Kripkean conceivability and epistemic modality

In this paper, I show that (i) from what I call a “Kripkean” account of the relations between conceivability and metaphysical necessities, (ii) an ap- parently plausible principle relating conceivability and epistemic modality and (iii) the duality of epistemic modalities, one can show the utterly anti-Kripkean result that every metaphysical necessity is an epistemic necessity. My aim is to present and diagnose the problem and evaluate the costs of some possible Kripkean reactions. In particular, I will evaluate the consequences and the- oretical costs of rejecting the main ingredients of the argument, namely that we cannot genuinely conceive the negations of metaphysical necessities, that there is no postulated relation between conceivability and epistemic possibil- ity (actually, between unconceivability and epistemic impossibility) and that epistemic possibility and necessity are not dualities.