We consider the classic cake-division problem when the cake is a heterogeneous good represented by an interval in the real line. We provide a mechanism to implement, in all anonymous way all envy-free and efficient allocation when agents have private information on their preferences. The mechanism is a multi-step sequential game form in which each agent at each step receives a morsel of the cake that is the intersection of what she asks tor herself and what the other agent concedes to her.
Strategic divide and choose
NICOLO', ANTONIO;
2008
Abstract
We consider the classic cake-division problem when the cake is a heterogeneous good represented by an interval in the real line. We provide a mechanism to implement, in all anonymous way all envy-free and efficient allocation when agents have private information on their preferences. The mechanism is a multi-step sequential game form in which each agent at each step receives a morsel of the cake that is the intersection of what she asks tor herself and what the other agent concedes to her.
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