Riforma della magistratura: da un modello di legittimazione mista alla casualità istituzionale

The article offers a critical analysis of the proposed reform of Title IV of the Constitution, arguing that it entails a structural transformation of the constitutional paradigm concerning judicial independence. It examines how the intervention of the constitutional revision legislator does not merely consist of an organizational adjustment aimed at addressing factional distortions within the High Council of the Judiciary, but rather affects the circuit of legitimacy designed by the Constituent Assembly. The introduction of sortition as the ordinary criterion for selection, the duplication of the Councils, and the establishment of a High Disciplinary Court appear to alter this framework, replacing representation with randomness and potentially creating asymmetries between the judicial and lay components. The paper challenges the presumed equivalence between randomness and impartiality, emphasizing that the legitimacy of guarantee bodies cannot be detached from a recognizable institutional foundation. The reform therefore raises issues of systemic coherence, proportionality, and the resilience of the balance among powers.