We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific constituencies, which can reduce aggregate welfare.
Information and Targeted spending
Antonio Nicolò
2019
Abstract
We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific constituencies, which can reduce aggregate welfare.
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