded in mystery; the central daily of the Italian Communists publicly denied that the leadership of the Party had received any such letter from Dubček.⁷⁸ Other sources, on

74 For a summary, see OTÁHAL, M.: *Opoziční proudy v české společnosti 1969–1989*, p. 93–111.

75 Le memorie di Smrkovský dettate prima di morire. In: *Giorni – Vie nuove*, Vol. 5, Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 11 (1975), unpagged; for the Czech text, see *Rozhovor Ondřeje Pitra s Josefem Smrkovským: Nedokončený rozhovor*, pp. 4–25. As to Smrkovský's role in the early 1970s, see also VRABEC, Václav: *Vybočil z řady: Medailón Josefa Smrkovského a doby, v níž žil* [He Did Not Toe the Line: A Portrait of Josef Smrkovský and His Times]. Praha, Naše vojsko 1991, pp. 164–174; as to relations between reformist Communists and Italy, see LOMELLINI, Valentine: *L'appuntamento mancato: La sinistra italiana e il Dissenso nei regimi comunisti 1968–1989*. Firenze, Le Monnier 2010, pp. 98–101.

76 Dubček žaluje [Dubček Accuses]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 5, No. 3 – Special Edition (April 1975); the text of Alexander Dubček's letter to the Federal Assembly and the Slovak National Council (pp. 4–16) was placed after an editorial (pp. 1–3). Refer also to the abridged Italian version published in the *l'Espresso weekly*: Alexander Dubcek accusa: Perché avete tradito. In: *l'Espresso*, Vol. 21, No. 16 (1975), pp. 46–53 (the unabridged letter was published in the Italian version of the *Listy* journal in June 1975, pp. 1–17). A customary reference to relations between Dubček and Italy is the article by Luciano Antonetti *Dubček e l'Italia*. In: DUBČEK, Alexander: *Il socialismo dal volto umano: Autobiografia di un rivoluzionario*. Roma, Riuniti 1996, pp. 329–350.

77 See BENCÍK, Antonín: *Utajovaná pravda o Alexandru Dubčekovi: Drama muže, který předběhl svou dobu* [The Secret Truth about Alexander Dubček: The Drama of a Man Who Outran His Times]. Praha, Ostrov 2001, pp. 78–80 (the text of the letter is published in: DUBČEK, Alexander: *Od totality k demokracii: Prejavy, články a rozhovory, výber 1963–1992* [From Totalitarianism to Democracy: Speeches, Articles and Interviews, Selection 1963–1992]. Ed. Jozef Žatkuliak – Ivan Láluha. Bratislava, Veda 2002, pp. 247–253). As to Dubček's numerous letters of protest, see also UHER, Ján: *Dubčekovy pookupačné protestné listy proti moci a jej zneužívaniu v rokoch 1969–1989* [Dubček's Post-Occupation Letters of Protest against Power and Its Misuse between 1969 and 1989]. In: *Cesty k novemburu 1989: Aktivity Alexandra Dubčeka. Zborník zo seminára pri príležitosti 10. výročia novembra 1989* [The Roads to November 1989: Activities of Alexander Dubček. A Collection of Presentations Delivered at the Seminar Organised on the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of November 1989]. Bratislava, Nová práca 2000, pp. 51–86 (printed text of the letter on pp. 145–152).

78 "Regarding the information printed in several newspapers and concerning a letter of Alexander Dubček to MP Enrico Berlinguer and a lengthy document on the situation in Czechoslovakia written by Zdeněk Mlynář, the Press Office of the Communist Party of Italy states that the documents have not been delivered to any member of the leadership of the Party." (Sulle notizie relative a una lettera di Dubcek. In: *l'Unità*, 7 June 1975, p. 13.) The term "lengthy document by Zdeněk Mlynář" refers to Mlynář's *Československý pokus o reformu 1968*.

the contrary, confirm they in fact had.⁷⁹ Although there was also an alleged Soviet attempt “to establish contacts in the same way as with Josef Smrkovský in 1973,”⁸⁰ the response of the official Czechoslovak authorities was adamant. They regarded these initiatives as efforts to denigrate the image of the already calm and placid situation in Czechoslovakia which Husák’s propaganda was serving to international audiences. In his May 1975 comments on the situation in Czechoslovakia intended for the Secretariat and the Foreign Department of the Communist Party of Italy, Luciano Antonetti aptly characterised the absurdness of the allegations: “Since mid-April, the attacks were aimed directly at Dubček and other opponents, all lumped together, by the way [...] alternately accused of being ‘right-wing opportunists,’ ‘revisionists,’ ‘deniers,’ ‘traitors,’ ‘fascists’ or almost fascists, ‘anti-Soviets,’ and thus ‘anti-Communists.’”⁸¹

The dismissed members of the Communist Party were trying to include the “Czechoslovak issue” in the agenda of the planned conference of European Communist Parties, which was to take place in 1975, but was finally held in June 1976 in Berlin.⁸² It is in this context that Zdeněk Mlynář’s attempt to offer, in the form of a structured memorandum (dated January to February 1975), an extensive analysis of the situation in Czechoslovakia, written “with the knowledge of and in consultations with A. Dubček and other dismissed members of the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.” The purpose was to initiate a discussion within the global Communist Movement (the document “was distributed to leaders of Communist Parties which were to attend the conference”).⁸³ The book titled *Československý pokus o reformu 1968: Analýza jeho teorie a praxe* [The Czechoslovak Attempt at Reform 1968: Analysis of its Theory and Practice] was published

79 In his unpublished autobiographic memoirs, Luciano Antonetti writes that Italian Communists indeed received the letter and that it was Dubček who did not want it published (ANTONETTI, L.: *Vivere all'ombra (della Cecoslovacchia, e non solo)*, pp. 93 and 140 – see Footnote 68). According to information then aired by Radio Free Europe, it was also confirmed by Secretary of the Communist Party of Spain Santiago Carrillo: “In an interview for *Le Nouvel Observateur* of 23 to 29 June, he believed that Dubček had indeed sent letters to Berlinguer and Honecker, and considered it ‘a correct step,’ adding: ‘During the conference, we will defend Comrade Dubček’s right to express his opinions freely in Prague.’” (DEVLIN, Kevin: *The International Communist Movement: A Tale of Two Conferences*, 18 July 1975, p. 11. The article is available at <http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/115-4-115.shtml>, downloaded on 13 November 2011.)

80 According to Mlynář, “the whole matter kept dragging on until the autumn of 1975” (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář’s “Information on the case of Josef Hodic,” p. 4).

81 *Biblioteca Roberto Ruffilli*, Forlì (hereafter BRR), f. Luciano Antonetti, 1. 4. Relazioni PCI-ČSR [Relations between the Communist Party of Italy and Czechoslovakia], 001, Comments on the situation in Czechoslovakia, 6 May 1975. See also Mlynář’s informative text of 1975 titled “Komunisté bez legitimace v Československu” [Communists without a Membership Card in Czechoslovakia], the Czech original of which is deposited in Mlynář’s NA fund (Part 1, k. 3), and Antonetti’s translation into Italian in the fund of Luciano Antonetti in Forlì (1. 4. Relazioni PCI-ČSR, 002, MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk).

82 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář’s “Information on the case of Josef Hodic,” p. 3.

83 *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.

immediately after the meeting by the exile Index Publishing House⁸⁴ in Cologne, and its subsequent Italian edition (probably translated by Luciano Antonetti), under a changed title translated as “Prague – An Open Issue,” and with a foreword by renowned mathematician and member of the leadership of the Communist Party of Italy Lucio Lombardo Radice. It can be ranked among Czechoslovak attempts aimed at influencing the attitudes of Euro-Communism.⁸⁵

After the adoption of the resolution on the “Anti-Party Actions of Dubček and Other Persons”⁸⁶ by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on 18 April 1975, adopted as a direct consequence of the manuscript in question having been sent to the Central Committee, the editorial board of the *Tvorba* journal and Orbis Publishing House,⁸⁷ the State Security searched Mlynář’s apartment. They did so five days later, on 23 April.⁸⁸ The “Statement on Documents Written by Alexander Dubček, Václav Havel and Zdeněk Mlynář,” which was prepared by the Ministry of the Interior and the Office of the Attorney General,⁸⁹ bears the same date. At the end of 1975, the State Security also organised a larger operation the purpose of which was to uncover the so-called Mlynář’s group in the region of Varnsdorf, where Mlynář, thanks to contacts with his former secondary schoolmate Jan Pospíšil, was allegedly disseminating “harmful literature.” A proposal for a further course of action of February 1976 says that Mlynář “has initiated a recent intensification of publication activities of remaining right-wing opportunists in order to create the impression of a broad

84 As to circumstances accompanying the creation of the text, see also CACCAMO, F.: *Jiří Pelikán a jeho cesta socialismem 20. století*, pp. 52–55 – see Footnote 68. However, some people in Czechoslovakia viewed Mlynář’s memorandum very negatively, as a “plea of a ‘loyal Communist’ to Brezhnev” (GORDON SKILLING, H.: *Československo – můj druhý domov*, p. 422 – see Footnote 60).

85 The Italian translation was published without the opening part: MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *Praga – questione aperta: Il '68 cecoslovacco fra giudizio storico e prospettive future*. Bari, De Donato 1976. Regarding the Italian edition, see also documents deposited in Antonetti’s fund, for instance Mlynář’s contract with the publishing house or his letters.

86 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 2, Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 18 April 1975.

87 Copies of Mlynář’s accompanying letters to these institutions are deposited in the very same place.

88 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 13, and Part 3, k. 2, “House Search Protocol” and “House Search Evaluation.” Some confiscated documents were returned to Mlynář on 29 October 1976 (see *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 13, “Ruling”).

89 According to the statement, Mlynář was expressing himself “more cautiously,” which was why “it is not yet possible to conclude with certainty [...] that the contents of the documents constitute a criminal act” (Stanovisko orgánů politické moci [Position Statement of Political Power Authorities]). In: MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistou na volné noze*, p. 18 n. – see Footnote 6). See also Mlynář’s lengthy letter to the Minister of the Interior Jaromír Obzina of February 1976, with a rejection of summons to Bartolomějská Street No. 7 “for the purpose of official proceedings” (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 2, Mlynář’s Letter to Obzina dated 15 February 1976).

opposition.”⁹⁰ However, Mlynář also received sympathetic support from several Czech intellectuals who founded Charter 77 soon thereafter – in March 1976, an appeal signed, for instance, by Václav Havel, Karel Kosík, Jan Patočka and Ludvík Vaculík was released. It demanded public discussion on the principles and propositions contained in Mlynář’s confiscated book in Czechoslovakia.⁹¹ Mlynář’s open letter of February 1976 to European Communist Parties,⁹² the purpose of which was to influence the abovementioned international conference in Berlin,⁹³ also fits into this framework.

90 A copy of the file that the State Security kept on Zdeněk Mlynář, codenamed “Countryman” and dating back to 1975, can be found in Mlynář’s NA fund (Part 3, k. 2).

91 The text dated 24 March 1976 was later published by Mlynář himself (*Výzva opozičních intelektuálů z 24. března 1976* [An Appeal of Opposition Intellectuals of 24 March 1976]. In: MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistou na volné noze*, p. 19 n.); a copy can be found in Mlynář’s NA fund (Part 3, k. 2). Numerous dissent initiatives in those months were also watched with interest by the exile community, as indicated by *Knihá Charty* [The Charter Book] compiled by Vilém Prečan: see, for instance, *Výzva čtrnácti bývalých členů ÚV KSČ – Propustit politické vězně*, 20. 1. 1976 [Appeal of 14 Ex-Members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia: Release Political Prisoners, 20 January 1976]. In: PREČAN, Vilém (ed.): *Knihá Charty: Hlasy z domova 1976/77* [The Charter Book: Voices from Home 1976/77]. Cologne – Rome, Index – Listy 1977, p. 30 n.; *Dopis sedmi bývalých členů ÚV KSČ konferenci komunistických a dělnických stran Evropy v Berlíně*, 25. 6. 1976 [Letter of Seven Ex-Members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to the Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties in Berlin, 25 June 1976]. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 40–42; *Otevřený dopis Zdeňka Mlynáře politickým činitelům odpovědným za zákonnost v ČSSR*, 8. 9. 1976 [Open Letter of Zdeněk Mlynář to Political Authorities Responsible for Law and Order in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, 8 September 1976]. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 50–56; *Otevřený dopis deseti právních odborníků ústavním orgánům ČSSR ve věci mladých hudebníků odsouzených v Plzni a v Praze pro údajné výtržnictví k omdnutí svobody*, 6. 11. 1976 [Open Letter of 10 Legal Experts to Constitutional Bodies of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Regarding the Case of Young Musicians Sentenced to Prison in Prague and Plzeň for Alleged Disorderly Conduct, 6 November 1976]. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 78–86; *Prohlášení čtyř bývalých členů ÚV KSČ k propuštění některých politických vězňů v Československu*, 14. 12. 1976 [Statement of Four Ex-Members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Release of Some Political Prisoners in Czechoslovakia]. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 87 n.

92 Una lettera di Zdenek Mlynar a PC a PS d’Europa occidentale. In: *l’Unità*, 11 April 1976, p. 19. A less abridged version was also reprinted by *La città futura*, the weekly of the Italian Communist Youth Federation. The original Czech text was published in *Listy* (MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *Otevřený dopis komunistům a socialistům Evropy* [Open Letter to Communists and Socialists of Europe]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (June 1976), pp. 41–45). In addition, the archives of Luciano Antonetti contain a translation of Mlynář’s previous open letter dated 17 September 1975 and “delivered by a young Czechoslovak who introduced himself as a ‘messenger of common friends’” (*BBR*, f. Luciano Antonetti, 1.4 Relazioni PCI–ČSR, 001, Antonetti’s Letter to Giuseppe Damo of 13 October 1975).

93 See also the open letter of seven ex-members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (including Mlynář) who were active during the Prague Spring, dated 25 June 1976: *Ex-dirigenti del PC cecoslovacco scrivono alla conferenza di Berlino*. In: *l’Unità*, 30 June 1976, p. 14. Regarding the context of the participation of Italian Communists in the conference, see PONS, Silvio: *Berlinguer a la fine del comunismo*. Torino,

Also probable is Mlynář's participation in an important attempt to create a common platform of communist outcasts, namely a document titled "Notes on the Situation and Outlooks of the Opposition in 1975," which analysed "certain tendencies the future development of which should be rationally considered and evaluated both at home and abroad." The authors wanted the document to "break through the wall of fear"; they admitted that "since 1970, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has been a qualitatively new organism, more than any other time before," and concluded that domestic and international factors had allowed, "for the first time ever, the existence of an opposition against the regime in the form of a numerically strong and politically experienced group of Communists." In their opinion, the opposition was to focus – also by pointing at discrepancies between common political practices and "generally democratic and officially recognised principles (e.g. the principles of Helsinki)" – on current tendencies of Communist Parties of Western Europe and to accept a "democratic Marxist programme." It was also supposed to resolutely advance "from the 'policy of shouts' to a policy of creating and submitting realistic alternatives of solutions of various domestic policy issues." Just as there were two literatures and two cultures, the authors of the document believed there ought to be "also two social sciences and analytical socio-political productions. Publication options would also be analogous (samizdat or abroad)." However, the platform needed substantial help from West European Communists and political émigrés to become "political opposition."⁹⁴

The appeal elicited a broad discussion among the Czechoslovak socialist opposition abroad; some authors commented on it and the *Listy*⁹⁵ group prepared a "Response to 'Notes on the Situation and Outlooks of the Opposition,'" which was sent to Prague a few months later, when Mlynář's book *Československý pokus o reformu 1968* and other opposition documents had already become known. The "Response" interpreted the "Notes" as a "significant step forward in the search for a realistic opposition base in current circumstances." The authors of the *Listy* group noted the development of the "parallel political culture" and "new quality" of activities of the political opposition, based on "democratic socialism." In addition, they appreciated the fact that "the possibilities offered by the Helsinki Declaration

Einaudi 2006, pp. 84–89. Similar letters of former Prague Spring leaders to Italian Communists enjoyed a lot of publicity in Italy; see Lettera al PCI di esponenti del "nuovo corso" cecoslovacco. In: *l'Unità*, 18 June 1976, p. 15; LOMELLINI, V.: *L'appuntamento mancato*, p. 101 – see Footnote 74.

94 ASCD, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 4, "Notes on the Situation and Outlooks of the Opposition in 1975."

95 As to the *Listy* group, see RAŠKA, Francis D.: *The Long Road to Victory: A History of Czechoslovak Exile Organizations after 1968*. New York, Columbia University Press 2012; CACCA-MO, Francesco: Mezi exilem, domácí opozicí a mezinárodním veřejným míněním. Exilový časopis *Listy* [Among the Exile, Domestic Opposition, and International Public Opinion. The Exile Journal *Listy*]. In: *Soudobé dějiny*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2013), pp. 345–378.

as a tool for criticising the regime and as a means of an immunisation of sorts from the criticism have been recognised at home.”⁹⁶

It is indeed a text which presages different aspects of the future development of opposition activities in Czechoslovakia. As seen from letters sent by Zdeněk Hejzlar, Director of Czechoslovak Radio in 1968, from his exile in Sweden to Jiří Pelikán, the birth of the “comprehensive response” referred to the above was a long and difficult process and, moreover, there was general expectation of a “repressive strike” that was supposed to ensure that “Social Democratic governments will make an offer of asylum to those affected by it” (which indeed happened a year later).⁹⁷ According to information he received from home, another lengthy (and untitled) text of Mlynář⁹⁸ “contains the outcome of a certain reconciliation of moderate (Mlynář, etc.) and more radical (F. Kriegel, etc.) opinions.”⁹⁹ As indicated by efforts to establish new communication links with home, part of the group of political émigrés concentrated around the *Listy* journal pinned a lot of hope on the formation of the new platform, which remains almost unnoticed by historical research into opposition activities taking place in those times.

