An argument commonplace in narratives concerning the difficult recovery after the 2008 crisis, the relative backslide of 2011, and the European peripheral debt crisis is that difficulties occurred because European economic integration has been privileged over any form of political solidarity. Consequently, Europe should develop the institutions of solidarity to provide relief of instability and inequality. However, almost nothing is said about what form such solidarity should assume. Maastricht had to lead to political union and to some form of solidarity, but this aspect always remained vague and was not implemented. What has been implemented after the crisis is an even tougher set of control- oriented institutions that introduce further rigidities in European economies, reducing the degrees of freedom of national economic policy. The aim of this contribution is to argue that the implementation of solidarity schemes in the EU should not be conceived of as a compensatory measure for the costs and damages directly or indirectly caused by the European Monetary Union (EMU) and its rigidities and passiveness, including the inability to curb financial instability. Solidarity schemes should instead be the product of unified programs framed by a genuine constitutional federalism.

Making social Europe really social

stefano solari
2020

Abstract

An argument commonplace in narratives concerning the difficult recovery after the 2008 crisis, the relative backslide of 2011, and the European peripheral debt crisis is that difficulties occurred because European economic integration has been privileged over any form of political solidarity. Consequently, Europe should develop the institutions of solidarity to provide relief of instability and inequality. However, almost nothing is said about what form such solidarity should assume. Maastricht had to lead to political union and to some form of solidarity, but this aspect always remained vague and was not implemented. What has been implemented after the crisis is an even tougher set of control- oriented institutions that introduce further rigidities in European economies, reducing the degrees of freedom of national economic policy. The aim of this contribution is to argue that the implementation of solidarity schemes in the EU should not be conceived of as a compensatory measure for the costs and damages directly or indirectly caused by the European Monetary Union (EMU) and its rigidities and passiveness, including the inability to curb financial instability. Solidarity schemes should instead be the product of unified programs framed by a genuine constitutional federalism.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Caricamento pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3340032
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact