We use the repeated random assignment of external examiners to schools in Italy to investigate whether the effect of external monitoring on test score manipulation persists over time. We find that this effect is still present in the tests taken one year after exposure to the examiners. In the second year after exposure, however, this effect disappears, suggesting that persistence is short lived.
Does monitoring deter future cheating? The case of external examiners in Italian schools
Bertoni M.
Membro del Collaboration Group
;Brunello G.Membro del Collaboration Group
;
2021
Abstract
We use the repeated random assignment of external examiners to schools in Italy to investigate whether the effect of external monitoring on test score manipulation persists over time. We find that this effect is still present in the tests taken one year after exposure to the examiners. In the second year after exposure, however, this effect disappears, suggesting that persistence is short lived.File in questo prodotto:
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