96 ASCD, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 4, “Response to ‘Notes on the Situation and Outlooks of the Opposition.’” The fund also contains other related documents, including “Draft Response to ‘Notes on the Situation and Outlooks of the Opposition.’” Expert opinions on different aspects of the “Notes”: see, for instance, “Comments on the Issue of Czechoslovakia in 1975” by an unnamed author, who emigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany in March 1976 and whose text openly criticised the optimism of Mlynář and people around him who “know about Russian pressure on part of the leadership aiming at eliminating the most blatant consequences of the ‘normalisation’” (*Ibid.*), or “Comments on the Prague Notes” by Vladimír Horský (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 14); see also CACCAMO, F.: *Jiří Pelikán a jeho cesta socialismem 20. století*, p. 53 n. – see Footnote 65, and Pelikán’s letter to Havlíček dated 4 April 1976, in PELIKÁN, Jiří – HAVLÍČEK, Dušan: *Psáno z Říma, psáno ze Ženevy. Korespondence 1969–1989* [Written from Rome, Written from Geneva. Correspondence 1969–1989]. Olomouc, Burian a Tichák 2013, p. 110.

97 On 9 August 1976, Hejzlar wrote to Pelikán: “Too many people are planning to go out and all of them generally expect that finding a place for them here does not pose much of a problem.” (ASCD, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 16, Correspondence, 0025.)

98 It is probably the text then published in the *L’76* magazine: MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Zur Begründung sozialistischer Demokratie: Das Aktionsprogramm der KPT aus dem Jahr 1968 und die europäische kommunistische Bewegung. In: *L’76*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1976), pp. 12–32. The text was translated into German by Adolf Müller, as indicated in his letter to Pelikán dated 10 July 1976 (ASCD, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 16, Correspondence, 0027).

99 See *Ibid.*, Correspondence, 0025, Hejzlar’s Letter to Pelikán, 11 June 1976; see also Hejzlar’s Letters to Pelikán, 3 March and 9 July 1976. See also Pelikán’s Letter to František Janouch dated 26 October 1976, containing a description of the situation in Czechoslovakia based on talks with Prečan, Kaplan and Reiman: the three main streams could be personified by Dubček, Mlynář and Kriegel (and it seemed that the second and third persons named above “could reach an agreement”). JANOUCH, František – PELIKÁN, Jiří: *Korespondence* – see Footnote 51.

Charter 77

It seems that the failure of all attempts to achieve an agreement of sorts with Husák's regime together with the end of secret negotiations with Soviet political high-ups (Mlynář proposed "M. S. Gorbachev, whom I studied with at the Faculty of Law in Moscow with for five years" as their partner even then, and also suggested that "the talks should take place in Moscow")¹⁰⁰ made a numerous group of former reformist Communists (including Mlynář) question the possibility of reforming the system then existing in Czechoslovakia from inside. As early as 1975, in an interview for Swedish TV, Jiří Hájek and Zdeněk Mlynář highlighted that "the Helsinki Accords in fact represent the recognition of what is common for Europe," at the same time noting that "the existence of elements that are contrary to European civilisation and its cultural base is out of line with the spirit and meaning of the Helsinki Conference."¹⁰¹ It is in this context that Mlynář's open letter dated 8 September 1976 and concerning the case of The Plastic People of the Universe, in which he protested against attempts to intimidate the youth and vigorously defended "a group of young people whose only crime is they were composing, singing and playing music and lyrics that went against the grain of various official authorities and administrators of culture and politics," should be interpreted. The letter analysed "both general social [...] and specific historical causes" which make young people "want to run away from the society, to build their own community outside the official one, a community free of what one perceives as the falsehood and lies of official social structures."¹⁰²

According to Mlynář, the protest actions and personal contacts in September 1976 resulted in "different ideological and political orientations, hitherto basically isolated" becoming closer; in November, the first "concrete proposal for a joint

100 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář's "Information on the Case of Josef Hodic," p. 4.

101 Hovoří Z. Mlynář a J. Hájek [Z. Mlynář and J. Hájek Speaking]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 5, No. 7 (December 1975), pp. 13–17 (here p. 16). The "invitation" for the interview was Mlynář's idea (see HÁJEK, J.: *Paměti*, p. 314 – see Footnote 69).

102 MLYNÁŘ, Z.: Proti falši a lži: Otevřený dopis politickým činitelům, odpovědným za zákonost v ČSSR. [Against Falsehood and Lies: An Open Letter of Zdeněk Mlynář to Political Authorities Responsible for Law and Order in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 6, No. 6 (1976), pp. 5–7; see also Una lettera di Mlynar sui problemi dei giovani. In: *l'Unità*, 15 September 1976, p. 14. For the context of Mlynář's letter and other initiatives of intellectuals in support of the musicians, see GORDON SKILLING, H.: *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*. London, Allen & Unwin 1981, pp. 9–11. In addition, the Italian *l'Unità* daily was closely watching the case and subsequently printed a number of additional shorter articles dealing with it. Antonetti's archives contain "a long and detailed account of the trial of four of 19 young musicians, poets and singers, members of The Plastic People of the Universe and of the DG 307 bands, who had been arrested in March and accused of being anti-social elements, parasites, drug addicts, alcoholics, perverts, public order disturbers, and repeated offenders, which took place 21 to 23 September 1976 in Prague," dated 8 November 1976. (BBR, f. Luciano Antonetti, 1.4 Relazioni PCI-ČSR, 001.)

protest”¹⁰³ was born. In a document concerning the “case of Josef Hodic” (in the summer of 1981, he disappeared from Vienna and reappeared in Prague as an agent of the Czechoslovak intelligence) and sent to other representatives of the socialist opposition in exile in July 1981, he later wrote that “after the conference of Communist Parties in Berlin in 1976, the political orientation of the opposition group of former KSC functionaries, where I held a leading position, changed. We came to the conclusion that there were no prospects for our cause without ‘pressure from below’ against Husák’s regime, and we thus sought a connection with other, non-communist groups of the opposition movement. At the end of 1976, the reorientation resulted in creating Charter 77; J. Hájek became its spokesman on behalf of the group of former Communists.”¹⁰⁴

This may also be a reason for explaining the participation of a substantial part of reformist Communists expelled from the Party after 1968 in the non-socialist platform demanding observance of human rights, i.e. Charter 77.¹⁰⁵ Insofar as the important role of Zdeněk Mlynář, who was also, *inter alia*, one of the sharpest commentators on difficulties during the initial months of Charter 77’s¹⁰⁶ existence, it is perhaps appropriate to mention the the following words of Václav Havel:

103 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 1, k. 3, Mlynář’s Study Titled *Ideologické a politické směry uvnitř hnutí za občanská práva v současném Československu* [Ideological and Political Directions within the Civil Rights Movement in Today’s Czechoslovakia], p. 28 n.

104 *Ibid.*, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář’s “Information on the Case of Josef Hodic,” p. 4.

105 See also Mlynář’s “Statement on the Situation in Czechoslovakia,” dated 16 January 1977, one day after Pavel Kohout’s, which he addressed to “democratic public opinion and democratic governments,” “European Communists” and “European Socialists,” asking them to help find a solution to the situation. (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 10, Statement on the Situation in Czechoslovakia.) The appeal was also published in Italian: Arresto in Cecoslovacchia di quattro intellettuali che firmarono la “Charta 77.” In: *l’Unità*, 19 January 1977, p. 12. Antonetti’s Italian translations of Kohout’s and Mlynář’s appeals are kept in his fund (BBR, f. Luciano Antonetti, 1.4 Relazioni PCI-ČSR, 002). On 23 January 1977, Antonetti also wrote a letter addressed to Antonio Rubbi, Head of the International Department of the Communist Party of Italy, in which he conveyed requirements of the Czechoslovak socialist opposition: “[...] in addition, a request was presented (it seems that by Mlynář) whether it would be possible to notify them of the response of our Party, if any, to their appeals,” and “whether it would be possible – just like other newspapers do – to call a local comrade from Rome and ask him for information or an interview.” (*Ibid.*, Antonetti’s Letter to Rubbi, 23 January 1977.)

106 Mlynář provided perhaps his most detailed account of the evolution of the opposition activities shortly after his emigration, in a university publication titled *Ideologische und politische Richtungen innerhalb der Bürgerrechtsbewegung in der heutigen Tschechoslowakei*. (Sonderveröffentlichung des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien.) (Köln/R., b.n. 1978). The Czech original, *Ideologické a politické směry uvnitř hnutí za občanská práva v současném Československu* [Ideological and Political Directions within the Civil Rights Movement in Today’s Czechoslovakia], is deposited in Mlynář’s NA fund, Part 1, k. 3. See also numerous articles in Czechoslovak exile press: MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: První bilance Charty 77 [The First Results of Charter 77]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (July 1977), pp. 1–9; IDEM: Exkomunisté a křesťané v Chartě 77 [Ex-Communists and Christians in Charter 77]. In: *Studie*, No. 60 (1978), pp. 414–427 (the article was also

“The community of former KSČ functionaries around Zdeněk Mlynář had discussed the possibility of establishing a human rights committee or a Helsinki committee, similar to those founded in the Soviet Union, even earlier.

[...]

My nervousness was increased by the fact that the meeting had been scheduled to take place at four o'clock, but Zdeněk Mlynář, who was to bring signatures collected by several collectors among the ex-KSČ community, did not turn up, although it was close to five. However, he finally arrived (it turned out we had misunderstood each other as to the arrangements), bringing more than 100 signatures, which pulled my breath away. All in all, we had 243 signatures, the police did not appear, we dealt with the relevant agenda, and our small group had a toast of champagne.

[...]

Making this step was not easy for many non-Communists, but also for many Communists: the stepping out toward life and the true general state of mind, out of one's own shadow, was paid for by the necessity to give up the 'leading role' principle forever. It is true that many former Communists probably would not have defended it expressly, but it was undoubtedly still present in their blood or minds. Zdeněk Mlynář deserved a lot of credit for recognising, thanks to his fine political sense, the urgency of the step and for convincing people around him, thanks to the weight of his authority, to do so.”¹⁰⁷

The participation of reformist Communists in the inception of Charter 77 not only played a crucial role in the creation of the movement, but also was the moment that convinced many of them of the impossibility of implementing reforms from the top, although they still regarded western Communist Parties as their principal reference framework.¹⁰⁸ The support for Charter 77 voiced by some Italian

published in Mlynář's work *Socialistou na volné noze*, pp. 43–54); IDEM: Místo disidentů na politické mapě dneška [The Place of Dissidents on Today's Political Map]. In: HAVEL, V. (ed.): *O svobodě a moci*, pp. 227–256 – see Footnote 3.

107 HAVEL, Václav: Dálkový výslech: Rozhovor s Karlem Hvižďalou [Long-Distance Interrogation: An Interview with Karel Hvižďala]. In: IDEM: *Spisy* [Collected Works], Vol. 4: *Eseje a jiné texty z let 1970–1989. Dálkový výslech* [Essays and Other Texts from the Years 1970–1989. Long-Distance Interrogation]. Ed. Jan Šulc, Praha, Torst 1999, pp. 699–917, here pp. 837 and 841–843. According to Mlynář, Havel was the principal author of the text; he himself professed to be the author of the “section dealing with the role of the Communist Party, and also the section on the nature of Charter 77 as an informal civic initiative without any fixed organisational structures.” (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 1, k. 3, MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Ideologické a politické směry uvnitř hnutí za občanská práva v současném Československu* [Ideological and Political Directions within the Civil Rights Movement in Today's Czechoslovakia], p. 29.)

108 GORDON SKILLING, H.: *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*, pp. 44–47 – see Footnote 101. Shortly thereafter, Petr Pithart, one of the prominent personages of the nascent dissident movement, characterises efforts of reformist Communists as pure “illusions of reformists in his monograph on 1968, published under the pen name of Josef Sládeček in Cologne. Pithart regarded Mlynář's book of 1975 as an attempt to present Moscow's policy as “something understandable, even excusable,” in order to initiate a dialogue, first with “a vaguely defined and only presumed group of more enlightened politicians-ideologues

intellectuals and politicians is, after all, a well-known fact, and a report on international responses to Charter 77, prepared for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia dated 3 February 1977, even pointed out that “the leadership of the Communist Party of Italy is not only quite openly engaged in support for Charter 77, but also involves other organisations under the Party’s control or influence, such as trade unions or even twin towns.” The authors of the text were concerned about the public statement of six Italian intellectuals¹⁰⁹ and labelled the attitude of the Italian Communist Party leadership “cynical” (in this respect, they quoted, very suspiciously, a review of Mlynář’s book *Praga – questione aperta*, which was published in the *Rinascita* weekly).¹¹⁰ Another part of the report stressed that how the General Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party Bettino Craxi replied to “dear comrade Mlynář” saying that Italian Socialists would protest against the persecution of Charter 77 signatories.¹¹¹

The difficult period after the harsh repressions against Charter 77 by the regime¹¹² could be overcome only thanks to the assistance of other signatories – a “caucus” of sorts, the members of which were Zdeněk Mlynář, František Kriegel, Pavel Kohout, Ludvík Vaculík, Petr Uhl, Jan Vladislav, Pavel Landovský and many others.¹¹³ When a very harsh article accusing Mlynář, on the basis of an authentic letter, of

of the Eastern Bloc,” and later with European Communists. (PITHART, Petr: *Osmádesátý* [1968]. Praha, Rozmluvy 1990, pp. 207–210.)

109 Dichiarazione di intellettuali comunisti sulla Cecoslovacchia. In: *l’Unità*, 13 January 1977, p. 1. See also Mlynář’s interview in the daily of the Italian Socialist Party: Che cosa vogliamo con “Charta 77.” In: *Avanti*, 3 April 1977, p. 3.

110 See Footnote 84.

111 CÍSAŘOVSKÁ, Blanka – PREČAN, Vilém (ed.): *Charta 77: Dokumenty 1977–1989* [Charter 77: Documents 1977–1989], Vol. 3: *Přílohy* [Annexes]. Praha, ÚSD AV ČR, 2007, pp. 183–195, P8/3 – Comprehensive Report on International Reactions to and Activities of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Connection with Charter 77, Submitted by Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Vasil Biľak for a Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; see also BLAŽEK, Petr (ed.): “*Tentokrát to bouchne*”: *Edice dokumentů k organizaci a ohlasům kampaně proti signatářům Charty 77 (leden–únor 1977)* [“This Time It Will Explode”: An Edition of Documents on the Organisation of and Reactions to the Campaign against the Signatories of Charter 77 (January–February 1977)]. Praha, Filozofická fakulta Univerzity Karlovy [Faculty of Arts of Charles University] – Archiv bezpečnostních složek Ministerstva vnitra ČR [Security Services Archive of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic] 2007. In his reply to Mlynář dated 27 January 1977, General Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party Bettino Craxi protested against the persecution of the signatories of Charter 77 and proposed a “joint action of leftist and all democratic forces in Italy and Europe” (Charta 77 ve světě [Charter 77 in the World]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May 1977), pp. 31–38, here p. 33).

112 Mlynář, for instance, lost his job; he published a letter announcing the termination of his employment contract with the National Museum in his book *Socialistou na volné noze* (p. 240 n.), and it has also been preserved in Mlynář’s NA fund (Part 3, k. 2).

113 HÁJEK, J.: *Paměti*, p. 319 – see Footnote 72.

being a squealer in the 1950s appeared in the *Rudé právo* daily,¹¹⁴ Mlynář lost the last vestiges of any illusions that the situation might ever improve. On the same day, 1 March 1977, he accepted the offer of political exile which Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky had earlier made to Czech dissidents,¹¹⁵ and left Czechoslovakia in June 1977.¹¹⁶ (It is interesting to note that Mlynář wrote a letter to Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito on 30 January 1977, in which he indicated that his emigration to Austria could be politically misused and that he had been given until 4 February to think things over. He also asked whether it would be possible for him to “leave Czechoslovakia not for a capitalist country, but for Yugoslavia,” as this possibility had been indicated by Yugoslav diplomats he had known as early as 1969.)¹¹⁷

Before his departure, he addressed a text titled “Conditions and Foreseeable Outlooks of Marxist Opposition in Czechoslovakia (Principles)” to former reformist Communists, in which he, rather heretically, very clearly defined “ideological schemes preventing the Marxist opposition from stepping over the limits which need to be stepped over.” Generationally, most of the expelled Communists could play a decisive political role only “until 1980.” However, the fundamental change did not come so early, which is why it is “necessary to firmly integrate the Marxist opposition into the general democratic stream of pressure on the system from ‘the bottom up.’” To make this happen, the Marxist opposition has to “focus on a democratisation of the system” and “a concept of political and human rights (model: Charter 77) must be interpreted not as tactics leading to a limitation of the objective once it has been achieved, but as a way out of the situation.” This would obviously mean stepping beyond the “the policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia officially formulated in 1968,” one of the reasons being that it would “no longer be possible to obtain a majority consensus for the concept of the ‘leading role of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,’ like in 1968,” even at the expense of the Marxist opposition being “unable to rely on becoming the party that would win

114 OBORSKÝ, Stanislav: Práskač: O mistrovi v převlékání kabátu [The Squealer: On a Master Turncoat]. In: *Rudé právo*, 1 March 1977, p. 2. Mlynář himself re-published this article, together with his column reacting to it by using the words squealing, blackmailing and other motives of the forthcoming spring, and a letter that Jan Patočka wrote to him in connection with the article, in his book *Socialistou na volné noze* (pp. 71–78).

115 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář’s “Information on the Case of Josef Hodic,” p. 6. A week later, Mlynář wrote to Kreisky that he had got an offer to emigrate from Czechoslovak authorities as early as on 28 January 1977, but he had refused to do so at the time. However, as he was subsequently placed under house arrest, he decided to accept the offer, and asked to be allowed to work as an entomologist in Vienna. (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Mlynář’s Letter to Bruno Kreisky, 8 March 1977.)

116 Mlynář was allowed to take his personal belongings and his library with him (see *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 3, “List of Items Exported to Austria through Čechofracht”; Part 4, k. 18, “List of Books Exported from Czechoslovakia upon Relocation to Austria”). He was divested of Czechoslovak citizenship only on 21 July 1977, one of the reasons being that “he published a pamphlet titled ‘The White Paper’ in London.” (*Ibid.*, Part 3, k. 2.) He got Austrian citizenship only on 28 November 1979 (*Ibid.*).

