Questioni pregiudiziali: una prospettiva epistemologica sui rapporti tra neuroscienze e diritto.

In the last few years the problem of the influence of neuroscientific research on the juridical world has enjoyed a huge amount of interest, though the “neuroscience vs law” approach is sometimes unfold without a previous clarification of the conditions and the limits that permit a legitimate comparison between speeches and social practices (those under the general lables “science” and, respectively, “law”) originated and conducted within theoretical paradigms so distant. In other words, very often the juxtaposition between “neuroscience” and “law”, as well as the speculations built on it, are led leaving unexpressed definitions and theoretical presuppositions about the concepts of “law” and “science” employed, trusting on a share of intuitive common places about something which has been considered “essentially contested” instead. Thus, the aim of this paper is twofold: first, I will critically espose some epistemological issues emerged at the turn of the XX century, focusing on some reactions to the relativistic turn based on the (re-)discovery of the importance of the experimental side of every scientific enterprise. In my opinion, those proposals have given important insights that can help the clarification of a legitimate “scientific riductionism”; then, on those epistemological grounds, I will try to set the stage for a profitable discussion about the extra-theoretical use of scientific propositions, in particular of those generated within current neuroscience researches to deal with specific juridical problem