The epistemic dimension of the clinical encounter is crucial, and the maternal context is no exception: whether or not the knowledge provided by patients during labor and birth is valued can have a crucial impact on the clinical relationship. To explore this aspect, I will first attempt to show the potentially negative epistemic and ethical implications of ignoring the embodied knowledge provided by patients, both for patients themselves and for health care professionals, by highlighting the specificity of the maternal health care context. I will then suggest that because of the relevance of these harms, it is crucial to understand the source of this behavior, and that vice epistemology may be a useful conceptual framework for doing so. In particular, I will argue that a sui generis form of epistemic arrogance may be a valid candidate for uncovering, and hopefully addressing, one of the causes of this phenomenon. I will conclude that one of the primary causes of the disregard for patients’ relevant embodied knowledge lies at the institutional level and its focus on efficiency as profit maximization. Thus, the goal should be to advocate for a change in the overall ethos and epistemic policies of health care institutions.
Taking patients’ embodied knowledge seriously in Maternity Care. Epistemological and ethical issues.
Eugenia Stefanello
2025
Abstract
The epistemic dimension of the clinical encounter is crucial, and the maternal context is no exception: whether or not the knowledge provided by patients during labor and birth is valued can have a crucial impact on the clinical relationship. To explore this aspect, I will first attempt to show the potentially negative epistemic and ethical implications of ignoring the embodied knowledge provided by patients, both for patients themselves and for health care professionals, by highlighting the specificity of the maternal health care context. I will then suggest that because of the relevance of these harms, it is crucial to understand the source of this behavior, and that vice epistemology may be a useful conceptual framework for doing so. In particular, I will argue that a sui generis form of epistemic arrogance may be a valid candidate for uncovering, and hopefully addressing, one of the causes of this phenomenon. I will conclude that one of the primary causes of the disregard for patients’ relevant embodied knowledge lies at the institutional level and its focus on efficiency as profit maximization. Thus, the goal should be to advocate for a change in the overall ethos and epistemic policies of health care institutions.Pubblicazioni consigliate
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