117 *Ibid.*, Part 1, k. 3, Mlynář’s Letter to Josip Broz Tito, 30 January 1977.

decisive power positions by democratic means.”¹¹⁸ It is interesting to note that this “political testament” of Mlynář also appeared in the sights of the State Security; however, in their opinion it did not unify the opposition, but divided them into “those for whom Mlynář is an authority and those who look at these principles with a critical eye.”¹¹⁹

In Exile

By coincidence, Mlynář arrived in Vienna at the very moment as the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Vasil Biľak, who was there on a state visit. Interestingly enough Chancellor Kreisky received Mlynář early in the morning to meet him before Biľak.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, contacts with left-wing western politicians during his time in exile were sometimes a disappointment for Mlynář.

At that time, he pinned great hopes in the dialogue with Italian Communists and Socialists.¹²¹ As a matter of fact, it was the reaction to subsequent developments in Eastern Europe – as confirmed by the so-called “Biennale of Dissent” held in Venice in the winter of 1977/1978¹²² – a definitive turning point in the attitudes of Italy’s

118 *Ibid.*, Part 3, k. 4 (the author published part of the text in his book *Socialistou na volné noze*, pp. 35 – 41). A few years later, in an article for the samizdat *Lidové noviny* periodical, he wrote that “the so-called ‘party of the expelled’ ceased to be an influential political power sometimes in the mid-1970s.” (MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Jsem socialista na volné noze [I Am a Freelance Socialist]. In: *Lidové noviny*, No. 11 (1988), p. 4 n.)

119 Quoted according to: OTÁHAL, M.: *Opoziční proudy v české společnosti 1968–1989*, p. 219 n. – see Footnote 268.

120 See JANÝR, Přemysl: Ohlas Charty 77 v Rakousku [Reactions to Charter 77 in Austria]. In: CÍSAŘOVSKÁ, Blanka – DRÁPALA, Milan – PREČAN, Vilém – VANČURA, Jiří (ed.): *Charta 77 očima současníků: Po dvaceti letech* [Charter 77 in the Eyes of Contemporaries: 20 Years Later]. Brno, Doplněk 1997, pp. 67–72, particularly p. 70.

121 The first press conference of Mlynář in exile took place on 16 June 1977 in Vienna (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 1, k. 3). His emigration elicited many reactions in Italian media: see, for instance, Zdenek Mlynar lascia la Cecoslovacchia. In: *l’Unità*, 14 June 1977, p. 14; see Dubček diceva: Sparo anch’io. In: *l’Espresso*, Vol. 23, No. 30 (1977), p. 41 (an interview with Mlynář); also see Zdeněk Mlynář na Západě [Zdeněk Mlynář in the West]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 7, No. 5 (October 1977), p. 17; MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: An interview for *l’Espresso*. 30 July 1977. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 17–19. The texts are also deposited in Mlynář’s NA fund (Part 2, k. 36).

122 Mlynář ultimately did not appear at the event in order to be able to finish his book, as he wrote to Irena Dubská: “Of course, I will not come to Venice, although there will be some unpleasant consequences, but there is nothing that can be done about it.” (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 3, Mlynář’s Letter to Dubská, 30 October 1977.) The biennale in Venice is also covered in correspondence with Jiří Pelikán (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 6). Mlynář’s NA fund also contains an interesting proposal of two unrealised seminars on the political role of culture and the relation of culture and society in countries built on a Soviet model, which Mlynář wanted to organise (*Ibid.*, Part 1, k. 3, a text with a handwritten title “A Proposal for Venice (Biennale)”).

two largest left-wing parties in favour of the dissident movement.¹²³ In March 1977, the editorial board of the *L'76* magazine, consisting of the writers Heinrich Böll and Günter Grass and the journalist Carola Stern, handed over Mlynář's text on Charter 77 and the political situation in Czechoslovakia addressed to the General Secretary of Italian Communists, Enrico Berlinguer, and to Lucio Lombardo Radice.¹²⁴ However, Mlynář's subsequent attempt to arrange a meeting with Berlinguer was – unlike his meeting with the General Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party Bettino Craxi – unsuccessful, and the best-known Czechoslovak Communist dissident-in-exile was received only by Adalberto Minucci, a member of the leadership of the Party and editor-in-chief of the *Rinascita* weekly.¹²⁵ The failure of the attempt, indeed a “cold shower”¹²⁶ for the entire Czechoslovak socialist opposition, was partly a result of pressure exerted by Moscow on the just forming Euro-Communism. In any case, it charted a precise boundary in relations between the leadership of the Communist Party of Italy and Czechoslovak dissidents, who continued to be present on pages of the Italian CP's media, but were never recognised as a fully-fledged political partner.¹²⁷ On the other hand, Craxi unequivocally highlighted,

123 See LOMELLINI, V.: *L'appuntamento mancato*, pp. 115–122 – see Footnote 74. See also the reluctant letter of Jiří Pelikán dated 5 June 1977 and addressed to Head of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of Italy Sergio Segre, which concerned Mlynář's arrival in Vienna and the attitude of Italian Communists to Mlynář (PELIKÁN, Jiří: *Io, esule indigesto: Il Pci e la lezione del '68 a Praga*. Milano, Antonio Carloti 1998, p. 124 n.).

124 The title of the text can be translated as “The Political Situation around Charter 77: An Attempt at a Recap of January 1977” (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 4), an Italian summary of which was prepared by Luciano Antonetti (*BBR*, f. Luciano Antonetti, 1.4 Relazioni PCI-ČSR, 002, The Political Situation and Charter 77: The First Recap of January 1977). It was probably this text which Ota Šik wrote to Pelikán about in his letter dated 25 April 1977 – “Mlynář's analysis is fairly interesting, but does not tell much about the actual mood of the masses. I cannot imagine now whether people – and most of them are really workers and young people – have already put up, more or less, with the situation, or whether they are interested in any form of resistance.” (*ASCD*, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 15, Correspondence, 0007.)

125 See *BBR*, f. Luciano Antonetti, 1.4 Relazioni PCI-ČSR, 002, A Reminder for Sergio Segre, Antonetti's Text of 27 June 1977. However, *l'Unità* brought information about the meeting, although it comprised just a few lines. (Zdeněk Mlynar ricevuto a “Rinascita.” In: *l'Unità*, 8 July 1977, p. 1.) A summary of the interview which Mlynář had provided to the ANSA Press Agency while in Rome was then published. (Intervista di Mlynar sul dissenso in Cecoslovacchia. In: *Ibid.*, 17 July 1977, p. 15.)

126 REIMAN, M.: *Rusko jako téma a realita doma a v exilu*, p. 184 – see Footnote 42.

127 As indicated by a failed attempt to have an interview with Dubček, which Pelikán had repeatedly mentioned in his letters to Mlynář in the autumn of 1977, in *l'Unità* (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 8). There exist numerous sources on the topic (LOMELLINI, V.: *L'appuntamento mancato*, p. 119 n. – see Footnote 74; IDEM: Il dissenso dell'Est tra PCI a PSI: Una guerra fredda nella sinistra italiana. In: POGGIO, Pier Paolo (ed.): *Dissenso: Critica e fine del comunismo*. Venezia, Fondazione Luigi Micheletti – Marsilio 2009, p. 153–156). Nevertheless, *l'Unità* continued to publish opinions and attitudes of the “Czechoslovak socialist opposition” (see at least “Dichiarazione della Opposizione socialista cecoslovacca in esilio.” In: *l'Unità*, 7 January 1978, p. 14; Appello dell'opposizione cecoslovacca. In: *Ibid.*,

in connection with Mlynář, the political importance assigned to the issue of the dissent in Eastern Bloc countries, declaring that he was willing to get involved in favour thereof.¹²⁸ After all, the political opinions of Mlynář himself were at that time getting increasingly closer to the attitudes of western Social Democratic Parties, even at the expense of a tough exchange of opinions with former reformist Communists who found themselves in exile,¹²⁹ for example over an attempt to “strive more for the mutual cooperation of various exile groups, in a way similar to how the opposition at home was striving for it under the umbrella of ‘Charter 77.’”¹³⁰

Although Mlynář repeatedly stated that he had not “intended to ‘rebuild something from scratch’ in the Czechoslovak exile” and that he would “work within existing structures – particularly in the *Listy* group of J. Pelikán,”¹³¹ he had quite a difficult time to find his place within the political emigration where “a fairly strong political structure built for years” already existed.¹³² The *Listy* group underwent a fairly complex development and its common platform was built slowly. The “very loose and non-institutionalised grouping,” which more or less matched the group of people cooperating with the *Listy* journal, was formed mainly during meetings in Como in May 1970 and in Milan in 1972.¹³³ The formation of Charter 77 was a great impetus also for the group around Jiří Pelikán, and the arrival of Zdeněk Mlynář, who soon became one of the group’s leaders, caused profound changes in the activities of the socialist émigrés.

The likely rivalry between Pelikán and Mlynář in the *Listy* group, exacerbated by Mlynář’s privileged position in the eyes of Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, was sensed mainly by Zdeněk Hejzlar who counted on Mlynář’s involvement in the activities of the socialist opposition, but was concerned about the scope of Mlynář’s activities.¹³⁴ Assuming that disagreements might emerge during the meeting of the whole *Listy* group, Hejzlar recommended Pelikán to make better preparations for

18 August 1978, p. 11). See also MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Lettera aperta ai giovani comunisti. In: *La città futura*, Vol. 31 (1978), p. 1 n.

128 See the article in the daily of the Socialist Party, “Craxi ha ricevuto Zdenek Mlynar.” In: *l’Avanti*, 8 July 1977, p. 6; LOMELLINI, V.: *L’appuntamento mancato*, p. 121.

129 See CACCAMO, F.: *Jiří Pelikán a jeho cesta socialismem 20. století*, pp. 57–59 – see Footnote 68.

130 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 4, k. 18, Mlynář’s “Information on the Case of Josef Hodic,” p. 8.

131 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

132 Jak jsem vstoupil do Evropy [How I Entered Europe]. In: MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistou na volné noze*, pp. 81–85, here p. 82 – see Footnote 6.

133 O skupině LISTY [On the LISTY Group]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 7, No. 3–4 (July 1977), p. 15.

134 In his letter to Pelikán dated 21 June 1977, Hejzlar wrote: “You should push Mlynář at all costs to remain as close as possible to Euro-Communists, to win their trust, and not to cross their lines too much, because this is the only thing that is worth the effort, and he can do more than anyone else in this respect.” (ASCD, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 10, Correspondence, 0063.) Also interesting are the words that Hejzlar had addressed to Pelikán 10 days earlier: “Anyway, you yourself know very well that there are certainly many things in what you have written over the years which could make pitching you against Mlynář as much as possible.” (*Ibid.*, k. 16, Correspondence, 0025, Hejzlar’s Letter to Pelikán, 11 June 1977.)

the event, as “Zdeněk definitely does not plan to work only along the lines which we see as positive.”¹³⁵ A while later, he added: “You miscalculated – he wants to be involved in ‘big’ politics and he thinks he is the only one to make the wheels spin. This attitude has both positive and dangerous and negative aspects.” His “sweep” could be so strong that it would be necessary to “make an insignificant concession in the matter of our relationship with ‘other’ exiles to show our goodwill,” and thus “with Zdeněk, we will have to ‘capture’ exactly his manifestations of such ‘goodwill.’”¹³⁶ As a matter of fact, Hejzlar was very surprised when he received a meticulously prepared text from Zdeněk Mlynář titled “Comments on the Political Situation in Czechoslovakia and Its Possible Development,” including a detailed “Annex,” both dated August 1977.¹³⁷ The analysis contained Mlynář’s harsh criticism of the whole Prague Spring era and the “retreat policy of remnants of Dubček’s reformist leadership.” He wrote off the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia as a totally discredited force, perceiving “normalisation” as a safety mechanism of sorts, which would prevent the system “from getting out of Soviet control again.” In his opinion, ex-Communists could no longer expect that they would be rehabilitated as a fully-fledged political force, and he believed the only option was an orientation toward a “pluralistic democratic political system.” The “Annex” analysed Czechoslovakia’s subordination to the Soviet Union, economic difficulties, changes in the character of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (which, in his opinion, had become a “purely Soviet-style Party”), mechanisms used to suppress undesirable tendencies in the society, and the nature and influence of opposition groups. With this text, Mlynář presented the *Listy* group with a perspective that was somewhat different from the hitherto implemented policy of defending the slightly facelifted traditions of the Prague Spring.

Zdeněk Hejzlar’s reaction was contained in his letter to Mlynář dated 1 September 1977. He admitted that Mlynář’s “contacts with Kreisky are naturally very important and substantially benefit our interests, particularly in Austria and Germany.” At the same time, he warned Mlynář “not to succumb to the illusion that too much can be obtained through Kreisky.” He wrote that Mlynář’s “Annex” was “valuable and remarkable,” but he viewed the “catastrophic disintegration of structures with consequences that no one with common sense can wish” as very risky. He believed the positive evaluation of Pavel Tigrid’s activities was a “great mistake,” pointing at the unstable nature of the *Listy* group, which had never managed to advance beyond the level of a “free grouping,” basically unable to develop a programme platform.¹³⁸ In his reply, Mlynář repeated that it was necessary to draw a “clearer political profile and orientation” of the *Listy* group, to include new people in it, and to demonstrate in a more obvious way that its programme is a “political programme

135 *Ibid.*, k. 10, 0063, Hejzlar’s Letter to Pelikán, 16 July 1977.

136 *Ibid.*, Hejzlar’s Letter to Pelikán, 26 August 1977.

137 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 4 (a copy of the text can be also found in Pelikán’s fund in Rome, Serie 003, k. 10, Correspondence, 0063).

138 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Hejzlar’s Letter to Mlynář, 1 September 1977.

of democratic socialism.”¹³⁹ Jiří Pelikán also wrote to Mlynář, stating that he feels an “unclear orientation” in his text and that Mlynář should have highlighted that the “opposition wanted to retain (at least partly) the *socialist* character of the system.”¹⁴⁰ Three days later, Pelikán wrote a letter to Hejzlar, saying that changes would be inevitable, but that Mlynář “does not want to be a ‘deputy chairman’ after the reorganisation, given that he held the highest post of us all.” Although Pelikán was surprised by “some of Mlynář’s political positions and attitudes to people, mainly those at home (mostly negative bordering on biased),” he admitted that “Mlynář stands a better chance of succeeding, because he has more energy than me, is more productive, formulates better, and is not so sensitive – on the contrary, he is harsh enough, which is what a politician should be.”¹⁴¹

In October 1977, there was indeed an important meeting of the *Listy* group in Cologne,¹⁴² during which Pelikán delivered a presentation titled “Results Achieved So Far and New Possibilities of Opposition Activities Abroad,” while Mlynář presented his “Comments on the Situation in Czechoslovakia and Opposition Activities (Principles).” In a somewhat milder form, the document outlined the new situation in which, according to Mlynář’s opinion, the opposition of ex-Communists should “support all others who strive for the society to be able to tell, on its own volition, what system it wants to have after the long experience with ‘real socialism.’” The reorganisation of the group included the establishment of a coordination committee composed of Zdeněk Hejzlar, Jiří Pelikán, Zdeněk Mlynář and Adolf Müller (and in the years that followed also by some other people, e.g. Michal Reiman, on a temporary basis).¹⁴³

From that moment, Mlynář, who had an information-exchange connection with Prague at his disposal,¹⁴⁴ became one of the prominent characters of the Czech socialist dissent abroad. His position was further strengthened by the success of his book *Mráz přichází z Kremly* published in 1978 by Tomáš Kosta’s Europäische

139 *Ibid.*, Mlynář’s Letter to Hejzlar, 13 September 1977. Hejzlar reacted in a fairly conciliatory tone, although he very harshly criticised political capabilities of many émigrés, especially those living in German-speaking countries whom Mlynář wanted to install in top leadership positions (*Ibid.*, Hejzlar’s Letter to Mlynář, 19 September 1977).

140 *Ibid.*, Pelikán’s Letter to Mlynář, 11 September 1977.

141 ASCD, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 10, 0062, Pelikán’s Letter to Hejzlar, 14 September 1977. See also his letter to Havlíček dated 17 August 1977: PELIKÁN, Jiří – HAVLÍČEK, Dušan: *Psáno z Říma, psáno ze Ženevy. Korespondence 1969–1989*, p. 147 – see Footnote 97.

142 See also the draft statute prepared by Hejzlar on 1 October 1977 and other organisational materials in Mlynář’s NA fund (Part 2, k. 31).

143 On 28 October 1977, Pelikán wrote to Mlynář that “the impression of some people in Cologne was that there was some rivalry between us,” even though they had no reason to think so (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 8).

144 In May 1978, Mlynář wrote to Jan Kavan on the subject: “My own connection – as I told you in the summer – does not compete with documents that are delivered to you. It has been built to acquire and deliver various inside information (i.e. on inside developments in the opposition and/or the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, etc.), generally brief and not written.” (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 6.)

Verlangsanstalt Publishing House,¹⁴⁵ which was much discussed¹⁴⁶ and soon filmed.¹⁴⁷ (According to Bedřich Utitz, who translated the book into German, the book originally started with a “very gripping and fascinatingly written ‘non-fiction thriller,’ which was followed by a typical lengthy political essay and a political analysis of the preceding text.” He ultimately succeeded in talking the author out of including them in the book.¹⁴⁸) Mlynář’s public activities in those days were indeed remarkable: in January 1978, he made a presentation in Brussels; he and Pelikán travelled to Madrid shortly thereafter, having been invited there by the Communist Party of Spain; in May, he attended a meeting of the German Social Democrats in Frankfurt am Main¹⁴⁹; in June, he took part in a seminar in Norway and a congress in Amsterdam, and he also spoke before the Council of Europe, not to speak of dozens of articles written for various European dailies and magazines.¹⁵⁰

His attempt to reproduce the spirit of Charter 77 in exile, to establish contacts with different streams of the political emigration – not only with the Social Democrats,¹⁵¹

145 According to financial reports of February 1979, the German edition of the book sold 4,395 copies by the end of 1978 (see *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 1, The Budget of the Europäische Verlangsanstalt Publishing House of 27 February 1979 and a Proposal of Tomáš Kosta for Further Cooperation with Mlynář). The French version of the book was recommended to Gallimard Publishing House by Milan Kundera, who very much appreciated that the author “resisted all psychoses” and had maintained “common sense, distance, restraint in his judgments and, at the same time, was audacious enough to oppose common opinions” (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 13, Kundera’s Letter to Mlynář, 27 December 1978).

