Asserzioni condizionali e di condizionali

According to the mental models theory of conditionals by Johnson-Laird & Byrne, an indicative conditional sentence is implicitly totally evaluated because there are implicit models of the cases that are not explicitly represented. However people utter conditional sentences less than other equivalent sentences when they have to describe the cases which make the conditional sentences true, even if all of them were explicitly presented. It seems that people represent such models but do not take them as models making the conditional true. A general explanation might be that conditional sentences are typically used to make assertions when there is some reason to place emphasis on the antecedent. This hypothesis has been experimentally supported. Further reflections and analysis has led to isolate two roles which the antecedent can have in the assertions having a conditional form. The antecedent can be the condition under which the assertion of the consequent is made, in the sense that the commitment in the assertion concerns the consequent, and only it, and is made just in respect of the circumstance in which the antecedent is true (Quine’s idea). Or the antecedent can be used to specify the cases about which something is said through the consequent. The conditional assertions in which the antecedent has such a role are similar to the categorical universal sentences of the traditional logic. They are not made void by the falsity of the antecedent and tend to be made in specific circumstances. This idea has been made quite precise and experimentally supported. His conceptual evaluation has to cope with the difficulty that the analogy with the categorical universal sentences can be explicative only if such sentences can be analysed without resorting to the notion of a conditional. Some suggestions and hints are given to support the thesis that such an analysis is possible.