Dialetheism and the countermodel problem

According to some dialetheists, we ought to reject the distinction between object and meta-languages. Given that dialetheists advocate truth-value gluts within their object-language, whether in order to solve the liar paradox or for some other reason, this rejection of the object-/meta-language distinction comes with the commitment to use a glutty metatheory. While it has been pointed out that a glutty metatheory brings with it expressive deficiencies, we highlight here another complication arising from the use of a glutty metatheory, this time evidential in nature. According to this countermodel problem, while the thoroughgoing dialetheist who embraces a glutty metatheory can justify their acceptance of a rule of inference's invalidity using countermodels, to justify their renunciation of an unwanted rule they actually require the means to warrant their rejection of the rule's validity-which cannot be supplied by countermodels based on a standard dialetheic semantics. We end by sketching out a possible solution for the thoroughgoing dialetheist using a bilaterialist semantics.