146 As to former reformists, the “pamphlet” and his author provoked a very sharp objection (“he could have ended up in a place better than the dustbin of lies and slander”) of, for instance, Čestmír Císař in his reaction of 1980 (CÍSAŘ, Čestmír: *Veletoché Z. Mlynáře* [The Grand Circles of Zdeněk Mlynář]. In: IDEM: *I kapky proděravějí kámen: Samizdatová memoranda a jiné texty z let 1975–1989* [Even Drops Can Hollow a Stone: Samizdat Memoranda and Other Texts from the Years 1975–1989]. Ed. Petra Paterová. Praha, Národní archiv 2011, pp. 14–16).

147 Documents on reactions to the *Invasion* movie are stored in Mlynář’s NA fund (Part 2, k. 37).

148 UTITZ, Bedřich: *Kaleidoskop mého století* [The Kaleidoscope of My Century]. Ed. Jana Hradilková. Praha, Academia 2013, p. 166 n.

149 The *Listy* group had a liaison person responsible for “Czechs in exile” in West Germany; until 1978, that person was Jürgen Schmude. When he was appointed a Minister of the Cabinet, he was succeeded by Karsten Voigt (see NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 31, Adolf Müller’s Letter to Mlynář, 26 April 1978). Pelikán made it clear to Willy Brandt that “ZM was made responsible for maintaining contacts” (ASCD, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 10, Correspondence, 0062, Pelikán’s Letter to Brandt, 20 September 1977).

150 Mlynář’s relevant lectures, presentations and articles are kept in his NA fund (Part 1, k. 3 and 4; Part 3, k. 4), and also in the bibliography published in his book *Socialistou na volné noze* (pp. 231–235). Because of somewhat vague information on a “pardon” of sorts in Czechoslovakia (probably with respect to Dubček), there was a lengthy debate on the occasion of an appeal to supporters of the left, “Ten Years since the Prague Spring” (see NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 31).

151 On 13 February 1978, a meeting of Czechoslovak left-wing politicians in exile and representatives of some European Social Democratic Parties took place in Vienna (see NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 31, Hejzlar’s [slightly polemic] Letter to Mlynář, 19 January 1978,

but also with Pavel Tigrid, as indicated by his regular attendance at seminars in Franken organised by the Catholic association Opus Bonum¹⁵² – naturally could not dispense with polemics and discussions.¹⁵³ For instance, Zdeněk Hejzlar spoke very negatively of the “confusion of opinions” prevailing at the abovementioned meeting of the *Listy* group in Cologne, adding to Mlynář’s address: “An even worse thing is what has obviously happened to Zdeněk. He has apparently undergone the ‘exile’ metamorphosis at cosmic speed – since February, when they slapped him with his juvenile offense of the 1950s in Prague. Now he thinks only about starting on the side of those who have power and influence, even in exile, which is why he is ready – as one of us said in a low voice in Cologne – to sell the legacy of the Prague Spring, including its ‘orphans,’ to Kreisky and company. [...] The matter is further complicated by developments at home, where the opposition has obviously advanced from defending the Prague Spring via a cleverly devised legalistic struggle for civil rights to a group plurality of various ideological ruins and immaturities.”¹⁵⁴

In a sense, these discussions culminated at the end of September 1978, during a meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International, which was supposed to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia.¹⁵⁵ When Hejzlar let other members of the coordination committee of the *Listy* group know that he had arranged, after lengthy negotiations with Socialist International’s General Secretary Bernt Carlsson, the

Hejzlar’s Minutes of 15 February 1978, and [offended] Letters of Adolf Müller. [Müller had not been invited]). Opinions of Czechoslovak participants in the meeting differed; some were rather negative, as shown by Mlynář’s correspondence with Jiří Loewy, Radomír Luža and Miroslav Souček, and by other documents in Mlynář’s NA fund (Part 2, k. 8).

152 For instance, in his letter to other members of the coordination committee of the *Listy* group dated 8 March 1978, Mlynář spoke of the Franken meeting as “good and useful,” including how the problem of the resettlement of Germans had been handled in the joint communiqué (however, Pelikán, who had not been present, refused to attach his signature to it by phone) (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 7). In a published interview with Pavel Tigrid, he openly said: “[...] the nine years of ‘normalisation’ in Czechoslovakia of which I had first-hand experience with have brought me to the opinion that there is no other principled and ultimate way out of the totalitarian regime but to recognise full political freedom for the opposition, including opponents whose ideological and political orientation is utterly different from that of the regime, and to recognise the indivisibility of political, civil and human rights for all.” (Nad rozbitým džbánem jedné politiky: Rozhovor Zdeňka Mlynáře s Pavlem Tigridem [Over a Broken Jug of One Policy: An Interview of Zdeněk Mlynář with Pavel Tigrid]. In: *Svědectví*, Vol. 15, No. 58 (1979), pp. 233–255, here p. 243.)

153 See, for instance, ASCD, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 16, Correspondence, 0023, [a very critical] Letter of Antonín Liehm to Pelikán, 21 February 1978.

154 *Ibid.*, Correspondence, 0025, Hejzlar’s Letter to Pelikán, 20 November 1977.

155 See Socialistická internacionála o Československu [The Socialist International on Czechoslovakia]. In: MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistou na volné noze*, p. 92 n. (the text of the lecture itself is on pp. 93–97). The polemics within the *Listy* group were described for the first time by Francesco Caccamo in his book *Jiří Pelikán a jeho cesta socialismem 20. století*, pp. 59–65 – see Footnote 68; see also HAVLÍČEK, Dušan: *Listy v exilu: Obsahová analýza časopisu Listy, který v letech 1971 až 1989 vydával v Římě Jiří Pelikán* [The *Listy* Journal in Exile: An Analysis of the Content of the *Listy* Journal Published in Rome by Jiří Pelikán between 1971 and 1989]. Olomouc, Burian a Tichák 2008, pp. 62–64 and 218–223.

possibility to discuss the Czechoslovak problem at the next meeting of the Socialist International, and sent them a draft of a joint presentation that was to be delivered by Pelikán,¹⁵⁶ Mlynář objected, not only sending the members a new draft where he entirely ignored Hejzlar's concept of a potential "new reformist movement from 'above,'" but also assuring them that he would be "presenting his opinions under any circumstances" during the meeting.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, in spite of the fact "that it has so far always been Pelikán speaking on our behalf at international forums,"¹⁵⁸ Mlynář insisted that, should his proposal be chosen, he would want to present it himself at the meeting.¹⁵⁹ Two weeks later, he sent a new version with the comments of others, in which he explained his reasons, namely that he wanted the above arrangement "because of an explicit agreement to the effect that JP would focus more on Euro-Communists and I on the Socialist International." He also denied that he wanted to impose himself ("not to speak of any intention against JP"), reporting again for work within the group: "[...] I want to work with the *Listy* group; I think I naturally belong to it because of my entire political evolution. However, I have never been – whether at home as a member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, or later, when a member of the home opposition – a mere interpreter of some 'collective opinions' – I have always presented my own."¹⁶⁰

In any case, the text which was ultimately presented in Paris was significantly permeated with Mlynář's political opinions. It declared that "co-workers of the *Listy* group are not encapsulating themselves in their own past" and "strive for cooperation with all political forces whose programme is democratic socialism." Quite a lot of attention was paid to "parallel, unofficial culture" and "the movement defending human and civil rights – Charter 77"; the document also appreciated "the policy of détente" and looked for the support of younger people "who, as a rule, are no longer members of Social Democratic or Communist Parties."¹⁶¹ Here the reorientation of the *Listy* group toward Social Democracies was indeed obvious.

Another discussion took place a year later, on the occasion of another meeting of the group in Munich, which was held only after it had been clear that Jiří Pelikán had been elected to the European Parliament on behalf of the Italian Socialist Party. Mlynář prepared a document entitled "Criticism of and Contemplations about Further Possibilities of the *Listy* Group," dated 8 March 1979, for the meeting.

156 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 31, Hejzlar's Letters to Mlynář (Müller, Pelikán), 31 July and 29 August 1978.

157 ASCD, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 3, Correspondence, 0011, Mlynář's Letters to Pelikán (Hejzlar, Müller), 5 September 1978.

158 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 31, Hejzlar's Letters to Mlynář (Müller, Pelikán), 29 August 1978.

159 ASCD, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 3, Correspondence 0011, Mlynář's Letters to Pelikán (Hejzlar, Müller), 5 September 1978.

160 *Ibid.*, Mlynář's Letters to Pelikán (Hejzlar, Müller), 18 September 1978; copies of the letters in question and other documents are also kept in Mlynář's NA fund, Part 2, k. 6.

161 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 4, Text [with a hand-written title] "SI Bureau Meeting – Paris, 28 to 29 September 1978."

At the beginning, he paid tribute to Pelikán and his activities for being able to retain “some attention” with respect to the Prague Spring in the international context, and expressed his hope that it would be possible to implement the so-called “Kádár-isation” in Czechoslovakia. However, the author also demanded a new approach toward the changed situation at home and toward the possibilities offered by Euro-Communism which were, in his opinion, exhausted. He argued that the indispensable prerequisite was “to hold a fundamental programme discussion on the ideas and concepts of democratic socialism.” He also claimed the Prague Spring concept was “a historical hypothesis not verified in practice.” In his opinion, authors belonging to the *Listy* group should have broken the taboo, refrained from interfering with disputes taking place at home, and tried “to become an active element in the formation of a new faction of the Czechoslovak opposition, with a programmatically socialist orientation.” He therefore recommended that every issue of the *Listy* journal should be “focused on a specific topic,”¹⁶² have a “different structure” (for instance, only a third of the members of the future editorial board were to be drawn from among former Communists), reflect more the critical discussion of the past at home (“I generally agree with the trend formulated by the author of the manuscript titled ‘1968’”), and go beyond the “position of Communists (including Euro-Communists) wherever they place the interests of the Communist Movement before the interests of the Socialist Movement as a whole or the before interests of political democracy.” A greater openness toward all democratic exile groups and a proximity to the Socialist International were not to be a matter of tactics, but rather a “result of the evolution of opinions.” Just as in all other cases involving the “values of European liberalism,” Mlynář believed it would be necessary to further “solidarity without any calculations reflecting one’s own particular interests.”¹⁶³ Hejzlar’s comments concerning these considerations were very irritable (“I do not harbour many illusions about the possibilities of ‘cohesion’ with ZM”); he hoped that Pelikán’s election to the European Parliament might influence the situation because “Zdeněk’s way of thinking is already different from ours” and “we stand at the threshold of endless troubles.”¹⁶⁴ The fact is that Pelikán’s election to the European Parliament marked, in a way, the conclusion of one phase of the activities of the Czechoslovak socialist opposition abroad.

162 According to Hejzlar’s letter to Pelikán dated 3 March 1979, Mlynář recommended, as early as in 1976 while still in Prague, that the *Listy* journal should be transformed into a “theoretical review” (ASCD, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 16, Correspondence, 0025).

163 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 32, Mlynář’s Text “Criticism of and Contemplations about Further Possibilities of the *Listy* Group.” See also texts of Jiří Pelikán (“Comments on the Discussion on Future Work of the *Listy* Group”), Zdeněk Hejzlar (“On the Discussion of Activities and Possibilities in Exile”) and Adolf Müller (“Comments on Possibilities and Work of the *Listy* Group”) (all of them are kept in Mlynář’s NA fund, Part 2, k. 32). Mlynář’s reaction to Pelikán’s text was as follows: “You are rounding something as much as possible, you are probably more right than me in other matters – but we will settle everything up orally. I do not think the whole matter is serious enough to make a fuss about it.” (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář’s Letter to Pelikán, 18 May 1979.)

164 ASCD, f. Jiří Pelikán, Serie 003, k. 4, 0017, Hejzlar’s Letter to Pelikán, 14 June 1979.

Mlynář's personal situation changed almost at the same time, although his search for a definitive job for him to subsist on was to take a few years more.¹⁶⁵ He initially cooperated with various institutions (between September 1977 and December 1978, he worked as an entomologist in the Natural History Museum (*Naturhistorisches Museum*) in Vienna; from March 1979, he was a consultant at the Dr. Karl-Renner-Institut),¹⁶⁶ and he also had a few short university stints (in 1979, for instance, he spent two months in Oxford and lectured in Salzburg; in the academic year 1980/1981, he spent two semesters in Bremen as a Visiting Professor; and the academic year 1981/1982 saw him lecturing in Innsbruck). It was only on 1 June 1982 when he started working on a research project at the Austrian Institute for International Policy (*Österreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik*) in Laxenburg, outside Vienna, where he was employed until the late 1980s.¹⁶⁷ Under the influence of all these changes, Mlynář–politician was gradually becoming Mlynář–academician and –political-scientist, the contents of his academic and research activities being increasingly tied to projects managed from Vienna during the 1980s.

The “Experience of the Prague Spring 1968” Project

Even the 1975 “memorandum” quoted above says that one of the two steps that could support political change in Czechoslovakia is to “carry out, within the International Communist Movement and as an organic part of resolving past and current broad problems and discrepancies in the policy and theory of the Communist Movement, a necessary analysis of the developments which led to the formation, attempted implementation and suppression of the political reform in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in 1968.”¹⁶⁸

165 On 17 May 1979, he wrote the following to Tomáš Kosta: “I am thus looking for a job with a future (in my case at least for 15 years) to sustain me until I retire [...] I am trying once again for an entomologist's job in Munich. As it is completely free of any stress, it would suit me perfectly; of course, it does not pay too much, but I could do some moonlighting in politics and political science. But it is in Bavaria and the opinion of [Minister-President of *Bundesland* Bavaria] Strauss will matter. However, if they gave me the job, I would take it. If not, then there is political science; I have written to Bern and I am of course looking at Cologne (Vogele Institute). If none of the cream jobs goes in my favour, I will of course start drinking milk or buttermilk – but I would have a hard time if I had to start drinking goat milk.” (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 6.) There were lengthy scrambles about the arrival of Mlynář's wife Irena Dubská to Vienna (see *Ibid.*, k. 8).

166 See *Ibid.*, k. 1, Mlynář's Letter to Bruno Kreisky, 9 June 1980.

167 He maintained correspondence full of worries about his untenable financial situation with Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and other Austrian public officials (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 1, 6 and 8). In his letter to Minister Heinz Fischer dated 13 July 1984, Mlynář clearly explained that a transfer to a university (which finally took place in 1989) was the only option that would make him entitled to an average old-age pension (*Ibid.*, k. 6).

168 MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Československý pokus o reformu 1968*, p. 267 – see Footnote 32.

In 1977, during the meeting in question with Adalberto Minucci, Director of the *Rinascita* weekly, Mlynář once again put forward a request to hold “a study seminar on lessons learned from the events in Czechoslovakia since 1948.”¹⁶⁹ During the abovementioned meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International in September 1978, he said, *inter alia*, the “common interests of socialist forces in Europe” would have benefitted “from the establishment of a similar information and research centre, for example as part of the Scientific Institute of a Socialist Party.”¹⁷⁰ A few months later, the first of the projects arranged by Pelikán and managed by Mlynář, who ultimately became one of Europe’s most recognised experts on changes taking place in Eastern Europe, was launched.¹⁷¹

Between 1979 and 1989, Zdeněk Mlynář, supported by an unnamed “common partner,” various cultural and university institutions, and the Socialist International, was managing two research projects from Vienna: “Experience of the Prague Spring 1968” and “The Crises in Soviet-Type Systems.” Pelikán later wrote that “a few local Euro-Commies, Socialists and social scientists are willing to donate to us (anonymously, so that the Soviets do not get pissed off at them, and also to soothe their conscience) a sum of money for a series of academic and documentary works on “Spring 68” and its consequences for the Left in the West.”¹⁷² Both projects partly adopted the interdisciplinary approach to research of the second half of the 1960s and also the samizdat style of distribution.¹⁷³ In the first case, the works resulting from the project were disseminated in the form of mimeographed booklets, in the second case as printed brochures the distribution of which, however, was organised more or less privately.¹⁷⁴

169 See LOMELLINI, V.: *L'appuntamento mancato*, p. 119 – see Footnote 74. Even in the interview for *l'Espresso* weekly mentioned above, Mlynář kept repeating that “it would be appropriate to study the developments in Czechoslovakia, both between 1945 and 1948, in the following two decades and, after all, also now, more intensively and more specifically, not just from the viewpoint of current and passing interests of journalists.” (MLYNÁŘ, Z.: Interview se Zdeňkem Mlynářem o situaci Charty 77, p. 19 – see Footnote 105.)

170 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 4, Text [with a hand-written title] “SI Bureau Meeting – Paris, 28 to 29 September 1978.”

171 Michal Reiman states that “its establishment had been negotiated by Jiří Pelikán even before Zdeněk emigrated” (REIMAN, M.: *Rusko jako téma a realita doma a v exilu*, p. 186 – see Footnote 42).

172 In his letter to Havlíček dated 16 December 1978, PELIKÁN, Jiří – HAVLÍČEK, Dušan: *Psáno z Říma, psáno ze Ženevy. Korespondence 1969–1989*, pp. 185–186 – see Footnote 95.

173 According to Austrian tax statements, Mlynář was paid from the project’s funds since April 1980 (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 1). See also tax documents and transfers to the project’s account from two Munich and two Austrian banks (the first payment to Karel Kaplan – in the amount of 3,000 German Marks – is dated 15 March 1979), which can likewise be found in Mlynář’s NA fund (Part 2, k. 18).

