We study the problem of an organization that has a large number of potential tasks and has to choose which tasks to handle and which pair of experts should be assigned to each of them. We propose a mechanism that generates a Pareto-efficient assignment in the weak core and is group strategy-proof. The assignment rule generated by this mechanism is characterized by four axioms: Pareto-efficiency, theWeak Core property, Restricted Maskin Monotonicity and Invariance with respect to Deleted Links. The last two axioms are invariance properties with respect to specific preference changes.
Assigning Tasks to Pairs
Antonio Nicolo;
2025
Abstract
We study the problem of an organization that has a large number of potential tasks and has to choose which tasks to handle and which pair of experts should be assigned to each of them. We propose a mechanism that generates a Pareto-efficient assignment in the weak core and is group strategy-proof. The assignment rule generated by this mechanism is characterized by four axioms: Pareto-efficiency, theWeak Core property, Restricted Maskin Monotonicity and Invariance with respect to Deleted Links. The last two axioms are invariance properties with respect to specific preference changes.File in questo prodotto:
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