In this paper, we analyse a new formulation of Stackelberg differential games. We assume that the Leader can control not only the dynamics of the game, but also the length of the programming interval. This formu- lation of a free final time Stackelberg differential game is not explicitly considered in the literature and presents some interesting issues. After a formal definition of this kind of differential game, we show, using a practical example, the main difficulties associated with this new defini- tion. We close the article by presenting two open questions related to this issue.
Free final time Stackelberg differential games
Brambilla, Chiara;Grosset, Luca
2022
Abstract
In this paper, we analyse a new formulation of Stackelberg differential games. We assume that the Leader can control not only the dynamics of the game, but also the length of the programming interval. This formu- lation of a free final time Stackelberg differential game is not explicitly considered in the literature and presents some interesting issues. After a formal definition of this kind of differential game, we show, using a practical example, the main difficulties associated with this new defini- tion. We close the article by presenting two open questions related to this issue.File in questo prodotto:
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