174 Most of the texts are also quoted (in different language versions) in the list of Ludmila Šeflová *České a slovenské knihy v exilu: Bibliografie, 1948–1989* [Czech and Slovak Books in Exile: Bibliography, 1948–1989] (Praha, Československé dokumentační středisko [Czechoslovak Documentation Centre] 2008).

Pelikán's first specific message concerning the first project, which appeared in his correspondence with Mlynář, is dated 24 August 1978: "[...] I need to speak to you, confidentially; the thing with the 'Prague Spring Institute' which we talked about last year and which then fell asleep, looks realistic again, i.e. there would be funds for setting up a small place of work (two people) with the possibility of publishing 'Spring 68' documents in different languages."¹⁷⁵

Mlynář expanded on the proposed research project in his letter dated 17 November 1978, in which he accepted only the "management of the project's contents" (while Pelikán was expected to retain the position of an "organisational secretary"), refusing the idea of having the project institutionalised in Vienna: "If you or our common partner think that the matter should have an official title, I do not object to something like 'Prague Spring 1968 Research Project,' but I do not recommend its institutionalisation, i.e. calling it an institute, research centre, etc.; this will bring only problems and no benefits. In addition, a 'research project' is not a legal entity; it is not necessary to register anything, to submit reports to the tax authority, etc."¹⁷⁶

By January 1979, the project's preparations were in an advanced stage,¹⁷⁷ although Pelikán did not have any office to work from ("as a matter of fact, the Socialists were willing to let me have one room at their secretariat, but it would not have been good for our purpose because of the address").¹⁷⁸ As early as 6 February, Mlynář contacted more than 15 people who he thought might be interested in the matter¹⁷⁹ ("I contacted Prague on my own and also through V. Prečan").¹⁸⁰ However, some important co-workers of the *Listy* group (particularly Antonín J. Liehm, Zdeněk Hejzlar and Eduard Goldstücker) were not invited to cooperate from the very beginning.¹⁸¹ Mlynář offered membership in the project's board to Ota Šik,

175 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 7, Pelikán's Letter to Mlynář, 24 August 1978.

176 *Ibid.*, Mlynář's Letter to Pelikán, 17 November 1978.

177 See *Ibid.*, Mlynář's "Proposal of a Research Project of Experience of the 'Prague Spring' from the Viewpoint of Issues Relevant for the Western European Left."

178 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Pelikán's Letter to Mlynář, 15 January 1979.

179 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář's Letters.

180 In his letter, he also asked Prečan "not to disclose various matters (regarding the fees, etc.) to Kavan or Jiřina Š[iklová] (and the Prague end 'KAT') [which probably means Prague contacts of Jiřina Šiklová, who was using the code name "Kateřina," shortened to "KAT," in her clandestine correspondence – author's note], to prevent them from getting into usual gossip" (*Ibid.*, Mlynář's Letter to Vilém Prečan, 18 January 1979; see also Prečan's Answer, 24 January, and Mlynář's Reply, 29 January 1979).

181 In his letter dated 23 January 1979, Mlynář only notified Hejzlar of the new project – "so that you know about it as a member of the 'Vierbände': the opportunity "arose at the end of the year, and it was necessary to grab it, or lose the possibility of financial support. I hope that Jirka [Pelikán] has also clearly told you that the matter does not have anything in common with proposals for a 'documentation centre,' etc. presented so far, that it was not been meant as an offer to the *Listy* group, but was tied to my person, etc." (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Mlynář's Letter to Hejzlar, 23 January 1979.) Hejzlar was very offended by the information without any request for cooperation (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 31, Hejzlar's Letter to Mlynář, 14 February 1979, Mlynář's Reply, 19 March 1979).

Jiří Kosta, Vladimír Klokočka and Karel Kaplan (the first of them did not accept it, and the panel was later joined by Jiří Pelikán, Eduard Goldstücker and Radoslav Selucký).¹⁸² Mlynář's intention was to keep the matter "strictly an issue confined to professionals from social science disciplines, at least initially." He estimated he had "an additional five studies prepared by members of the exile community and at least three prepared at home tentatively arranged (promised) for the year 1979."¹⁸³ As early as January, in his letter to Karel Kaplan, Mlynář wrote that the texts should be focused on "Euro-Communists," and their form should therefore "be acceptable to them." He believed it was necessary to present, in particular, "documents and studies which they, because of their contents, are reluctant to start working on." As a financial reward, he offered "approximately 1,000 German Marks for selected and commented documents, approximately 1,500 German Marks for a study compiled from your other texts, and over 2,000 German Marks for an original study of about 50 pages in Czech (I want everything in Czech)."¹⁸⁴ Mlynář also confirmed to other potential co-workers that "the project does not depend on Communists, financially or otherwise," who should, on the contrary, "be continuously told things that even the best of them still do not like to hear."¹⁸⁵ The project was targeting mainly Italian, Spanish and French Communists: "The principal importance of the project is seen in affecting the ranks of Communists in the Roman language area."¹⁸⁶

The project got off to a rather slow start, as its principal actors could not be sure about its funding for quite a long time. It was only on 20 February 1979 when Pelikán notified Mlynář of a firm date: "The meeting will take place on Friday afternoon, 16 March, in Munich,"¹⁸⁷ which indicates that the funding was probably provided by the German Social Democrats.¹⁸⁸ The cooperation was proceeding

182 Šik's was the only one to refuse Mlynář's offer; Šik disagreed "with Mlynář's entire logic," because "economic issues simply cannot be placed *alongside* other processes as one of them" (*Ibid.*, Šik's Letter to Mlynář, 18 February 1979; see also Mlynář's Reply, 11 March 1979).

183 He expected the following papers from Prague: "K. Kouba et al., K otázce příčin neefektivnosti hospodářství [On the Issue of Causes of Ineffectiveness in the Economy], Z. Jičínský, K otázce vztahu federalizace a demokratizace na Slovensku 1968 a důsledky toho [On the Issue of the Relation of Federalisation and Democratisation in Slovakia in 1968 and Its Consequences], Miloš Hájek et al. – an as yet unspecified topic dealing with the year 1968." (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář's Letter to Pelikán, 6 February 1979.)

184 *Ibid.*, Mlynář's Letter to Karel Kaplan, 7 January 1979.

185 *Ibid.*, Mlynář's Letter to Jiří Kosta, 13 January 1979; see also Mlynář's Letter to Karel Kaplan, 18 January 1979.

186 *Ibid.*, Mlynář's and Pelikán's "Report on the 'Experience of the Prague Spring 1968' Research Project," 10 December 1981.

187 In the same letter, Pelikán mentioned another important project of the Czechoslovak exile community: "I gave your and Áda's [Müller] phone number to the University of Bremen so that they could invite you to that meeting about the doc[umentation] centre, which I initiated some five years ago. It now looks very realistic, and it will probably start in the autumn, with three or four researchers one of whom will probably be a Czech (either Prečan or Reiman)." (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 31, Pelikán's Letter to Mlynář, 20 February 1979.)

188 The series of circulars titled *Nový proud*, which seems to be a deception campaign of the Czechoslovak secret police (see *Spolupracovat ano – ale s kým* [Cooperation – Yes, but with

smoothly, the bitter row that erupted between the two main actors a week later notwithstanding,¹⁸⁹ and in spite of the fact that “our partners have some administrative problems” and “do not want an address in Rome to appear on official papers of the ‘project,’” as Pelikán wrote to Mlynář at the end of February. At the same time, Pelikán decided that he should join the board “[...] to appear in the ‘project’ at least in some way, I perhaps should be a member of the ‘board’ [...] although I will not meddle with things which you will decide.” He was only “worried whether you follow our principal objective, i.e. to address our know-how and information especially to Euro-Communist Parties, strictly enough.”¹⁹⁰ In April, Pelikán announced his candidacy for the European Parliament and repeatedly informed Mlynář about problems with the office and with the compilation of the directory. Although he had already ordered translations of the first works, he was rather disappointed about the weak reflection of “specific experience of the Spring of 1968 and its generalisation.”¹⁹¹ In another letter, he noted that “Craxi did not give us an office, and I was not able to find another, or rather find another for free, because we do not have money. This means we also cannot buy a copier and have to outsource the copying work to *copisterias*, which, for a 60-page study issued in a hundred copies, costs about 500 German Marks DM.”¹⁹² A profound organisational change took place after the election of Jiří Pelikán to the European Parliament as Mlynář also took over the organisational management part of the project and started coordinating

Whom]. In: MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistou na volné noze*, p. 134–137) regularly attacked exiled Socialists, but it is mainly comments on sources of the funding of Mlynář’s projects that are relevant for our topic (if for nothing else, then as an indication of the extent and quantity of information available to the Counterintelligence Service). Circular No. 64 of February 1981 published an article attacking Mlynář, whose “income is again counted in hundreds of thousands.” The comments on Mlynář’s income were as follows: “It is true that he only gets 5,000 Schillings a month from the Renner Institute, but it covers his pension insurance. His principal income is provided by the ‘Prague Spring’ project, for which he himself ‘charges’ the SPD 10,000 German Marks a year; he got 60,000 German Marks for the *Night Frost in Prague* movie screenplay; his visiting professorship in Bremen earns him 6,000 German marks a month, plus he of course gets rewarded for the studies and books that he writes. And because even this is not enough for him, he ‘arranged’ the assignment of another ‘study’ with the SPÖ, for which a ‘benevolent’ fund of one bank in Vienna will have paid him 200,000 Schillings only in this year.” (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 5, Spolupracovat ano – ale s kým. In: *Nový proud*, No. 64 (January 1981).)

189 Pelikán was very irked by Mlynář’s request to pay debts of the German version of the *Listy* journal from the account of the *Listy* journal (see *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 31, Pelikán’s Letter to Mlynář, 27 February 1979).

190 *Ibid.*, Pelikán’s Letter to Mlynář, 28 February 1979.

191 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Pelikán’s Letter to Mlynář, 10 April 1979; see also Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář’s Letter to Pelikán, 19 April 1979.

192 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Pelikán’s Letter to Mlynář, 20 April 1979; see also Pelikán’s Letter to Mlynář, 25 April 1979.

translations and copying of texts from Vienna (Pelikán retained only the Italian part of the whole enterprise, which subsequently kept slipping far behind schedule).¹⁹³

In January 1979, the authors-in-waiting received a document titled “The Research of Issues Related to the ‘Prague Spring 1968’ from the Viewpoint of Needs of the Western European Left.” According to Mlynář, the purpose of the project was to “make Czechoslovakia’s experience, which is of immediate relevance for the solution of theoretical and political issues associated with concepts of democratic socialism in Western Europe, to the West European Left (Euro-Communists, Socialists, and other Marxist groups).” The document proclaimed that the common study of “ideological, political, social, and economic issues” would be based on “an objective scientific analysis” and that “results of the research (separate studies) will be published in limited quantities (approximately 300 typewritten copies) and sent to research institutes of political parties, editorial boards of theoretical journals, and also to individual theoretically oriented representatives of left-wing political groups.” The anticipated duration of the project was five years, the project was organised by Mlynář and Pelikán, and the raised funds were tied to the project, which meant “they have nothing in common with the *Listy* group, the identically titled magazine, or the political collective activities of exiles and émigrés.” The topics of research were to be as follows:

“I. Internal political, social and economic foundations of the formation (1948–52) and forcible restoration (1968–72) of the Soviet-type totalitarian dictatorship system in Czechoslovakia;

II. Soviet influence on the evolution of Czechoslovak society;

III. Communist ideology as a factor in the formation of the totalitarian system and also a factor in efforts to reform and democratise it; the importance of Leninist ideological and organisational principles in the activities of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia from the above viewpoints;

IV. The real look of the social and political system in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the possibilities of reforming its component parts and the system as a whole;

V. Opinions of Czechoslovak Communists on political pluralism and the role of the opposition; alternative concepts of non-communist political orientations in Czechoslovakia. The status of an individual as a citizen in a socialist society (the concept of human and civil rights);

VI. International contexts and influences in the evolution of Czechoslovak society.”¹⁹⁴

The board of the project had its first meeting in Munich on 29 June. By that time, the first six studies had already been completed and some others arranged

193 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 31, Mlynář’s [detailed] Letter to Pelikán, 7 August 1979. The agenda was taken over by Irena Dubská during her trip to Rome in January 1980 (see Part 2, k. 13, List of Issues that Need to be Discussed in Rome).

194 *Ibid.*, Part 1, k. 2, The Research of Issues Related to the ‘Prague Spring 1968’ from the Viewpoint of the Needs of the Western European Left.

or agreed upon (however, some of them never materialised, e.g. those which were to be prepared by Irena Dubská, Adolf Müller, Vilém Prečan, Vladimír Horský, Ivan Pfaff and others). Each member of the board was assigned with a specific area of research: Kosta was responsible for economic issues, Kaplan for history, Pelikán for international context and implications, and Mlynář and Klokočka for the sociological and political segment of the project.¹⁹⁵ A year later, the board discussed altogether 10 studies whose contents, however, “do not cover even the basic topics outlined in the accepted research plan.”¹⁹⁶

As to the addressees, the project’s coordinators recognised a virtual community composed of experts potentially interested in the given topic, i.e. a “parallel polis” of sorts of the European Left (the final report mentions “more than 300 individuals and institutions”),¹⁹⁷ to which they intended to direct the work of the community of exiled dissidents (and, in some cases, texts circulating at home by underground channels of forbidden literature) using means typical for the samizdat: the outcome was to be a number of academic studies, copied on a mimeograph, which were to be disseminated within the “grey zone” of the European Left, as far as possible from Moscow’s positions. For instance, the archives of Luciano Antonetti, who translated the studies into Italian,¹⁹⁸ contain an interesting photocopy of the Italian directory which contained, apart from several research centres, libraries and magazines, also fairly renowned names, including Giuliano Amato, Norberto Bobbio, Giorgio Bocca, Bettino Craxi, Paolo Flores d’Arcais, Ernesto Galli della Loggia, Marco Pannella and Carlo Ripa di Meana.¹⁹⁹

The project’s presentation, which appeared in the autumn 1979 issue of the *Listy* exile journal, reads as follows: “Last year’s 10th anniversary of the Czechoslovak attempt at a combination of socialism and political democracy proved that there is still an interest in the lessons learned in those times, particularly among the European Left. [...] The result of the initiative was a concrete proposal: to attempt to process the lessons learned in Czechoslovakia before, during and after 1968 in a way which would help those in the West who are interested in it (particularly among the Left) understand positive aspects of the developments in Czechoslovakia and which would also help overcome myths and illusions about the so-called ‘real socialism.’” The readers were also told that results of the research project would be

195 *Ibid.*, Minutes of the First Meeting of the Board of the “Experience of the Prague Spring 1968” Research Project, Munich 29 June 1979.

196 *Ibid.*, Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Board of the “Experience of the Prague Spring 1968” Research Project, Munich 29 June 1980.

197 See *Ibid.*, MLYNÁŘ, Z. – PELIKÁN, J.: Report on the “Experience of the Prague Spring 1968” Research Project (followed by “Appendix No. 2” containing lists of names).

198 On 25 January 1980, Irena Dubská wrote to Antonetti: “Otherwise I am very happy you and Jiří [Pelikán] have agreed to more permanent cooperation on the project about the Prague Spring.” (*BBR*, f. Luciano Antonetti, 4 Correspondence, Mlynář.)

199 The list of addresses has been retained in the same place: *Ibid.*, 2.3 Progetto The Spring Project of Z. Mlynář, 001. The complete extensive directory (English, French, Italian and German) is a part of Mlynář’s NA fund (Part 4, k. 19).

published as separate studies in different languages and sent to selected recipients. A list of translated, almost completed and soon-to-be-translated publications followed. Readers were also acquainted with planned studies and also notified of the volumes circulating in the form of samizdat publications in Czechoslovakia. They also learned that “the first four studies will be distributed according to a specific directory to addresses in France, Italy, Spain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Scandinavia and other countries of Western Europe, and the project will be presented to the public in the media.”

“If the project proceeds successfully, a symposium on selected topics, attended by the whole team of authors and principal beneficiaries of the project, will be held late in 1980 or early in 1981. As soon as a greater number of studies have been completed, the board will also discuss the possibility of publishing the selected works (or excerpts therefrom) in Czech, in the form of a special collection, at the Index Publishing House, to make them available also to a broader community of interested parties in Czechoslovakia.”²⁰⁰

Until now, the project entitled “Experiences of the Prague Spring 1968” has not become as renowned as it should have, as it represents one of the deepest and basically never published reflections on the roots, development and failure of the Prague Spring.²⁰¹ Its deliverables included approximately 25 mimeographed publications in three languages and a major final congress in Paris.²⁰² When the project was over, the addressees received an extensive file of texts in Italian, French and English (the texts in Czech were not “disseminated”)²⁰³ dealing with a very broad range of topics related to the Prague Spring, from studies on ideological character of the communist power to analyses of the military, social, economic, philosophical and cultural consequences of the reform, from the influence of the mass media and the cultural policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to international policy issues.²⁰⁴ All in all, the project “Experiences of the Prague Spring 1968” produced the following publications between 1979 and 1982:

200 The Experience of the “Prague Spring 1968” as a Research Project. In: *Listy*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (September 1979), p. 66 n.

201 See HAVLÍČEK, D.: *Listy v exilu*, p. 254 n. – see Footnote 154.

202 The project’s coordinators presented the project at a press conference in Paris, which was covered by French dailies (see Mlynar et Pelikan lancent un “projet de recherches sur le printemps de Prague.” In: *Le Monde*, 17 November 1979). As proved by a copy of an English letter to potentially interested parties, the first two studies were indeed delivered a few months late (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 13).

203 The final report stated that “since the third study, translations into Spanish were abandoned (the Spanish recipients read French or Italian)” and that the “original Czech version of the manuscripts is produced in 30 copies which are sent to the project’s authors, some individuals among Czechoslovak political exiles, and also to opposition groups in Prague” (MLYNÁŘ, Z. – PELIKÁN, J.: Report on the “Experience of the Prague Spring 1968” Research Project).

