Der größte Anstoß in der Lehre der Freiheit? Prescienza, necessità e libertà tra Schelling e Agostino

First, the article examines the only occurrence of the lemma “Präscienz” in Schelling’s corpus (Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit), showing how the German philosopher conceives in conflictual terms the relationship between divine predestination (a notion in which he includes that of foreknowledge) and human freedom. Subsequently, it takes into consideration two Augustinian texts on the relationship between foreknowledge and free will (De libero arbitrio iii, De civitate dei v). The aim of the analysis is twofold: on the one hand, to clarify the argumentative strategy and the conceptual outcomes of Augustinian reflection, and, on the other – thanks to an accurate reconstruction of the semantics and the reciprocal relationship of the terms “praescientia”, “voluntas”, “necessitas” –, to highlight some possible residual problems concerning the relationship between divine foreknowledge and the freedom of human will.