The safety of medical data and equipment plays a vital role in today's world of Medical Internet of Things (MIoT). These IoT devices have many constraints (e.g., memory size, processing capacity, and power consumption) that make it challenging to use cost-effective and energy-efficient security solutions. Recently, researchers have proposed a few Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) based security solutions for MIoT. The use of RFID technology in securing IoT systems is rapidly increasing because it provides secure and lightweight safety mechanisms for these systems. More recently, authors have proposed a lightweight RFID mutual authentication (LRMI) protocol. The authors argue that LRMI meets the necessary security requirements for RFID systems, and the same applies to MIoT applications as well. In this paper, our contribution has two-folds, firstly we analyze the LRMI protocol's security to demonstrate that it is vulnerable to various attacks such as secret disclosure, reader impersonation, and tag traceability. Also, it is not able to preserve the anonymity of the tag and the reader. Secondly, we propose a new secure and lightweight mutual RFID authentication (SecLAP) protocol, which provides secure communication and preserves privacy in MIoT systems. Our security analysis shows that the SecLAP protocol is robust against de-synchronization, replay, reader/tag impersonation, and traceability attacks, and it ensures forward and backward data communication security. We use Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN) logic to validate the security features of SecLAP. Moreover, we compare SecLAP with the state-of-the-art and validate its performance through a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) implementation, which shows that it is lightweight, consumes fewer resources on tags concerning computation functions, and requires less number of flows.
SecLAP: Secure and lightweight RFID authentication protocol for Medical IoT
Mala H.;Kaliyar P.;Conti M.
2019
Abstract
The safety of medical data and equipment plays a vital role in today's world of Medical Internet of Things (MIoT). These IoT devices have many constraints (e.g., memory size, processing capacity, and power consumption) that make it challenging to use cost-effective and energy-efficient security solutions. Recently, researchers have proposed a few Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) based security solutions for MIoT. The use of RFID technology in securing IoT systems is rapidly increasing because it provides secure and lightweight safety mechanisms for these systems. More recently, authors have proposed a lightweight RFID mutual authentication (LRMI) protocol. The authors argue that LRMI meets the necessary security requirements for RFID systems, and the same applies to MIoT applications as well. In this paper, our contribution has two-folds, firstly we analyze the LRMI protocol's security to demonstrate that it is vulnerable to various attacks such as secret disclosure, reader impersonation, and tag traceability. Also, it is not able to preserve the anonymity of the tag and the reader. Secondly, we propose a new secure and lightweight mutual RFID authentication (SecLAP) protocol, which provides secure communication and preserves privacy in MIoT systems. Our security analysis shows that the SecLAP protocol is robust against de-synchronization, replay, reader/tag impersonation, and traceability attacks, and it ensures forward and backward data communication security. We use Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN) logic to validate the security features of SecLAP. Moreover, we compare SecLAP with the state-of-the-art and validate its performance through a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) implementation, which shows that it is lightweight, consumes fewer resources on tags concerning computation functions, and requires less number of flows.Pubblicazioni consigliate
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