204 See my introduction (CATALANO, Alessandro: Le esperienze della Primavera di Praga: Un progetto ingiustamente dimenticato. In: *eSamizdat*, No. 2–3 (2009), pp. 181–183) to the two volumes translated into Italian by Luciano Antonetti (CHVATÍK, Květoslav: *La politica*

1. Vladimír Klokočka: *The Ideological and Social Foundations of Power in the System of "Real Socialism"* (1979)
2. Karel Kaplan: *The Rise of a Monopoly of Power in the Hands of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 1948–1949* (1979)
3. Zdeněk Mlynář: *Notions of Political Pluralism in the Policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1968* (1979)
4. Karel Kaplan: *The Council for Mutual Economic Aid 1949–1951* (1979)
5. Josef Hodic: *Military Political Views Prevalent in the Czechoslovak Army 1948–1968 (with the Appendix: "Memorandum of the Military Political Academy")* (1979)
6. Josef Pokštefl: *The Interpretation of Democratic Centralism in the 1968 Statutes of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia* (1979)
7. Vladimír Klokočka: *The Position of the Individual in the System of "Real Socialism"* (1979)
8. Jiří Kosta: *History and Concept of the Czechoslovak Economic Reform (1965–1969)* (1979)
9. Radoslav Selucký: *Consumer Orientation and Political Development in the ČSSR in the 1960s* (1980)
10. Radoslav Selucký: *The Development of Concepts of Planning in Czechoslovakia (1945–1968)* (1980)
11. Karel Kovanda: *Experiences with Democratic Self-Management in Czechoslovak Enterprises during 1968* (1980)
12. Miloš Hájek: *The Development of the Internal Regime in the International Communist Movement and in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (1919–1968)* (1980)
13. Josef Pokštefl: *The Revival of the Theory of Division and Supervision of Power during the "Prague Spring"* (1980)
14. J. Präger [Jaroslav Klofáč]: *Changes in the Social Structure of Czechoslovakia between 1945–1980* (1980)
15. Zdeněk Strmiska: *The Social System and Structural Contradictions in Societies of the Soviet Type* (1980)
16. Dušan Havlíček: *The Mass Media in Czechoslovakia in 1956–1968* (1980)
17. Erazim Kohák: *The Philosophic Significance of the Czechoslovak Spring of 1968* (1981)
18. Jana Neumannová: *The Cultural Policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1956* (1981)

culturale in Cecoslovacchia dal 1945 al 1980. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 185–210; HODIC, Josef: *Opinioni politico-militari correnti nell'esercito cecoslovacco negli anni tra il 1948 e il 1968*. In: *Ibid.*, pp. 211–236). The second study – in spite of having been written by a collaborator of the State Security – contains the important "Memorandum of the Military Political Academy" of 1968. Five other volumes translated by Antonetti (by Mlynář, Kosta, Kovanda, Kohák and Liehm) were published much earlier in the collection: LEONCINI, Francesco (ed.): *Che cosa fu la „Primavera di Praga“? Idee e progetti di una riforma politica e sociale*. Bari – Roma, Manduria 1989 (there is also a re-edition: Venezia, Libreria Editrice Cafoscaria 2007).

19. Vratislav Pěchota: *Policy of the Possible: The Strategy of the Prague Spring in Regard to European Security and Cooperation* (1981)
20. Friedrich Levčík: *Czechoslovakia: Economic Performance in the Post-Reform Period and Prospects for the 1980s* (1981)
21. Zdeněk Strmiska: *The Social System and Structural Contradictions in Societies of the Soviet Type* (1981–1982)
22. Antonín J. Liehm: *From Culture to Politics* (1981)
23. Jiří Pelikán: *The International Workers' Movement and the "Prague Spring," and Other Attempts to Reforms the Soviet Model of Society* (1981)
24. Květoslav Chvatík: *Czechoslovak Cultural Policy 1945–1980* (1982)
25. Jan Skála [Jan Pauer]: *The Defeat of the "Prague Spring": From the Intervention in August 1968 to the Restoration of a Bureaucratic Power System* (1982)²⁰⁵

In spite of all attempts made, only four of the studies were ultimately produced by authors from Prague²⁰⁶ and Czech versions of the texts remained practically unknown. Mlynář, for instance, included his study titled "Představy o politickém pluralismu v politice KSČ roku 1968" ["Ideas on Political Pluralism in the Policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1968] in the collection of his essays *Problémy politického systému* [Problems of the Political System]²⁰⁷ only in 1987;

205 As to the total number of volumes, Mlynář himself claimed, on two occasions, that there were 28 of them, with both lists being introduced by the very same sentence: "Between 1979 and 1981, altogether 23 studies on the following topics were written"; in both cases, the lists contain an additional three volumes (25. Jiří Hájek: *Mezinárodní souvislosti čs. politiky roku 1968* [The International Contexts of the Czechoslovak Development in 1968]; 26. Anon. [Erika Kadlecová]: *Círky v Československu 1968* [Churches in Czechoslovakia 1968]; 28. Zdeněk Mlynář: "Pražské jaro" 1968 a současná krize politických systémů sovětského typu: Československo 1968 – Polsko 1981) [The "Prague Spring 1968" and the Contemporary Crisis of Soviet-Type Political Systems: Czechoslovakia 1968 – Poland 1981], which probably were never distributed (see Úvodní poznámky [Opening Notes]. In: MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistů na volné noze*), pp. 141–144, here p. 142 n.; STRMISKA, Zdeněk: *Sociální systém a strukturální rozpory společnosti sovětského typu* [The Social System and Structural Discrepancies of Soviet-Type Societies]. Cologne, Index 1983, Introduction, p. 5 n.). Annexes to the final report of the project provide information that permits a reconstruction of the assumed sequence of the last seven studies: "24. Lubomír Sochor: *The Ideology of 'Real Socialism' as a Type of Conservative Thought*; 25. Květoslav Chvatík: *Cultural Policy of the CPCz, 1945–1980*; 26. Vladimír Klokočka: *The Evolution of the Electoral System in Czechoslovakia*; 27. Jan Skála: *The 'Normalisation' Policy of the CPCz after 1969*; 28. Jiří Hájek: *The International Contexts of the Czechoslovak Development in 1968*; 29. Erika Kadlecová: *Churches in Czechoslovakia in 1968*; 30. Zdeněk Mlynář: *The Prague Spring 1968 and the Contemporary Crisis of the Soviet-Type Political System (Czechoslovakia 1968 – Poland 1981)*." (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář's and Pelikán's "Report on the "Experience of the 'Prague Spring 1968' Research Project," 10 December 1981, Appendix No. 1.) Czech (unpublished) copies of most of the volumes are kept in Mlynář's NA fund (Part 2, k. 23 and 24).

206 Other works that were not made use of are found in Mlynář's NA fund (Part 2, k. 38).

207 MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Problémy politického systému*, pp. 9–39 – see Footnote 13.

however, most of the texts were never published in any of the official channels.²⁰⁸ On the other hand, the principal political objective seemed to have been fulfilled, as the project, in the opinion of its initiators, “has contributed to circles of the West European Left gradually adopting a critical view on and shedding illusions about Soviet-type socio-political systems. The project naturally cannot make political parties actually reflect the project’s outcome in their official policies, but it has helped influence the way of thinking of individuals and smaller groups, even within Communist Parties.”

He goes on to say: “Profound changes on the left part of the political spectrum have posed a certain problem; the project’s orientation on Euro-Communist Parties has unnecessarily reduced the community of potentially interested subjects among the West European Left. Except for the Communist Party of Italy, most of the communist addressees belong to groups which are regarded as ‘dissidents’ within their own parties [...] and in France, for instance, most of them have already been expelled from the Communist Party.”

And finally: “On the other hand, there has been a growing level of interest in the project’s deliverables among groups of non-Communists [...] and also among Socialists, particularly in France and Germany.”²⁰⁹

According to the plan, the end of the project was to coincide with a large final congress; in February 1981, Mlynář reminded the other members of the board that “the seminar will probably be a culmination of sorts of the whole project, which will conclude its activities in 1982. Basically all planned topics – if their authors have firmly promised to deliver them – will have been published in the form of studies, which means that the project will comprise some 25 studies and a book of proceedings from the seminar. [...] We will also have the opportunity to publish in Czech (and then deliver to Czechoslovakia) at least two collections of selected texts of the project (and perhaps also the proceedings of the seminar) at the Index Publishing House.”²¹⁰

In the light of the overall outcome, it is not so important that the idea of publishing two collections of selected texts of the project in Czech never materialised – one of the reasons probably being that the board ultimately preferred only the publication

208 They were occasionally published after 1989 (see, for instance, KOSTA, Jiří: K historii a koncepci československé ekonomické reformy v letech 1965–1969 [On the History and Concept of the Czechoslovak Economic Reform in the Years 1965–1969]. In: *Acta Oeconomica Pragensia*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2005), pp. 27–47).

209 MLYNÁŘ, Z. – PELIKÁN, J.: Report on the “Experience of the Prague Spring 1968” Research Project – see Footnote 185.

210 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 19, Mlynář’s Report “To Members of the Board of the ‘Experience of the Prague Spring 1968’ Research Project,” 27 February 1981. See also Mlynář’s subsequent proposal titled “Draft Concept of the ‘Prague Spring 1968 – Polish Autumn 1980’ Seminar” (*Ibid.*).

of the seminar proceedings and one complete study (Strmiska's) at the Index Publishing House.²¹¹

These promisingly developing projects could have been dealt a heavy blow by the abovementioned affair of Josef Hodic, who had received a lot of confidential information from Mlynář; the latter thus decided to provide a detailed explanation of the matter. The lengthy report for exile circles has already been cited here on several occasions.²¹² Nevertheless, Mlynář wrote another, much shorter memo for the board of the project, in which he announced that he had more or less confirmed to Hodic that “the main source of funding perhaps must be the German SPD.”²¹³ Sometime later, Mlynář found “things which were perhaps meant to prove that I was spying for Eastern intelligence services”²¹⁴ in his apartment in Vienna. It is certainly by no coincidence that Mlynář's lengthy account has also been preserved as a translation into German dated 25 July 1981, together with a letter addressed to Bruno Kreisky dated 5 July. In the latter, Mlynář cautiously indicated that, under the circumstances, the support of the Austrian Chancellor might be used against him. In his reply dated 14 August, however, Kreisky reconfirmed his trust; he likewise confirmed he intervened on Mlynář's behalf with German Chancellor Willy Brandt in order to prevent the matter from having any further consequences.²¹⁵

The final act of the project took place on 22 and 23 October 1981 in Paris, in the Medici Hall of the Senate of the French Republic, under the title “Lessons Learned from the Prague Spring 1968 and Current Perspectives on the Democratic Development of Socialism: An International Seminar Organised by the Group of Czechoslovak Researchers on the Experience of the Prague Spring 1968 and the Committee for the Defence of Liberties in Czechoslovakia in Paris, 22 and 23 October 1981” [originally *Les Leçons du Printemps de Prague 1968 et les Perspectives Actuelles du Développement Démocratique du Socialisme: Colloque International organisé par le Groupe de Recherches Tchécoslovaques sur les expériences du Printemps de Prague et par le Comité de Défense des Libertés en Tchécoslovaquie, à Paris, les 22 et 23 octobre 1981*].²¹⁶ It was attended by more than 200 people, of whom 180 were “representatives of

211 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář's Letter to Adolf Müller, 20 January 1981; Part 2, k. 7, Mlynář's Letter to Adolf Müller, 8 July 1982; Part 2, k. 13, Report on the Progress of the Research Project as of 1 June 1981 and Outlooks for 1982, 21 May 1981.

212 *Ibid.* Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář's “Information on the Case of Josef Hodic.”

213 This memo of Mlynář is also titled “Information on the Case of Josef Hodic” and is dated 25 September 1981 (*Ibid.*).

214 See *Ibid.*, Part 1, k. 1, Mlynář's Letter to Count Richard Belcredi, 15 May 1981. Belcredi was one of the principal sponsors of the well-known exile conferences in Franken. This particular case is described in Mlynář's text “Amendment to the ‘Information on the Case of Josef Hodic,’” dated 10 December 1981, which explains the finding of suspicious papers with encrypted texts in his apartment on 18 March 1981. These were suspect documents the purpose of which probably was to discredit him and which Mlynář handed over to the Austrian Ministry of the Interior (*Ibid.*, Part 4, k. 18).

215 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 1, Mlynář's Letter to Kreisky, 5 July 1981, and Kreisky's Letter to Mlynář, 14 August 1981.

216 See also <http://histoire-sociale1.univ-paris1.fr/Document/Lit.htm> (downloaded on 16 April 2013).

various political and ideological trends of the West European Left: from Socialists and Social Democrats to Euro-Communists and other left-wing groups, such as the Italian 'Il Manifesto,' representatives of the Trotskyist orientation and non-affiliated left-wing intellectuals."²¹⁷

Bruno Schacherl commented on the seminar on the pages of the *Rinascita* journal, where he interpreted it as an indication of "deep interest in unity of the European Left," praised its outcome and atmosphere, and stressed that "what was noticed by all observers of the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 has been confirmed: the crucial role of intellectuals in the new trend. And not any intellectuals at that – Marxist and Communist intellectuals; we should perhaps say Euro-Communists *ante litteram*, which is, after all, how some of them call themselves."²¹⁸

The proceedings of the congress published by the Index Publishing House²¹⁹ were disseminated to a broad audience, and there were also German and French versions.²²⁰ In a report in English written by Mlynář and Pelikán, the conference was described as a great success, although the authors regretted the low attendance of Italian Communists (probably caused by the intervention of Soviet and French Communists). They saw the main current problem of European Communist Parties in an ongoing loss of the influence of unorthodox groups, the inability to overcome the vision that socialist states could be reformed "from above," and concerns about opposition movements, generally perceived as a threat. On the other hand, they regarded the success of French Socialists, who, having won the election, had put together a government, as very important, regretting that they had not chosen that party as their cooperation partner when organising the conference.²²¹ A comprehensive financial report on the project has been preserved as well: the total amount

217 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: Československo 1968 – Polsko 1981 [Czechoslovakia 1968 – Poland 1981]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (February 1982), pp. 58–60, here p. 58.

218 SCHACHERL, Bruno: *Praga '68 a la sinistra europea*. In: *Rinascita*, Vol. 38, No. 44 (1981), p. 38. Gianlorenzo Pacini, on the other hand, appreciated the "very numerous and qualified" attendance and highlighted that the liveliest disputes had concerned the role of Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which some of the debaters had still thought "capable of positive development" (PACINI, Gianlorenzo: Praga, tredici anni dopo. In: *La Nazione*, 14 November 1981). And, finally, Pelikán presented the congress in the French media (see PELIKÁN, Jiří: Prague – Varsovie – Paris. In: *Le Monde*, 3 November 1981).

219 *Československo 1968 – Polsko 1981 a krize sovětských systémů: Sborník z mezinárodního semináře v Paříži v říjnu 1981* [Czechoslovakia 1968 – Poland 1981 and the Crisis of Soviet Systems: Proceedings of the International Seminar in Paris in October 1981]. Cologne, Index 1983. The volume contained only a small part of the texts presented at the congress (refer also to NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 19, Mlynář's Letter to Šik, 4 January 1982, and many other documents concerning the preparation of the seminar).

220 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk (ed.): *"Der Prager Frühling": Ein wissenschaftliches Symposium*. Köln/R., Bund-Verlag 1983; MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk – PELIKÁN, Jiří (ed.): *Budapest, Prague, Varsovie: Le Printemps de Prague quinze ans après*. Paris, La Decouverte – Maspero 1983.

221 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 13, Report on the International Conference "The Lessons of Prague Spring 1968 and the Contemporary Prospects for a Democratic Development of Socialism" (October 22–23 1981 in Paris), 10 December 1981.

remitted to two accounts in Cologne and Munich (the second one was used to fund the Italian version) was close to 400,000 German Marks.²²²

The “Crises in Soviet-Type Systems” Project

The second project, “Crises in Soviet-Type Systems,” started getting shape as early as the second half of 1981 this was so not just because of the new situation in Poland, but also because of changes in the community of addressees: “The existing focus on Euro-Communist Parties would, however, be changed; more specifically, it would be broadened to include Socialist Parties (especially in France) and Social Democratic Parties (especially in the Federal Republic of Germany – the left wing of the SPD),” stated the progress report of the first project when describing outlooks for next year.²²³ The new project, which was expected to span the 1982 to 1985 period, got off to a quick start. It was to have a new board composed of Czechoslovak, Polish and Hungarian researchers in exile (Włodzimierz Brus, Ferenc Fehér, Agnes Heller, Pierre Kende, Jiří Kosta, Jiří Pelikán, Aleksander Smolar, Lubomír Sochor and Zdeněk Strmiska later indeed took part in its activities) and a similar structure (although there were to be two seminars and selected works were to be published also in Czech, Polish, Hungarian and Russian). Its orientation was characterised as follows:

“The common objective of research studies to be undertaken in the framework of the project is to present an analysis of crisis phenomena and forms of their overcoming in Soviet Bloc countries, to show system-resident causes which trigger the crises over and over again, and to justify the necessity of implementing system changes in the future (the necessity of doing away with totalitarian features of the systems). The research will cover the post-1956 period, its basic focus being the current state of Soviet-type systems and their evolution perspectives during the 1980s. Attention will be paid primarily to Central European countries of the Soviet Bloc: Poland, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic; however, the reality of the Soviet Union as the country from

²²² The payments remitted to these accounts were as follows: 19,200 and 50,800 German Marks in 1979; 71,900 and 28,100 German Marks in 1980; 88,500 and 51,500 German Marks in 1981 (plus 15,000 German Marks as a “special subsidy for the Index Publishing House”); 24,500 and 30,000 German Marks in 1982 (plus 15,000 German Marks as a “special subsidy for the Index Publishing House”). The costs of the organisation of the Paris seminar alone were almost 50,000 German Marks. (See *Ibid.*, Appendix No. 3, Financial Report.)

