Dignity as a Conversation in Polarized Societies

The pervasive use of the concept of dignity in contemporary constitutional discourse has given mixed results. It has marshalled a tradition of strong rights protection. It has emphasized the importance of courts and other institutions putting the needs of the people at center stage and considering the context in which such claims take place. It has provided claimants with a powerful tool to make themselves heard and draw social attention. Perhaps even more importantly, it has suggested a binary approach to rights violations, showing that protecting someone’s right is not just important for the person involved, but for the society as a whole. However, the success of dignity in comparative law is not without flaws. Its frequent use has made it a powerful tool that parties can use in the courtroom or take to the streets to vindicate their priorities; although it implicates the social recognition of a certain rights violation or of a specific interest, the emphasis on dignity is likely to flare up cultural and social clashes. It may fall prey to subjectivism, making the vindication of rights a matter of personal and social sensitiveness to a certain issue. Such contentious uses of dignity have convinced some scholars that the notion of dignity should be simply abandoned; to achieve reconciliation, cabin political and judicial narratives, and make the jurisprudence more consistent, more appealing alternatives to dignity would be available, such as equality. Despite many flaws and shortcomings, dignity can play at least a dual role in contemporary constitutional law. Firstly, it can remind parties that they need to treat others, and not just to be treated, with dignity. Secondly, it conveys the idea that all the participants in society deserve to be heard, listened to, and treated with respect. can also warn societies that political and legal institutions serve to channel conflicts, reconcile opposing views, and provide room for common deliberations. Institutions are ways in which legal orders do not just defuse conflicts but also operationalize the notion of dignity—they translate it into sophisticated mechanisms.