We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose in alternative front a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. All allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set Of its users. Agents have gregarious Preferences over allocations: given all allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent call be forced to be a User and no agent who wants to be it User call be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium Outcome is all efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

NICOLO', ANTONIO
2008

Abstract

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose in alternative front a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. All allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set Of its users. Agents have gregarious Preferences over allocations: given all allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent call be forced to be a User and no agent who wants to be it User call be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium Outcome is all efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
gregarious.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: Published (publisher's version)
Licenza: Accesso libero
Dimensione 217.64 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
217.64 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11577/2268137
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 4
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 3
social impact