²²³ *Ibid.*, Report on the Progress of the Research Project as of 1 June 1981 and Outlooks for 1982, 21 May 1981. Sometime later, the interest of the *Listy* group in China started growing as well. Pelikán arranged several important visits and documents of the project were regularly sent to China (see *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 31, Pelikán’s “Preliminary Report on the Visit to China”; Part 2, k. 13, Mlynář’s “Notes on Sino-Soviet Relations,” 20 February 1983).

which the socio-political system was ‘exported’ from and which is the principal power guarantor of its existence in Central Europe will also be studied.”

It continued: “Politically, the project is expected to contribute to overcoming remnants of illusions about the so-called ‘real socialism,’ in particular among the West European Left, and to help furnish evidence that Soviet-type systems cannot be a positive alternative to the evolution of present Western societies.”²²⁴

The new board started working very soon. It divided the research work into six thematic groups (each had its own head), expecting that three or four studies would be published as early as in 1982. At the same time, a new directory of recipients was to be prepared, this time “with a greater emphasis on the German language region.”²²⁵ There was also a plan to organise an international symposium titled “The Soviet Bloc after Brezhnev” some time in 1984 in Milan, for which presentations had already been prepared (they were later published as the fifth volume of the project’s edition), but the political situation of Italian left-wing parties did not allow that. Consequently, there was no other option but to look for another left-wing organisation capable and willing to take over the organisational arrangements of the congress.²²⁶ However, the publication rate of the studies fell very short of the initial intentions, as some authors did not submit their manuscripts at all, and the project also did not succeed in reducing the “unilateral prevalence of Czechoslovak authors.” The first studies were thus distributed only in 1983.²²⁷ The slow start of the project was also probably caused by Mlynář’s serious personal crisis that he found himself in after surgery in 1982 and which he overcame with difficulty only after psychiatric treatment.²²⁸ In any case, the slow start “resulted in substantial

224 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 15 (copy: Part 2, k. 21), Research Project: “Crises in Soviet-Type Systems.” A Proposal of the Thematic Focus of Research Activities, which Will Be Discussed and Elaborated in Detail by the Board of the Project, 23 September 1982.

225 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 14, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of the “Crises in Soviet-Type Systems” Research Project Held in Paris on 30 January 1982.

226 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 15, The “Evolution Possibilities of Soviet-Type Systems in the 1980s” International Symposium; Part 2, k. 14, Minutes of the Meetings of the Board Held on 19 November 1983 and 17 March 1984. The second document contains the following sentence: “Given the current discordant relations between the Socialists and Communists in Italy, it is hardly possible, now or in the future, to count on the symposium being organised in cooperation with both of them.”

227 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 14, Minutes of the Meetings of the Board Held on 19 June 1982, 9 October 1982, 8 January 1983 and 19 November 1983. The “Progress Report of the Project as of 1 October 1983” states that, compared to the first project, “delays in the fulfilment of the plan of studies are more frequent and there are greater difficulties with respect to the coordination of the work of the authors” (*Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 15).

228 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 3, the untitled personal text cited above; Part 2, k. 4, Irena Dubská’s Letter to Zdeněk Strmiska, 5 September 1983; Part 2, k. 6, Mlynář’s Letter to Strmiska, 9 August 1983. At the time, organisational matters of the project were taken over by Zdeněk Strmiska. (See also MINK, Georges: Zdeněk Strmiska ve Francii [Zdeněk Strmiska in France]. In: *Sociologický časopis*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2009), pp. 426–428; a former colleague in France also mentioned the group’s extensive work “which is still waiting to become a subject of interest of a doctoral candidate.”)

savings in the ‘project’s’ budget,” thanks to which it was possible to plan international symposiums without any additional subsidies.

The March 1983 letter which Mlynář and Pelikán sent to potentially interested parties and individuals outlined the principal directions of the new project, while the project that was about to end was described as follows: “A group of Czechoslovak researchers living in the West since 1968 has already published approximately 25 studies on the Czechoslovak attempt to reform the Soviet-type socio-political system in the framework of the project ‘Experience of the Prague Spring 1968.’ You have already received most of the studies and you will receive the rest in the next few months. The purpose of the project was to provide more detailed information to all in the West – in both political and academic circles – who were interested in the attempt, the conditions which had allowed its (short-lived) success, and the causes of its failure.” It was explicitly promised that the studies of the new project “[would] be printed rather than photocopied”²²⁹ and that they “will be distributed free of charge, just as in the case of the project which is being concluded right now.”²³⁰

It was quite a radical change, but consistent with Mlynář’s new concept. The “homemade samizdat” of sorts had developed into cooperation with one of the most important Czechoslovak publishing houses working in exile. Nevertheless, the series of studies produced by the project remained outside regular editions and its volumes were not available in the regular book market. In his recap of activities of Index’s activities, publisher Adolf Müller also included them in a special category, adding that they were sent to “universities, research centres, and other institutions and private individuals all over the world.”²³¹ Mlynář later explained his concept of dissemination of the project’s results as follows: “During the eight years since the start of the first project, ‘Experience of the Prague Spring 1968’ (1979–1982), till the end of the current project, ‘Crises in Soviet-Type Systems,’ a relatively stable

229 See the final report of Adolf Müller about the activities of his publishing house, titled “Report on the Activities of Index Publishing House from 1971 to 1989,” which was reprinted in: PREČAN, Vilém: Ke spolupráci dvou posrpnových exilových nakladatelství: Korespondence z let 1971–1987 s dodatky z roku 1996 [On the Cooperation of Two Post-August Exile Publishing Houses: Correspondence of the Years 1971–1987, with Amendments added in 1996]. In: *Ročenka Československého dokumentačního střediska 2003* [Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Documentation Centre 2003]. Praha, Československé dokumentační středisko 2004, pp. 53–134, the report is on pp. 127–134 (especially p. 134).

230 A copy of the letter is available in the fund of Luciano Antonetti (2.3, 001, The “Spring” project of Z. Mlynář).

231 MÜLLER, A.: Report on the Activities of Index Publishing House from 1971 to 1989, p. 133. Müller regularly received substantial sums of money. The average costs of one volume of the Project were about 4,000 German Marks per language version; in exceptional cases, the costs climbed up to 12,000 German Marks (see NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 1, Documents on the Finances and Accounting of Index Publishing House). As to relations with Index (including some financial problems), see also correspondence available in Mlynář’s NA fund (Part 2, k. 22) and invoices for translations connected to each of the studies (Part 2, k. 7).

community of about 2,000 subscribers of studies published in the framework of the projects had developed.”²³²

As also indicated by the selection of languages in which the volumes were published – German (black jacket), English (red jacket) and French (blue jacket) – the project leaders’ first priority till the end of the 1980s – as we are yet going to see – was to maintain ties with the community they wanted to influence through the projects. Not even on this occasion were the texts disseminated in Czech; they were not so much interested in presenting the outcome of the project at the book market or in samizdat form circulating in Czechoslovakia and other countries. As late as the autumn of 1984, the project “Crises in Soviet-Type Systems” was expected to produce 20 to 25 publications.²³³ At the end of the day, only the following came into being:

1. Włodzimierz Brus – Pierre Kende – Zdeněk Mlynář: *“Normalisation” Processes in Soviet-Dominated Central Europe: Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland* (1982)
2. Zdeněk Mlynář: *Relative Stabilisation of the Soviet Systems in the 1970s* (1983)
3. Karel Kaplan: *Political Persecution in Czechoslovakia, 1948–1972* (1983)
4. Lubomír Sochor: *Contribution to an Analysis of the Conservative Features of the Ideology of “Real Socialism”* (1984)
5. Włodzimierz Brus – Pierre Kende – Zdeněk Mlynář: *The Soviet Systems after Brezhnev* (1984)
6. Ferenc Fehér – Agnes Hellerová: *Eastern Europe under the Shadow of a New Rapallo* (1984)
7. Radoslav Selucký: *The Present Dilemma of Soviet-East European Integration* (1985)
8. Jiří Kosta – Bedřich Levčik: *Economic Crisis in the East European CMEA Countries* (1985)
9. Dušan Havlíček – Pierre Kende: *Public Information in the Soviet Political Systems* (1985)
10. Ferenc Fehér – Agnes Hellerová: *Eastern Left: Western Left: A Contribution to the Morphology of a Problematic Relationship* (1985)
11. Karel Kaplan: *The Overcoming of the Regime-Crisis after Stalin’s Death in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary* (1986)
12. Maria Hirszowiczová – Patrick Michel – Georges Mink: *The Crisis: Problems in Poland, Part 1* (1986)
- 12a. Krzysztof Mreła – Jan Zielonka: *The Crisis-Problems in Poland, Part 2* (1988)²³⁴
13. Gert-Joachim Glaessner: *Bureaucratic Rule: Overcoming Conflicts in the GDR* (1986)
14. Zagorka Golubovičová – Svetozar Stojanović: *The Crisis of the Yugoslav System* (1986)

232 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 20, Mlynář’s “Proposal for Continuing Work after the Conclusion of Work on the ‘Crises in Soviet-Type Systems’ in the New Form of a Discussion Forum Titled ‘Reforms in Soviet-Type Systems,’” 14 July 1987.

233 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 14, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board Held on 29 April 1984.

234 The volume was published only in English (see *Ibid.*, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board Held on 11 April 1986).

- 15.–16. Zdeněk Strmiska: *Change and Stagnation in Soviet-Type Societies: A Theoretical Framework for Analysis* (1989)
- 17.–18. Aleksander Smolar – Pierre Kende: *The Role of the Opposition: The Role of Opposition Groups on the Eve of Democratisation in Poland and Hungary (1987–1988)* (1989)

Some of the studies were later published separately and in other languages.²³⁵ Mlynář himself published Czech versions of his texts “Normalizace v Československu po roce 1968” [Normalisation in Czechoslovakia after 1968] (from the first volume) and “Od Brežněva ke Gorbačovovi: Vývojové možnosti politického systému v sovětském bloku po Brežněvovi” [From Brezhnev to Gorbachev: Evolution Possibilities of the Political System in the Soviet Bloc after Brezhnev] (from the fifth volume) in the book *Problémy politického systému* already cited above.²³⁶ Moreover, the latter study is more or less identical with one chapter of the most elaborate analysis of Soviet-type systems, which Mlynář presented at the beginning of the second project, in the book *Krize v sovětských systémech 1953–1971* [Crises in Soviet Systems 1953–1971].²³⁷

Subsequent developments were dramatically affected by the new situation in Moscow after Mikhail Gorbachev’s election to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 11 March 1985. Mlynář immediately commented on it in the *Listy* journal: “We are going to write a lot about what started with Mikhail Gorbachev’s arrival to the Kremlin. [...] The state of stagnation and agony, the funeral-to-funeral policy producing feelings of uncertainty and apathy, are over.”²³⁸ The board of the project had a similar view: “[...] previous stagnation is over. However, the developments so far cannot yet be regarded as reform steps. Nevertheless, we are in a situation that may develop into an attempt

235 See, for instance, HAVLÍČEK, Dušan: Veřejná informace v sovětských politických systémech [Public Information in the Soviet Political System]. In: WOLÁK, Radim – KÖPPLOVÁ, Barbara (ed.): *Česká média a česká společnost v 60. letech* [Czech Media and Czech Society in the 1960s]. Praha, Radioservis 2008, pp. 115–167.

236 MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Problémy politického systému*, pp. 40–64 and 65–75 – see Footnote 13. For instance, some studies were published in German in MEYER, Thomas – MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk (ed.): *Die Krise des Sowjetsystems und der Westen: Ökonomie, Ideologie, Politik und die Perspektiven der Ost- West-Beziehungen*. Köln/R., Bund-Verlag 1986.

237 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *Krize v sovětských systémech 1953–1981: Příspěvek k teoretické analýze* [Crises in Soviet Systems 1953–1981: A Contribution to the Theoretical Analysis]. Kolín n/R., Index 1983 (the book was published in a reworked edition after November 1989; IDEM: *Krize v sovětských systémech od Stalina ke Gorbačovovi* [Crises in Soviet Systems from Stalin to Gorbachev]. Praha, Prospektum 1991). At the same time, a German edition appeared: *Krisen und Krisenbewältigung im Sowjetblock*. Köln/R. – Wien, Bund-Verlag 1983. It was a work which Mlynář wrote while working at the Austrian Institute for International Policy (see NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 15, Zwischenbericht über den Fortgang der Arbeiten im Rahmen des Forschungsprojektes, 25 September 1981).

238 Z. Mlynář: Stagnace končí [The Stagnation Is Over]. In: *Listy*, Vol. 15, No. 26 (April 1985), pp. 1–2.

at a reform of the system.”²³⁹ The situation caused a lot of problems for the project, which we are now able to trace back and reconstruct: by early September 1985, nine studies had already been published and an additional six (three of which contained very long texts) were in the process of translation. Due to the fast-paced developments in the Soviet Union, as a result of which some of the publications seemed obsolescent, some 30 studies were to be published by the end of 1987. As for their distribution, it was continuously highlighted that the number of subscribers had grown considerably (from about 1,500 to around 2,000 two years later).²⁴⁰ Although the number may look impressive, it is clear that it was a “virtual” group of subscribers; for instance, Mlynář’s archive contains a list of studies available in all three language versions as late as 31 October 1985, by which time nine studies had already been published. It is easy to find that it was the German version which the subscribers were interested in the most, but it is definitely impossible to say that the studies disappeared from the shelves in a few months.²⁴¹

Various presentations and speeches at congresses, particularly at those organised by Zdeněk Mlynář in Freudenberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, together with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (*Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*), which was close to the West German Social Democrats, constituted an important part of the project. The first of these events, “The Analysis of Soviet Systems and Possibilities of Their Development,” took place on 13 to 16 June 1985; the second one, “The Reform Policy of M. Gorbachev – A Potential Way Out of the Crisis,” took place two years later, from 22 to 25 October 1987. It is worth mentioning, *inter alia*, that different internal documents prepared on these occasions (and especially for the first symposium) also highlighted apart from important relations with West German Social Democrats that interest was likewise shown by Italian Communists.²⁴²

The total number of studies published by the end of the second project, which was much more comparative than the first one, was 16; three of them were twice as extensive as the rest. There was a clear re-orientation to a German-speaking audience, which was obvious as early as during the first of the symposiums, in 1985 and was later also reflected in the general nature of the work of the team of authors. An October 1984 report on progress stated that “the political objective of the symposium is to help overcome (or at least help discuss) the illusions about the possibilities of reform-Communist developments in the Soviet Bloc, so widespread among the Left in Western Europe, and efforts of the ‘Ostpolitik’ to bypass or suppress uncomfortable political problems related thereto.”²⁴³ A year

239 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 14, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board Held on 27 September 1985.

240 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 20, Progress Reports of the “Project” as of 1 October 1983, 1 October 1984 and 1 September 1985.

241 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 22.

242 See *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 15, Report on the International Symposium in Freudenberg, 13 to 16 June 1985.

243 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 20, Progress Report of the “Project” as of 1 October 1984.

later, a similar report mentioned that “the connection of the ‘project’ with the West German SPD has been strengthened,”²⁴⁴ and, later still, that it was the SPD representatives themselves who “intentionally did not want any publicity at this time.”²⁴⁵

The Final Report of the project of August 1987 stated that more than 20 studies had been prepared between 1982 and 1987 (although some of them were published only after the Final Report) and that the two abovementioned symposiums organised in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation had taken place. In addition, the report points out that the developments in the Soviet Union had necessitated a change in the initial concept of the project which, however, “has achieved its principal objective in relation to the Left in Western Europe.” It seems that it produced the greatest response in Italy, “thanks to cooperation with the Communist Party of Italy and also the Socialist Party (or, more especially, their media). Representatives of both parties attend international symposiums organised by the ‘Project,’ and the ‘Project’s’ studies and authors are promoted in the press.”²⁴⁶

In this respect, it is worth mentioning that, according to the report cited below, the “Crises in Soviet-type Systems” project sponsored two conferences about the Prague Spring in 1988 – one in Freudenberg, organised in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the other in Bologna, organised by the Gramsci Institute, the Gramsci Foundation and the Pietro Nenni Foundation²⁴⁷ – by the fairly substantial sum of 15,000 German Marks. The report comments on the later event with satisfaction: “The symposium drew extraordinary attention from the Italian press, mainly because of two reasons; it was the first event in 20 years which was jointly organised by the Italian Communist Party and the [Italian] Soc[ialist] Party [...] and, second, Alexander Dubček sent his written contribution to the conference.”²⁴⁸

However, a proposal for a new project had already been presented a few months earlier. Compared to previous projects, it had a radically changed structure, its objective being to establish a discussion forum titled “Reforms in Soviet-type Systems.” Zdeněk Mlynář’s proposal first mentioned that “a relatively stable

244 *Ibid.*, Progress Report of the “Project” as of 1 September 1985.

245 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Report on the Meeting Held on the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the “Prague Spring” in Freudenberg, 20 April 1988.

246 The report specifically lists the *Ottavo giorno*, *Mondo operaio* and *Rinascita* magazines (see *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 22, Final Report of the “Crises in Soviet Systems” Research Project, 25 August 1987).

247 See the collection of the studies *La Primavera di Praga vent’anni dopo*, which was published in 1988 as a double issue (11–12) of the *Transizione* journal.

248 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 22, Report on the Progress of the Research Project in 1988, 10 August 1988. The report also explained the reasons why some of the studies had not been published (some had not been submitted, others had become obsolete because of rapid developments in the Soviet Union). See also *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 8, Report on the Meeting Held on the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the “Prague Spring” in Freudenberg, 20 April 1988, and Minutes of the Meeting of Members of the Board Held on the Same Day.

community of about 2,000 subscribers of studies published by the projects has been established” in the eight years from the start of the first project to the end of the second one, and later highlighted that “the interest of the stable circle of subscribers to studies produced by the research projects so far has recently been focused on monitoring current developments in the Soviet Union and basically also in the entire Soviet Bloc, in connection with the new reform line represented by M. Gorbachev.” It was not only the subscribers that the new situation was affecting; it also reduced authors’ options and required new forms of activities. As Mlynář wrote, “authors contributing to the current research projects are now unable to produce erudite scientific monographs on topical development issues, as the situation in Soviet Bloc countries is fluid. The present style of work – i.e. to publish monographic studies in the framework of a research project – is therefore no longer tenable.”²⁴⁹

For this reason, it seemed more effective to change the activities of the group and transform it into one of the protagonists of debates within the left-wing movement in Western Europe. To this end, a number of discussion symposiums were to be organised, followed by the publication of volumes containing the results of these events, still in three language versions for the existing community of subscribers (the annual costs were estimated at 80,000 German Marks). Of particular interest is the fact that Mlynář believed, even in the late 1980s, that the distribution of publications on his own was “the only possible way to retain the existing community of about 2,000 regular subscribers in the West and contacts with the Soviet Block countries mentioned earlier. If the publication were transferred into the hands of regular publishing houses – they [the published volumes] would make their way to bookshops, but not to the stable community of subscribers to the research projects undertaken so far.”

The conclusion of the project’s creators at that time may seem almost unreal now, but it proves how uncertain the development of the socialist system, which was soon to collapse, almost painlessly, then was: “Such a discussion forum format would be possible and allow us to work for at least three years (1988–1990). Around 1990, the situation within the Soviet Bloc will probably be more stabilised, and then it would be possible to consider other forms of activities.”²⁵⁰ However, by that time the international situation started moving rapidly forward; in the autumn of 1988, Alexander Dubček visited Italy, where he received an honorary doctorate in political science in Bologna, again drawing all the attention of the European Left.²⁵¹ It is symptomatic that his attitude to émigrés was very reserved; he did not meet with Mlynář at all, and had only a brief meeting with Pelikán,

249 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 20, Mlynář’s “Proposal for a Continuation of Work after the Completion of the ‘Crises in Soviet-Type Systems’ Research Project in the New Form of a Discussion Forum Titled ‘Reforms in Soviet-Type Systems,’” 14 July 1987.

250 *Ibid.*

251 See ANTONETTI, Luciano: Alexander Dubček v Itálii. Symbol “pražského jara” po dvaceti letech [Alexander Dubček in Italy. The “Prague Spring” Symbol after 20 Years]. In: *Soudobé dějiny*, Vol. 15, No. 3–4 (2008), pp. 670–685, REIMAN, Michal: Setkání s Alexandrem

which the latter, then a member of the European Parliament, bitterly commented on as follows: “What the Czechoslovak authorities did not succeed in – in isolating me – they managed to accomplish. It makes one feel like throwing up [...]” Dubček’s tactics allegedly counted on “his own way,” as “he has contacts with the Big Brother and he believes that they will need him again one of these days. This is why he keeps a low profile.”²⁵² The unification of the former “party of the expelled” was made impossible once again.

The 1989 progress report of the project shows that the fast-paced political developments made the board reconsider the publication of some studies that had already been completed. At the same time, its members regarded the format of one discussion seminar a year as very flexible. However, they dropped the idea of changing the name of the project, as “changing the ‘trademark’ of the project would make matters complicated and unclear.” Various events in 1989 were thus held under the same heading, including the new symposium, “Legal State in Soviet-Type Societies,” in Fraudenberg. On that occasion, texts were also translated into Russian, because “the event was attended by a number of representatives of Soviet Bloc countries (the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary), both officials and those from the ranks of critical groups,” including Gorbachev’s advisor Evgeny A. Ambartsumov.²⁵³ That could be interpreted as “the next step on the way of our project to the countries which the studies deal with,” which “could also be significant for the future (in particular, for instance, in the case of the personal involvement of the project’s members in reform policies in their respective homelands).”²⁵⁴ It seems that Mlynář sent a “letter with a sentence to the effect that, due to the developments in Russia, Euro-Communists do not stand a chance, and he advocated a clear orientation to the Socialist International” also to kindred opposition circles at home. According to Miloš Hájek, Mlynář’s contacts with Prague, which allegedly “went through some embassies,” were a known fact.²⁵⁵

Although the strategy of the project’s team and its supporters still seemed promising at that stage, the following months showed that the assumptions were more or less illusory.

Dubčekem ve Vídni v listopadu 1988 [The Meeting with Alexander Dubček in Vienna in November 1988]. In: *Soudobé dějiny*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2002), pp. 136–146.

252 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 7, Pelikán’s Letter to Mlynář, 23 November 1988 [with a hand-written note saying “destroy after reading”].

253 *Ibid.*, Part 2, k. 14, Report on the Progress of the Research Project in 1989. By mid-1990, there was still a sum of 71,510 German Marks in the project’s account (*Ibid.*, Financial and Accounting Report for the Period from 20 June 1989 to 30 June 1990).

254 *Ibid.*, Report on the International Symposium in Freudenberg, 17 to 19 May 1989.

255 See VANĚK, Miroslav – URBÁŠEK, Pavel (ed.): *Vítězové? Poražení? Životopisná interview*, sv. 1: *Disent v období tzv. normalizace* [Winners? Losers? Biographic Interviews, Vol. 1: The Dissent during the So-Called Normalisation Era]. Praha, Prostor 2005, Interview with Miloš Hájek, pp. 109 and 111.

Conclusion

An attempt at a conclusion shows that, within a period of time only slightly longer than 10 years, Zdeněk Mlynář managed several projects which made a significant contribution to explaining many aspects of the functioning of socialist societies to western readers. It is worth noting that at the end of the 1980s, Mlynář's working method changed from the distribution of more or less elaborate samizdat publications to organising discussion forums. As late as on the eve of the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, he saw the European Left as his partner in the dialogue, and he saw the distribution of works produced in a manner close to samizdat as an ideal tool to initiate the dialogue (which was, by the way, asymmetrical). Just at the time when Czechoslovak society started moving and samizdat was experiencing a heyday, as an increasing number of periodicals were issued (including the re-established *Lidové noviny* daily), Mlynář still did not see the establishment of deeper contacts with this world as his priority, continuing to prefer the tactics formulated by the Czechoslovak socialist opposition during the first half of the 1970s, i.e. instigating reforms through pressure jointly exercised by the principal forces of the European Left on the top leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

Although we do not want to underrate Mlynář's research projects, which rather deserve a word of commendation for their quality and value, it is not very difficult to identify several weak spots in the abovementioned strategy; contrary to the *Listy* journal, the influence of individual studies and indeed of the whole projects was almost nil in Czechoslovakia (one of the reasons also being the step-by-step loss of interest in the legacy of the Prague Spring, as well as the issue of the reform ability of the system as such); and relations with authors in Czechoslovakia remained limited to a few texts included in the first project. This fact was probably the principal reason why the developments unfolding in Czechoslovakia were difficult to comprehend for Mlynář and his collaborators; the tool they chose, i.e. a "multi-lingual" samizdat of sorts, in fact prevented the texts, very rarely quoted even in the most detailed and thorough analyses, from finding their way not only into the research and academic environment, but also to libraries (only a few copies are available even now, often kept in marginal libraries, most of them coming from donated estates of some of the subscribers). Moreover, the subscribers' community was not just virtual, it was also vague, as it included people who, while being important for relations between Eastern countries and high-ups in Western Communist Parties, rarely held truly leading posts (which was perhaps the main difference between Mlynář's community and the network of contacts built by Jiří Pelikán, whose roots were much deeper). At the end of the day, the forum proposed in the late 1980s presented many issues that were quickly disappearing from political debates in Czechoslovakia as topical.

As for Zdeněk Mlynář, those times can be characterised by his renewed interest in political activities and his rather surprising return to the idea of reforms being implemented "from above." The fact that he once was a close friend of Mikhail

Gorbachev must have played a substantial role, and their mutual respect did not abate even after Gorbachev's very controversial visit to Prague in the spring of 1987, which Mlynář sharply rebuked him for even years later.²⁵⁶ As proved by Mlynář's analysis of the reforms taking place in the Soviet Union published in the Italian *Rinascita* magazine, which has been cited above, the Czech political scientist believed, as late as the end of the 1980s, that it would again be possible "to make use of the Party, as the strongest and most authoritative organisation of the political system, to carry through the reform," although "it will initially be necessary, in the interest of the democratic reform, to make use of the *autocratic method*, which is characteristic of the existing, as yet unreformed system."²⁵⁷ At the same time, he must have been well aware that "the solution in Czechoslovakia is not a return of the political crew of 1968," as "Czechoslovakia needs a political leadership that is not a captive of the past, but speaks on behalf of present generations and current problems."²⁵⁸ However, the basic principle repeatedly put emphasis on in the first article, namely that the Soviet system is "reformable," was repeated again.²⁵⁹ In the case of Mlynář, there was probably a certain paradox which made him unable to face the growing gap between developments in Czechoslovakia, where Socialist political forces were gradually losing their importance, and the great demand continuing to exist (also because of the Prague Spring) in various European Communist and Socialist Parties.

Nevertheless, even in Italy, hardly a year later, the ongoing differentiation within the Czechoslovak opposition became obvious during two major conferences dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the Prague Spring; the first of them took place on 29 and 30 April 1988 in Cortona (it was organised by the Giangiacomo Feltrinelli Foundation under the auspices of the City of Cortona and the Region of Tuscany), the second one on 7 and 8 July 1988 in Bologna (it was organised by the Gramsci Institute of the Region of Emilia-Romagna, the Pietro Nenni Foundation and the Gramsci Foundation in Rome – also thanks to the above mentioned financial contribution by the project managed by Mlynář). Luciano Antonetti, one of the most sensitive persons in Italy insofar as the legacy of the Prague Spring was concerned, wrote the following about the first of the events:

256 See manuscripts of Mlynář's numerous articles of those days, which are kept in his NA fund (Part 1, k. 5). As for the visit to Prague, see GORBACHEV, M. – MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Reformátoři nebývají špatní*, pp. 70–73 – see Footnote 13.

257 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *L'ostacolo del primo stato*. In: IDEM et al.: *Il progetto Gorbaciov*, p. 39 – see Footnote 13; the quotation comes from the Czech version titled *The Role of the Communist Party in the Reform Process*. In: IDEM: *Problémy politického systému*, p. 98 – see Footnote 13.

258 ANTONETTI, Luciano: *La forza e i nemici di Gorbaciov: Intervista a Z. Mlynář*. In: MLYNÁŘ, Z. et al.: *Il progetto Gorbaciov*, p. 171; the Czech quotation comes from the original of the interview titled *On the Conclusion of the Discussion in Rinascita* (Materials), p. 5 n. (NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 2, k. 32).

259 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *Il crocevia della riforma politica*. In: IDEM et al.: *Il progetto Gorbaciov*, p. 13; the Czech version titled *The Starting Point and Possibilities of Political Reform*. In: IDEM: *Problémy politického systému*, p. 85 – see Footnote 13.

“The conference clearly showed differences and opposing positions between old émigrés (those who left after 1948) and the new ones (post-1968). Nevertheless, there are differences and disputes even within the latter: the socialist opposition group, which heads the *Listy* journal, is acting in concert with 1968 reformers who had stayed at home; others, for example Vilém Prečan and Jan Pauer, stress the role of ‘civic society’ in their analyses, and are very critical toward Dubček and the leaders KSČ of 1968. In the Czechoslovak Documentation Centre of Independent Literature, which he has been the head of since he emigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany, Prečan is a capable and convincing promoter of the ideas of Václav Havel and Jan Patočka. [...] It would indeed require no clairvoyant to understand that, in the event of a change of regime, a battle would break out between those who think about continuity with the reformist movement of 1968 and those who regard this chapter (and all the talk about reformed socialism or socialism combined with democracy) closed for good.”²⁶⁰

Indeed, it is enough to compare Prečan’s presentation at the conference in Cortona, which was focused entirely on the passivity (and subsequent capitulation) of KSČ leaders and the active role of the civic society,²⁶¹ with Mlynář’s lecture in Bologna, which analyses similarities between the Prague Spring and Gorbachev’s reforms and advocates the concept of reform-ability of socialist systems “from above,”²⁶² to see how far apart these two positions are. The fact that the opposition at home had in the meantime centred around Václav Havel and that Prečan’s opinions prevailed in Czechoslovak society was to be confirmed a few months later by the so-called Velvet Revolution, the marginalisation of former reformist Communists, and also the reception of Mlynář at the moment of his hasty return to Prague, which has been mentioned at the beginning of this study.²⁶³ The case of his alleged high treason and Mlynář’s political activities

260 The excerpt taken over from Antonetti’s unpublished biographic notes is quoted in an article by Claudia Natoli titled Luciano Antonetti, la storia e gli storici della Primavera di Praga. In: BIANCHINI, Stefano – GAMBETTA, Guido – MIRABELLA, Salvatore (ed.): *Una vita per la Cecoslovacchia: Il fondo Luciano Antonetti*. Bologna, CLUEB 2011, p. 61.

261 PREČAN, Vilém: Seven Great Days: The People and Civil Society during the “Prague Spring” of 1968–1969. In: CATALUCCIO, Francesco M. – GORI, Francesca (ed.): *La Primavera di Praga*. Milano, Franco Angeli 1990, pp. 165–175; the Czech version: Lid, veřejnost, občanská společnost jako aktér Pražského jara [The People, the Public and the Civic Society as Actors of the Prague Spring]. In: IDEM: *V kradeném čase: Výběr ze studií, článků a úvah z let 1973–1993* [During the Stolen Time: A Selection of Studies, Articles and Essays from 1973 to 1993]. Ed. Milan Drápala. Brno, Doplněk 1994.

262 MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: La politica della “primavera di Praga,” l’URSS e la riformabilità dei sistemi comunisti. In: *Transizione*, No. 11–12 (1988), pp. 30–59.

263 Even official representatives of the Communist Party perceived his return with a certain suspicion. For instance, film director Jiří Svoboda, the Chairman of the Communist Party from 1990 to 1993, said: “Mlynář was not with us in 1989, but he came to ‘advise’ us, he wanted us to screen all who had been involved in purges and he wanted to settle accounts. His reform started with repressions! [...] Of the dead, nothing but the good, but people like him will remain Bolsheviks until their death!” (Cited according to: MAYER, François:

in the first half of the 1990s – starting with a proposal that the 68-ers run independently in the first elections in June 1990,²⁶⁴ via efforts to create a new left-wing party,²⁶⁵ and ending in the unsuccessful participation of the Left Block Party (of which Mlynář was Honorary Chairman) in the 1996 elections – were the swan song of his public activities.²⁶⁶ Although these attempts were generally accepted with scepticism, Mlynář got some recognition even from some of his political opponents. On 24 April 1997, for instance, Václav Havel wrote in his letter of condolence to Mlynář's wife Irena Dubská that Mlynář “was one of the most respectable political opponents I have ever encountered.”²⁶⁷

It is possible to conclude that by the end of the 1980s, Czechoslovak society had grown apart from the analyses of Mlynář's team,²⁶⁸ and it is likely that the lack of understanding for the revolutionary events of 1989 on the part of Italian Communists and other European left-wing parties is attributable to the information channels they chose.²⁶⁹ Mlynář's team decision not to develop stronger relations with the civic society proved to be fatal and politically short-sighted when the communist system collapsed worldwide.²⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the extensive work of Mlynář during the 1980s played a decisive role in influencing segment of the European public opinion which was ideologically closest to him. In this respect, Mlynář's projects indeed fulfilled the role that Mlynář's funding partners had in mind. Similarly, the decision not to publish the studies in Czech clearly indicates who was the partner whom the texts produced by the projects were meant for; the same decision, however, wasted an opportunity to start a real dialogue with the increasingly active Czechoslovak dissent. The ultimate consequence of the

Češi a jejich komunismus: Paměť a politická identita [The Czechs and Their Communism: Memory and Political Identity]. Praha, Argo 2009, p. 91.)

264 See HÁJEK, M.: *Paměť české levice*, p. 311 n. – see Footnote 17.

265 See VANĚK, M. – URBÁŠEK, P. (ed.): *Vítězové? Poražení? Životopisná interview*, Interview with Vojtěch Mencl, pp. 531 and 535 – see Footnote 254.

266 Insofar as Mlynář's political activities in the early 1990s are concerned, see the collection of interviews and articles in MLYNÁŘ, Zdeněk: *Proti srsti: Politické komentáře 1990–1995* [Against the Grain: Political Commentaries 1990–1995]. Praha, Periskop 1996.

267 NA, f. Zdeněk Mlynář, Part 3, k. 2.

268 On the last phases of Communism in Czechoslovakia, see PULLMANN, Michal: *Konec experimentu: Přestavba a pád komunismu v Československu* [The End of an Experiment: The Restructuring and Fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia]. Praha, Scriptorium 2011.

269 In addition to five (partly quoted) articles on Gorbachev's reforms, Mlynář published many other texts in the *Rinascita* magazine between 1986 and 1989, and also gave several interviews to *l'Unità* (see at least *Il mio compagno di studi Mikhail Gorbaciov*. In: *l'Unità*, 9 April 1985, p. 9; in Czech, see *My Schoolmate Gorbachev*. In: MLYNÁŘ, Z.: *Socialistou na volné noze*, pp. 123–128).

270 There have been repeated indications that Gorbachev was trying to probe the possibility of Mlynář becoming the President of Czechoslovakia, but it is not certain how seriously these actions were meant (see, for instance, the interview with Karel Urbánek in: SÝS, K. – SPÁČIL, D. (ed.): *Záhady 17. listopadu*, p. 175 – see Footnote 18; and the interview with Jaroslav Jenerál in: VANĚK, M. – URBÁŠEK, P. (ed.): *Vítězové? Poražení? Životopisná interview*, p. 275 – see Footnote 255).

decision of Mlynář and his collaborators to disseminate the works produced by the research project in the form of a “multi-lingual samizdat” was that the texts remained almost unknown even to the most meticulous and thorough researchers.

There is a lingering question why Zdeněk Mlynář was pushing for the “exile-styled” samizdat. It is likely that all the reasons outlined above played a role in that; his habits acquired in Czechoslovakia, where he, as a functionary of the KSČ, believed that influencing higher political spheres was more important than initiating a public debate; organisational reasons, which required maintaining existing contacts at all costs; and, after all, also financial reasons, as the “clandestine” funding prevented the projects from becoming known very much. In spite of all efforts, the idea of exporting the samizdat model to Western Europe without the background of a real “parallel polis” proved to be fallacious.

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